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Abstract	Critical	research	on	farmers	in	the	global	South	often	studies	them	as	victims	of	global	neoliberal	 policies.	 The	present	 research	 is	 instead	 interested	mainly	 in	 the	 agency	of	farmers	 who	 are	 surviving	 the	 increasingly	 difficult	 agrarian	 situation	 in	 the	 global	South.	 It	studies	how	they	articulate	their	concerns	and	how	they	organize	themselves	to	try	to	improve	their	living	conditions.	Taking	the	region	of	Vidarbha	in	Central	India	as	a	case,	this	thesis	analyses	how	farmers	mobilize	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	the	widespread	 phenomenon	 of	 farmers’	 suicides.	 It	 specifically	 looks	 at	 how	 they	 try	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 agriculture,	 how	 they	 mobilise,	 and	 how	 they	attempt	to	 find	strategies	 to	challenge	the	seemingly	unreachable	 forces	of	 the	market	and	 the	 state.	 This	 research	 is	 conceptually	 positioned	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	(perceived)	material	conditions	of	people	and	the	frames	and	strategies	they	use	in	their	movement	 activities.	 A	 qualitative	 methodology	 is	 combined	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	secondary	statistical	data	and	academic	literature.		The	 movement	 at	 the	 core	 of	 this	 thesis	 consists	 of	 a	 number	 of	 small	 groups	 and	activists	who	organize	varied	forms	of	collective	action	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	is	 therefore	 distinctly	 different	 from	 earlier	 peasant	 and	 farmers’	 movements.	 These	groups	 persist	 on	 a	 low	 level	 of	 activity,	 but	 their	 set	 of	 actions	 encompasses	 a	wide	range	of	activities,	from	agitations	on	the	road	to	establishing	shops	for	their	products.	While	the	groups	are	very	diverse	in	many	respects,	most	of	the	movement	actors	raise	similar	demands,	most	importantly	for	higher	prices	for	agricultural	products.	They	all	bring	 forward	 the	 issues	of	 farmers,	namely	of	 small	 and	medium	 farmers	 engaged	 in	capital-intensive,	groundwater-based,	commercial	agriculture	in	semi-arid	zones.	The	way	that	farmers	and	activists	frame	their	analysis	of	the	present	situation	suggests	a	fine-grained,	differentiated	understanding	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	as	a	web	of	structural	inequalities	and	risks	(such	as	price	risk	or	droughts).	The	farmers’	abilities	to	cope	with	these	risks	depend	on	how	these	different	inequalities	convey	the	effects	of	the	crisis	on	what	 is	 often	 understood	 as	 the	 ‘peasantry’.	 The	 thesis	 proposes	 four	 frames	 of	 the	movement	 actors’	 visions	 and	 ideas	 for	 a	 future	 of	 agriculture.	 This	 allows	 for	 an	analysis	of	 the	 tensions	 that	occur	among	the	groups	and	that	are	 immanent	 in	all	 the	groups’	main	demand:	a	better	price	for	agricultural	produce.	But	movement	actors	tend	to	 hold	 on	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 ‘peasantry’	 and	 of	 an	 eventually	 capitalist	 development.	However,	 the	tensions	 in	 their	visions	show	that	 there	 is	 instead	a	need	 for	new	ideas	and	 thorough	 analysis	 to	 resist	 neoliberal	 capitalism	while	 avoiding	 falling	 back	 on	 a	romanticized	 ‘united	peasantry’.	When	 this	 can	be	 achieved,	 the	 resistance	 of	 farmers	can	provide	more	than	short-term	support	for	the	richer	section	of	the	‘peasantry’.		The	 research	 finds	 that	 a	 successful	 mobilisation	 strongly	 depends	 on	 the	trustworthiness	of	the	activists	and	that	constructing	this	trustworthiness	is	marked	by	a	 perceived	 contradiction:	 an	 activist	 is	 seen	 by	 his	 or	 her	 (potential)	 supporters	 as	trustworthy	 if	 he	 or	 she	 is	 honest	 and	 able	 to	 achieve	 things.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	movement	actors,	 the	 latter	 can	be	achieved	mostly	by	being	 close	 to	 the	powerful	or	
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involved	 in	 (electoral)	 ‘politics’.	 But	 this	 puts	 the	 first	 component	 of	 perceived	trustworthiness	 at	 stake:	 the	 reputation	 of	 honesty,	 because	 ‘politics’	 is	 perceived	 as	dishonest.	Only	if	the	activist	stays	away	from	electoral	politics,	he	or	she	is	perceived	as	an	 honest	 leader	 of	 the	movement	 sphere,	 but	 again	 less	 able	 to	 achieve	 things.	 The	small	groups	along	the	spectrum	of	this	heterogeneous	movement	cannot	compete	with	the	 established	 political	 parties	 in	 terms	 of	 achieving	 things.	 Therefore,	 the	 activists’	reputation	 of	 honesty	 becomes	 their	 main	 mobilizing	 argument	 to	 distinguish	themselves	from	the	established	political	parties.	Such	movement	groups	then	have	the	potential	 to	mobilize	people	outside	the	arena	of	electoral	politics,	but	they	also	face	a	limitation	in	forming	mass	alliances	as	a	counter-hegemonic	force	against	the	politics	of	neoliberalism.	Finally,	 this	 thesis	 shows	 how	 the	 discourses	 around	 farmers’	 suicides,	 as	 well	 as	various	levels	of	engagement	with	them	have	become	an	important	part	of	the	activism	in	 Vidarbha.	 The	 suicides	 can	 even	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	movement,	which	 is	 characterized	by	a	 certain	 lack	of	power	and	by	 the	difficultly	 to	 capture	 the	new	realities	of	farmers	stranded	between	the	new	neoliberal	policies	and	older	forms	of	oppression	such	as	caste.	In	India,	as	well	as	in	other	countries,	the	discourse	around	(farmer)	suicides	opens	up	a	space	to	talk	about	the	implications	of	capitalist	agriculture	and	 particularly	 neoliberal	 policies	 for	 farmers,	 and	 thus	 the	 darker	 sides	 of	 the	dominant	development	narrative.			 	
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Zusammenfassung	Kritische	 Forschung	 zu	 BäuerInnen	 im	 globalen	 Süden	 untersucht	 diese	 oft	 als	 Opfer	globaler	 neoliberaler	 Politik.	 Vorliegende	 Arbeit	 hingegen	 fokussiert	 auf	 die	Handlungsmacht	 derjenigen	 BäuerInnen,	 die	 im	 zunehmend	 schwierigen	landwirtschaftlichen	 Umfeld	 des	 globalen	 Südens	 überleben.	 Behandelt	 werden	 die	Artikulation	ihrer	Anliegen	und	wie	sie	ihren	Kampf	für	verbesserte	Lebensbedingungen	organisieren.	Am	Fallbeispiel	der	Region	Vidarbha	in	Zentralindien	wird	analysiert,	wie	BäuerInnen	 die	 ‚Agrarkrise’	 und	 das	 verbreitete	 Phänomen	 der	 Bauernselbstmorde	nutzen,	um	politisch	zu	mobilisieren.	Die	Arbeit	beleuchtet,	wie	Bauern	versuchen,	die	jetzige	Situation	in	der	Landwirtschaft	zu	verstehen,	wie	sie	politisch	mobilisieren	und	Strategien	 entwickeln,	 um	 die	 scheinbar	 unerreichbaren	 Kräfte	 von	 Markt	 und	 Staat	herauszufordern.	 Diese	 Forschung	 positioniert	 sich	 konzeptuell	 am	 Schnittpunkt	zwischen	 den	 (wahrgenommenen)	 materiellen	 Bedingungen	 der	 Menschen	 und	 den	Bezugsrahmen	 und	 Strategien,	 welche	 die	 BäuerInnen	 und	 AktivistInnen	 in	 ihren	Aktivitäten	 innerhalb	 der	 sozialen	 Bewegungen	 nutzen.	 Die	 qualitative	 Methodologie	wird	 kombiniert	 mit	 einer	 Analyse	 sekundärer	 statistischer	 Daten	 und	 akademischer	Literatur.		Die	soziale	Bewegung	im	Zentrum	dieser	Arbeit	besteht	aus	mehreren	kleinen	Gruppen	sowie	 AktivistInnen,	 die	 unterschiedliche	 Formen	 von	 kollektiver	 Aktion	 zum	 Thema	der	 ‚Agrarkrise’	 organisieren.	 Sie	 unterscheidet	 sich	 damit	 deutlich	 von	 früheren	Bauernbewegungen.	Diese	Gruppen	bestehen	auf	einem	tiefen	Level	von	Aktivität	 fort,	aber	 ihre	Aktionen	sind	sehr	vielfältig	und	gehen	von	explizit	politischen	Aktionen	auf	der	Strasse	bis	hin	zum	Aufbau	von	Läden	für	ihre	Produkte.	Die	einzelnen	Gruppen	sind	in	 vieler	 Hinsicht	 sehr	 unterschiedlich,	 aber	 ihre	 Forderungen	 sind	 sich	 häufig	 sehr	ähnlich.	Die	wichtigste	 ist	ein	höherer	Preis	 für	Agrarprodukte.	Sämtliche	AkteurInnen	unterstützen	 die	 Anliegen	 von	 BäuerInnen,	 genauer	 gesagt	 von	 kleinen	 und	mittleren	Bauern,	 welche	 kapitalintensive,	 grundwasserbasierte	 und	 kommerzielle	Landwirtschaft	in	semi-ariden	Zonen	betreiben.		Die	Bezugsrahmen,	welche	BäuerInnen	und	AktivistInnen	für	ihre	Analyse	der	jetzigen	Situation	benötigen,	legen	ein	feinkörniges,	differenziertes	Verständnis	der	‚Agrarkrise’	als	 ein	 Netz	 von	 strukturellen	 Ungleichheiten	 und	 Risiken	 (zum	 Beispiel	 Preisrisiken	und	Dürren)	nahe.	Die	Fähigkeit	der	BäuerInnen,	mit	diesen	Risiken	umzugehen,	hängt	von	den	strukturellen	Ungleichheiten	ab,	welche	die	Auswirkungen	der	‚Agrarkrise’	auf	diejenige	 Kategorie	 beeinflussen,	 die	 oft	 als	 ‚Bauernschaft’	 oder	 ‚Kleinbauerntum’	verstanden	 wird.	 In	 dieser	 Arbeit	 werden	 die	 Visionen	 und	 Ideen,	 welche	 die	AkteurInnen	der	Bewegung	hinsichtlich	der	Zukunft	der	Landwirtschaft	hegen,	 in	vier	Bezugsrahmen	 gruppiert.	 Dies	 ermöglicht	 eine	 Analyse	 der	 Spannungen,	 welche	innerhalb	 der	 Gruppen	 bestehen	 und	 die	 immanent	 sind	 in	 der	 Hauptforderung	 der	Gruppen	nach	einem	besseren	Verkaufspreis	 für	 ihre	Agrarprodukte.	Die	AkteurInnen	der	 sozialen	 Bewegung	 tendieren	 dazu,	 an	 der	 Idee	 der	 ‚Bauernschaft’	 und	 einer	schlussendlich	 kapitalistischen	 Entwicklung	 festzuhalten.	 Die	 Spannung	 in	 ihren	
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Visionen	weisen	jedoch	klar	aus,	dass	neue	Ideen	und	eine	genaue	Analyse	der	Situation	nötig	 sind,	 um	 gegen	 den	 neoliberalen	 Kapitalismus	Widerstand	 leisten	 zu	 können	 –	ohne	in	die	romantisierende	Kategorie	der	einheitlichen	‚Bauernschaft’	zurück	zu	fallen.	Wenn	 dies	 erreicht	 ist,	 wird	 ein	 Widerstand	 von	 BäuerInnen	 möglich,	 der	 mehr	erreichen	 kann	 als	 eine	 kurzfristige	 Unterstützung	 für	 die	 reicheren	 Teile	 dieser	‚Bauernschaft’.		Die	vorliegende	Arbeit	zeigt,	dass	der	Erfolg	der	Mobilisierung	stark	davon	abhängt,	wie	die	 (potentiellen)	 UnterstützerInnen	 die	 Vertrauenswürdigkeit	 der	 AktivistInnen	einschätzen.	 Der	 Versuch,	 diese	 Vertrauenswürdigkeit	 aufzubauen,	 ist	 gekennzeichnet	von	einem	wahrgenommenen	Widerspruch:	Eine	AktivistIn	wird	von	den	(potentiellen)	UnterstützerInnen	 als	 vertrauenswürdig	 erachtet,	wenn	 er	 oder	 sie	 erstens	 ehrlich	 ist	und	 zweitens	 fähig,	 etwas	 zu	 erreichen.	Aus	der	 Sicht	der	AkteurInnen	der	Bewegung	scheint	 letzteres	 vor	 allem	 dadurch	 zu	 gehen,	 dass	 der	 oder	 die	 AktivistIn	 gute	Beziehungen	 zu	 mächtigen	 Personen	 hat	 oder	 aktiv	 ist	 in	 der	 institutionellen	 Politik.	Aber	das	setzt	die	erste	Komponente	der	Vertrauenswürdigkeit	aufs	Spiel:	Den	Ruf	von	Ehrlichkeit,	 denn	 ‚Politik’	 wird	 als	 unehrlich	 betrachtet.	 Nur	 wenn	 sich	 der	 oder	 die	AktivistIn	von	der	institutionellen	Politik	fernhält,	kann	er	oder	sie	in	der	Einschätzung	der	UnterstützerInnen	eine	ehrlichere	AnführerIn	der	Bewegungssphäre	bleiben	–	wird	aber	 wiederum	 nicht	 als	 fähig	 wahrgenommen,	 Dinge	 zu	 erreichen.	 Die	 Gruppen	 im	Spektrum	 dieser	 heterogenen	 Bewegung	 sind	 klein	 und	 können	 nicht	 mit	 den	etablierten	Parteien	konkurrieren,	wenn	es	darum	geht,	Dinge	zu	erreichen.	So	wird	die	Reputation	 der	 AktivistInnen	 bezüglich	 deren	 Ehrlichkeit	 zum	 wichtigsten	Mobilisierungsargument.	 Sie	 erlaubt	 es	 den	 Gruppen,	 sich	 von	 den	 etablierten	politischen	Parteien	abzugrenzen.	Solche	Gruppen	haben	damit	das	Potential,	Menschen	ausserhalb	der	institutionellen	Politik	zu	mobilisieren.	Gleichzeitig	sind	sie	kaum	in	der	Lage,	 der	 Politik	 des	 Neoliberalismus	 grosse	 Allianzen	 als	 konterhegemoniale	 Kraft	entgegensetzen	zu	können.		Schliesslich	zeigt	die	Arbeit	auf,	wie	die	Diskurse	um	die	Bauernselbstmorde	sowie	die	Auseinandersetzung	 damit	 auf	 verschiedenen	 Ebenen	 zu	 einem	 wichtigen	 Teil	 des	Aktivismus	in	Vidarbha	geworden	sind.	Die	Suizide	können	sogar	als	Komponente	einer	sozialen	 Bewegung	 verstanden	werden,	 die	 charakterisiert	 ist	 durch	 einen	Mangel	 an	Macht	 und	 durch	 die	 Schwierigkeit	 die	 heutigen	 Realitäten	 von	 BäuerInnen	 zwischen	neuen	 neoliberalen	 Politiken	 und	 älteren	 Formen	 von	 Unterdrückung	 wie	beispielsweise	 das	 Kastensystem	 zu	 verstehen.	 Nicht	 nur	 in	 Indien,	 sondern	 auch	 in	anderen	Ländern	öffnet	der	Diskurs	um	(Bauern-)Selbstmorde	einen	Raum,	um	über	die	Auswirkungen	 der	 kapitalistischen	 Landwirtschaft	 und	 insbesondere	 der	 neoliberalen	Politik	 auf	BäuerInnen	 zu	 reden	 –	 und	 somit	 über	 die	 dunklere	 Seite	 des	 dominanten	Entwicklungsnarrativ.		 	
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I. Introduction	Every	half	 hour	 a	 farmer	 commits	 suicide	 in	 India1	–	 arguably	because	of	 an	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 induced	 by	 neoliberal	 policies	 in	 Indian	 agriculture.	 News	 reports	 suggest	 that	since	 1995	 more	 than	 300,000	 farmers	 have	 committed	 suicide	 in	 the	 country.	 The	government	data	has	been	critiqued	as	it	often	under-reports	these	numbers.	P.	Sainath,	a	noted	 journalist	who	has	covered	the	 issue	for	a	 long	time,	recently	pointed	out	that	the	number	of	farmer	suicides	might	be	even	higher2.	Even	these	conservative	estimates	have	sent	alarm	signals	to	the	media,	politicians	and	academia	in	India	and	abroad.		On	a	personal	note,	my	interest	in	the	subject	of	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	India	arose	because	of	 the	 sad	 reality	 of	 the	 countryside	 reflected	 in	 these	 numbers.	 But	 when	 I	 began	researching	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 India,	 I	 became	 increasingly	 uncomfortable	 with	referring	 to	 farmers	 as	 ‘suffering	 subjects’	 driven	 to	 suicide	 by	 the	 government	 and	market	 forces.	 I	 realized	 that	 I	was	only	 looking	 at	 the	 suffering	 through	 exploitation,	violence	 or	 adverse	 social	 relations.	 Robbins	 (2013)	 inspired	 me	 to	 go	 beyond	 this	singular	bias.	With	the	evolution	of	anthropology	(and	development	studies)	away	from	‘the	savage’	or	‘the	other’,	he	argues	that	the	savage	has	been	replaced	by	the	suffering	lot.	This	category	of	suffering	then	serves	as	justification	for	research.	Robbins	called	for	an	anthropology	of	‘the	good’,	which	takes	a	closer	look	at	people	trying	to	foster	good,	be	it	through	their	values,	social	relations	or	ideas	for	the	future.	To	this	effect,	I	became	interested	in	the	farmers’	perceptions	of	their	situations,	particularly	in	their	hopes	for	the	future,	and	in	their	protests	as	a	form	of	agency.		In	 this	study,	 I	aim	to	analyse	the	protests	by	 farmers3	groups	 in	Vidarbha,	a	region	 in	Central	India	that	has	come	to	be	identified	as	a	region	with	farmers’	suicides.	My	aim	is	to	 understand	 how	 activists	 and	 supporters	 of	 these	 groups	 mobilise	 other	 peasants	around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha,	 how	 they	 organize	 activities,	 articulate	 their	demands	 and	 what	 solutions	 they	 envision	 for	 overcoming	 the	 crisis.	 I	 also	 try	 to	illustrate	the	difficulties	and	ambiguities	that	are	inherent	in	these	processes.	The	 visions	 and	 ideas	 of	 ‘movement’	 actors	 are	 of	 particular	 importance	 in	 the	wider	context	of	a	controversial	debate	among	academics	as	well	as	activists	about	the	future	of	 agriculture.	 Globally,	 agriculture	 is	 changing	 in	 a	 fundamental	way	 and	 discussions	about	 its	 future	are	 influenced	by	 transnational	agrarian	movements	and	 their	 ideas	–	most	prominently	the	idea	of	food	sovereignty	–	at	all	levels.	At	the	same	time,	the	idea	that	small	and	medium	farmers	farming	with	ecological	methods	can	feed	the	world	has	reignited	 old	 questions.	 Furthermore,	 profitable	 agriculture	 has	 become	 almost	impossible	 for	 small	 or	 medium	 farmers	 in	 regions	 like	 Vidarbha	 in	 Central	 India.	Therefore,	 this	 study	makes	 a	 strong	 case	 for	 listening	 to	 grassroots	 voices	 about	 the																																									 																					1	This	number	is	based	on	Mishra	(2014)	for	the	period	1995	–	2012.	See	part	VII	for	details.		2	See	 a	 recent	 BBC	 report:	 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-28205741;	 Sainath	2015.	3	For	a	clarification	of	the	term	farmer	that	I	use	throughout	this	work,	see	section	2.1,	chapter	II.	
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future	 of	 agriculture	 and	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 critically	 analyse	 them	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	neoliberal	policy	regime	that	has	restructured	an	already	unequal	agrarian	structure	in	rural	India.	
1 Debates	about	Agrarian	Change	and	Social	Movements	This	 research	 is	positioned	within	 two	broader	debates:	 first,	 the	question	of	agrarian	change	 or	 the	 prospects	 of	 farmers	 under	 neoliberal	 policy	 regimes	 (globally	 and	particularly	 in	 India),	 and	 second,	 the	 debate	 surrounding	 the	 emergence	 of	 social	movements	 and	 their	 possible	 outcomes.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 broadly	 outline	 these	debates	to	then	refine	my	research	question.		
1.1 Changing	Agriculture	
Farmers’	Prospects	In	his	book	“The	Age	of	Extremes”,	Eric	Hobsbawm	anticipated	what	was	supposedly	the	most	significant	development	of	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	which	was	the	death	of	the	peasantry	(Hobsbawm	1994).	According	to	him,	the	class	of	peasantry	that	was	 once	 the	 most	 dominant	 mode	 of	 living	 had	 become	 marginalised	 and	 almost	disappeared.	 However,	 contrary	 to	 expectations,	 we	 have	 been	 witness	 to	 the	extraordinary	 persistence	 of	 the	 peasant	 class	 in	 India	 and	 other	 southern	 countries	(Bernstein	2001)	–	 though	 the	 respective	processes	 are	very	different	 among	 regions,	e.g.	 among	 Indian	 states	 (Mohanty	 and	 Lenka	 2016,	 188).	 Many	 authors	 expect	 the	peasantry	 to	 persist	 in	 the	 decades	 to	 come	 because	 large-scale	 capitalist	 agriculture	does	not	seem	to	consolidate	and	surplus	labour	is	not	absorbed	into	the	industrial	and	service	sectors	(see	e.g.	Basu	2013).	In	 the	 past	 decades	 of	 rural	 neoliberal	 restructuring,	 the	 world	 of	 farmers	 has	 been	changing	 tremendously.	 Despite	 being	 internally	 highly	 differentiated,	 people	 all	 over	the	world	working	in	agriculture	under	neoliberal	transformation	share	a	wide	range	of	experiences:	 from	a	consolidation	and	rise	of	existing	economic	and	social	 inequalities	along	 with	 the	 concentration	 of	 control	 over	 the	 means	 of	 production,	 as	 well	 as	 a	general	 de-prioritization	 of	 rural	 populations	 (Patel	 2006).	 Patel’s	 list	 of	 problems	 is	“gloomy,	but	helpfully	so”	(ibid,	78)	as	it	brings	back	our	focus	on	certain	key	issues	in	the	 debate	 about	 farmers’	 prospects	 in	 the	 neoliberal	 age	 (see	 also	 Amin	 2004;	McMichael	2006).	There	are	different	lenses	for	studying	these	developments.	The	corresponding	debates	link	 to	 the	 grand	 theories	 about	 the	 path	 of	 development	 of	 agrarian	 societies.	 They	encompass	the	big	questions	that	early	scholars	of	economy	and	society	have	concerned	themselves	with	in	the	last	150	years.	To	put	this	research	in	context,	I	will	give	a	brief	overview	of	such	debates	(see	chapter	VI).	Proponents	of	a	neoliberal	development,	or	of	the	mainstream/residual	perspective,	as	Geiser	(2014)	called	it,	believe	that	 liberalizing	trade	and	financial	markets	with	freely	floating	 prices	 of	 agricultural	 commodities	 and	 allowing	 an	 increasing	 importance	 of	
	 17	
corporations	in	agriculture	would	eventually	lift	farmers	from	poverty	(see	e.g.	Braun	et	al.	2005).	At	the	same	time,	there	is	a	growing	realisation	that	“certain	basic	conditions	of	
life	must	be	provided	to	people	everywhere”	(Sanyal	2007	cited	in	Chatterjee	2008a,	55)	if	the	market	does	not	provide	these	conditions	for	whatever	reasons.	The	argument	goes	that	 alternatively	 the	 state	 or	 Non-Governmental	 Organisations	 (NGOs)	 should	intervene	 to	 ensure	 food	 and	 social	 security	 or	 agricultural	 improvements	 (Harriss-White	 2008).	 All	 these	 ideas	 are	 comfortable	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 benign	 neoliberal	capitalist	development.	Leftist	 scholars,	 or	 the	proponents	of	 the	 radical/relational	perspective	 (Geiser	2014),	criticise	 the	 basic	 tenets	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 capitalist	 development	 path.	Many	 of	 these	scholars	are	engaged	in	debates	around	the	‘contemporary	agrarian	question’.	T	J	Byres	took	 an	 orthodox	Marxist	 stand,	 arguing	 that	 agriculture	 should	 industrialise	 and	 the	agricultural	labourers	should	find	work	in	another	sectors	(Byres	1991,	cited	in	Lerche	2013,	384).	Therefore,	Byres	was	optimistic	about	development	 in	 the	 form	of	a	high-growth	 capitalist	 economy	 that	 could	 provide	 better	 conditions	 for	 the	 rural	 labour	force	in	a	non-agrarian	economy,	this	capitalist	economy	eventually	being	a	precursor	to	socialism.	Consequently,	 he	holds	 a	 critical	 position	 towards	 the	 idea	of	 redistributive	land	 reform	 because	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 “farming	 miniature	 plots	 within	 a	 stagnant,	
backward,	agrarian	economy”	(Lerche	2013,	384).		According	 to	 Lerche	 (2013),	 this	 approach	 was	 challenged	 on	 various	 grounds.	 One	group	of	 challenges	 comes	 from	within	 the	political	 economy	 tradition	 and	 comprises	three	 different	 arguments.	 First,	 Byres	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 transformation	 from	 pre-capitalist	 to	 capitalist	 production	 relationships.	 However,	 Bernstein	 pointed	 out	 that	capitalist	agriculture	has	been	prevalent	all	over	the	world	since	the	end	of	colonialism.	Therefore,	pre-capitalist	classes	that	could	be	a	barrier	to	capitalist	transformation	have	ceased	to	exist.	The	“pre-capitalist	peasant	and	landlord	classes	have,	by	now,	been	almost	
universally	transformed	into	capitalist	farmers,	petty	commodity	producers	and	‘classes	of	
labour’,	all	existing	within	capitalist	social	relations”	(Bernstein	1996,	42-43).	Second,	 he	 argues	 against	 Byres’	 notion	 that	 agricultural	 production	 accumulates	capital,	 which	 contributes	 to	 industrial	 development	 in	 the	 same	 country.	 Circuits	 of	capital	 and	 commodities	 are	 no	 longer	 national,	 “but	are	mediated	by	the	effects	of	the	
circuits	 of	 international	 capital	 and	 world	 markets,	 for	 each	 sector	 in	 any	 capitalist	
economy”	 (Bernstein	 1996,	 42-43;	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	accumulation	 of	 capital	 within	 agriculture	 is	 no	 longer	 decisive	 for	 the	 national	industrial	capital	in	the	same	country.	Based	on	these	two	arguments,	Bernstein	argued	that	 the	 agrarian	 question	 of	 capital	 has	 been	 fundamentally	 altered	 in	 the	 current	globalised	era	(see	particularly	Bernstein	2006).		The	third	argument	concerns	the	agrarian	question	of	labour.	Traditionally,	the	struggle	was	against	the	feudal	landlords	and	for	land	reforms,	a	struggle	that	potentially	united	the	 peasants	 and	 the	 capital	 for	 a	 peasant-based	 growth,	 and	 an	 accumulation	 from	below.	Today,	the	pre-capitalist	peasants	have	already	been	transformed	into	a	“modern,	
fragmented, reserve army of labour” (Lerche	 2013,	 386)	 and	 the	 agrarian	 question	 from	
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below,	namely	the	quest	for	land	reforms,	has	been	replaced	by	“general	questions	of	the	
relationship	 between	 capital	 and	 labour”	 (ibid),	 by	 demands	 for	 a	 “generalized	 living	
wage”	(ibid).		Another	group	of	challenges	comes	from	the	proponents	of	new	concepts	such	as	food	sovereignty,	 arguably	 related	 to	 the	 post-developmentalist	 perspective	 (Geiser	 2014).	They	 claim	 to	 have	 developed	 an	 alternative	 to	 both	 the	 leftist	 and	 the	 neoliberal	capitalist	 view	 of	 agriculture	 that	 focuses	 on	 capital	 accumulation	 in	 agriculture	(McMichael	2007).	They	call	 this	alternative	the	 ‘peasant	way’	of	agriculture	and	bring	forward	 two	 major	 points	 of	 criticism.	 First,	 they	 argue	 that	 the	 classical	 agrarian	question	 fails	 to	 see	 that	 small-scale	 farmers	 too	 also	 subordinated	 to	 international	capital	in	the	era	of	neoliberal	globalization.	The	global	corporate	food	regime	based	on	the	 liberalization	of	agricultural	markets	and	withdrawal	of	 the	 state	 from	rural	areas	purportedly	creates	transnational	agribusiness	near-monopolies.	This	food	regime	ruins	and	 dispossesses	 the	 peasantry	 and	 is	 responsible	 for	 rural	 poverty	 and	 hunger.	 The	second	 point	 of	 criticism	 is	 that	 the	 agrarian	 question	 doesn’t	 problematize	 the	ecological	 consequences	 of	 high	 growth	 capitalism.	 There	 is	 an	 urgent	 need	 to	 find	alternatives	 to	 an	 economic	 growth	 based	 solely	 on	 fossil	 fuels.	 Therefore,	 the	 ‘food	sovereignty’	argument	envisions	a	food	regime	that	includes	aspects	of	social	justice	and	environmental	sustainability	(Fairbairn	2008;	McMichael	2007,	2012).		Many	of	these	ideas	relating	to	food	sovereignty	are	heavily	contested,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	category	of	the	‘peasantry’.	A	majority	of	scholars	agree	that	the	realities	of	 the	 people	 living	 from	 agriculture	 are	 very	 different	 –	 according	 to	 their	 access	 to	land,	manpower	or	capital,	their	main	crops,	as	well	as	their	geographical	region.	A	core	contestation	 results	 from	 competing	 notions	 of	 a	 ‘heterogeneous	 peasantry’	 versus	 a	‘united	 peasantry’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 onslaught.	 As	 Bernstein	 (2013)	argues,	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 peasants	 bears	 the	 danger	 of	 obscuring	 tensions	within	rural	society	–	between	different	classes,	generations	or	genders.		
India:	Debates	on	‘Agrarian	Crisis’	In	India,	where	more	than	half	the	working	population	depends	on	agriculture	and	the	number	of	small	and	marginal	farmers	has	been	growing	(Lerche	2013),	the	changes	in	agriculture	 –	 arguably	 due	 to	 neoliberal	 policies	 –	 are	 often	 labelled	 as	 an	 ‘agrarian	crisis’.	 The	 debates	 outlined	 above	 are	mirrored	 in	 the	 Indian	 context.	 Some	 authors	argue	 that	 the	 steeply	 falling	 agricultural	 profitability	 has	 hit	 all	 agrarian	 classes	 in	India.	 A	 corollary	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 historical	 rise	 in	 the	 share	 of	 capitalist	farming	has	been	halted	by	neoliberal	policies.	The	big	 landholders	 could	maintain	or	increase	 their	wealth	by	 resorting	 to	 rent	 extraction	 and	moneylending.	However,	 the	sections	 of	 the	 peasantry	 who	 had	 no	 alternative	 outside	 agriculture	 were	 being	pauperized.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 corporatization	 of	 agriculture	 has	 allowed	transnational	 capital	 to	 take	 control	 over	 peasant	 production	 (see	 e.g.	 Patnaik	 2010,	cited	 in	 Lerche	 2013,	 390;	 Lerche	 2015;	 Reddy	 2016).	 This	 argument	 largely	corresponds	to	the	populist	argument	based	on	ideas	of	the	‘urban	bias’	(see	chapter	II).	
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In	 contrast,	 other	 authors	 claim	 that	 rural	 groups,	 regions	 and	 crops	 were	 very	differently	 affected	 by	 recent	 changes	 in	 the	 agricultural	 policies.	 They	 argue	 that	 the	rural	 elite	 of	 big	 landholders	 and	 capitalist	 farmers	 continue	 to	 have	 high	 returns	 on	their	 investment	 in	 agriculture.	 It	 was	 mostly	 the	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 who	suffered	from	the	old	agrarian	inequalities	as	well	as	the	New	Economic	Policies	(see	e.g.	Ramachandran	2011;	Reddy	2016).	It	 is	characteristic	 for	 the	debate	on	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 in	 India	 that	 the	 farmers’	suicides	are	often	highlighted	as	 the	worst	manifestation	of	 the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 (see	e.g.	Reddy	and	Mishra	2010b;	Vikram	2016).	Virtually	all	the	articles	about	the	crisis	of	agriculture	bring	up	the	phenomenon	of	the	farmer	suicides.	Many	authors	use	it	rather	directly	as	an	 indicator	 for	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 rural	 economy	 and	 society	 –	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	severity	 of	 these	 problems	 (Mohanty	 2005).	 The	 suicide	 statistics	 are	 then	 cited	 as	evidence	of	the	harm	that	neoliberal	policies	have	caused	(Mohanty	2005;	Vasavi	2009,	2012).		This	 debate	 has	 constructed	 quite	 a	 linear	 –	 and	 rather	 unanimously	 acknowledged	 –	causality	between	 the	neoliberal	policies	of	 the	government	and	 the	 farmers’	 suicides.	This	 link	 in	 turn	provoked	 the	question	whether	 farmers’	 suicides	 are	passive	 acts	 or	can	be	seen	as	 “the	last	act	of	the	desperate	to	speak	in	a	political	voice” (Vasavi	2009,	104,	see	also	Münster	2012,	2015a;	see	chapter	VII).	
Active	Farmers	These	reflections	bring	me	to	 the	question	of	what	 farmers	do	 themselves	when	 faced	with	the	economic	changes	they	have	to	face.	Among	the	possible	ways	of	engaging,	the	focus	 here	 lies	 on	 political	 mobilization	 and	 collective	 action:	 do	 farmers	 mobilize	around	 their	 issues,	 formulate	 demands	 and	 engage	 in	 the	 above-mentioned	 debates,	and	 if	 so,	 how?	 In	 India,	 in	particular,	 there	 is	 a	diverse	history	of	 farmer	movements	that	have	contributed	to	debates	about	the	political	economy	of	development,	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	farmer	suicides	in	India	(Arora	2001;	Brass	1995;	Dhanagare	1995;	Lindberg	2010;	Omvedt	2005;	see	section	2,	chapter	IV).		At	 the	 global	 level,	 transnational	 agrarian	 movements	 like	 La	Vía	Campesina	claim	 to	speak	 for	 the	 small	 farmers	 of	 the	 world.	 They	 have	 grown	 in	 the	 last	 decades	 and	revived	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 future	 of	 peasant	 production	 (Desmarais	 2002).	 La	Vía	
Campesina	 in	 particular	 has	 been	 important	 in	 developing	 the	 concept	 of	 food	sovereignty	and	brought	it	to	fame	among	farmer	activists	worldwide.	The	transnational	agrarian	 movement	 is	 therefore	 credited	 for	 having	 reframed	 the	 discourse	 on	development	of	agriculture	(Lerche	2013;	Reddy	and	Mishra	2010b).		While	transnational	agrarian	movements	have	grown	on	a	global	 level,	 in	India	the	big	farmer	movements	have	instead	lost	their	strength,	i.e.	the	peasant	movements	of	1950s	and	 1960s	 that	 mostly	 aimed	 at	 land	 reforms,	 and	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movements	 of	1970s	 and	 1980s	 whose	 major	 demand	 was	 a	 remunerative	 price	 for	 agricultural	produce	(Arora	2001).	Despite	this	broad	tendency,	there	still	are	activists	and	groups	which	mobilize	 around	 the	 contemporary	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’.	 Such	movements	 have	 the	
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potential	to	influence	what	visions	of	a	future	agriculture	are	conceived,	discussed	and	eventually	put	 into	practice	 (Borras,	Edelmann,	 and	Kay	2008;	McMichael	2007).	This	brings	me	to	the	second	broad	debate	to	which	this	research	relates.	
1.2 Social	Movements	Theories	of	social	movements	are	concerned	with	the	how	and	why	of	collective	action	in	 a	 society	 and	 its	 resulting	 consequences.	 It	 is	 a	 broad	 field	 of	 theories,	 some	being	concerned	with	the	structures	that	enable	or	prevent	social	mobilisation,	some	with	the	psychological	 factors	 that	 cause	 certain	 individuals	 to	 become	 active,	 and	 still	 others	about	the	role	of	ideas.	In	the	following	sections,	I	briefly	touch	upon	these	approaches	and	 arrange	 them	 according	 to	 the	 questions	 guiding	 this	 study:	 why	 do	 social	movements	 emerge,	 how	 do	 people	mobilize	 others	 and	 how	 does	 framing	 challenge	ideas?	
Why	Social	Movements	Emerge	The	question	of	why	and	under	which	conditions	social	movements	emerge	might	be	the	most	 fundamental	question	 in	 social	movement	 studies.	 I	 focus	here	 first	on	 the	 ideas	that	 place	 the	 conditions,	 experiences	 and	 grievances	 of	 people	 at	 the	 centre	 stage	 –	broadly	called	the	strain	and	breakdown	theories.		These	 theories	 have	 a	 long	 history	 going	 back	 to	 Marx’s	 idea	 that	 contestation	 is	inherent	 in	 capitalist	 societies	 (Tarrow	 2011).	 In	 the	 1950s,	 these	 theories	 had	 a	comeback	 as	 collective	 behaviour	 theories.	 They	 relied	 on	 Durkheim’s	 ([1893]	 1964,	cited	in	Buechler	2011)	argument	that	the	lesser	degree	of	social	integration	in	modern	societies	 could	 lead	 to	 chronic	 strains	 or	 acute	 breakdown	of	 people,	 thereby	 causing	different	 dysfunctional	 behaviours	 such	 as	 collective	 behaviour	 or	 suicide.	 Collective	behaviour	was	therefore	seen	as	an	exception	to	normal	political	activities,	most	often	with	negative	connotations	(Tarrow	2011).		The	 collective	behaviour	 theories	have	been	 criticised	at	many	 levels,	mostly	 as	being	too	deterministic	 in	assuming	a	linear	relationship	between	the	macro-level	strain	and	the	micro-level	 behaviour.	 A	 certain	 level	 of	 discontent	 and	 suffering	 is	 found	 among	large	 segments	 of	 the	 population,	 but	 collective	 action	 does	 not	 emerge	 everywhere.	Therefore,	strain	and	discontent	are	at	most	necessary	but	not	sufficient	causes	of	social	movements.	These	shortcomings	and	the	emergence	of	the	resource	mobilization	theory	(see	 section	 1.2	 below)	 led	 to	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 collective	 behaviour	 theories.	Only	recently	have	theoretical	approaches	that	put	the	grievance	of	people	back	at	the	centre	witnessed	a	revival	(Buechler	2011	and	2016,	104).	Current	proponents	of	this	 idea	have	a	positive	disposition	towards	social	movements,	but	share	the	argument	that	a	social	movement	can	emerge	with	a	common	grievance	at	the	centre	as	a	crucial	mobilising	factor.	The	grievance	as	a	mobilising	factor	may	even	compensate	 for	 a	 lack	of	 resources	and	organizational	properties	 (Buechler	2011).	To	counter	 the	argument	 that	grievance	 is	only	a	necessary	and	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	the	emergence	of	social	movement	and	hence	of	little	explanatory	power,	they	argue	
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that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 closely	 study	which	 type	of	grievances	makes	 the	emergence	of	social	movements	more	likely.	There	are	three	main	arguments	under	the	contemporary	version.	First,	it	is	the	relative	deprivation	compared	to	other	groups	or	a	rapidly	increasing	deprivation	over	time	that	heightens	the	sense	of	grievance	and	forms	a	reason	to	initiate	protest,	particularly	if	the	processes	in	place	to	distribute	resources	are	perceived	to	be	unjust	(see	e.g.	Buechler	2011).	Second,	more	than	the	absolute	sense	of	grievance,	it	is	a	rising	sense	of	injustice	that	 can	 explain	 the	 emergence	 of	 social	 movements.	 This	 process	 of	 rising	consciousness	 can	 be	 a	 result	 of	 education	 or	 of	 the	 appearance	 of	 NGOs	 or	 existing	protest	 groups	 (Bebbington	2009).	 Third,	 a	 quotidian	 disruption	 in	 peoples’	 everyday	life	 can	 cause	 unrest	 and	 protest.	 This	 idea	 is	 based	 on	 Habermas’	 concept	 of	 the	“progressive	 colonization	 of	 lifeworld”	 describing	 the	 process	 of	 external	 institutions	exercising	an	increasing	control	over	people’s	daily	life	(Habermas	1987,	in	Bebbington	2009;	Snow	et	al.	1998).		Bebbington	 (2009)	 elaborated	on	 the	 colonization	of	 lifeworlds	 in	 today’s	world:	 new	forms	 of	 investment	 in	 (rural)	 areas,	 cultural	 modernization	 affecting	 ‘traditional’	practices,	 new	 practices	 of	 dispossession	 (Harvey	 2005),	 and	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 the	markets	 or	 upsetting	 of	 prices	 (Edelman	 2005).	 With	 regard	 to	 agriculture,	 these	changes	directly	 relate	 to	 the	 issues	discussed	earlier	about	 farmers’	prospects.	 Sahoo	(2010)	also	argued	that	globalisation	in	India	has	led	to	the	withdrawal	of	the	state	from	many	of	its	earlier	social	functions,	which,	in	turn,	has	given	rise	to	more	visible	forms	of	inequality	and	exploitation.	Globalisation	and	its	policy	processes	have,	in	other	words,	created	 conditions	where	mobilisation	of	 those	adversely	 affected	becomes	 likely	 as	 a	response	 (referring	 back	 to	 Karl	 Polanyi’s	 ‘double	movement’).	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	contemporary	 developments	 in	 agriculture	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 cause	 widespread	farmer	protests.	I	will	take	up	this	proposition	by	studying	farmers’	perceptions	of	their	situation	under	neoliberal	policies.		
How	to	Mobilize	People	Approaches	focussing	on	grievance,	however,	tend	to	underestimate	the	importance	of	mobilization	 strategies	 and	 resources.	As	mentioned	above,	 the	 strain	and	breakdown	approaches	often	have	a	rather	deterministic	or	mechanistic	approach	and	assume	that	certain	 kind	 of	 grievances	 almost	 automatically	 lead	 to	 collective	 action.	While	 these	structural	mobilization	potentials	surely	are	 important	conditions	 for	collective	action,	the	mobilizing	structures,	the	resources	–	and	the	leaders	and	activists	–	of	an	emerging	movement	are	crucial	as	well.	Based	 on	 this	 criticism,	 a	 second	 theoretical	 approach	 emerged:	 the	 resource	mobilization	 theory.	 It	 aimed	 to	 fill	 this	 gap	 and	 grasp	 the	 importance	 of	 available	money,	time,	networks	and	leadership.	With	the	resource	mobilization	theory,	a	rational	type	 of	 agency	 became	 more	 important	 and	 the	 mobilizing	 structures	 that	 enable	collective	action	came	into	focus	(Kriesi	2014).	The	resource	mobilization	theorists	still	assume	 a	 mechanistic	 relationship	 between	 macro-level	 strain	 and	 micro-level	
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behaviour.	Logically,	they	argue	that	the	most	important	factors	for	a	social	movement	to	emerge	are	the	availability	of	sufficient	resources	(see	McAdam,	McCarthy,	and	Zald	1996;	McCarthy	and	Zald	2001).	From	such	a	perspective,	social	movements	were	seen	as	 institutionalized	 elements	 of	 the	 society	 that	 fight	 for	 their	 particular	 group’s	interests.		The	 resource	 mobilisation	 theory	 further	 developed	 into	 the	 theory	 of	 political	opportunities	 (Kriesi	 2004;	 McAdam,	 Tarrow,	 and	 Tilly	 2003),	 namely	 the	 political	opportunities	 for	 mobilization.	 The	 political	 opportunity	 structure	 includes	 formal	political	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 discursive	 opportunities,	 the	 latter	 referring	 to	 which	ideas	become	visible	and	resonate	with	the	public.	The	political	opportunity	structures	can	change	according	to	the	perceived	shifts	in	power	disparities	between	the	elite	and	the	challengers.	Such	shifts	can	improve	the	chances	of	success	as	well	as	raise	the	costs	of	 repression.	 The	 success	 of	 collective	 action	 then	 depends	 on	 seizing	 those	 political	opportunities	(Kriesi	2014).	The	 resource	 mobilization	 theory	 particularly	 mentions	 leadership	 as	 an	 important	resource	 –	 e.g.	 to	 cease	 such	 political	 opportunities.	 But,	 as	 Morris	 and	 Staggenborg	(2011)	 argued,	 the	 resource	 mobilization	 theorists	 most	 often	 talk	 about	 the	 great	leaders	 and	 neglect	 the	 “myriad	 levels	 of	 leadership	 and	 roles”	 (ibid	 171).	 The	painstaking	 work	 of	 mobilization	 especially	 needs	more	 attention.	 For	 the	 context	 of	South	Asia	in	particular,	there	are	important	debates	over	leaders	in	social	movements	and	their	ability	to	mobilize	supporters	(see	chapter	V).	
How	Framing	Challenges	Ideas	Questions	 about	why	 and	 how	 social	movements	 emerge	 lead	 to	 the	 question	 of	why	movements	 matter.	 Social	 movements	 can	 have	 very	 different	 expected	 outcomes.	Beyond	the	relatively	more	visible	results	such	as	influencing	policy	changes,	there	are	outcomes	that	are	more	difficult	to	capture	or	foresee	(Bebbington	2009;	Giugni	1998).	For	 instance,	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 social	 movement	 can	 be	 to	 challenge	 the	 hegemonic	opinion	and	to	politicise	poverty	or	inequality	(Bebbington	2007).	Social	movements	are	then	 seen	 as	 a	 phenomena	 giving	 rise	 to	meanings	 and	 values	 that	 otherwise	 remain	unheard	 (Bebbington	2009).	 In	 the	particular	 case	of	movements	 that	 emerge	 around	issues	 of	 poverty,	 Bebbington	 (2010)	 argued	 that	 they	 can	 potentially	 challenge	 the	“ways	 in	 which	 poverty	 is	 understood,	 governed	 and	 acted	 on	 in	 society	 (…)	 and	 how	
government	 intervenes	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 poverty	 reduction	 (as	 defined	 by	 government)”	(ibid,	1305).	Snow	 and	 Benford	 (relating	 to	 Goffman	 1974)	 introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘framing’	 in	social	movement	studies	(Benford	and	Snow	2000;	Snow	2011).	Framing	refers	 to	 the	effort	of	 social	movement	participants	 to	use	 language	and	 ideas	 in	order	 to	 influence	the	public’s	understanding	of	certain	issues	and	to	persuade	people.	Framing	is	thus	like	a	marketing	of	ideas	(Oliver	and	Johnston	2000).	It	is	important	for	the	emergence	and	success	of	a	movement	whether	or	not	its	ideas	resonate	with	the	public	and	can	spark	solidarity.	 This	 in	 turn	 depends	 on	 how	 those	 ideas	 are	 framed.	 By	 emphasizing	 the	
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seriousness	 of	 their	 claims,	 blaming	 somebody	 for	 the	 problems	 and	 suggesting	solutions,	 movement	 activists	 mobilize	 possible	 supporters	 and	 try	 to	 effect	 change	(Benford	and	Snow	2000;	Johnston	2010;	Snow	2011).	McMichael	(2010)	pointed	to	the	same	direction,	emphasizing	that	social	movements	all	over	 the	 world	 challenge	 the	 predominant	 path	 of	 neoliberal	 development	 and	contemporary	 accumulation	 through	 dispossession.	 By	 bringing	 to	 light	 seemingly	“unthinkable	alternatives”,	they	challenge	the	“epistemic	assumptions	[namely	the	market	
episteme]	that	order	the	contemporary	world”	 (McMichael	2010,	11).	 In	 the	context	of	a	neoliberal	 restructuring	 of	 agriculture	 and	 the	 difficulty	 of	 imagining	 alternatives	 to	such	 a	 development,	 farmers’	 movements	 in	 particular	 acquire	 an	 important	 role	 in	bringing	forward	their	issues	and	articulating	their	ideas	(see	chapter	VI).		Despite	 the	 relevance	 of	 framing	 and	 ideational	 contestation,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 refer	back	 to	 the	 more	 structural	 approaches	 inherent	 in	 those	 ideas	 that	 place	 grievance	centre	stage.	In	order	to	understand	the	material	constraints	and	social	processes	of	the	building	 of	 frames,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 origins	 of	 ideas	 and	 the	 relation	between	ideas	and	‘reality’	or	material	interests	(Oliver	and	Johnston	2000;	Rudé	1980).	Even	Snow	(2011)	stated	that	frame	theorists	focused	little	on	the	material	bases	of	the	frames.	I	 would	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 indeed	 important	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 material	 conditions	 and	grievances	that	contribute	to	the	ideas	and	frames	of	movement	actors;	however,	these	structural	 conditions	 do	 not	 turn	 into	 ideas	 mechanistically.	 Rather	 they	 are	 highly	subjective	and	depend	on	people’s	perceptions.	Therefore,	this	research	is	conceptually	positioned	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	 perceived	material	 conditions	 of	 people	 and	 the	frames	and	strategies	they	use	in	their	movement	activities.	
2 Research	Questions	and	Objective	Existing	 research	 into	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 peasant	 suicides	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 the	suffering	 subjects.	 This	 study	 focuses	 on	 the	 agency	 of	 those	 who	 survive	 the	increasingly	 difficult	 agrarian	 scene	 of	 the	 global	 South,	 on	 how	 they	 articulate	 their	issues	and	how	they	organize.	It	also	concentrates	on	these	peasants’	understanding	of	their	situation	and	questions	the	popular	conception	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	that	neglects	the	social	and	economic	factors	which	mediate	the	crisis’	effects	on	that	larger	category	identified	 as	 the	 peasantry.	 Please	 refer	 to	 the	 respective	 chapters	 to	 see	 in	 greater	detail	how	the	research	is	embedded	in	current	debates.		Against	 the	backdrop	of	agrarian	change	 in	 India	and	 the	agency	of	 farmers	 to	engage	with	those	changes,	I	introduce	the	research	objective	of	this	thesis	as	follows:	To	show	
how	 people	 in	 Vidarbha	 affected	 by	 the	 'agrarian	 crisis'	 mobilise	 to	 struggle	 for	 their	
concerns/interests	and	what	the	latter	are.		
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This	 leads	 to	 the	 following	 research	 question:	 How	 do	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	
mobilisations	around	the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 in	Vidarbha	understand	their	situation,	how	do	
they	envision	a	future	for	agriculture,	and	what	is	the	nature	of	these	mobilisations4?	In	 order	 to	 operationalize	 this	 main	 research	 question,	 I	 tackle	 the	 following	 sub-questions:	1. Mobilisation:	 What	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 mobilisations	 that	 form	 around	 the	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	the	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides	in	Western	Vidarbha?		a. Organization	(see	chapter	IV)	i. Which	actors	and	groups	are	involved?	ii. How	are	the	groups	organized	and	how	do	the	actors	cooperate?		iii. What	are	the	main	activities	and	demands	of	the	different	groups	and	actors?		iv. Do	 we	 find	 a	 heterogeneity	 of	 groups,	 or	 can	 we	 talk	 of	 a	‘movement’?	b. Participation	and	mobilization	(see	chapter	V)	i. Who	does	the	work	of	mobilization?	ii. What	mobilization	strategies	do	they	use?		iii. What	motivations	do	the	actors	have	to	participate?	iv. How	much	do	actors	participate	in	electoral	politics	or	cooperate	with	political	parties	and	how	do	they	justify	their	choice?	2. Discursive	background	of	the	mobilisations:	What	is	the	actors’	understanding	of	the	present	agrarian	situation	and	how	do	they	frame	its	further	development?	a. How	 do	 the	 actors	 understand	 the	 present	 situation	 of	 agriculture	 in	Vidarbha?	How	do	 these	 perceptions	 about	 the	 situation	 of	 agriculture	correlate	with	available	data?	(see	chapter	III)	b. What	 frames	do	 the	 involved	actors	use	 to	 construct	 long–term	visions	for	agriculture?	How	do	these	ideas	differ	between	actors?	(see	chapter	VI)	c. Framing	farmer	suicides	(see	chapter	VII)	i. How	 do	 the	 actors	 frame	 farmer	 suicides	 and	 where	 do	 they	locate	the	reasons?	ii. How	 and	why	 do	 these	 frames	 become	 part	 of	 the	movements’	strategies?	By	 examining	 and	 discussing	 these	 sub-questions,	 I	 want	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 above-sketched	 debates	 around	 social	 movements	 and	 agrarian	 change.	 The	 ethnographic	approach	 (see	 below,	 section	 1.3)	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 social	movement	 studies	 and	questions	of	agrarian	change	provides	insights	into	mobilisation	processes	as	well	as	the	conception	 of	 social	 movements	 in	 rural	 areas.	 This	 study	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	understanding	 of	 movements	 with	 low	 levels	 of	 activity	 in	 marginal	 regions	 of	 the																																									 																					4	I	will	come	back	to	the	conceptual	 issues	of	(social)	movement	in	part	IV.	Until	then,	I	put	the	word	movement	in	quotation	marks.		
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world.	Resistance	against	neoliberalism,	strategies	of	mobilization	against	and	visions	of	what	lies	beyond	are	studied	from	a	grassroots	perspective,	which	can	help	understand	the	 realities	 of	 farmers	 facing	 these	 neoliberal	 policies	 as	well	 as	 the	 impacts	 of	 such	mobilisations.	In	this	sense,	I	aim	to	contribute	on	a	policy	level.	Rural	poverty	as	well	as	the	 low	 profitability	 of	 small	 and	medium	 scale	 agriculture	 –	 particularly	 in	 dry	 land	areas	–	are	severe	problems	 in	 the	context	of	an	agricultural	sector	under	 intensifying	neoliberalisation,	 in	 India	 and	 elsewhere.	 Therefore,	 studying	 the	 conditions	 on	 the	ground	and	capturing	the	perspectives	of	those	concerned	is	of	the	utmost	importance.	This	 study	 should	 help	 understand	 these	 processes	 better	 and	 provide	 a	 relevant	background	 for	policies	 in	 this	 context.	 Finally,	with	 this	 research,	 I	 hope	 to	 carry	 the	‘movement’	groups’	demands	to	a	different	audience.	By	critically	analysing	their	claims	and	 visions,	 I	 can	 at	 best	 provide	 new	 ideas	 or	 approaches	 for	 new	 analyses	 to	 the	‘movement’	actors.		
3 Methodological	Approach	I	 used	 a	 qualitative	methodology	 to	 understand	 the	 internal	 dynamics	 of	mobilisation	and	the	perspectives	of	activists	and	supporters.	To	capture	on-going	activities	that	are	often	 fluid	and	exist	 in	 shifting	 conditions,	 ethnography	as	a	methodological	 approach	has	 particular	 relevance	 (Plows	 2008,	 1524).	 Along	 with	 Plows,	 I	 argue	 that	ethnography	enables	the	researcher	of	social	mobilisations	to	“understand	what	is	going	
on	‘upstream’;	at	the	grassroots,	in	often	hidden,	‘latent’	(Melucci	1996),	social	conditions”	(ibid,	1524).	Apart	 from	 participant	 observation,	 I	 include	 qualitative	 interviews	 as	 another	important	 method.	 The	 study	 focuses	 on	 a	 mobilisation	 that	 is	 fragmented	 both	 in	geographical	 terms	 but	 also	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 involved	 actors.	 Consequently,	 I	followed	the	involved	actors	to	understand	mobilisation	(see	below).	Epistemologically,	ethnography	can	take	two	different	stands.	Sierk	et	al.	(2009)	argue	that	an	ethnographer	can	either	be	a	 realist	 ‘knower’	who	promises	 to	mirror	a	 social	reality.	 Alternatively,	 an	 ethnographer	 can	 also	 take	 an	 interpretivist	 stand	 and	understand	 the	 contingency	 of	 what	 is	 being	 reported.	 Social	 realities	 are	 then	understood	as	socially	constructed	in	an	interplay	between	individual	agency	and	social	structure.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 ethnographic	 material	 is	 co-constructed	 by	 the	 research	participants	 and	 the	 researchers.	 Fabian	 and	 de	 Rooij	 (2010)	 hold	 that	 “epistemology	
can	then	be	conceived	as	public	reflection	on	how	we	think	we	can	 legitimize,	put	up	 for	
critique	and	discussion,	what	we	offer	as	knowledge	based	on	ethnography”.	As	 a	 middle	 ground	 between	 the	 realist	 versus	 interpretivist	 stand,	 Maxwell	 (2012)	defended	 critical	 realism	 in	 social	 research	 (based	 on	 Roy	 Bhaskar,	 see	 Bhaskar	 and	Hartwig	2010).	He	argues	that	critical	realism	is	a	“commitment	to	the	existence	of	a	real,	
though	not	an	‘objectively’	knowable,	world”	 (Maxwell	2012,	10).	Critical	 realism	means	to	 commit	 to	 an	 ontological	 realism	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 “there	is	a	real	world	that	exists	
independently	 of	 our	 perceptions,	 theories,	 and	 constructions”,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	
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holds	 up	 a	 form	 of	 epistemological	 constructivism,	 which	 means	 that	 “our	understanding	 of	 this	world	 is	 inevitably	 a	 construction	 from	 our	 own	 perspectives	 and	
standpoint”	(both	quotations:	ibid,	5;	emphasis	in	original).		There	are	two	implications	of	such	a	stand	for	this	research.	First,	as	the	epistemological	approach	is	constructivist,	I	understand	that	it	is	not	possible	to	have	“any	‘objective’	or	
certain	knowledge	of	the	world,	and	[I]	accept	the	possibility	of	alternative	valid	accounts	
of	any	phenomenon”	(Maxwell	2012,	5).	Consequently,	there	is	no	possibility	of	finding	a	single,	‘correct’	understanding	of	the	world	independent	from	one’s	standpoint.	But	still,	Maxwell	 argues,	 “realists	 (…)	 see	 theoretical	 terms	 as	 referring	 to	 ((…)	 not	 ‘reflecting’)	
actual	features	and	properties	of	a	real	world”	(ibid,	8).		This	 leads	 me	 to	 the	 second	 implication,	 namely	 that	 a	 real	 world	 exists	 beyond	 the	multiple	 realities	 as	 incommensurable,	 socially	 constructed	worlds.	 It	 is	 important	 for	this	 research	 that	 “mental	 states	 and	 attributes	 (including	 meanings	 and	 intentions),	
although	not	directly	observable,	are	part	of	the	real	world”	(Maxwell	2012,	8).	I	consider	it	 crucial	 to	 believe	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 real	world,	 because	 the	 interviewed	 farmers	arguably	 perceive	 their	 conditions	 and	 constraints	 as	 real	 and	 not	 just	 socially	constructed.	Here,	 I	 follow	Putnam	 (1999)	who	argued	 that	 this	belief	 in	 a	 real	world	does	 justice	 to	 most	 peoples’	 –	 and	 my	 interviewees’	 –	 notion.	 This	 “notion	 that	our	
worlds	and	life	are	constrained	by	a	reality	not	of	our	own	invention	plays	a	deep	role	in	
our	lives	and	is	to	be	respected”	(Putnam	1999,	9).	This	 combination	 of	 a	 realist	 stand	 and	 ethnography	defines	 this	 research.	While	 it	 is	mainly	 based	 on	 perceptions	 of	 people,	 it	 often	 is	 contextualized	with	 other	 data,	 e.g.	statistics	–	particularly	in	chapter	II	and	III	about	the	agricultural	situation	in	Vidarbha,	but	also	in	chapter	VII	about	farmer	suicides.	This	use	of	different	data	does	not	imply	a	hierarchy	of	importance,	but	serves	as	a	triangulation	strategy.	Typically,	 ethnographic	 research	 is	 inductive	 and	 strongly	 relies	 on	 material	 from	fieldwork	(see	e.g.	Caines	2010).	Caines	cited	Charles	Frake	“that	the	ethnographer	seeks	
to	find	not	only	answers	to	the	questions	he	or	she	brings	into	the	field,	but	also	questions	
to	 explain	 what	 is	 being	 observed”	 (ibid,	 432).	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 conducted	 inductive	research	 strongly	 basing	my	 research	 questions	 and	 research	 procedure	 on	 empirical	data	 from	 the	 field.	Therefore,	 the	 research	process	was	designed	 in	 an	 iterative	way,	which	means	that	the	steps	of	literature	review,	data	production	and	data	analysis	were	conducted	 alternately.	 The	 research	 process	 is	 shown	 in	 the	 table	 below.	 In	 the	following,	I	will	describe	these	steps	in	further	detail,	starting	with	the	definition	of	the	empirical	field	in	which	this	study	is	embedded.						
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Table	1:	Overview	of	the	research	process	
	 Time	 Activities	
Phase	1	 07/2010	-	01/2011	 Initial	literature	review	Definition	of	research	interest	
1st	field	visit	 01/2011	–	03/2011	 Explorative	field	work:	initial	interviews	Choosing	the	region	Vidarbha	Assistant:	Aditee	Hedaoo	
Phase	2	 03/2011	–	10/2011	 Writing	proposal	Defining	research	questions	Preparing	main	field	visit	
2nd	field	visit	 10/2011	–	04/2012	 Main	field	visit	Choosing	the	‘movement’	groups	Shadowing/interviewing	‘movement’	activists	Observing/interviewing	‘movement’	activists	and	supporters	in	villages	Assistant:	Premsagar	Tasgaonkar	
Phase	3	 04/2012	–	04/2013	 Analysis	of	empirical	data	Literature	review	Redefining	research	questions	Initial	writing		
3rd	field	visit	 05/2013	–	07/2013	 Collection	of	missing	and	continuative	data	Assistant:	Manoj	Patil	
Phase	4	 07/2013	–	12/2014	 Analysis	of	empirical	data	Writing	of	all	chapters	
4th	field	visit	 01/2015	–	03/2015	 Discussion	of	findings	with	research	participants	Presentation	of	findings	at	research	institutions	Assistant:	Aniket	Gattuwar	
Phase	5		 03/2015	–	08/2016	 Finalising	chapters	
3.1 Research	Focus	During	 an	 initial	 explorative	 field	 visit,	 I	 interviewed	 many	 activists	 throughout	Maharashtra	who	claimed	to	speak	in	the	name	of	farmers.	I	started	with	names	that	I	received	 from	 an	 academic	 expert,	 Prof.	 R.	 Ramakumar,	 through	 Internet	 research,	 as	well	 as	 snowball	 sampling.	The	method	of	 snowball	 sampling	provided	me	with	many	names	and	opened	many	doors.	But	 it	bore	 the	risk	 that	 I	would	only	get	names	 from	within	 a	 certain	network	of	 activists	while	 leaving	 out	 others.	 Therefore,	 I	 used	other	sources	 such	 as	 newspapers	 to	 find	 additional	 names,	 where	 I	 could	 start	 snowball	sampling	anew.	Finally	I	came	back	to	the	same	names	through	these	three	methods	and	therefore	considered	my	sample	of	activists	and	groups	as	sufficiently	complete.		
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Starting	 in	Mumbai	and	Western	Maharashtra,	 the	 interviews	 took	me	 to	Marathwada	and	Vidarbha,	 and	 it	 is	 in	Western	Vidarbha	where	 I	 found	a	number	of	 activists	who	claim	to	speak	 in	 the	name	of	 the	 farmers5.	The	notions	of	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	and	 farmer	suicides	 were	 most	 prominent	 when	 talking	 about	 Vidarbha’s	 agriculture,	 be	 it	 in	interviews	with	activists	or	 journalists	as	well	 as	 in	 scientific	papers.	The	 interviewed	activists	 told	 me	 stories	 of	 indebted	 farmers,	 suicides,	 low	 prices	 and	 a	 failing	government.	 I	 found	 a	 dynamic	 and	 diverse	 ‘movement’	 around	 these	 issues	 and	decided	 to	 focus	 on	 these	 groups	 and	 activists6.	 Beside	 this	 ‘movement’,	 Western	Vidarbha	 is	 interesting	 in	terms	of	 its	agriculture,	particularly	with	regards	to	rain-fed	agriculture	 in	 the	 context	 of	 liberalizing	 agricultural	 markets	 (see	 chapter	 VI).	 The	region	 is	 part	 of	 the	 so-called	 cotton	 belt	 of	 India,	 dominated	 by	 mostly	 rain-fed	agriculture,	and	many	authors	argue	that	 the	region	 is	heavily	affected	by	an	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	(see	chapter	III).		This	 geographical	 focus	on	districts	of	Western	Vidarbha	 is	 due	 in	part	 to	 the	 groups’	strong	 regional	 focus.	 The	 groups	 are	 active	 in	 particular	 villages,	 most	 of	 them	 in	Western	Vidarbha.	Vidarbha	is	also	famous	for	its	districts	that	have	a	reputation,	that	is	statistically	 backed-up,	 of	 being	 a	 ‘hotspot’	 for	 farmer	 suicides	 (see	 chapter	 VII).	 This	also	 made	 these	 districts	 an	 interesting	 study	 site.	 However,	 several	 groups	 do,	 of	course,	have	activities,	networks	and	most	of	all	discourses	that	go	far	beyond	Western	Vidarbha.		In	the	following,	I	will	specify	the	sampling	strategy	that	I	used	for	the	second	and	third	field	 visits.	 I	 start	with	 the	 groups	 and	 activists	 before	 I	 come	 to	 the	 villages	 and	 the	groups'	 supporters	 in	 the	 villages.	 To	 choose	 the	 groups,	 the	 villages	 as	 well	 as	 the	research	participants,	I	applied	purposeful	sampling,	i.e.,	I	chose	the	most	typical	cases	(see	Patton	2002).	But	 of	 course	 –	 particularly	when	 choosing	 villages	 –	 I	 also	had	 to	apply	 convenience	 sampling.	 The	 aim	 with	 these	 sampling	 strategies	 was	 to	 select	‘movement’	 groups	 and	 research	 participants	 that	 promised	 a	 high	 amount	 of	 new	information.	
Selecting	Groups	First,	 I	 attempted	 to	 map	 the	 groups	 and	 activists	 that	 claim	 to	 mobilize	 for	 farmer	issues.	To	 select	 a	 sample	 for	 further	 study,	 several	 criteria	were	 important.	 First	 and	foremost,	the	groups	should	be	active,	organize	activities	on	different	levels	and	have	a	presence	 (i.e.	 activists	 working)	 in	 at	 least	 one	 village	 in	 the	 Western	 Vidarbhan	districts.	 These	 points	 were	 easy	 to	 find	 out	 through	 interviews	 with	 journalists	 and	activists	and	left	me	with	only	a	few	groups	and	activists.	Second,	the	group	should	have																																									 																					5	Because	of	 this	 sampling	 strategy,	organisations	 for	 agricultural	 labour	did	not	 come	 into	my	focus.	I	have	found	agricultural	labour	organizations,	but	very	few	(one	example	is	the	All	India	Agricultural	 Workers	 Union).	 They	 do	 not	 talk	 about	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	 have	 a	 very	different	focus	in	their	work.	6	Another	 aspect	 is	 that	 the	 Naxalite	 movement	 is	 not	 very	 present	 in	 Western	 Vidarbha.	 Of	course,	the	Naxalite	movement	can	also	be	understood	as	a	farmer	movement.	But	studying	the	Naxalite	movement	would	lead	to	a	different,	particular	field	that	is	not	the	aim	of	this	research.		
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some	 sort	 of	 a	 base,	 a	 group	 of	 supporters	 and	 activists.	 There	 were	 some	 political	leaders	who	were	also	considered	farmer	leaders	by	the	interviewees,	but	there	was	no	group	forming	around	them.	Therefore	I	excluded	them	in	a	first	step.	Some	of	these	so-called	 farmer	 leaders	 that	 I	 excluded	 here	 became	 part	 of	 my	 research	 as	 individual	activists.	Third,	the	group	should	have	certain	political	demands	that	go	beyond	(self-)	help	or	charitable	activities.		I	found	that	many	of	these	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	or	self-help	groups,	though	 concerned	with	 certain	 aspects	 of	 farmer	 life,	 did	 not	make	 explicitly	 political	demands	from	the	state.	Many	of	these	groups	shared	this	characterisation	in	so	far	as	they	distinguished	themselves	from	‘movements’.		The	fourth	criterion,	that	the	group	should	not	be	a	political	party,	proved	very	difficult	to	 realize	 in	 the	 field.	While	 some	groups	were	not	at	 all	 engaged	 in	electoral	politics,	others	did	engage	but	still	claimed	to	be	part	of	a	‘movement’	and	not	a	party.	In	the	end,	this	 criterion	 blurred	 and	 eventually	 I	 did	 study	 some	 of	 the	 groups	 that	 engage	 in	electoral	 politics	 after	 all;	 one	 is	 even	 a	 political	 party.	 I	 have	 reflected	 on	 this	 very	interesting	issue	when	describing	the	heterogeneous	‘movement’	(chapter	IV	as	well	as	this	analysis	of	 the	balancing	act	by	 leaders	between	electoral	politics	and	 ‘movement’	activities	(chapter	V).		Based	on	this	list	of	criteria,	I	identified	five	groups	to	study	in	more	detail		
• Svabhimani	Shetkari	Sanghatana	(SSS),		
• Kisan	Adikar	Abiyan	(KAA),		
• Vidarbha	Jan	Andolan	Samiti	(VJAS),		
• Bharatiya	Kisan	Sangha	(BKS)	
• All	India	Kisan	Sabha	(AIKS)	Apart	 from	 these	 groups,	 several	 individual	 activists,	 including	 journalists,	 academics,	(former)	politicians	or	 farmer	 leaders,	became	 important	 for	 the	research	as	well	 (see	chapter	IV).		
Choosing	Villages7	For	 each	 of	 these	 five	 groups,	 I	 studied	 one	 village	 in	 greater	 detail	 to	 specifically	understand	the	processes	of	mobilisation	on	the	ground.	I	split	up	the	fieldwork	during	the	main	field	visit	(see	table	1).	I	visited	three	villages	along	with	my	research	assistant	Premsagar	Tasgaonkar	during	the	second	field	visit.	Following	the	survey	of	these	three	villages,	Tasgaonkar	went	alone	to	the	fourth	village,	by	which	time	he	was	familiar	with	the	 research	 process.	 In	 the	 fifth	 village,	 Andrea	Wynistorf,	 a	 Masters	 student	 at	 the	University	of	Zurich	conducted	her	MSc-thesis	(Wynistorf	2012).	Consequently,	I	rely	on	her	 findings	when	 I	describe	 this	group.	Additionally,	 I	accessed	Wynistorf’s	 interview	
																																								 																					7	I	 consider	 the	village	as	a	 sociological	unit.	The	 important	point	was	not	whether	or	not	 that	physical	space	actually	qualified	as	a	‘revenue	village’	or	a	gram	panchayat,	but	that	people	said	that	they	belonged	to	that	particular	village.	
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transcripts,	which	proved	helpful	in	particular	because	she	asked	some	extra	questions	in	her	interviews	that	relate	to	my	research	questions.		
Table	2:	Overview	over	the	‘movement’	groups	and	the	respective	villages	in	the	research	process.	
Group	 Village	 Time	 Covered	by	
Svabimani	Shetkari	S.	 Village	SSS	 3	weeks	 Lieberherr	
Vidarbha	Jan	Andolan	S.	 Village	VJAS	 3	weeks	 Lieberherr	
Kisan	Adikar	Abiyan	 Village	KAA	 3	weeks	 Lieberherr	
Bharatiya	Kisan	Sangh	 Village	BKS	 1	week	 Tasgaonkar	
All	India	Kisan	Sabha	 Villages	AIKS	 3	weeks	 Wynistorf		I	 was	 interested	 in	 studying	 mobilization	 in	 villages	 where	 the	 groups	 in	 focus	 are	active.	Therefore,	I	asked	the	leaders	or	main	activists	of	the	groups	to	give	me	names	of	villages	 where	 this	 was	 the	 case.	 Typically,	 there	 had	 not	 been	 many	 villages	 where	leaders	claimed	to	have	a	strong	presence.	Among	those,	 I	 first	 focussed	on	 those	 that	grow	 cotton	 under	 rain-fed	 conditions,	 because	 these	 conditions	 are	 often	 associated	with	 farmer	 suicides.	 Second,	 I	 chose	 those	 villages	 where	 the	 local	 activists	 were	interested	in	cooperating	with	me.	Because	I	wanted	to	understand	the	activists'	work	in	the	villages,	live	as	their	guest,	and	follow	them	to	agitations	and	activities	from	time	to	time,	this	second	criterion	became	the	dominant	one.	The	 groups	were	 active	 only	 in	 certain	 districts	 or	 villages,	 and	 their	 level	 of	 activity	differed	 strongly	 among	villages.	Therefore,	 in	 the	 villages	 I	 chose	 –	where	one	 group	was	active	–	none	of	the	other	groups	were	active	or	notably	present.	As	a	result	of	this	reality	 as	 well	 as	 my	 sampling	 strategy,	 the	 villages	 strongly	 corresponded	 to	 the	groups:	one	group	was	active	in	one	village.	Therefore	(and	as	part	of	the	anonymization	strategy,	 see	below),	 I	name	 the	villages	according	 to	 the	group	 I	 studied	 there.	As	an	example,	the	village,	where	I	studied	the	group	KAA	is	therefore	called	village	KAA.	
Choosing	Research	Participants	Within	 the	 groups	 that	 I	 studied	 in	 more	 detail,	 I	 talked	 to	 many	 different	 people,	ranging	 from	 the	 main	 leaders,	 activists	 on	 different	 levels	 and	 casual	 supporters.	Because	 of	 the	 approach	 to	 ‘follow	 the	 group’,	 the	 sampling	 approach	was	 top-down.	This	was	also	the	case	 in	 the	villages,	where	I	 first	 talked	to	the	 local	activist.	To	get	a	more	detailed	view	on	the	role	and	position	of	the	local	activists,	I	interviewed	not	only	the	 activist	 of	 the	 selected	 village,	 but	 also	 activists	 from	 three	 to	 five	 other	 (often	neighbouring)	 villages.	 Then,	 I	 asked	 the	 main	 activist	 to	 provide	 me	 the	 names	 of	supporters,	whom	I	 interviewed	next.	 I	aimed	to	cover	all	active	supporters	as	well	as	some	occasional	supporters	and	sympathisers.		Additionally,	 I	 included	 some	 socio-economic	 indicators.	 First	 and	 from	 a	 rural	development	perspective,	I	was	interested	in	learning	about	the	perspective	of	farmers	with	 different	 sizes	 of	 landholdings,	 particularly	 that	 of	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers.	
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While	it	was	possible	to	talk	to	farmers	with	different	amounts	of	landholding	and	also	to	some	who	owned	land	and	worked	as	 labourers	too	(see	below),	talking	to	 landless	labourers	or	migrant	labourers	was	rather	difficult.	This	might	have	been	because	of	the	nature	 of	 my	 entry	 into	 the	 village:	 my	 hosts	 (the	 respective	 activists)	 often	 tried	 to	steer	the	process	of	whom	I	was	talking	to	and	the	labourers	themselves	did	not	seem	to	see	any	benefit	 in	 talking	 to	me.	Notably,	 the	 farmers	 supervising	 the	 labourers’	work	(as	 also	 observing	mine)	 also	made	 it	 difficult	 to	 talk	 to	 the	 latter.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	important	to	state	that	my	information	about	villages	mostly	reflects	the	farmers’	views.	The	 labourers	 to	whom	 I	 could	 speak	consistently	maintained	 that	 those	groups	were	for	 the	 farmers	 and	 that	 nobody	was	 fighting	 for	 the	 labourers.	 Also	 the	 groups	 saw	themselves	as	 farmer	 ‘movements’	and	most	did	not	claim	to	speak	 for	 labourers	 (see	chapter	IV).	Second,	I	tried	to	interview	women	as	well	as	men,	but	this	also	proved	difficult.	 I	was	able	to	talk	to	women,	but	getting	them	to	talk	about	agricultural	politics	proved	difficult	in	most	cases.	Often,	women	straightforwardly	said	that	agricultural	politics	was	a	man’s	issue	and	that	they	didn’t	know	about	it	or	weren’t	interested.	In	the	groups	under	focus,	women	 activists	 and	 supporters	 were	 a	 tiny	 minority	 and	 even	 those	 engaged	 were	reluctant	to	talk	about	political	issues.	For	that	matter,	the	topic	of	women’s	rights	or	the	position	of	women	in	society	was	hardly	ever	addressed	by	interviewees.	If	at	all,	it	was	about	the	 increasingly	high	dowry	and	the	burden	for	 families	 that	comes	with	having	daughters.	I	am	aware	that	women	play	a	crucial	role	in	agriculture	as	well	as	in	many	local	political	institutions	and	that	there	are	many	groups	for	whom	women’s	issues	are	important	 (see	e.g.	Shah	2004b);	however,	 in	 the	particular	groups	 I	 studied,	 issues	of	women’s	rights	were	practically	a	non-issue.		Third,	 I	 wanted	 to	 interview	 people	 from	 different	 castes	 and	 religions.	 This	 proved	difficult	as	well	for	two	possible	reasons.	First,	interviewees	emphasized	that	caste	was	no	longer	an	issue	and	they	were	reluctant	to	tell	me	who	belongs	to	which	caste.	The	discourses	 of	 the	 various	 involved	 groups	 have	 always	 tended	 to	 bypass	 issues	 of	differentiation	within	peasantry,	particularly	caste	 (see	chapters	 IV	and	VI).	 I	 also	had	the	impression	that	many	interviewees	knew	well	how	I	would	think	about	caste,	why	I	would	ask	these	questions	and	so,	they	would	tell	me	what	(they	thought)	I	wanted	to	hear.	The	second	reason	was	that	I	generally	interviewed	people	from	only	a	few	castes,	because	farmers	who	own	land	in	one	village	often	belong	to	similar	castes	(see	chapter	III).		To	conclude,	I	want	to	emphasize	again	that	I	have	chosen	an	approach	that	centres	on	groups	 that	 make	 up	 a	 form	 of	 heterogeneous	 ‘movement’	 in	 my	 study	 region.	 This	sampling	approach	had	immediate	consequences,	particularly	in	the	villages.	Originally,	I	wanted	 to	 talk	 also	 to	 people	who	 do	 not	 support	 a	 group	 or	 even	 criticize	 it.	 This,	however,	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 impossible.	 I	 entered	 the	 village	 as	 a	 guest	 of	 the	 village	activist	 (all	 male)	 and	 was	 therefore	 considered	 to	 be	 on	 his	 side.	 Regardless	 of	 my	claims	to	be	independent	of	the	group,	 it	seemed	that	many	would	not	take	the	risk	of	criticising	 the	 groups	 or	 activists	 openly	 –	with	 a	 few	 exceptions.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 I	
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write	 from	 a	 ‘movement’	 perspective,	 though	 of	 course	 critically	 reflecting	 on	 the	perceptions	of	the	interviewees.	
Overview	over	the	Interviewees	Figure	 1	 provides	 some	 numbers	 regarding	 the	 interviews	 and	 provides	 a	 broad	overview	 referring	 to	 the	 characteristics	 described	 above.	 In	 total	 this	 study	 relies	 on	254	interviews	(including	the	material	collected	by	Wynistorf	and	Tasgaonkar).	A	dozen	of	 these	 were	 interviews	with	 experts	 not	 directly	 belonging	 to	 any	 group	 and	more	than	 sixty	 I	would	 instead	 classify	 as	 key	 actors	 or	 activists	 in	 the	 villages	 or	beyond.	Women	 represented	 roughly	 10%	 of	 the	 research	 participants,	 but	 only	 5%	 of	 the	activists.		About	 170	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	 villages.	 Out	 of	 these	 research	 participants,	roughly	 80%	 provided	 information	 about	 their	 land	 holdings.	 Those	 80%	 are	constituted	as	 follows	 (all	 numbers	 approximate)8:	 10%	had	 less	 than	2.5	 acres	or	no	land	 at	 all,	 35%	owned	between	2.5	 and	5	 acres,	 25%	between	5	 and	10	 acres,	 again	25%	between	 10	 and	 25	 acres,	 and	 only	 5%	more	 than	 25	 acres.	 These	 numbers	 are	displayed	in	figure	1	below.	Regarding	 castes,	more	 than	30%	of	 the	 research	participants	did	not	want	 to	 specify	their	caste	or	religion.	Some	villages	had	a	high	population	of	one	particular	caste	that	was	mirrored	in	the	sample	of	research	participants.	Village	VJAS	has	a	high	number	of	
Banjara	(belonging	to	Nomadic	Tribes	(NT)	/	Denotified	Tribes	(DNT))9	and	village	SSS	a	high	number	of	Gavali	 (also	NT/DNT).	The	Maratha-Kunbis	are	many,	particularly	 in	village	 BKS	 and	 villages	 AIKS	 but	 are	 also	 present	 in	 other	 villages,	 while	 Teli	 are	prominent	 in	 villages	 AIKS	 and	 village	 KAA.	 Gond	 (Scheduled	 Tribes	 (ST))10,	 Mali	(OBC)11	and	Mang	 (Scheduled	 Castes	 (SC))12	as	 well	 as	 Buddhists13	are	 present	 in	 all	villages.	Muslims	were	most	numerous	in	village	KAA	and	villages	AIKS.		
																																								 																					8	For	more	details	on	the	landholding	classification	see	section	2.1,	chapter	II.	9	These	are	official	designations	given	to	various	groups	of	historically	disadvantaged	people	 in	India.	 The	 terms	 are	 recognised	 in	 the	 Constitution	 of	 India	 and	 the	 various	 groups	 are	designated	in	one	or	other	of	the	categories.	NT/DNT	groups	do	not	come	under	the	Scheduled	Tribes	due	 to	historical	 circumstances;	 they	 are	 listed	 separately.	They	are	 entitled	 to	benefits	from	the	Indian	reservation	system.	10	Scheduled	Tribes	are	another	official	designation.	They	are	entitled	to	benefits	from	the	Indian	reservation	system.	11	OBC	 stands	 for	 Other	 Backward	 Classes.	 The	 government	 declares	 certain	 castes	 as	 part	 of	OBCs,	which	allows	them	to	benefit	from	the	Indian	reservation	system.	12	Scheduled	Castes	are	another	official	designation.	They	are	entitled	to	benefits	from	the	Indian	reservation	system.	13	In	Vidarbha,	many	people	that	originally	belonged	to	Scheduled	Castes	converted	to	Buddhism	(following	Ambedkar,	who	publicly	converted	to	Buddhism	in	Nagpur	in	1956).		
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Figure	1:	Overview	of	the	composition	of	interviewees	(only	illustrative)14	
		
3.2 Data	Collection	and	Production	I	now	show	how	my	data	was	collected	and	constructed.	I	distinguish	between	these	two	processes.	 I	 use	 data	 collection	 for	 government	 reports	 or	 data	 provided	 by	 social	activists	 themselves	 or	 journalists	 where	 neither	 my	 research	 assistants	 nor	 I	 were	involved.	 By	 data	 construction	 I	 refer	 to	 data	 generated	 by	 research	 participants	 in	cooperation	 with	 my	 research	 assistants	 and	 me,	 i.e.	 field	 notes	 and	 interview	transcripts.	
Review	of	Literature	and	Data	Collection	First,	 I	 reviewed	 literature	 on	 academic	 debates	 about	 social	 mobilisation	 and	movements	 in	 general,	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 movements,	 the	 processes	 of	mobilization,	 the	 role	of	 leaders	and	what	movements	 can	 change.	 Second,	 I	 reviewed	literature	on	farmer	movements	in	India	and	globally,	on	agrarian	change	in	general	and	on	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	India	in	particular.	For	the	last	topic	as	well	as	the	description	of	 the	 study	 region,	 I	 relied	 strongly	 on	 government	 reports	 and	 fact-finding	commissions.	 Additionally,	 some	 of	 the	 groups	 and	 activists	 produced	 information																																									 																					14	The	 percentages	 are	 based	 on	 different	 populations;	 for	 details	 please	 see	 text	 above.	“Position”	 refers	 to	 the	 position	 of	 the	 interviewee	 in	 the	 ‘movement’	 groups	 and	 has	 all	interviewees	as	population;	“Gender”	also	has	all	the	interviewees	as	population;	“Land”	refers	to	a	different	population,	namely	those	interviewees	in	the	villages	that	revealed	their	landholdings.	
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material	 such	 as	 leaflets,	 books,	 flyers,	 and	 articles	 as	 well	 as	 promotional	 movies.	 I	looked	through	the	material	during	the	field	research	together	with	my	field	assistants,	but	I	did	not	analyse	it	systematically.		
Data	Construction	The	 public	 activities	 of	 the	 groups	 are	 often	 only	 a	 small	 part	 of	 their	 activities.	Therefore,	 participant	 observation	 is	 a	 crucial	 method	 for	 capturing	 all	 forms	 of	activities.	For	this	research,	participant	observation	was	important	at	two	levels:	First	to	understand	the	groups	and	their	activities	(chapter	IV),	as	well	as	mobilizing	strategies,	particularly	that	of	leaders	(chapter	V);	and	second,	to	better	comprehend	the	situation	of	farmers	living	in	Vidarbha	(chapter	III).	For	the	second	point,	I	spent	time	in	villages	(see	 above),	 I	 have	 lived	 at	 the	 village	 activists’	 houses	 and	 taken	 part	 in	 everyday	activities	 related	 to	 mobilisation	 and	 agriculture.	 For	 the	 former	 point,	 I	 asked	 the	activists	 I	 interviewed	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 field	 visit	 as	 well	 as	 the	 local	 activists	whether	 they	 could	 take	 me	 with	 them	 whenever	 they	 were	 taking	 part	 in	 any	mobilization	 activities.	 This	 approach	 is	 informed	by	Marcus	 (1998)	who	proposed	 to	
“follow	the	people”	–	which	in	my	study	entails	following	the	‘movement’	actors	(cited	in	Rahm	2012,	126).	 I	 attended	many	meetings,	 rallies	and	other	activities,	observed	 the	activities	of	the	activists	as	well	as	the	behaviour	of	the	audience,	and	broadly	captured	the	 content	 of	 the	 meetings	 and	 speeches.	 Further	 I	 had	 many	 informal	 discussions	during	these	agitations.	Sometimes	the	activists	allowed	me	to	shadow	them	for	a	whole	day.	But	most	of	the	time,	I	 just	observed	the	meetings	or	rallies	and	then	the	activists	went	their	own	way.		The	second	main	method	was	to	conduct	semi-structured	 interviews	with	the	selected	interview	partners.	For	the	interview	guidelines	I	relied	on	Flick	(2010).	The	questions	varied	depending	on	 the	 interviewees,	whether	 they	were	 journalists	 or	 activists	who	served	 as	 key	 actors	 (see	 Fetterman	2008)	 and	were	well	 educated	 and	 familiar	with	political	jargon,	or	farmers	who	simply	participated	in	one	agitation	(see	Annexes	1	and	2	 for	 the	 interview	guidelines).	The	 interview	guidelines	were	 flexible	and	 I	combined	and	 adapted	 them.	 For	 example,	 when	 I	 was	 interviewing	 the	 village	 activists,	 I	combined	 elements	 of	 two	 interview	 guidelines.	 The	 guidelines	 included	 broad	questions	 as	 well	 as	 stimulating	 questions	 and	 points	 to	 be	 touched	 upon.	 The	interviews	 were	 the	 basis	 for	 chapters	 III	 to	 VII	 of	 this	 research.	 Particularly	 for	 the	analysis	 of	 frames	 constructed	 by	 the	 groups'	 actors,	 Plows	 (2008,	 1529)	 stated,	interviews	can	serve	to	identify	how	the	interviewees	frame	issues	“in	their	own	terms”.	Considering	 that	 social	 movement	 activists	 often	 start	 becoming	 active	 because	 they	have	been	“framed	out”	or	their	demands	ignored,	this	has	particular	importance	(ibid,	1529).	 Consequently,	 interviews	 were	 especially	 important	 for	 chapters	 III	 and	 VI,	where	 I	 analyse	how	 the	 ‘movement’	 actors	 frame	 their	 situation	and	possible	visions	for	the	future.	I	 took	 field	 notes	 during,	 before	 and	 after	 the	 interviews	 as	 well	 as	 during	 the	participant	observation	in	villages	and	at	‘movement’	activities.	Sometimes	I	relied	fully	on	my	observations,	but	most	often,	I	required	the	help	of	my	field	assistants	to	discuss	
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and	 try	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 what	 was	 happening.	 These	 field	 notes	 constituted	 an	important	part	of	the	material	for	this	research.		
Co-construction	of	Data	–	A	Drama15	Staged	for	Me?	During	fieldwork,	there	were	many	incidents	that	made	the	co-construction	of	data	very	visible.	 Sometimes,	 when	 I	 talked	 to	 supporters	 in	 villages	 or	 at	 agitations,	 I	 got	 the	feeling	that	a	drama	was	being	staged	for	me.	Because	I	came	to	study	the	 ‘movement’	and	I	was	introduced	by	leaders	of	the	involved	groups,	it	was	probably	crucial	for	lower	level	 activists	 to	 create	 an	 impressive	 picture	 about	 their	 activities,	 achievements	 or	reputation.	Or	perhaps	 it	was	simply	 their	 involvement	 that	made	 them	want	 to	show	me	the	best	they	had	to	offer.	This	desire,	however,	at	times	led	to	difficult	situations.	Instead	 of	 following	 the	 activists	 like	 a	 shadow	 as	 I	 had	 intended,	 I	was	welcomed	 in	villages	with	drums	and	trumpets,	was	asked	to	give	speeches,	forced	to	do	interviews	with	farmers	that	were	placed	in	front	of	me.	During	the	long	stays	in	all	three	villages	(to	 different	 extents)	 it	was	 difficult	 to	 interview	 the	 people	 I	wanted	 to.	 I	 was	 often	accompanied	 by	 some	 of	 the	 activist’s	 family	 members	 or	 friends.	 When	 I	 finally	managed	 to	 go	 around	 unaccompanied,	 the	 only	 people	 I	 ended	 up	 talking	 to	 again	turned	out	to	be	relatives	of	the	activist.	Another	time,	some	farmers	–	also	friends	of	the	village	activists	–	heard	that	I	was	interested	to	talk	to	marginal	 farmers	and	suddenly	people	with	considerable	landholdings	presented	themselves	as	marginal	farmers	to	me.	This	 reveals	 again	 that	 the	 chosen	 methodological	 approach	 provided	 me	 with	 the	perspectives	 of	 ‘movement’	 actors,	 but	 not	 of	 the	 people	 who	 were	 not	 part	 of	 the	interviews.	 Considering	 my	 research	 questions	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 description	 of	 the	‘movement’,	 its	 mobilization	 strategies	 and	 framings,	 being	 able	 to	 understand	 many	different	perspectives	within	a	‘movement’	is	a	strength.		
3.3 Data	Management	and	Analysis	
Translation	and	Transcription	The	majority	of	the	interviews	happened	in	Marathi	or	Hindi	and	a	minority	in	English.	Only	 some	 activists	 were	 fluent	 in	 English.	 The	 research	 assistants	 Premsagar	Tasgaonkar,	Manoj	 Patil,	 Aditee	Hedaoo	 and	Aniket	 Gattuwar	 acted	 as	 interpreters	 in	the	 field.	 Nearly	 all	 the	 interviews	 were	 recorded	 with	 a	 digital	 recorder.	 During	meetings,	 rallies	 etc.	 they	 translated	 for	 me	 on	 the	 go.	 This	 information	 was	 not	recorded,	 but	 I	 took	 notes	 later.	 Translation	 can	 both	 add	 and	 obscure	 information	because	 translation	always	 involves	 an	 interpretation,	negotiation	and	 construction	of	meaning.	Nevertheless,	 I	 tried	 to	minimize	 the	potentially	 lost	 nomenclatures	used	by	the	 research	 participants.	 Therefore,	 the	 research	 assistants	 did	 the	 transcription	 and	translation	 of	 all	 the	Marathi/Hindi	 interviews	 (I	 transcribed	 the	 English	 ones).	 They	
																																								 																					15	I	 use	 the	word	 drama	 here	 not	 to	 emphasize	 a	 dramatic	 notion,	 but	 to	 refer	 to	 the	Marathi	word	tamasha	(a	form	of	Marathi	theatre),	that	was	used	by	research	participants	often	and	that	they	translated	into	English	as	drama.	
	 36	
included	information	in	the	transcripts	that	had	gone	lost	or	been	misinterpreted	during	the	interviews.		
Data	Analysis	The	 data	 were	 analysed	 using	 techniques	 of	 Grounded	 Theory	 (Corbin	 and	 Strauss	2008;	 Strauss	 and	 Corbin	 1996).	 This	 allowed	 me	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 material	systematically	and	to	become	familiar	with	it.	It	also	makes	implicit	assumptions	visible.	I	used	in	particular	open	and	axial	coding	intensively.		Grounded	Theory	is	inductive.	Induction	refers	to	the	fundamental	distinction	between	quantitative	and	qualitative	approaches	where	the	former	is	exclusively	concerned	with	‘hypothesis	testing’	and	‘verification’	and	the	latter	focuses	on	developing	concepts	and	grounded	 theory	 from	 the	 field	 experience.	 A	 qualitative	 researcher	 begins	 with	 the	field,	derives	concepts,	constructs	a	web	of	hypotheses	and	finally	develops	a	grounded,	field-based	theory.	This	characteristic	of	qualitative	methodology,	hence,	both	in	terms	of	 methodological	 principle	 as	 well	 as	 valid	 epistemology,	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 the	distance	between	field	and	theory.	Since	qualitative	methodology	is	inductive	in	nature,	it	also	proposes	the	‘emergent’	nature	of	reality	and	permits	the	field	reality	to	develop	concepts	and	theories.	We	know	that	field	data	is	initially	fragmented	and	unstructured.	The	layers	and	structures	within	reality	are	infinite	and	evolving.	Hence,	there	cannot	be	one	foundational	theory	to	explain	the	whole	reality.	Data	emerging	from	the	field	thus	lead	to	the	generation	of	concepts	and	a	web	of	hypotheses.		In	 applying	 Grounded	 Theory	 to	 develop	 this	 field-based	 theory,	 I	 started	 with	 open	coding	 of	 the	 constructed	 data.	 This	 involves	 splitting	 up	 the	 material	 and	 becoming	familiar	with	it.	In	this	process,	I	used	codes	that	I	derived	from	the	interviews.	I	had	a	large	number	of	 interviews	and	so	 I	 started	by	analysing	about	a	dozen	of	 them	using	open	 coding16.	 Then,	 I	 used	 axial,	 deductive	 coding17	for	 those	 interviews	 before	 I	continued	with	the	others.	During	the	whole	process	of	coding,	I	kept	switching	between	open	and	axial	coding,	between	working	 inductively	and	using	 the	codes	derived	 from	previous	 interviews.	 This	 change	 between	 inductive	 and	 deductive	work	 proved	 very	challenging.	But	it	allowed	me	to	better	understand	the	situation	and	statements	of	the	research	 participants.	 I	 used	 selective	 coding18,	 the	 third	 coding	method	 of	 Grounded	Theory,	 mainly	 in	 the	 process	 of	 writing	 when	 I	 structured	 the	material	 defining	 the	thread	 of	 the	 story.	 During	 coding,	 I	 technically	 worked	 both	 with	 the	 computer	program	atlas.ti	as	well	as	manually	with	printouts	of	the	texts	and	markers.		
																																								 																					16	Open	coding	is	to	segment	and	divide	the	data	into	similar	groupings.	By	going	back	and	forth	and	constantly	comparing	data,	preliminary	codes	can	be	formed,	modified	and	sharpened.	 17	During	axial	deductive	coding,	the	preliminary	codes	are	related	to	each	other	and	theoretical	concepts	are	used	to	create	codes	that	help	understanding	the	phenomenon	under	study	in	new	ways. 18	Selective	 coding	 is	 the	 last	 coding	 step	 and	 includes	 organizing	 the	 codes	 in	 a	 way	 that	articulates	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 and	 helps	 contributing	 to,	 challenging	 or	developing	theory. 
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Anonymization	I	 use	 two	 different	 strategies	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 interview	 material,	 one	 for	 the	 leaders,	activists,	scholars	and	journalists	with	a	high	level	of	publicity	and	one	for	the	activists	with	a	 low	 level	of	publicity	as	well	 as	 supporters.	For	 the	people	with	a	high	 level	of	publicity,	I	did	not	anonymize	their	interviews	at	all.	Anonymization	for	these	research	participants	would	have	been	difficult.	The	 ‘movement’	 in	Vidarbha	 is	not	 that	big	and	any	person	 familiar	with	 the	 topic	 could	have	 figured	out	easily	who	 the	 interviewees	were.	I	would	have	had	to	hide	that	the	study	is	about	Vidarbha	and	decontextualize	the	research	 in	 order	 to	 anonymize	 them.	 In	 addition,	 the	 interviews	 were	 not	 about	personal	 or	 intimate	 issues	 but	 about	 political	 opinions	 and	 thoughts	 that	 these	participants	 express	 publicly	 in	 other	 instances.	 Finally,	 I	 aim	 to	 credit	 them	 for	 their	ideas	 that	 have	 become	 part	 of	 this	 research.	 Of	 course,	 this	 was	 done	 with	 their	consent.		For	 the	 people	 with	 a	 low	 level	 of	 publicity,	 I	 used	 a	 strategy	 for	 complete	anonymization.	The	reason	 for	 this	strategy	 is	 that	 I	assured	 the	research	participants	that	 I	 would	 anonymize	 them	 and	 thus	 that	 they	 could	 freely	 tell	 me	 anything	 they	thought	 about	 the	 respective	 organization.	 As	mentioned	 above,	 I	mostly	 interviewed	people	 suggested	 by	 the	 local	 activist.	 If	 I	would	 reveal	 the	 organization,	 landholding,	caste	and	other	information	about	an	interviewee,	it	might	be	still	possible	for	the	local	activist	 to	 figure	 out	who	 it	 was	 –	 if	 he	wanted	 to.	 As	 I	 did	 not	want	 to	 reveal	 these	details	 about	 the	 interviewees,	 giving	 interview	 numbers	 or	 another	 designation	seemed	pointless.	Instead,	I	mention	specific	characteristics	according	to	the	respective	topic	 (e.g.	 small/medium	 farmer,	 supporter/activist).	 This	 aims	 at	 making	 the	arguments	comprehensible.	The	village	activists	 take	an	 intermediate	position	and	are	sometimes	 anonymized	 (even	 the	 organization)	 when	 the	 content	 might	 possibly	 be	delicate,	and	at	others	they	have	been	named	to	credit	them	for	their	ideas.		
3.4 Movement	Research	and	Reciprocity	Regarding	the	research	ethics	relevant	to	this	research,	I	discuss	the	issue	of	reciprocity.	Reciprocity	in	research	means	what	the	research	participants	give	to	the	researcher	and	what	the	latter	is	able	to	give	back	to	them	(Crow	2008).	In	social	movement	research	in	particular,	this	often	relates	to	if	and	how	a	researcher	can	engage	in	and	contribute	to	the	 social	 movements	 she/he	 is	 studying.	 Arguably	 it	 starts	 with	 the	 question	 of	whether	neutrality	should	or	even	can	be	aspired	to	or	if	one	should	take	sides	to	begin	with.	As	a	consequence	of	my	constructivist	epistemological	approach	(sketched	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter),	I	believe	that	it	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable	to	be	neutral.	I	 refer	 here	 to	 feminist	 thinkers,	 for	 example,	 who	 have	 strongly	 claimed	 that	 all	research	 is	 underwritten	 with	 political	 implications	 and	 personal	 intentions,	 be	 it	research	methods,	sites	or	fields	(see	Law	2006,	for	an	overview).	My	goal	is	to	consider	different	perspectives	and	to	reflect	critically	on	one’s	own	position	and	the	positions	of	the	 interviewees.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 this	 study,	 namely	 to	analyse	the	different	perceptions	and	ideas	of	‘movement’	actors	and	to	present	them	to	a	different	audience.	
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Beyond	 these	 discussions,	 the	 question	 remains	 if	 and	 how	 social	 movement	researchers	should	get	involved	with	the	movements	they	study.	Some	activist-scholars	directly	 engage	 with	 the	 movement	 they	 are	 researching	 and	 generate	 immediate	reciprocation.	There	is	a	vivid	debate	about	the	feasibility	as	well	as	the	desirability	of	activist-scholars	(see	e.g.	Gillan	and	Pickerill	2012),	and	there	are	several	critical	issues.	First,	 as	 Dawson	 and	 Sinwell	 (2012)	 argue,	 promises	 of	 reciprocity	 can	 evoke	expectations	from	the	side	of	the	research	participants	that	the	researcher	is	not	willing	or	able	to	provide.	This	can	harm	the	relationship.	During	my	fieldwork,	I	constantly	had	to	 explain	 the	 limitations	 of	 my	 own	 possibilities	 of	 support	 because	 I	 had	 the	impression	that	some	‘movement’	actors	greatly	overestimated	my	potential	influence.		Second	and	more	importantly,	a	direct	involvement	in	the	struggles	and	open	solidarity	is	 possible	 and	 can	 be	 beneficial	 in	 those	 movements,	 with	 whose	 demands	 the	researcher	can	 fully	 identify.	But	 there	are	also	 the	so-called	ugly	movements	 that	are	opposed	to	the	political	stand	of	the	researcher,	e.g.	right-wing	extremists.	There,	those	who	 demand	 for	 reciprocity	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 consternated	 when	 reciprocity	 seems	neither	possible	nor	desirable	(for	an	elaboration	on	this	topic,	see	Gillan	and	Pickerill	2012,	136-137).	Plows	(2008,	1532-1533)	nicely	describes	that	there	are	many	different	streams	in	one	social	movement,	some	of	which	are	close	to	the	researcher’s	own	stand	while	 others	 seem	 insupportable.	 In	 this	 case,	 reciprocity	 becomes	 even	 more	complicated.		In	 this	 research	 I	 experienced	 similar	 situations	 to	 the	 ones	Plows	describes.	 To	 start	with,	 I	 am	 deeply	 involved	 with	 rural,	 agrarian	 and	 agricultural	 issues.	 It	 is	 no	coincidence	that	I	decided	to	study	mobilisations	around	neoliberal	policies	and	farmer	suicides.	 I	 believe	 that	 many	 of	 the	 groups’	 demands	 are	 important	 and	 I	 hope	 to	provide	 a	 different	 audience	 for	 them	 through	 my	 research.	 Nevertheless,	 I	 became	increasingly	 aware	 that	 despite	 my	 focus	 on	 farmer	 groups,	 these	 groups	 had	 more	dimensions	 than	 just	 the	 agricultural	 one.	 I	 realised	 that	my	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 about	many	aspects	of	daily	life	and	politics	in	the	region	was	so	considerable	(in	spite	of	my	fieldwork),	 that	 I	 felt	 unable	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 position	 of	 these	 groups	 beyond	agricultural	 issues,	 e.g.	 in	 terms	 of	 caste-politics	 or	 their	 position	 towards	 Hindu	nationalism	 (see	 chapter	 IV	 and	 VI),	 let	 alone	 impact	 them.	 In	 many	 incidences,	 I	understood	 that	 some	 groups	 or	 certain	 activists	 support	 communalist,	 right	 wing	politics	that	are	opposed	to	my	own	political	views.		My	direct	involvement	in	the	groups’	activities	during	fieldwork	was	more	passive	than	active	and	often	involuntary.	My	presence	was	mentioned	in	speeches	to	emphasize	the	importance	of	claims.	I	was	in	the	newspaper	several	times	without	me	even	knowing	it	and	 it	 seemed	 to	 give	 the	 groups	 a	 certain	 relevance	 that	 a	 researcher	 from	 abroad	would	 do	 research	 about	 them.	 Consequently,	 incidents	 when	 I	 was	 involved	 in	 the	‘movement’	 activities	 then	sometimes	 left	me	with	a	bitter	 taste	 in	my	mouth,	despite	my	solidarity	with	some	of	the	struggles.		To	conclude,	I	argue	that	the	question	is	not	whether	or	not	to	get	involved,	but	rather	at	what	 level.	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 there	might	 be	more	 immediate	 and	 efficient	 ways	 to	
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engage	in	social	struggles	than	doing	research	about	them.	I	agree	with	Croteau	(2005,	20)	 who	 states	 that	 “becoming	 an	 academic	 to	 support	 social	 movements	 is	 akin	 to	
launching	 a	 space	 program	 to	 develop	 a	 pen	 that	 writes	 upside	 down.	 At	 best,	 it	 is	 a	
circuitous	route.”	At	the	same	time,	I	believe	it	is	important	as	a	social	movement	scholar	to	reflect	how	one	can	be	relevant	to	the	social	movement	one	studies	–	and	there	are	manifold	 ways	 to	 engage.	 Many	 researchers,	 for	 example,	 provide	 academically	 very	valuable	results	and	analyses	of	movements.	Even	if	the	direct	benefit	of	this	knowledge	for	 the	 activists	 is	 limited,	 there	 is	 no	 point	 in	 creating	 a	 hierarchy	 between	 activist	knowledge	 and	 academic	 knowledge.	 These	 results	 can	 also	 be	 very	 important	 for	researchers	 to	 situate	 themselves	 vis-à-vis	 neoliberalism	 or	 capitalism	 and	 in	 critical	support	 of	 those	 movements	 with	 whom	 they	 work.	 Additionally,	 they	 can	 serve	 to	influence	 and	 change	 relevant	 policies	 (Fuller	 and	 Kitchin	 2004;	 Gillan	 and	 Pickerill	2012).	It	is	in	this	realm	where	I	see	my	own	contribution.	I	can	contribute	to	academic	debates	about	 agriculture	 in	 the	 times	 of	 neoliberal	 globalization	 by	 reflecting	 on	 perceptions	and	visions	of	 farmers	and	activists	 in	one	marginal	 region.	By	depicting	 their	diverse	perspectives	 on	 the	 situation	 and	 the	 future	 of	 agriculture,	 I	 can	 enrich	 and	 critically	analyse	 both	 movement	 debates	 as	 well	 as	 academic	 arguments.	 Particularly	 with	regard	to	the	former,	this	work	emphasizes	carefully	listening	to	the	grassroots.		
4 Structure	of	the	Thesis	The	following	chapters	relate	to	the	debates	on	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	India.	In	chapter	II,	I	describe	 the	 debates	 on	 agricultural	 and	 agrarian	 changes	 in	 India’s	 primary	 sector.	 I	show	 how	 the	 changes	 caused	 by	 the	 Green	 Revolution,	 the	 persistence	 of	 old	 social	structures	and	New	Economic	Policies	have	shaped	today’s	agriculture.	Two	strands	of	argument	 that	 are	 dominant	 in	 India	 run	 through	 this	 chapter.	 One	 depicts	 how	 the	whole	peasantry	is	in	crisis	and	suffers	from	these	new	policies.	The	other	distinguishes	between	different	 groups	of	 farmers,	 of	which	 some	are	 in	deep	 crisis	 and	experience	even	 negative	 profits	 from	 agriculture,	 while	 others	 make	 a	 good	 living	 from	 their	agricultural	activities.		In	chapter	III,	I	break	down	this	discussion	at	the	level	of	the	study	region	of	Vidarbha.	After	providing	an	overview	of	Vidarbha’s	context	of	and	its	agriculture,	 I	analyse	how	the	interviewed	farmers	themselves	perceive	their	agricultural	situation.	To	conclude,	I	link	the	perceptions	of	farmers	in	chapter	III	with	the	academic	debates	in	chapter	II	and	the	statistical	data	in	chapter	III.		The	following	chapters	IV	and	V	relate	to	debates	in	social	movement	theories	over	the	why	and	how	of	 social	movements	 as	well	 as	 over	possible	outcomes.	 In	 chapter	 IV,	 I	first	 give	 an	overview	of	 the	 recent	 rural	movements	 in	 India	before	mapping	out	 the	current	actors	I	found	in	Vidarbha.	I	describe	the	groups	I	focus	on	in	more	detail:	what	do	these	groups	do,	what	demands	do	they	have	and	how	do	they	cooperate	with	each	other?	I	relate	these	‘movement’	groups	to	the	past	farmer	movements.	I	also	reflect	on	
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whether	or	not	 these	mobilisations	can	be	called	a	 ‘movement’	based	on	debates	over	what	constitutes	a	 social	movement.	 In	debates	on	social	movements	as	well	as	 in	my	fieldwork,	one	of	the	most	important	questions	concerns	how	social	movements	emerge	and	grow	in	strength	and	why	people	decide	to	take	part	in	them.	This	was	the	question	that	 brought	 me	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 leaders	 in	 the	 context	 of	 farmer	 ‘movement’	groups	in	Vidarbha.	In	 chapter	V	 therefore,	 I	 analyse	 the	 role	of	 leaders	 in	 the	 ‘movement’.	 First,	 I	 give	an	overview	about	debates	on	the	role	of	leaders	and	on	different	leadership	styles	in	India.	Second,	 I	 analyse	 how	 leaders	 need	 to	 prove	 their	 trustworthiness.	 I	 analyse	 how	supporters	 of	 the	 ‘movement’	want	 their	 leader	 to	 be	 a	 'fixer'	 who	 is	 able	 to	 achieve	things	and	is	therefore	close	to	political	powers.	At	the	same	time,	they	expect	a	leader	to	be	honest	and	therefore	distinctly	non-political.	Thus,	leaders	try	to	manage	a	difficult	balancing	act	between	being	good	fixers	and	proving	their	honesty.	In	the	final	chapters,	I	bring	these	two	broad	debates	together.	In	chapter	VI,	the	visions	of	 ‘movement’	actors	 for	 the	 future	of	agriculture	 take	centre	stage.	 I	discuss	different	ideas,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	 future	 of	 small/medium-scale	 farming	 in	 dry	 land	areas.	 I	 analyse	 how	 these	 frames	 have	 changed	 compared	 to	 the	 earlier	 farmer	movements	 and	 how	 they	 can	 be	 positioned	 in	 a	 global	 debate	 about	 the	 future	 of	agriculture.		In	chapter	VII,	I	describe	the	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides.	The	focus	lies	on	how	the	‘movement’	 actors	 interact	 with	 this	 topic	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 on	 a	 local	 as	 well	 as	 a	discursive	 level.	 I	 show	how	 these	 suicides	 have	 become	 'public	 deaths'	 and	 are	 even	understood	 as	 a	 ‘silent	movement’.	 I	 show	 how	 the	 suicides	 are	 used	 in	 the	 struggle	against	the	neoliberal	policies	in	central	Indian	farmer	struggles,	as	are	other	incidents	of	suicides	from	different	countries	of	the	world.		In	chapter	VIII,	I	wrap	up	the	thesis.	I	go	back	to	the	initial	themes	that	the	present	study	explores,	 some	of	which	 relate	 to	 analysing	 the	nature	of	 the	 agrarian	mobilization	 in	Vidarbha,	the	role	of	the	leaders	in	mobilisation,	the	demands,	visions	and	outcomes	of	the	groups’	struggles	and	so	on.	The	thesis	ends	with	an	overall	conclusion	and	outlook	for	the	future.	
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II. Crisis	of	Agriculture	in	India		The	 notion	 of	 an	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 is	 prominent	 in	 discussions	 on	 rural	 India.	 Its	 exact	meaning,	characteristics	and	causes,	however,	are	subject	to	debate.	In	the	first	section	of	this	chapter,	I	describe	India’s	agricultural	policies	since	independence	in	order	to	put	this	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	context.	In	the	second	section,	I	analyse	the	major	characteristics	of	this	crisis.	In	the	third	section,	I	outline	two	major	arguments	to	describe	and	explain	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.		
1 Agricultural	Policies	in	India	after	Independence	Agricultural	performance	has	been	 fluctuating	sharply	 since	 independence.	During	 the	colonial	 period,	 agriculture	 was	 marked	 by	 stagnation.	 In	 the	 decades	 after	independence,	agriculture	caught	up,	but	showed	very	meagre	growth	rates.	According	to	Ramakumar	(2010),	India's	development	after	independence	can	be	divided	into	four	periods.	The	first	is	the	period	of	National	Planning	from	1950–1965.	The	second	can	be	called	the	early	Green	Revolution	phase	(mid–1960s	to	the	early	1980s),	followed	by	the	
late	Green	Revolution	phase	 (from	 the	early	1980s	 to	early	1990s).	The	 fourth,	present	period	started	in	the	early	1990s	and	is	characterized	by	a	shift	in	agricultural	policies	towards	liberalization	of	domestic	markets	as	well	as	international	trade.		
1.1 National	Planning	(1950	–	1965)	The	central	government	under	Prime	Minister	Jawaharlal	Nehru	introduced	the	5-Year	Plans,	which	were	developed	and	monitored	by	the	Planning	Commission	of	India.	The	major	 goals	 initially	 had	 been	 to	 reduce	 regional	 disparities	 and	 strengthen	 domestic	industry	and	production	while	allowing	limited	domestic	competition.	In	terms	of	food	production,	 the	major	concern	was	to	ensure	production	of	affordable	staple	 foods	 for	the	urban	population	to	enable	industrial	growth	(Ramakumar	2010).		Srinivasan	 (1987)	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 bought	 food	 crops	 from	 domestic	suppliers	 below	 market	 prices	 and	 sold	 them	 at	 subsidized	 rates.	 The	 prices	 of	agricultural	goods	were	kept	low	either	in	order	to	guarantee	affordable	staple	crops	for	the	country's	consumers,	or	to	please	the	lobby	of	traders	and	industry	upstream.	This	low	procurement	price	was	a	hidden	tax	for	the	farmers.	However,	agriculture	benefited	from	different	subsidies	 in	 return:	agricultural	 income	was	 tax-free;	 land	 taxation	was	negligible	 as	 were	 charges	 for	 irrigation	 water	 from	 publicly	 funded	 reservoirs.	Nevertheless,	 this	 indirect	 taxing	of	agriculture	points	 to	 the	so–called	urban	bias	 (see	also	 Braverman	 and	 Kanbur	 1987).	 Authors	 like	 Lewis	 (1954)	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	agricultural	sector	was	reduced	to	playing	the	role	of	a	provider	of	 food	and	 labour	to	industry	 in	 the	 development	 literature	 and	 was	 not	 considered	 an	 area	 of	 growth	 in	itself.	According	 to	Corbridge	and	 Jones	 (2010,	7)	 the	goal	was	 to	extract	a	 significant	net	 flow	of	 resources	 from	agriculture,	particularly	 in	 the	Second	and	Third	Five-Year	Plans.	
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Varshney	 (1993)	 countered	 that	 because	 in	 India	 democracy	 came	 before	industrialization,	policies	marked	by	an	urban	bias	were	abandoned	after	two	Five-Year	Plans.	Successive	governments	had	been	unable	to	enforce	pricing	that	was	against	the	interests	of	 farmers.	Rather,	 as	Ramakumar	 (2010)	argued,	 agricultural	policies	based	on	subsidized	 inputs	such	as	 fertilizers,	diesel,	electricity	and	credit	were	promoted	 in	the	first	three	Five-Year	Plans.	A	particular	focus	was	on	increasing	public	investments	in	irrigation	–	the	importance	of	which	declined	continuously	after	the	First	Plan.		Consequently,	 yields	 did	 increase	 during	 the	 period	 of	 National	 Planning.	 However,	Ramakumar	 argues	 that	 this	 was	 not	 through	 increasing	 productivity,	 but	 mostly	through	an	increase	of	the	area	under	cultivation.	The	latter	–	and	with	it	the	growth	of	yields	–	plateaued	in	the	1960s.		
1.2 New	Agricultural	Strategy	(mid-1960s	–	1990s)	This	plateau	 in	production	growth,	 together	with	a	growing	population,	 led	to	a	major	food	crisis	in	the	mid-1960s.	Thus,	a	New	Agricultural	Strategy	was	introduced	in	order	to	achieve	growth	in	the	agricultural	sector.	This	heralded	the	era	of	the	so-called	Green	Revolution	 (mid-1960s	 to	 early	 1990s).	 The	 state	 supported	 High	 Yielding	 Variety	(HYV)	seeds,	chemical	fertilizers,	pesticides,	mechanization,	irrigation,	and	cheap	credit	in	order	to	intensify	agricultural	production	(Baker	and	Jewitt	2007;	Mishra	2008).	On	the	one	hand,	 the	New	Agricultural	Strategy	was	 firmly	rooted	 in	 the	adoption	of	new	technology	provided	by	the	State.	On	the	other	hand,	 it	relied	heavily	on	state	support	for	 four	major	 areas	 of	 agricultural	markets.	 First,	 prices	 of	 agricultural	 outputs	were	subjected	 to	 controls.	 For	 that	 purpose,	 the	 Agricultural	 Pricing	 Commission	 was	established	in	order	to	advise	the	government	about	the	best	prices	for	incentivizing	the	adoption	of	 technology.	The	Minimum	Support	Price	 (MSP)	and	Maximum	Retail	Price	came	into	existence.	Second,	the	state	nationalized	commercial	banks.	These	new	public	banks	consequently	spread	geographically	and	increased	their	functional	reach.	This	led	to	increased	credit	availability	particularly	in	rural	areas	and	weakened	the	position	of	the	moneylenders.	Third,	 the	state	regulated	prices	of	 inputs	 like	 fertilizers,	pesticides	and	electricity	 for	 irrigation.	 Fourth,	 the	marketing	of	 farm	products	was	 regulated	 to	avoid	 market	 distortions.	 The	 Agricultural	 Produce	 and	 Marketing	 Committee	 Act	 of	1963	 and	 the	 Essential	 Commodities	 Act	 1955	 allowed	 for	 a	 number	 of	 regulated	markets	 to	 develop	 –	 one	 of	 which	 was	 the	 Maharashtra	 State	 Co–operative	 Cotton	Growers	Marketing	Federation	Limited	(MSCCGMF)	(see	chapter	III).	In	the	early	phase	of	 the	 Green	 Revolution,	 agricultural	 growth	 rates	 were	 modest	 and	 below	 those	experienced	 during	 the	 preceding	 phase	 of	 National	 Planning.	 The	 stagnation	 of	 less	fertile	regions	would	not	be	compensated	by	the	high	performance	of	more	fertile	ones.	However,	in	the	1980s,	the	late	phase	of	Green	Revolution,	agriculture	recovered.	As	the	Green	Revolution	spread	to	more	regions	and	crops,	grain	yields	increased	(Ramakumar	2010).		Some	authors,	most	prominently	Prabhat	Patnaik,	argued	that	in	the	phase	of	the	Green	Revolution,	existing	inequalities	were	further	aggravated.	Even	if	there	was	an	increase	in	agricultural	production	and	the	availability	of	 food	grains,	 this	happened	in	a	highly	
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iniquitous	 manner.	 Patnaik	 (1975)	 argued	 that	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 was	 unequal	 in	three	 respects.	 First,	 it	 benefited	 affluent	 farmers	 more	 than	 the	 small	 and	 marginal	ones,	 the	 landless,	 and	 the	 poor.	 Green	 Revolution	 technologies	 such	 as	 HYV	 seeds,	chemical	 fertilizer	 and	 pesticides	 were	 only	 accessible	 to	 farmers	 who	 already	 had	sufficient	resources	and	could	mobilize	these	to	invest	in	new	technology.	Furthermore,	in	order	to	generate	more	yields	with	those	technologies,	a	high	level	of	knowledge	and	access	 to	 extension	 services	 were	 required	 (see	 also	 Griffin	 and	 Ghose	 1979;	 Jodhka	1994).	 The	 general	 debate	 about	whether	 or	 not	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 has	 increased	poverty	 is	vast	and	controversial	 (for	an	overview	see	Das	2002).	However,	 the	Green	Revolution’s	tendency	to	increase	inequality	is	not	disputed.		Consequently,	 as	 Rao	 (1994)	 argues,	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 New	 Agricultural	 Strategy	were	 that	 it	 exacerbated	 structural	 inequalities	 and	 focused	 too	heavily	on	 the	 supply	side.	 It	 therefore	 neglected	 property	 relations	 (e.g.	 in	 land)	 and	 popular	 demand	 for	food.	An	impressive	example	for	the	importance	of	such	structural	limitations	and	how	these	can	be	overcome	 is	West	Bengal.	There,	 the	Communist	Party	of	 India	 (Marxist)	was	 in	 power	 and	 tenancy	 reforms	 were	 implemented	 much	 more	 successfully	 than	elsewhere.	 Ramachandran,	 Swaminathan	 and	Rawal	 (2003)	 showed	 that	West	 Bengal	had	 the	 highest	 growth	 rate	 in	 agricultural	 production	 of	 all	 States	 in	 the	 late	 Green	Revolution	period.	And	this	performance	could	be	traced	back	to	tenancy	reforms	rather	than	 technological	 progress	 (see	 also	 Banerjee,	 Gertler,	 and	 Ghatak	 2002).	 Therefore,	the	Green	Revolution,	together	with	the	land	reforms	(see	section	1.4	below),	arguably	benefited	a	group	of	landed	farmers	that	can	be	described	as	“bullock-capitalists”.	Their	influence	 grew	 in	 the	 1970s	 (Rudolph	 and	 Rudolph	 1987),	 particularly	 in	 farmer	movements	in	India	(see	section	2.3,	chapter	IV).	Second,	 the	 Green	 Revolution	mainly	 focused	 on	 rice	 and	 wheat,	 leaving	 other	 crops	behind.	 Thus,	 Green	Revolution	 technologies	 brought	 advantages	 but	 only	 under	 very	particular	agricultural	conditions	and	for	particular	crops.	The	soil	needed	to	be	rich	for	the	high-yield	varieties	to	grow,	optimal	irrigation	was	essential,	and	sufficient	amounts	of	chemical	fertilizers	and	pesticides	applied	continuously	were	required	to	support	the	monocultures.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 these	 conditions,	 effects	 on	 yields	were	much	 lower.	Third	 and	 closely	 connected	 to	 the	 second,	 the	Green	Revolution	 favoured	 areas	with	favourable	environmental	conditions	–	specifically	plain,	irrigable	areas	with	good	soils.	This	 pointed	 to	 the	 increasing	 inequality	 between	 regions	 caused	 by	 the	 Green	Revolution.	 Finally,	 there	 were	 major	 environmental	 hazards	 related	 to	 the	 Green	Revolution.	Excessive	use	of	nitrogen-based	fertilizer	led	to	nitration	and	eutrophication	of	 rivers	 and	 lakes.	 Irresponsible	 use	 of	 pesticides	 posed	 a	 health	 risk	 for	 large	 rural	populations,	 farmers	 and	 agricultural	 labour	 in	 particular.	 Further,	 this	 mode	 of	agriculture	was	highly	energy-intensive:	energy	was	needed	to	produce	nitrogen-based	fertilizer	 and	 operate	 agricultural	 machinery,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 irrigation.	 Particularly	 in	cases	when	Green	Revolution	 technology	was	applied	 to	some	extent	 in	dryland	areas	(e.g.	for	sorghum	or	cotton),	it	led	to	water	scarcity	and	soil	erosion	–	both	major	issues	
	 44	
in	 India	 (for	 a	 comprehensive	 literature	 review	 see	 Glaeser	 2011;	 Le	 Mons	 Walker	2008).	
1.3 New	Economic	Policies	(from	1990s	onwards)	After	 the	 Indian	 financial	 crisis	 in	 1991,	 the	 government	 introduced	 new	 policies	 of	stabilization	 and	 structural	 adjustment	 supported	 by	 the	 Bretton–Woods	 institutions	(called	the	New	Economic	Policies).	Some	economists	together	with	these	international	finance	 institutions	 started	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 terms	 of	 trade	 were	 skewed	 against	agriculture:	 the	 combination	of	 input	 subsidies	 and	price	 support	 for	 output	had	kept	domestic	prices	low	and	hampered	production.	According	to	the	neo-classical	ideology,	opening	up	and	liberalizing	agricultural	markets	would	allow	prices	to	adjust	to	world	market	prices.	This	 in	turn	would	provide	 incentives	 for	 farmers	to	produce	more	and	adopt	 new	 technologies,	 finally	 leading	 to	 increased	 agricultural	 efficiency.	Furthermore,	 India	 would	 start	 producing	 where	 its	 comparative	 advantages	 lay,	namely	 in	 export-oriented	horticulture	and	 floriculture.	Consequently,	 the	goal	was	 to	cut	input	subsidies	as	well	as	price	support	–	leaving	the	provision	of	food	for	the	people	with	less	income	to	the	private	economy	(Parikh	1997;	Pursell	and	Gulati	1993).	These	economic	policies	coincided	with	a	major	withdrawal	of	the	state.	The	removal	of	trade	barriers	and	cuts	in	subsidies	were	not	the	only	measures	introduced	during	the	New	Economic	Policies.	First,	 in	 the	 field	of	domestic	 trade,	 the	marketing	system	was	considered	to	be	discriminatory	against	 farmers.	State–managed	buying	agencies	were	seen	as	inhibiting	contact	between	the	big	private	buyers	and	farmers.	Thus,	monopoly	procurement	 schemes,	 i.e.	 when	 the	 state	 acts	 as	 the	 only	 buyer,	 and	 similar	 policies	were	abolished.	Second,	the	financial	sector	was	liberalized	and	deregulated,	reversing	the	 above-mentioned	 nationalization	 of	 banks.	 This	 had	 severe	 consequences	 on	 the	availability	 of	 credit	 in	 rural	 areas	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 rural	 credit	 halted.	 This	development	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 return	 of	 the	 informal	 sector.	 Third	 and	 fourth,	public	expenditures	on	agricultural	research	and	extension	decreased.	These	tasks	were	taken	 over	 by	 private	 corporations,	 public-private	 partnerships,	 and	 NGOs.	 The	 fifth	point	 leads	 directly	 to	 the	 next	 section:	 land	 ceiling	 laws	 were	 seen	 as	 inhibiting	modernisation	of	the	agricultural	sector.	Thus,	many	states	abolished	or	loosened	them.	Such	 measures	 were	 intended	 to	 achieve	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 attract	 potential	investors	(Ramakumar	2010).		To	 summarize,	 the	 New	 Economic	 Policies	 were	 supposed	 to	 encourage	 a	 shift	 in	cropping	 patterns,	 foster	 trade,	 attract	 private	 investment	 in	 all	 areas	 of	 agriculture,	thereby	 renewing	 Indian	agriculture,	 as	well	 as	 increase	 incomes	 in	 rural	 areas.	Their	consequences,	 as	 I	 will	 show	 later,	 are	 subject	 to	 debate.	 However,	 these	 neoliberal	policies	should	not	draw	attention	away	from	another	set	of	policies	that	were	crucial	in	the	agricultural	context:	land	reforms.	
1.4 Land	Reforms	In	the	phase	of	National	Planning,	the	state	had	promised	to	remove	the	middlemen	and	redistribute	 land.	While	 the	 state	was	 quite	 successful	 in	 the	 former	 through	 laws	 as	
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well	 as	 compensation	 payments,	 the	 latter	 was	 a	 major	 failure.	 Nehruvian	 economic	planning	 and	 its	 state	 interventionism	 promised	 to	 change	 power	 relations	 in	 India's	rural	 areas.	 This	 included	 land	 distribution,	 public	 resource	 provision,	 employment	policies,	 introduction	of	new	technologies,	and	 infrastructural	 improvements.	All	 these	goals	were	“premised	on	the	expropriation	of	the	landlord	class	and	the	transformation	of	
tenant	 usufruct	 rights	 into	 ownership”	 (Mohanty	 2005,	 250;	 Rajasekaran	 1998).	 The	Tenancy	 Act	 in	 the	 1950s	 legally	 abolished	 all	 tenures	 and	 terminated	 all	 tenancy	arrangements.	 Landlords	 could	 only	 retain	 the	 land	 they	were	 cultivating	 themselves.	Tenants	 were	 declared	 owners	 of	 the	 land	 they	 had	 been	 leasing	 and	 tenancy	 was	allowed	only	up	to	one	year's	duration;	by	the	end	of	the	year,	the	tenant	would	own	the	land.	 The	 Land	 Ceiling	 Act	 in	 the	 1960s	 then	 defined	 an	 upper	 limit	 to	 landholdings	allowed	for	one	individual19	(Mohanty	2001).		There	 has	 been	 a	 lot	 of	 talk	 –	 and	 struggle	 –	 related	 to	 land	 reforms	 in	 India	 after	independence.	Despite	these	ambitious	laws	and	some	minor	successes,	land	reforms	in	India	have	been	a	major	failure.	The	Indian	state	failed	to	end	the	extreme	concentration	of	 land	 ownership.	 According	 to	 data	 of	 the	 Annual	 Report	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Rural	Development,	out	of	63	million	acres	that	would	have	been	subject	to	redistribution	in	the	 mid–1950s	 according	 to	 ceiling	 laws,	 only	 4.89	 million	 acres	 were	 in	 fact	redistributed,	 less	 than	 2%	 of	 the	 cultivated	 area.	 Moreover,	 more	 than	 20%	 of	 the	redistributed	 land	 was	 in	 West	 Bengal,	 a	 state	 under	 a	 leftist	 government	 and	 well	known	for	its	successful	implementation	of	land	reforms	(Mishra	2007;	Ramachandran	2011).	According	to	data	from	the	NSS	Surveys	of	Employment	and	Unemployment,	the	Gini	coefficient20	for	land	ownership	increased	from	0.74	in	1993-94	to	0.75	in	2004-05	and	eventually	to	0.78	in	2011-12	–	indicating	an	increasingly	unequal	land	distribution	(Rawal	 2013).	 Rawal	 also	 showed	 that	 the	 share	 of	Dalits	 and	 Muslims	 in	 total	 land	under	cultivation	is	much	lower	than	their	share	in	the	total	number	of	households	and	that	this	disparity	has	not	decreased.		In	 terms	 of	 land	 reforms,	 many	 scholars	 see	 a	 reversal	 of	 land	 reforms,	 namely	 a	growing	concentration	of	 land	ownership.	The	official	policies	are	about	to	jettison	the	goals	of	land	reform,	e.g.	through	the	abolition	of	land	ceiling	laws	(or	the	increase	of	the	ceilings)	that	makes	absentee	farming	possible	again.	 In	Maharashtra,	 for	example,	 the	land	ceiling	law	is	still	in	place.	However,	it	is	not	valid	for	corporations,	only	for	natural	persons.	Consequently,	 there	 is	 less	 land	 for	redistribution,	while	at	 the	same	time	we	can	 observe	 an	 accelerated	 loss	 of	 land.	 Even	 official	 data	 shows	 such	 a	 gap	 between	potential	 and	 real	 performance	 (Rajasekaran	 2004;	 Ramachandran	 2011).	Ramachandran	 (2011,	 60)	 showed	 that	 in	 some	 areas	 the	modest	 successes	 are	 even																																									 																					19	These	ceiling	 laws	are:	18	acres	of	 irrigated	land;	27	acres	of	 land	without	assured	perennial	supply	 of	 water	 for	 irrigation,	 but	 assured	 water	 supply	 for	 one	 crop;	 36	 acres	 of	 land,	 with	unassured	water	supply;	or	54	acres	of	dry	crop	land.	20	The	 Gini	 coefficient	 measures	 what	 percentage	 of	 the	 population	 is	 in	 possession	 of	 what	percentage	of	a	resource	–	in	this	case,	land.	If	the	Gini	coefficient	is	0,	a	society	is	perfectly	equal.	The	closer	it	comes	to	1,	the	higher	is	the	inequality.		
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being	 reversed.	 Furthermore,	 he	 reported	 reverse	 tenancy,	 i.e.	 that	 small	 landowners	lease	 out	 land	 to	 big	 landholders,	 particularly	 in	 areas	 where	 the	 former	 lack	 the	resources	to	take	advantage	of	technology.	In	this	section,	it	is	clear	that	agricultural	policies	after	independence	have	been	subject	to	many	shifts.	How,	then,	do	these	link	to	the	“agrarian	crisis”?		
2 Symptoms	of	the	“Agrarian	Crisis”	In	 this	 section,	 I	 analyse	 the	major	 symptoms	 of	 the	 “agrarian	 crisis”	 in	 India.	 These	include	 issues	 at	 the	 level	 of	 agricultural	 economy,	 the	 rural	 credit	 system,	 public	investment	and	expenditure,	as	well	as	the	depletion	of	natural	resources.		Before	starting,	I	want	to	make	a	general	point	about	the	importance	of	agriculture	and	landholding	 in	 rural	areas,	because	 landholding	will	 figure	prominently	 in	 this	 section	and	 beyond.	 The	 sub-section	 below	 will	 also	 serve	 to	 explain	 the	 classification	 of	landholdings	I	use.		
2.1 Classification	of	Landholdings	Certainly,	 landholding	 is	 not	 the	 only	 basis	 of	 income	 or	 wealth	 in	 rural	 India	 today.	Non-agricultural	 income	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 people’s	 total	 income,	 be	 it	 rural	manufacturing,	construction	or	remittances	(Misra	2013).	The	importance	of	and	access	to	 non-agricultural	 income	 differs	 depending	 on	 many	 factors	 like	 education,	 wealth	and/or	 caste	 (Lanjouw	 and	 Shariff	 2004,	 4443).	 Further,	 it	 also	 depends	 on	 the	profitability	of	agriculture.	In	rain-fed	areas	for	example,	people	are	more	dependent	on	non-agricultural	income	than	in	irrigated	areas.	Still,	even	in	those	rain-fed	regions,	non-farm	employment	constitutes	only	up	to	half	of	the	total	household	income,	leaving	the	other	half	to	agriculture	(Bhakar	and	Singh	2013,	83-84).		Even	 if	 the	 importance	 of	 agricultural	 income	 has	 decreased	 significantly	 and	landholding	 does	 not	 solely	 determine	 peoples’	 income,	 agriculture	 still	 counts	 for	 a	major	 part	 of	 people’s	 incomes.	 Azam	 and	 Shariff	 (2011)	 conclude	 that	 “farm	income	
continues	to	be	the	most	important	source	of	income	and	income	inequality	in	rural	India”	(ibid,	5).	Yet	in	the	context	of	this	thesis,	I	consider	it	appropriate	to	talk	about	different	groups	of	farmers	depending	on	their	landholdings.	In	classifying	landholdings,	I	adopt	the	 system	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 (GoI	 2012),	 adjusted	 by	 (Arora	 2001).	 The	classification	has	five	different	categories	of	farmers:	
• rich	 farmers:	 large	 landholdings	 above	 25	 acres	 (mainly	 living	 on	 rent,	 labour	working	on	their	land)	
• medium	 farmers:	Medium	 landholdings	between	10	 and	25	 acres	 (working	on	their	 own	 land	 through	which	 they	 eke	 out	 their	 living,	may	 occasionally	 hire	labour)	
• semi–medium	farmers:	Medium	landholdings	between	5	and	10	acres	(working	on	their	own	land,	may	occasionally	hire	labour,	and	also	work	as	labourers	on	others’	fields)	
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• small	 farmers:	 Small	 landholdings	 between	 2.5	 and	 5	 acres	 (working	 on	 their	own	land,	but	also	working	as	labourers	on	others’	fields)	
• marginal	 farmers	 and	 agricultural	 labourers:	marginal	 landholdings	 below	 2.5	acres	 and	 the	 landless	 (working	 on	 their	 own	 land	 and/or	 as	 labourers	 on	others’	fields)	I	 am	 aware	 of	 bypassing	 the	 vast	 debate	 about	 a	meaningful	 classification	 of	 farmers	(see	 Shah	 (2004a)	 for	 a	 detailed	 overview).	 The	 above	 classification,	 for	 example,	 is	criticised	for	not	differentiating	between	groups	of	farmers	with	regards	to	nature	and	extent	of	 land	ownership,	non-agricultural	 sources	of	 livelihoods	or	between	 irrigated	and	rain–fed	land.		This	 also	 points	 to	 the	 relative	 usage	 of	 the	 terms	 peasant	and	 farmer.	 I	 use	 farmer	throughout	 the	 present	 study,	 with	 the	 only	 exception	 of	 fixed	 expressions	 (like	 old	peasant	movements),	when	rephrasing	authors	that	explicitly	used	the	word	peasant	or	when	talking	about	the	‘peasantry’.	I	begin	by	stressing	that	I	do	not	agree	with	scholars	who	argue	 that	 at	 times	 it	 is	more	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 the	homogeneity	 rather	than	heterogeneity	 of	 the	 peasantry	 (see	 e.g.	 Colburn	1989).	 The	 impact	 of	 neoliberal	reorganisation	 worldwide	 is	 differentiated	 along	 class	 lines	 in	 rural	 societies.	 I	 am	aware	that	India	is	no	exception,	especially	because	of	the	unique	history	of	its	land	and	agrarian	 system,	 where	 the	 independent	 state	 in	 India	 did	 not	 put	 a	 decisive	 end	 to	feudal	 power	 and,	 unsurprisingly,	 the	 project	 of	 redistributive	 land	 reforms	 was	 a	failure.	The	choice	of	‘farmers’	against	‘peasant’	denotes	an	ideological	position	too.	The	emphasis	 and	 usage	 of	 peasantry	 as	 a	 class	 that	 is	 uniformly	 affected	 by	 neoliberal	policies	 masks	 the	 deeper	 inequality	 that	 has	 historically	 characterised	 Indian	agriculture.		I	consider	 it	crucial	 to	differentiate	between	the	different	groups	of	 farmers	whenever	possible.	However,	 the	differentiation	between	classes	within	agriculture	 in	 this	 thesis	remains	rather	elementary,	because	my	focus	remains	on	‘movement	groups’	and	their	mobilisation	 strategies.	Keeping	 this	 in	mind,	 over	 the	 course	of	 the	 thesis,	 I	 highlight	the	 perceptions	 of	 various	 groups	 of	 farmers	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 overall	 identity	 of	 a	united	peasantry,	agriculture,	their	future,	and	state	policies.		In	 Marathi,	 the	 language	 of	 most	 of	 the	 interviews,	 this	 distinction	 does	 not	 exist.	Interviewees	used	the	word	kisan	to	talk	about	peasants	and	farmers.	To	keep	as	close	as	possible	to	the	peoples’	native	language	and	to	avoid	putting	unintended	meaning	in	their	 statements,	 I	 use	 kisan	 as	 well	 whenever	 I	 directly	 quote	 from	 interviews.	Consequently	 and	 lastly,	 I	 use	 farmers	 instead	 of	 peasants	 because,	 as	we	will	 see	 in	later	chapters,	 farmers	generally	identify	themselves	as	belonging	to	a	class	within	the	larger	group	known	as	farmers/kisans.	
2.2 Profitability,	Trade	and	Production	Despite	 the	 neoliberal	New	Economic	 Policies,	 India	 still	 provides	market	 support	 for	farmers,	 though	 currently	 this	 support	 is	 being	 dismantled.	 The	 central	 government’s	Commission	 for	Agricultural	Costs	and	Prices	(CACP)	defines	Minimum	Support	Prices	
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for	 agricultural	 products	 every	 year	 for	different	 crops	 and	qualities.	The	 goals	 are	 to	guarantee	 an	 income	 for	 the	 farmers	 and	 to	 balance	 against	 the	 high	 volatility	 of	international	 prices	 for	 agricultural	 raw	 materials	 (Shroff	 2006).	 The	 state,	 i.e.	 its	procurement	 agencies,	 is	 supposed	 to	 guarantee	 these	MSPs	 to	 the	 producers	 in	 case	market	prices	drop	below	the	defined	MSP.	Further,	a	Maximum	Retail	Price	is	defined	for	the	products	to	be	sold	to	consumers	to	protect	them	from	high	prices	and	bridle	the	power	of	middlemen	and	traders.		Within	 this	system,	different	crops	are	guaranteed	protection	 to	a	different	extent:	 for	rice,	the	domestic	price	is	far	below	the	international	price;	for	wheat,	it	is	on	a	similar	level	but	less	volatile;	for	sugar,	it	is	far	beyond	the	international	price,	while	for	cotton	it	 more	 or	 less	 follows	 the	 international	 price.	 This	 clearly	 reflects	 the	 differential	policies	still	used	by	the	government	to	protect	different	interests	(Mittal	2006).		The	 CACP	 defines	 these	MSPs	whilst	 considering	 the	 cost	 of	 production,	 demand	 and	supply,	 trends	 in	market	prices,	 inter–crop	price	parity,	as	effects	on	the	cost	of	 living.	The	 commission	 uses	 both	 macro-	 and	 aggregated	 micro–level	 data,	 communicating	with	other	ministries,	state	governments,	academic	institutions,	and	select	organizations	(CACP	2013).	Basing	the	calculation	of	the	MSP	mostly	on	the	costs	of	production	(CACP	2011)	makes	 sense	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 protecting	 farmer	 income.	 However,	 it	 is	being	criticized	for	distorting	the	market	of	agricultural	products	(see	e.g.	Chand	2003).	Still,	as	MSPs	have	increased	in	recent	years,	this	has	not	necessarily	meant	that	farmers	are	better	off.	Agricultural	profitability	depends	on	whether	the	 increase	 in	MSP	could	offset	 increases	in	the	costs	of	production	in	the	2000s.	Profitability	in	rice	and	wheat,	for	example,	is	likely	to	have	shrunk	(Dev	and	Rao	2010,	Ramakumar	2014);	for	cotton,	see	section	2.3,	chapter	III.	A	 problem	 of	 the	 MSPs	 is	 that	 the	 yields	 per	 acre	 differ	 greatly	 among	 the	 different	regions,	 crops	 and	 farmers.	 For	many	 farmers,	MSPs	 do	 not	 even	 compensate	 for	 the	actual	costs	of	production.	Ramachandran	(2011)	found	that	as	much	as	21%	of	(mostly	poor)	 farmers	 earn	 negative	 crop	 incomes.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 incomes	 of	 big	landholders	in	most	villages	are	high.	In	a	village	case,	the	agricultural	income	in	the	top	decile	 of	 villagers	was	more	 than	Rs	3.2	 lakh	per	 household	per	 year	 (Ramachandran	2011;	Ramakumar	2010).	Beyond	the	farm	gate,	prices	are	increasingly	dependent	on	world	market	prices.	Cotton	serves	as	a	good	 illustration:	until	 the	 late	1990s,	 less	 than	2%	of	 the	domestic	cotton	production	was	imported,	whereas	in	the	early	2000s	it	was	already	more	than	10%.	At	the	 same	 time,	 India	 has	 become	 a	 net-exporter	 of	 cotton	 due	 to	 a	 rise	 in	 domestic	production	(Ramakumar	2014).	Consequently,	liberalization	also	imported	the	volatility	of	international	prices.		Even	without	considering	international	trade	and	world	market	prices,	the	relationship	between	 the	 price	 and	 output	 of	 agricultural	 produce	 is	 highly	 contested.	 In	 other	words,	the	supply	responsiveness	of	farmers	is	far	from	clear.	Non–price	factors	such	as	inputs,	technology,	institutions,	or	infrastructure	might	play	a	bigger	role	in	the	growth	
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of	 agricultural	 output.	 Chand	 (2004)	 also	 showed	 that	 price	 increases	 alone	 do	 not	result	in	output	growth.	They	need	to	be	combined	with	technological	development	and	diffusion,	 input	use,	and	 irrigation.	Additionally,	 it	 is	highly	questionable	 if	 the	current	world	 market	 price	 for	 raw	 materials	 is	 a	 reliable	 indicator	 for	 future	 prices	(Ramakumar	2010).	Therefore,	 world	 market	 prices	 bearing	 the	 risk	 of	 high	 uncertainty	 tend	 to	 provide	wrong	signals	 for	cultivation	decisions	and	may	 lead	 to	ecologically	unsustainable	and	economically	 unviable	 cropping	patterns.	Apart	 from	 the	higher	 volatility,	 prices	 have	also	 fallen.	 After	 the	 mid–1990s,	 the	 domestic	 prices	 of	 many	 agricultural	 goods	 fell	sharply,	e.g.	prices	of	cotton,	tea,	coffee,	spices	and	horticultural	products	(Ramakumar	2010;	Sen	and	Bhatia	2004).		At	the	same	time,	the	period	of	liberalization	brought	promises	of	increasing	exports	for	cash	crops.	Since	the	1950s,	the	share	in	gross	cropped	area21	cultivated	with	food	crops	has	declined	steadily,	particularly	after	the	mid-1970s.	Starting	in	the	1980s,	there	has	been	a	 fall	even	 in	 the	absolute	number	of	hectares	used	 for	cultivation	of	 food	grains	and	pulses.	At	the	same	time,	the	area	used	for	cultivating	fruits	and	vegetables	has	been	increasing.	This	means	that	the	cropping	pattern	has	changed	from	low–value	crops	to	high-value	commercial	crops	(Ramakumar	2010).		This	 decline	 in	 food	 grain	 cultivation	 has	 coincided	 with	 a	 steep	 fall	 in	 food	 grain	consumption	 in	 rural	 areas.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 per	 capita	 consumption	 of	 fruits,	vegetables,	 dairy	 products	 and	 meat	 in	 rural	 areas	 increased.	 To	 interpret	 this	 as	 a	voluntary	change	in	dietary	patterns	would	be	misleading,	because	the	per	capita	calorie	consumption	in	rural	areas	has	fallen	since	the	1990s.	This	decline	was	sharpest	for	the	lowest	30%	of	households	with	respect	to	consumer	expenditure.	This	indicates	that	the	fall	 in	 per	 capita	 food	 grain	 consumption	happened	not	 by	 choice	 but	 by	distress	 and	indicates	increasing	malnutrition22	(GoI	2007;	Ramakumar	2010).	There	have	been	two	distinct	sub-phases	in	the	growth	of	agricultural	production	after	1992-93.	 In	 the	 1990s,	 agricultural	 growth	 rates	 slowed	 down	 significantly	 but	 they	revived	in	the	period	after	2002-03	(Ramakumar	2014,	Lerche	2015,	50).	This	revival,	however,	 did	 not	 raise	 the	 growth	 rates	 of	 agricultural	 production	 of	 the	 combined	phase	of	the	1990s	and	2000s	over	the	1980s.	In	this	combined	period,	for	the	first	time	after	independence	the	rate	of	agricultural	growth	fell	behind	the	growth	of	population	(Ramakumar	 2014).	 Agricultural	 productivity	 (namely,	 total	 factor	 productivity23)	shows	 a	 similar	 development.	 While	 its	 growth	 decreased	 in	 the	 1990s,	 it	 increased	again	 in	 the	 2000s	 but	 could	 not	 reach	 the	 level	 of	 the	 1980s	 (Binswanger-Mkhize																																									 																					21	The	gross	cropped	area	is	the	total	area	sown	once	and/or	more	than	once	in	a	particular	year,	i.e.	the	area	is	counted	as	many	times	as	there	are	sowings	in	a	year.		22	Patnaik	 (2008)	 calculated	 that	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 rural	 population	 unable	 to	 access	 the	required	2,400	calories	per	day	increased	from	75%	in	1993-94	to	87%	in	2004-05.	23The	 total	 factor	 productivity	 is	 the	 portion	 of	 output	 not	 explained	 by	 the	 amount	 of	 inputs	used	in	production.	If	all	inputs	are	accounted	for,	then	total	factor	productivity	can	be	taken	as	a	measure	of	long-term	technological	change.	
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2013).	 Despite	 the	 substantial	 increases	 in	 these	macro	 level	 indicators	 in	 the	 2000s	compared	to	the	1990s,	many	individual	farmers	have	remained	distressed.	The	afore-mentioned	shift	in	cropping	patterns	towards	cash	crops	went	hand-in-hand	with	a	shift	towards	high-yield	varieties	and	genetically	modified	crops.	Those	seeds	are	more	expensive	and	require	a	different	method	of	production.	It	is	intensive	in	terms	of	time,	money,	knowledge	and	thus	extension.	On	the	one	hand,	this	means	that	farmers	are	 increasingly	dependent	on	 input	markets,	which	 feature	scarcely	regulated	private	and	 informal	 sources.	 On	 the	 other,	 it	 leads	 to	 increasing	 costs	 of	 production	 –	particularly	the	cash	component	of	these	costs	(Reddy	and	Mishra	2010b).	Increasing	 input	 costs	 are	 a	 serious	problem	 for	many	 farmers	 –	particularly	 those	 in	rain-fed	 areas,	 who	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 irrigation	 and	 therefore	 no	 secured	 yields.	Farmers	 need	 to	 deal	with	 the	 uncertainties	 of	 the	market,	 invest	 in	 inputs	 and	 cope	with	 crop	 failures.	 However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 availability	 of	 affordable	 credit	 is	 very	low.	This	leads	to	a	high	percentage	of	farmers	falling	into	debt	traps.	
2.3 Indebtedness	and	the	Credit	System	During	 the	New	Economic	Policies	period,	 the	 financial	 sector	was	 liberalized	 as	well.	The	banks	were	supposed	to	work	on	a	commercial	basis:	profitability	had	become	their	major	 concern	 so	 they	got	permission	 to	 close	 their	 rural	branches.	Consequently,	 the	credit	supply	and	number	of	rural	branches	 fell	sharply	 in	the	1990s,	which	 led	to	the	resurgence	of	moneylenders	and	the	informal	credit	system	(Chavan	2005;	Ramakumar	and	Chavan	2007;	Sadanandan	2014,	302).		At	the	same	time,	microcredit	entered	the	credit	system.	There	 is	a	 large	debate	about	the	impact	of	microcredit.	In	a	review,	Ghosh	(2013)	argued	that	it	cannot	be	seen	as	a	silver	 bullet	 and	 is	 rather	 problematic.	 Ramachandran	 (2011)	 postulated	 that	microcredit	 has	 two	major	 disadvantages.	 First,	 borrowers	 often	 use	 these	 very	 small	loans	 for	 temporary	 consumption	 shortfalls	 instead	 of	 long–term	 productive	investments.	 This	 forces	 them	 into	 a	 debt	 trap.	 Second,	 with	 interest	 rates	 similar	 to	those	of	informal	lenders,	microloans	are	expensive	for	borrowers.	In	its	beginning,	the	microcredit	 sector	was	mostly	 led	 by	 NGOs	 and	 financed	 by	 formal–sector	 banks.	 All	credit–linked	 schemes	 from	 the	 government	 were	 implemented	 through	 self–help	groups.	Additionally,	Ghosh	(2013)	argued	that	microcredit	needs	to	be	subsidised	and	regulated	by	the	state	if	it	is	to	be	successful.	However,	in	recent	years,	microcredit	has	awakened	private	corporate	interest	and	many	non–banking	finance	companies	obtain	cheap	 credit	 from	 formal–sector	 banking	 institutions	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 microcredit	capital	(Ramachandran	2011).	In	the	2000s,	rural	credit	volume	expanded	but	was	highly	skewed	in	favour	of	the	rural	rich	and	large	businesses.	A	large	portion	of	the	increase	was	due	to	indirect	loans24	in	new	 areas	 such	 as	 new	 forms	 of	 financing	 commercial	 export-oriented	 and	 capital-																																								 																					24	Indirect	loan	refers	to	any	loan	that	is	transferred	from	a	dealer	(who	originated	the	loan)	to	a	third	party.	
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intensive	agriculture,	where	the	loans	are	given	to	corporations	and	partnership	groups	within	the	ambit	of	agricultural	credit.	This	means	that	agricultural	 loans	moved	away	from	 marginal,	 small	 or	 medium	 farmers	 towards	 large	 agri-business	 interests	(Ramakumar	and	Chavan	2014).	Together	with	New	Economic	Policies,	this	points	to	a	drive	 to	 privatise,	 generating	 new	 incomes	 for	 rich	 commercial	 farmers	 and	corporations	(Ramachandran	2011).	Consequently,	Reddy	and	Mishra	(2010b)	argued	that	the	incidence	as	well	as	volume	of	indebtedness	 increases	with	 landholding.	Compared	 to	 the	 rich	 farmers,	marginal	 and	small	 farmers	rely	much	more	on	high-interest	bearing	non-institutional	agencies.	The	share	of	 credit	 for	marginal	 farmers	 in	 total	 credit	 volume	decreased,	which	 indicates	that	credit	access	is	particularly	difficult	for	them	(Ramakumar	and	Chavan	2014;	Reddy	and	Mishra	2010b).	The	combination	of	the	state	retreating	from	the	credit	sector	and	farmers	 becoming	 increasingly	 dependent	 on	 cash	 for	 cultivation	 leaves	 many	 –	particularly	small	and	marginal	farmers	–	at	the	mercy	of	unscrupulous	moneylenders.	
2.4 Public	and	Private	Investment	and	Public	Expenditures	Not	 only	 did	 investment	 by	 the	 financial	 sector	 in	 agriculture	 decline,	 but	 public	investment	 in	 agriculture	 as	 a	 share	 of	 the	 agricultural	 Gross	 Domestic	 Product	 also	declined	 steadily	 from	 the	 early	 1980s	 until	 2004-05.	 Following	 this	 long	 period	 of	decline,	 investment	increased	moderately	for	three	years,	only	to	fall	again	after	2006-07.	Consequently,	public	investment	in	2010-11	was	lower	than	in	2004-05	as	well	as	in	the	early	1980s.	Private	investment	(i.e.	investment	by	private	entities)	stagnated	in	the	1980s,	increased	moderately	in	the	1990s,	and	grew	rapidly	in	the	2000s.	In	the	1990s,	the	increase	in	private	investment	was	not	enough	to	compensate	for	the	simultaneous	fall	 of	public	 investment,	but	 in	 the	2000s,	but	 it	helped	account	 for	 increases	 in	 total	investments.	However,	a	smaller	section	of	cultivators	accounted	for	the	rise	in	private	investment	than	in	the	1980s,	which	has	been	used	mainly	for	well	construction.	At	the	same	 time,	 the	state	had	 largely	withdrawn	 input	subsidies	while	 increasing	subsidies	for	 electricity	 –	 again	 prioritizing	 those	 farmers	 who	 can	 afford	 a	 private	 well	(Ramakumar	2010;	Ramakumar	2014).	Additionally,	 there	 was	 a	 decline	 in	 public	 expenditure	 for	 research	 and	 education,	extension,	storage/warehousing,	and	soil	and	water	conservation	since	the	1990s	(Dixit	2012)25.	This	 long-term	decline	had	ominous	 impacts	on	agricultural	growth.	Even	the	Planning	 Commission	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 states	 that	 the	 slow	 growth	 in	 the	1990s	 was	 due	 to	 the	 weakened	 support	 system	 in	 agriculture	 (Ramakumar	 2010).	Historically,	 the	 government	 was	 largely	 responsible	 for	 these	 domains,	 but	 the	 new	policies	 were	 intended	 to	 encourage	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 replace	 public-sector	institutions	 by	 competitive,	 demand–driven	 extension	 networks.	 Consequently,	 the	share	of	expenditure	on	agriculture	in	total	national	expenditure	is	likely	to	have	fallen	
																																								 																					25	For	a	detailed	overview	of	the	government	schemes,	see	the	India	Rural	Development	Report	2012/2013	(IDFC	2013).	
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in	the	1990s	and	2000s	(Ramakumar	2014)26	while	at	the	same	time	control	of	private	firms	 over	 agricultural	 research	 and	 extension	 increased.	 However,	 private	 research	covers	only	a	small	sub–set	of	needs	of	the	small	and	marginal	farmers.	The	technology	developed	by	private	enterprises	is	likely	to	be	more	suitable	for	capital–intensive	forms	of	commercial	agriculture.	Furthermore,	the	remaining	public	resources	were	removed	from	 food	crops	and	shifted	 to	high–value,	export–oriented	crops	 (Ramachandran	and	Rawal	2009).	Even	stronger	than	during	the	Green	Revolution,	research	tends	to	neglect	issues	relevant	for	rain-fed	agriculture	and	the	public	sector	must	address	the	needs	of	resource-poor	farmers	in	less	endowed	regions	(Dev	2012).		Despite	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 state	 during	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 one	 major	 public	scheme	 was	 introduced	 in	 2005:	 The	 Mahatma	 Gandhi	 National	 Rural	 Employment	Guarantee	 Act	 (MGNREGA).	 With	 this	 Act,	 the	 state	 guarantees	 100	 days	 of	 wage	employment	(mostly	unskilled	manual	work)	per	year	to	every	household.	This	scheme	has	 grown	 to	 hold	 immense	 importance	 in	 rural	 areas	 of	 India	 and	 there	 is	 a	 large	debate	 about	 its	 strengths,	 weaknesses	 and	 impacts–	 many	 of	 them	 remaining	inconclusive	 [see	Banerjee	 (2015)	 for	 a	 recent	 article	 particularly	 about	Maharashtra;	also	see	Ranaware	et	al.	(2015)].	
2.5 Irrigation	and	the	Depletion	of	Resources	The	 changing	 cropping	 patterns	 and	 modes	 of	 production	 coincide	 with	 a	 dwindling	resource	base,	particularly	soil	and	water.	Because	of	 intensive	cultivation	practices	or	malpractices	such	as	excess	use	of	chemical	fertilizer	and	the	extension	of	cultivation	to	marginal	areas,	land	degradation	and	soil	erosion	are	a	growing	problem	in	India,	with	the	proportion	of	degraded	land	increasing	(Reddy	and	Mishra	2010b).		When	 it	 comes	 to	water,	 the	main	 problems	 are,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 poor	 drainage	 and	floods	during	or	immediately	after	the	monsoons.	On	the	other	hand,	the	fields	need	to	be	 irrigated	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 reliable	 yields	 (see	Rodell,	 Velicogna,	 and	 Famiglietti	2009).	Despite	an	urgent	need,	the	government	does	not	take	steps	to	improve	irrigation	and	 there	 is	an	absence	of	public	 investment	 in	surface	 irrigation	 (Ramakumar	2014).	Farmers	 still	 invest	 high	 sums	 to	 drill	 wells	 in	 order	 to	 access	 groundwater	 aquifers	(Harriss-White	 2008;	 Rao	 2008).	 Through	 groundwater	 irrigation	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	sustainable	 recharge	 of	 wells,	 surface	 irrigation,	 and	 water	 conservation	 structures,	groundwater	 reserves	 undergo	 irreversible	 depletion.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 an	 acute	scarcity	 of	 water	 in	 the	 summer	 months	 (Ramakumar	 2014).	 This	 indicates	 that	 a	neglect	 of	 infrastructure	 for	 surface	 irrigation	 and	 the	 overemphasis	 on	 private	borewells	 leads	 to	 severe	problems	–	particularly	 in	dryland	and	drought-prone	areas	like	Vidarbha.	
																																								 																					26	Ramakumar	(2014)	argued	that	at	the	level	of	the	central	government	the	share	of	expenditure	on	 agriculture	 clearly	 increased	 in	 the	 2000s	 after	 having	 stagnated	 in	 the	 1990s.	 For	 state	governments,	 the	 share	 has	 fallen	 steeply.	 Considering	 that	 the	 states	 are	 more	 important	 in	agriculture	 than	 the	 central	 government,	 he	 reached	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 total	 share	 has	decreased	overall.		
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An	increasing	pumping	depth	and	decreasing	well	yield	translates	into	higher	costs	and	risks	 for	a	 farmer	 investing	 in	a	borewell,	which,	after	 some	 time	will	 cease	supplying	water.	Even	here	the	risks	are	unevenly	distributed:	the	more	capital	a	farmer	has,	the	deeper	 he	 or	 she	 can	 afford	 to	 drill.	 One	 solution	 would	 be	 to	 stop	 relying	 solely	 on	borewell	 irrigation,	 which	 has	 become	more	 important	 in	 recent	 decades,	 and	 invest	more	in	surface	irrigation,	water	harvesting,	and	conservation.	However,	this	 is	clearly	not	happening	in	rural	India	(Daftary	2013;	see	also	Kulkarni,	Shah,	and	Shankar	2015).	Apart	 from	 the	 decreasing	 groundwater	 level,	 an	 overuse	 of	 groundwater	 without	investment	 in	 other	 irrigation	measures	 can	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 loss	 of	 soil	 fertility,	 acute	problems	 of	 salinity	 and	 resultant	 yield	 stagnation	 (Ramakumar	 2014).	 Last	 but	 not	least,	 borewell	 irrigation	 requires	 a	 lot	 of	 power,	 without	 which	 it	 is	 dysfunctional	(Birner,	 Gupta,	 and	 Sharma	 2011;	 Reddy	 and	 Mishra	 2010b).	 This	 again	 increases	production	costs	for	farmers	and	makes	agricultural	operations	dependent	on	electricity	supply,	 which	 is	 often	 insufficient	 in	 rural	 areas	 due	 to	 load	 shedding.	 To	 conclude,	Taylor	(2013)	argues	that	groundwater	depletion	“represents	a	common	tragedy	of	debt-
driven	livelihoods	within	an	austere	agrarian	environment”	(ibid,	691).	
Picture	1:	A	rain	fed,	dry	land	cotton	field	in	Vidarbha		
	Last	but	not	 least,	 there	 is	one	more	alleged	 ‘symptom’	of	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’:	 the	 so-called	 farmer	 suicides.	 Arguably,	 a	 wave	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 has	 swept	 the	 Indian	countryside	 since	 the	 introduction	 of	 neo-liberal	 policies	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Many	researchers,	 activists	 and	 politicians	 see	 a	 direct	 causal	 relationship	 between	 these	policies	 and	 the	 farmer	 suicides.	 It	 is,	 however,	 a	 complex	 phenomenon	 that	 I	 will	analyse	in	detail	in	chapter	VII.		
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This	 section	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 situation	 of	 farmers	 in	 India	 is	 severe	 and	 it	 would	appear	justified	to	describe	it	as	a	crisis.	The	causes	of	this	crisis	and	the	way	it	affects	different	groups	of	farmers	are	disputed.	Apart	from	the	academic	debate,	this	crisis	also	figures	 prominently	 in	 political	 debates	 and	 among	 farmer	 activists.	 To	 understand	them,	I	will	analyse	the	different	arguments	in	the	next	section.		
3 ‘Agrarian	Crisis’:	Understanding	the	Ideological	Debates	The	debates	about	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	began	in	the	1990s,	because	the	neoliberal	New	Economic	Policies	were	largely	seen	as	having	severely	aggravated	–	or	even	triggered	–	the	 crisis.	 However,	many	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 current	 problems	 lie	 in	historically	 unequal	 land	 relations	 and	 oppressive	 social	 structures	 that	 have	 never	been	dismantled.	This	leads	to	a	set	of	questions	about	the	nature	and	consequences	of	this	 ‘agrarian	crisis’:	 Is	agriculture	as	a	whole	discriminated	against	and	therefore,	are	all	 farmers	 regardless	 of	 their	 landholdings,	 regions	 and	 crops	 suffering	 from	 the	 so–called	‘agrarian	crisis’	equally?	Or	are	some	groups	of	farmers	suffering,	while	others	are	flourishing?	In	the	following,	I	specifically	discuss	these	two	different	lines	of	arguments.	I	 start	with	 the	 first	argument	 that	paints	a	picture	of	 the	whole	agricultural	sector	as	being	 in	 crisis,	 and	 globalisation	 as	 well	 as	 liberalization	 creating	 a	 situation	 where	agriculture	 becomes	 unprofitable,	 even	 for	 big	 capitalist	 farmers.	 In	 India,	 this	argument,	particularly	in	the	debates	of	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	(see	chapter	IV,	section	2.3),	still	echoes	the	debate	of	the	urban	bias	vs.	agrarian	(neo-)	populism.	
3.1 Urban	Bias	and	Neo-Populism	The	idea	of	juxtaposing	the	countryside	with	urban	areas	is	old.	In	the	context	of	India,	it	was	 most	 famously	 Gandhi	 who	 viewed	 the	 urban	 lifestyle	 pejoratively,	 demonized	hospitals,	railways	and	industrial	machinery	while	suggesting	that	it	was	only	in	villages	that	“civilization”	could	be	nurtured	(Corbridge	and	Jones	2010).	In	the	late	1960s	and	1970s,	Lipton	(1977)	initiated	the	urban	bias	debate	and	broke	with	the	romanticism	of	Gandhi	and	others	by	pointing	towards	the	underdevelopment	of	rural	areas.	The	theory	of	urban	bias	says	that	the	unequal	distribution	of	resources	 is	 inefficient,	because	the	marginal	returns	in	developmental	investments	are	higher	in	rural	areas.	The	urban	bias	is	 then	 “(a)	 an	 allocation,	 to	 persons	 or	 organizations	 located	 in	 towns,	 of	 shares	 of	
resources	 so	 large	 as	 to	 be	 inefficient	 and	 inequitable,	 or	 (b)	 a	 disposition	 among	 the	
powerful	to	allocate	resources	in	this	way”	(Lipton	as	cited	in	Corbridge	and	Jones	2010,	9).	In	India,	the	debate	about	the	hidden	tax	for	farmers	(see	section	1.1	in	this	chapter)	relies	on	the	same	assumptions.	Corbridge	 and	 Jones	 (2010)	 reviewed	 the	 debate	 of	 urban	 bias	 and	 found	 a	 renewed	interest	(see	also	Byres	2004)	in	the	idea	that	the	current	economic	and	political	system	discriminates	 against	 the	 agricultural	 sector.	 Lipton	 (1977)	 argued	 that	 this	 bias	 has	been	 dominant	 in	 developing	 economies	 since	 the	 1950s	 and	 has	 been	 nurtured	 by	economic	theories	emphasizing	the	importance	of	industrial	production.	First,	with	the	shift	 in	 orientation	 away	 from	 a	 heavy	 dependence	 on	 primary	 commodities	 towards	
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industrialization	 and	 import	 substitution	 strategies,	 agriculture	 has	 been	 put	 at	 a	disadvantage.	 The	 artificially	 overvalued	 currency	 did	 support	 domestic	 industries	 by	making	 imports	 and	 machinery	 under-priced,	 but	 this	 meant	 that	 the	 terms	 of	 trade	moved	 against	 agriculture,	 particularly	 for	 export-oriented	 agriculture,	 making	 their	crops	worthless.	Second,	 the	states’	attempts	 to	buy	all	 food	crops	 in	order	 to	provide	urban	dwellers	with	cheap	food	further	fuelled	the	so-called	price	twist.	Lipton	argued	that	 for	 these	 two	 reasons,	 goods	 and	 services	 from	 rural	 areas	 are	 systematically	under-priced	 in	 reference	 to	 a	 hypothetical	 free	 market	 price	 (Corbridge	 and	 Jones	2010).		In	 2002,	 Lipton	 revised	 his	 urban	 bias	 hypothesis	 (Eastwood	 and	 Lipton	 2002).	 The	authors	 admitted	 that	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 liberalization	 of	agricultural	 markets	 on	 the	 other	 have	 improved	 the	 terms	 of	 trade	 for	 primary	products.	However,	as	Bezemer	and	Headey	(2008,	1354)	argued,	the	urban	bias	of	the	1970s	 and	 1980s,	with	 price	 regimes	 favouring	 urban	 over	 rural	 areas,	 still	 persisted	due	to	international	trade	regimes.	However,	they	agreed	that	the	urban	bias	still	exists	and	 has	 evolved.	 Eastwood	 and	 Lipton	 described	 it	 as	 having	 become	 a	 distributional	urban	bias	and	claim	that	because	the	elite	is	still	concentrated	in	urban	areas,	powerful	groups	have	managed	 to	channel	public	policies	 in	 such	a	way	 that	urban	areas	profit	disproportionally.	 Therefore,	 they	 concluded	 that	 rural	 areas	 still	 lag	 behind	 in	many	aspects,	e.g.	in	health	and	literacy.	Bezemer	and	Headey	emphasized	the	new	urban	bias	as	 an	 anti-agriculture-bias	 and	 argued	 that	 this	 bias	 intensified	 in	 the	 areas	 of	government	expenditures	and	foreign	aid,	particularly	in	the	poorest	countries.	
3.2 Urban	Bias:	A	Critique	The	hypothesis	of	a	general	discrimination	against	rural	areas	or	the	agricultural	sector	has	been	 criticised	on	many	grounds.	 Corbridge	 and	 Jones	 (2010)	named	 three	major	points	 of	 criticism	 against	 the	 idea	 of	 urban	 bias.	 First,	 a	 focus	 on	 urban	 bias	underestimates	 urban	 poverty	 and	 more	 concretely	 neglects	 the	 urban	 poor.	 They	argued	 that	 data	 is	 difficult	 to	 find	 and	 interpret,	 but	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 urban	poverty	 is	 increasing	 and	 food	 insecurity	 is	 deteriorating	 in	 urban	 areas	 –	 in	 many	places	 even	 faster	 than	 rural	 poverty.	 This	 might	 imply	 that	 the	 urban	 poor	 cannot	benefit	from	the	urban	bias	as	much	as	before;	or,	that	small-scale	farmers	are	not	in	a	position	 to	 profit	 from	 the	 improved	 terms	 of	 trade.	 Second,	 the	 definition	 of	what	 is	urban	 and	 what	 is	 rural	 is	 not	 straightforward.	 Depending	 on	 the	 definition,	measurements	 and	 data	 used,	 the	 results	 can	 differ	 significantly.	 According	 to	Satterthwaite	 (2004),	 India	 has	 an	 urban	 population	 of	 between	 30%	 and	 60%	 ,	depending	on	how	the	settlements	between	2,000	and	20,000	inhabitants	are	classified.	Third,	 “rururban”	 economies	 and	 cross-sectoral	 livelihood	 strategies	 are	 becoming	increasingly	important.		Another	critique	goes	against	 the	 implicit	 tendency	to	treat	 the	“rural”	or	 farmers	as	a	group	with	uniform	 interests.	 If	 one	 looks	 closely,	 Lipton’s	hypothesis	 is	based	on	 the	idea	 “that	ordinary	small-farmers	[sic]	in	countries	like	India,	hard-working,	rational	and	
innovative,	were	unable	to	secure	a	fair	return	for	their	efforts	because	of	systematic	policy	
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discrimination	against	the	countryside”	(Corbridge	and	Jones	2010,	8).	So	the	urban	bias	hypothesis	from	the	beginning	acknowledged	it	is	particularly	the	smallholders	who	are	discriminated	against.	Nonetheless,	the	whole	hypothesis	is	based	on	the	idea	of	a	rural-urban	divide.	Lipton	attempted	to	include	the	issues	of	inequality	within	urban	and	rural	areas	respectively	by	calling	the	rural	elite	members	of	the	“urban	class”	and	urban	poor	as	part	of	the	“rural	class”.	This	brought	him	major	criticism.	Authors	like	Griffin	(1977)	charged	 that	 Lipton’s	 concept	 of	 class	 was	 untenable.	 The	 attempt	 to	 differentiate	between	rural	and	urban	areas	in	terms	of	classes	neither	adds	to	conceptual	clarity	nor	strengthens	the	argument.		The	last	critique	is	linked	to	the	role	of	the	rural	elite.	Byres	(1979)	argued	that	despite	Lipton’s	 attempt	 to	 include	 the	 rural	 elite	 in	his	 concept,	he	had	underestimated	 their	power	–	particularly	 in	 India.	 In	 fact,	 the	middle	 and	 rich	 strata	of	 the	 Indian	 farmers	have	had	powerful	organizations	to	lobby	for	their	interests.	The	idea	of	the	urban	bias,	arguably	glossing	over	class	differentiation	 in	rural	areas	and	calling	for	more	support	for	agriculture	in	general,	was	met	with	a	huge	response	among	organisations	of	these	strata	 of	 the	 farmers.	Most	 prominently,	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	New	 Farmers’	Movements	(see	part	IV)	asserted	their	view	and	developed	the	argument	further.	Sharad	Joshi,	an	important	farmer	leader	(see	part	IV)	in	Maharashtra,	strongly	argued	that	the	battle	in	India	was	between	urban	India	and	rural	Bharat	(Arora	2001;	Byres	1988).	These	ideas	are	still	prominent	among	activists	of	groups	mobilizing	around	agricultural	issues.		In	many	publications,	the	ideas	of	the	urban	bias	are	still	very	important.	Some	authors	make	 it	 explicit.	 Gail	 Omvedt	 for	 example	 argues	 that	 “agriculture	has	continued	to	be	
discriminated	against,	and	this	has	had	the	consequence	of	maintaining	often	severe	rural	
poverty	even	in	the	face	of	economic	development.	(…)	India’s	urban	bias	has	remained	in	
place.”	(Omvedt	2005,	198).	But	it	is	also	present	when	Deshpande	and	Arora	(2010)	in	the	introduction	to	their	book	“Agrarian	Crisis	and	Farmers	Suicides”	state	that	“farmers	
as	a	group	 today	 feel	 let	down	by	 the	policies	of	 the	State	 that	puts	 them	relatively	 in	a	
disadvantageous	position.	This	 is	made	abundantly	 clear	by	many	analysts	 in	 the	 recent	
past”	(ibid,	p3).	Other	authors	do	not	 talk	about	 the	urban	bias,	but	nurture	 the	 idea	that	 farmers	–	as	one	 group	 –	 are	 disadvantaged	 by	 policies	 and	 markets.	 Vasavi	 (2009)	 for	 example	writes	 that	 in	 globalized	 markets,	 other	 countries	 would	 produce	 much	 cheaper	 –	“leaving	no	scope	for	the	sons	of	the	soil	either	in	domestic	or	international	markets”	 (ibid,	p190).	These	authors	do,	elsewhere	in	their	texts,	acknowledge	that	the	crisis	does	not	affect	 all	 farmers	 the	 same	way	but	 is	more	 severe	 for	 small	 and	marginal	 farmers	or	rain-fed	agriculture.	Still,	 the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 is	seen	rooted	 in	a	general	neglect	of	 the	countryside.	 Desphande	 and	 Arora	 (2010),	 immediately	 after	 the	 citation	 above,	 add	that		
“in	other	words,	it	is	not	that	the	state	is	discriminatory	against	the	farmers	as	a	group,	
but	the	policies	are	sufficiently	provocative	in	widening	the	gap	between	the	net	incomes	
of	 farmers	and	agricultural	 laborers	on	the	one	hand	and	the	remaining	professions	on	
the	other.	This	has	culminated	in	severe	distress	across	the	country”	(ibid,	3)	
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Emphasizing	 the	 deterioration	 of	 the	 whole	 agricultural	 sector	 bears	 the	 danger	 of	hiding	away	the	tremendous	differences	within	rural	society.	
3.3 Differentiation	of	Farmers		The	 other	 argument	 about	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 emphasizes	 that	 the	 picture	 of	 an	undifferentiated	 crisis	 affecting	 agriculture	 in	 general	 is	 highly	 misleading.	 Rather,	different	crops,	regions	and	farmers	are	affected	very	differently,	and	some	still	flourish.	Ramachandran	(2011)	argued	that	certain	rural	classes,	namely	the	big	landholders	and	capitalist	farmers27,	continue	to	reap	high	incomes	from	agriculture.	It	 is	the	small	and	marginal	 farmers	 in	 particular	 who	 suffer	 from	 the	 crisis,	 due	 to	 old	 agrarian	inequalities	combined	with	the	New	Economic	Policies.	He	stated	powerfully	that	some	authors	would	conclude		
“in	the	post-1991	period,	differentiation	in	the	rural	economy	is	no	longer	occurring,	and	
has	 been	 replaced	 by	 ‘immiserisation’	 of	 the	 peasantry.	 (…)	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 it	 [this	
formulation]	represents	a	category	confusion,	since	there	is	no	reason	why	differentiation	
need	be	inconsistent	with	immiserisation.”	(ibid,	71)	On	the	contrary,	he	argued	that	the	record	of	production	and	investment	crisis	of	post–liberalisation	agriculture	 is	an	exacerbation	of	older	 trends	with	new	policy	measures.	Consequently,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 undifferentiated	 crisis	 across	 all	 regions,	 crops,	 classes,	 or	years	(see	chapter	VI,	section	3.1).		With	the	commercialisation	of	agriculture,	 the	differentiation	of	 farmers	gave	way	to	a	class	of	 rich	 farmers	 (Le	Mons	Walker	2008;	Mohanty	2005;	Pandit	1979).	These	 rich	farmers	 have	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 ownership	 of	means	 of	 production,	while	 the	 poor	farmers	have	hardly	any	or	only	very	small	plots	of	land	and	often	labour	in	and	out	at	the	same	time.	This	inequality	in	villages	is	only	increasing.	To	take	a	Vidarbha	village	as	an	example,	survey	data	shows	that	the	top	5%	of	the	village	population	owns	35%	of	wealth,	 while	 the	 bottom	 50%	 own	 10%	 (Ramachandran	 2011).	 Nair	 and	 Banerjee	(2012)	 have	 examined	 land	 distribution	 and	 found	 that	 it	 became	 more	 unequal	between	1960	and	2002	and	that	particularly	medium	farmers	were	increasingly	at	risk	of	losing	their	land.		Ramachandran	 (2011)	 pointed	 out	 that	 several	 macro	 indicators	 should	 be	 analysed	with	regard	to	their	different	implications	for	different	classes	of	farmers.	Then,	it	would	become	 obvious	 that	 agricultural	 development	 has	 been	 skewed	 towards	 the	 richer	farmers.	 One	 indicator	 is	 that	 of	 electricity	 consumption	 in	 agriculture.	 Overall	consumption	 rose	 since	 the	 New	 Economic	 Policies.	 Given	 that	 ownership	 of	 motor	pumps	in	villages	is	skewed	towards	big	landholders,	it	is	mostly	the	rich	that	benefited.	Another	 such	 indicator	 is	 the	 consumption	 of	 chemical	 fertilisers,	 which	 increased	markedly	but	had	very	different	implications	on	different	groups	of	farmers.	In	order	to																																									 																					27	Following	Byres	(2004),	 it	 is	more	accurate	to	talk	about	capitalist	or	rich	farmers	 instead	of	big	 landholders.	The	 reason	 is	 that	 it	was	 the	 former	 that	would	get	 the	advantages	of	 today’s	neo-liberal	policies	rather	than	the	latter.	
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sustain	soil	quality,	 it	 is	necessary	to	stabilize	the	consumption	of	urea,	phosphate	and	potash	at	a	balance	of	about	4:2:1,	with	slight	changes	depending	on	soil	type.	In	1992,	fertiliser	 prices	 were	 partially	 liberalized:	 the	 prices	 of	 phosphate	 and	 potash	 were	decontrolled	while	 urea	 remained	 under	 government	 control.	 This	 led	 to	 increases	 in	the	 prices	 of	 potash	 and	 phosphate,	 while	 urea	 prices	 were	 still	 moderate.	 Despite	efforts	 of	 the	 government	 to	 restore	 price	 parity,	 these	 different	 prices	 persisted.	Through	 the	 period	 of	 the	 Green	 Revolution,	 this	 ratio	 was	 slowly	 but	 steadily	approaching	 the	 balance	 of	 4:2:1,	 but	 deteriorated	 quickly	 after	 1992:	 nitrogenous	fertilisers	 increased	 rapidly	 and	 phosphate	 as	 well	 as	 potash	 fertilisers	 fell	 relatively	(Ramakumar	 2014).	 Usually	 the	 rich	 farmers	 can	 afford	 to	 diversify	 their	 fertilizer	mixture,	while	 the	 poor	 rely	 solely	 on	 urea.	 This	 overuse	 of	 urea	 leads	 to	 a	 declining	fertiliser	response	as	well	as	a	depletion	of	micronutrients	from	the	soil	–	and	eventually	to	a	deterioration	of	soil	 fertility,	affecting	the	lands	of	the	poor.	After	2009,	this	effect	might	even	have	accelerated	because	the	prices	of	fertilizers	skyrocketed	–	particularly	those	of	phosphorus	and	potash	fertilizers	(Ramakumar	2014).	Parthasarthy	 (2015)	 argued	 that	 there	 should	 be	 more	 studies	 on	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 upwardly	 mobile	 farmers	 and	 developments	 in	 the	 agrarian	 sector.	 The	rich	farmers,	he	says,	play	a	role	in	the	processes	of	marketization	and	commodification.	They	have	a	tendency	to	seek	rents	and	profits	as	ways	of	protecting	their	 interest.	By	their	constant	lobbying	for	subsidies	for	export-oriented	agriculture	as	well	as	for	agro-processing	industries	together	with	their	refusal	to	develop	the	skills	base	of	labour	and	their	 opposition	 to	 food	 security,	 “sections	of	the	peasantry	[the	rich	farmers,	provincial	
elite]	have	a	role	in	facilitating	neo-liberal	policies	resulting	in	the	marginalization	of	the	
peasantry	[poorer	farmers]	and	contributing	to	agrarian	distress”	(ibid,	822).	These	 analyses	 of	 Ramachandran,	 Ramakumar	 and	 Parthasarthy	 show	 that	 it	 is	misleading	to	talk	about	agriculture	in	crisis	in	toto.	Rather,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	 different	 groups	 of	 farmers.	 One	way	 of	 doing	 so	 is	 according	 to	 the	 size	 of	landholdings.	
3.4 Landholdings	in	Rural	India	Land,	 the	 most	 important	 means	 of	 production	 still	 defines	 the	 different	 classes	 of	agricultural	households.	The	rich	 farmers	generally	own	the	most	and	best	 land	 in	 the	villages.	Their	members	are	not	involved	in	agricultural	operations	on	the	land.	Rather,	the	 land	is	 leased	out	to	tenants.	The	rich	farmers	may	be	from	traditionally	dominant	rural	castes	as	well	as	from	OBCs.	In	any	case,	they	are	“entrenched	in	positions	of	social	
and	 political	 dominance”	 (Ramachandran	 2011,	 59).	 The	 medium,	 semi-medium	 and	small	 farmers	 stand	between	 the	 rich	 capitalist	 farmers	and	 the	 landless	workers	and	marginal	farmers	(for	the	definitions	see	section	2.1,	this	chapter).	They	do	most	of	the	operations	on	their	land	themselves,	while	they	are	also	subjugated	to	the	markets.	Land	is	still	the	foundation	of	power,	even	if	other	businesses	like	money	lending,	agro-processing	 industries,	 dairy,	 trade,	 petrol	 pumps,	 sale	 and	 leasing	 of	 agricultural	machinery	 or	 inputs	 are	 important	 sources	 of	 income	 and	 power	 as	 well.	 But	 these	
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businesses	too	are	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	rich	farmers.	It	is	often	the	(former)	landlords	 that	 seek	 access	 to	 the	 institutions	 of	 state	 power,	 on	 a	 local	 level	 the	
panchayati	raj	institutions28.	This	allows	them	to	be	the	first	to	seize	the	opportunities	of	higher	 education	 or	 modern	 sector	 employment,	 which	 in	 turn	 further	 increases	inequality	(Ramachandran	2011).	The	2010–11	agricultural	census	shows	that	the	number	of	small	and	marginal	farms	is	increasing.	Table	 3	 depicts	 the	 percentages	 of	 marginal	 and	 small	 landholdings	 as	 a	percentage	of	total	landholdings	and	how	it	has	developed	from	the	1980s	to	today.	The	percentage	 of	 small	 and	marginal	 farmers	 has	 grown	 and	 constitutes	 now	more	 than	80%	of	all	landholdings.	Table	4	shows	the	same	trend	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	area	under	 cultivation,	where	 the	 area	 cultivated	 by	 small	 and	marginal	 farmers	 increased	from	 16%	 to	 53%.	 While	 this	 development	 can	 be	 seen	 all	 over	 India,	 this	marginalization	 is	most	 pronounced	 in	 Karnataka,	Maharashtra,	Madhya	 Pradesh	 and	Tamil	 Nadu.	 Furthermore,	 the	 area	 per	 holding	 has	 been	 decreasing	 (Deshpande	 and	Arora	2010).		One	of	the	main	reasons	for	this	development	is	that	over	time,	the	rural	population	has	increased	 tremendously.	 In	 1951,	 the	 rural	 population	 of	 India	 was	 298.6	 million;	 in	2001	 it	 reached	 742.6	 million.	 This	 means	 that	 in	 five	 decades	 the	 rural	 population	increased	by	444	million	people.	In	this	period,	the	number	of	cultivators	has	doubled,	while	 the	 number	 of	 agricultural	 labourers	 has	 quadrupled.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 net	 area	sown29	has	increased	only	from	about	119	million	ha	in	1951	to	about	141	million	ha	in	2001;	the	gross	cropped	area	increased	in	the	same	period	from	about	132	million	ha	to	186	million	ha.	This	has	put	immense	pressure	on	land	resources:	the	net	area	sown	per	cultivator	had	declined	from	1.70	ha	in	1951	to	just	1.11	ha	in	2001	and	from	4.35	ha	to	1.32	 ha	 per	 worker	 in	 the	 same	 period.	 Apart	 from	 the	 small	 landholding	 size,	 the	number	 of	 parcels	 in	 each	 landholding	 is	 also	 increasing:	 there	 are	 an	 estimated	 2.7	parcels	in	each	of	the	small	and	marginal	holdings	due	to	on-going	fragmentation	(Sidhu	2010).	This	fragmentation	of	land	is	a	consequence	of	the	law	of	inheritance	of	ancestral	property,	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 progressive	 tax	 on	 inherited	 land,	 and	 scarce	 non-farm	employment	(Niroula	and	Thapa	2005).		
																																								 																					28	Maharashtra	 has	 a	 three–tier	 system.	 The	 panchayati	 raj	 institutions	 are	 the	 basis	 of	 local	governance:	the	gram	panchayat	at	the	village	level,	the	panchayat	samiti	one	level	higher	at	the	development	 block,	 and	 zilla	parishad	 at	 the	 district	 level	 and	 on	 the	 highest	 level	 the	 state’s	government.	In	Maharashtra,	the	zilla	parishad	is	the	most	powerful	of	the	three.	It	is	composed	of	directly	elected	councillors	 (numbering	50–75)	as	well	as	 the	chairpersons	of	 the	panchayat	
samiti.	Its	tasks	are	to	prepare,	review	and	monitor	a	Five–Year	Plan	for	the	district	(GoI	2007).	Those	Five-Year	Plans	are	based	on	a	vision	from	the	district	and	the	development	plans	from	the	
gram	panchayats	and	panchayat	samitis	(Sridharan	2006).	29	The	net	 area	 sown	 is	 the	 total	 area	under	 crop	 cultivation.	 In	 contrary	 to	 the	 gross	 cropped	area,	the	number	of	crops	grown	on	the	land	per	year	does	change	the	net	sown	area.		
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Land	is	inherited,	owned	and	operated	predominantly	by	men.	The	legal	discrimination	against	 women’s	 ownership	 rights	 to	 agricultural	 land	 has	 decreased30	or	 even	disappeared.	But	many	social	norms	continue	to	be	barriers	for	women’s	ownership	of	land.	One	 example	 is	 that	 dowry	 is	 seen	 as	 the	woman’s	 legitimate	 share	 of	 ancestral	property	and	therefore	 land	 is	given	to	 the	sons	rather	 than	daughters.	 In	some	cases,	women	have	a	desire	to	own	land,	but	they	do	not	want	to	demand	their	share	in	land	because	they	do	not	want	to	risk	a	fight	with	their	family	members.	As	a	result,	women	are	still	strongly	discriminated	against	and	only	a	minority	of	women	inherits	or	owns	land	(Agarwal	1994,	Kulkarni	et	al.	2008,	Landesa	2013).	
Table	3:	Percentage	of	landholdings	(in	%	of	total	landholdings)	in	India	(based	on	GoI	2012)	
	 1980–81	 1990–91	 2000–01	 2010–11	
Large	 2.4%	 1.6%	 1.0%	 0.7%	
Medium	 9.1%	 7.1%	 5.5%	 4.3%	
Semi-medium	 14.0%	 13.1%	 11.7%	 10.0%	
Small	 18.1%	 18.8%	 18.9%	 17.9%	
Marginal	 56.4%	 59.4%	 62.9%	 67.0%		
Table	4:	Percentage	of	area	operated	under	marginal	and	small	holdings	(in	%	of	total	operated	area)	in	India	(based	on	GoI	2012)		 1980–81	 1990–91	 2000–01	 2010–11	
Large	 23.0%	 17.3%	 13.2%	 10.9%	
Medium	 29.6%	 27.0%	 24.0%	 21.2%	
Semi-medium	 21.2%	 23.2%	 24.0%	 23.6%	
Small	 14.1%	 17.4%	 20.2%	 22.1%	
Marginal	 12.0%	 15.0%	 18.7%	 22.2%	
Average	landholding	per	household	 4.5	acres	 3.8	acres	 3.3	acres	 2.9	acres		Together,	 these	 trends	 show	 that	 the	 number	 of	 landholdings	 that	 are	 too	 small	 to	provide	 sufficient	 income	 is	 increasing.	 Reddy	 and	 Mishra	 (2010b)	 argue	 that	 those	households	 are	 only	 viable	 if	 they	 can	 earn	 at	 least	 50%	 of	 their	 livelihood	 outside	agriculture.	 While	 small	 farms	 are	 not	 necessarily	 inefficient,	 there	 are	 several	structural	factors	that	do	work	against	small	and	marginal	farmers.	One	of	these	factors	is	 that	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 struggle	 to	 buy	 high-quality	 inputs	 such	 as	 high-																																								 																					30	The	Hindu	Succession	Act	1956	covers	inheritance	and	succession	of	property	of	Hindus,	Sikhs,	Buddhists,	and	Jains	(a	large	majority	of	the	Indian	population).	The	Act	was	amended	in	2005	to	grant	 rights	 to	women	 to	 inherit	 agricultural	 land	 of	 the	 parents	 and	 husband.	 After	 nearly	 a	decade,	 Maharashtra	 together	 with	 four	 other	 southern	 states	 (Kerala,	 Andhra	 Pradesh,	Karnataka	 and	 Tamil	 Nadu)	 had	 amended	 their	 succession	 laws	 to	 allow	 women	 to	 inherit	agricultural	 land.	 For	 more	 information	 on	 the	 land	 rights	 of	 women	 of	 other	 groups,	 see	Kulkarni	et	al.	(2008).	
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yielding	 variety	 seeds.	 Another	 factor	 is	 that	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 have	 much	higher	transaction	costs	and	low	bargaining	power	in	the	local	markets	(see	e.g.	Reddy	and	Mishra	2010b).	Additionally,	most	 farmers	do	not	have	any	storage	opportunities,	are	 in	 urgent	 need	 of	 money	 or	 the	 trader	 is	 their	 moneylender	 at	 the	 same	 time.	Therefore,	they	have	to	sell	their	produce	immediately	and	cannot	wait	for	the	price	to	increase	(Parasuraman	and	Rajaretnam	2011).	Consequently,	they	end	up	paying	more	for	their	inputs	and	achieve	lower	prices	for	their	yields.	I	 will	 come	 back	 to	 these	 aspects	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 with	 particular	 focus	 on	Maharashtra	 and	 Vidarbha.	 Based	 on	 the	 information	 and	 arguments	 so	 far	 in	 this	chapter,	I	now	would	like	to	reflect	on	the	nature	of	what	is	called	the	“agrarian	crisis”.		
4 Concluding	Thoughts:	What	Kind	of	Crisis?	It	becomes	clear	in	this	chapter	that	the	situation	is	difficult	for	the	masses	of	the	Indian	peasantry	 –	 a	 situation	 often	 labelled	 as	 the	 “agrarian	 crisis”.	 However,	 it	 might	 be	misleading	 to	 name	 the	 complex,	 overlaying	 causes	 and	 symptoms	 uniformly	 as	 an	‘agrarian	crisis’.	Reddy	and	Mishra	(2010b)	argue	that	it	is	necessary	to	distinguish	
“between	 the	 two	 faces	 of	 the	 crisis,	 namely,	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	 the	 ‘agricultural	
crisis’.	(…)	‘Agricultural	crisis’	refers	to	performance	of	the	agricultural	sector	in	terms	of	
changes	 in	growth	of	productivity	and	production	and	the	underlying	factors.	 ‘Agrarian	
crisis’	 is	 structural	 and	 institutional	 in	 nature,	 as	 could	 be	 seen	 in	 growing	
marginalization	and	failure	of	support	systems,	especially	as	a	part	of	the	reforms	agenda	
because	of	the	shift	in	institutional	emphasis	from	state	to	market”.	(ibid,	43)	This	 distinction	 partly	 mirrors	 the	 different	 lines	 of	 arguments	 outlined	 above.	 It	 is	crucial	 to	differentiate	between	 these	 two	crises,	because	 their	underlying	 factors	and	structures	as	well	as	 their	consequences	 for	different	groups	of	 farmers	might	be	very	different.	Bearing	in	mind	the	many	crises	this	‘agrarian	crisis’	encompasses,	during	the	course	 of	my	 qualitative	 research	 I	was	 faced	with	 the	 scenario	 of	most	 interviewees	using	 the	 expression	 “agrarian	 crisis”	 rather	 unspecifically	 or	 uncritically	 to	 refer	 to	both	crises.	Because	this	research	is	concerned	with	the	way	activists	and	farmers	talk	about	the	situation	of	farmers,	I	have	adopted	this	terminology	as	well.	That	aside,	I	see	the	agrarian	crisis	as	a	major	problem.	The	withdrawal	of	the	state	from	agriculture	 since	 the	 1990s	 in	 many	 areas	 has	 worsened	 the	 situation	 for	 the	 large	sections	of	the	peasantry.	In	a	situation	of	high	price	volatility	and	low	profitability	for	small	 and	medium	 farmers,	 support	 from	 the	 state	 in	 the	 form	 of	 of	 price	 support	 or	credit	would	be	urgently	needed.	I	therefore	find	it	important	to	talk	about	an	agrarian	crisis	 to	 emphasize	 the	 structural	 nature	 thereof.	 The	 respective	 policies	 and	developments	 affect	 the	 poorer	 sections	 of	 the	 peasantry	 adversely,	 and	 at	 the	 same	time	help	the	rural	elite	to	accumulate	more	land	and	wealth.	I	emphasise	the	unequal	consequences	of	the	agrarian	crisis	because	the	popular	conception	of	the	crisis	avoids	the	multitude	of	social	and	economic	factors	that	mediate	the	effects	of	the	crisis	on	the	
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larger	 category	 identified	 as	 ‘peasantry’.	 In	 fact,	 the	 varied	 perceptions	 and	 visions	 of	the	agrarian	crisis	form	a	very	significant	part	of	the	present	thesis.	Last	but	not	least,	I	understand	that	caste	and	gender	are	very	important	categories	to	understand	rural	life	and	everyday	struggles	of	the	peasantry.	I	will	come	back	to	these	two	categories	repeatedly	in	the	course	of	this	study.	Nevertheless,	the	study	is	focused	on	 mobilisations,	 which	 unfortunately	 are	 mostly	 the	 domain	 of	 men	 from	 high	 and	middle	caste	groups.		As	mentioned	above,	various	regions	are	affected	very	differently	by	the	agrarian	crisis.	For	this	thesis,	I	have	chosen	a	‘movement’	active	in	Vidarbha.	Vidarbha’s	rural	areas	are	less	 developed	 than	 other	 regions	 in	 Maharashtra	 and	 are	 known	 to	 feature	 a	disproportionally	high	number	of	 farmer	suicides.	 In	 the	next	chapter,	 therefore,	 I	will	introduce	Vidarbha	and	its	agriculture.		
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III. Vidarbha:	a	Region	in	Distress?	Despite	being	located	in	the	geographical	centre	of	India,	Vidarbha	is	a	marginal	region	in	many	 respects.	Within	 the	 relatively	 advanced	 state	 of	Maharashtra,	 Vidarbha	 lags	behind	 in	 terms	 of	 agricultural	 development	 and	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 one	 of	 the	regions	where	 a	 very	 high	 number	 of	 farmers	 commit	 suicides.	 Living	 in	 a	 backward	region	 is	 important	 to	how	farmers	understand	their	situation.	Therefore,	 this	chapter	III	is	dedicated	to	Vidarbha,	the	region	where	my	research	is	located.	After	introducing	Vidarbha,	I	will	depict	how	the	agrarian	crisis	manifests	itself	in	that	region.	I	will	refer	to	secondary	literature	and	statistics	as	well	as	interviews	with	farmers	and	‘movement’	actors.		
1 Vidarbha	in	Context	Vidarbha	 is	a	 region	 located	 in	 the	very	east	of	 the	State	of	Maharashtra.	Maharashtra	has	several	administrative	levels:	the	highest	unit	is	the	state,	followed	by	the	division,	then	 the	district,	 the	development	block	and	 finally	 the	village.	For	 issues	of	planning,	development	and	administration,	Maharashtra	is	often	split	into	three	regions:	Vidarbha	(Amravati	 and	 Nagpur	 division),	 Marathwada	 (Aurangabad	 division),	 Rest	 of	Maharashtra	 (Konkan,	Nashik	and	Pune	divisions)	and	Mumbai	 (GoM	2013b).	For	 this	thesis,	I	take	the	level	of	the	region	(Vidarbha)	as	the	main	reference	because	Vidarbha	is	important	for	interviewees	to	describe	where	they	live	and	belong	to.		Vidarbha	has	an	area	of	about	97,000	km2	(31.7%	of	Maharashtra’s	area)31	and	a	rural	population	of	 roughly	23	million	 in	2011	 (23%	of	Maharashtra’s	 population)	 living	 in	nearly	14,000	villages.	 (GoM	2013b;	Parasuraman	and	Rajaretnam	2011).	The	eastern	and	 western	 parts	 of	 Vidarbha	 differ	 considerably.	 The	 eastern	 part	 has	 large	 forest	coverage	 and	 grows	mainly	 rice,	while	 the	western	 part	 belongs	 to	 the	 cotton	 belt	 of	India.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 study	 is	 on	 three	 western	 districts:	 Wardha,	 Yavatmal	 and	Buldhana.	
																																								 																					31	To	compare,	Switzerland	has	an	area	of	roughly	41,000	km2.		
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Figure	 2:	 The	 six	 different	 political	 divisions	 of	 Maharashtra.	 The	 divisions	 of	 Amravati	 (or	Amaravati)	and	Nagpur	constitute	the	region	of	Vidarbha.		
	To	 explain	why	Vidarbha	 can	 be	 considered	 a	marginal	 region	 and	 to	 understand	 the	inequalities	between	the	different	regions	of	Maharashtra,	I	start	with	a	history	first	of	Vidarbha	 and	 then	 of	 Maharashtra.	 I	 then	 explore	 the	 importance	 of	 cotton	 to	 the	region’s	development	before	analysing	 the	socio-economic	dominance	of	 the	Maratha-
Kunbi	caste-complex.	Lastly,	I	discuss	the	situation	of	landholdings	in	Vidarbha.	
1.1 Regional	Inequality:	Vidarbha	in	Maharashtra	Vidarbha	as	it	is	presently	configured	became	an	administrative	region	only	recently.	In	the	 beginning	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 region	 called	Berar	 (roughly	Amravati	 division)	belonged	 to	 the	 Maratha	 kingdom	 and	 was	 later	 transferred	 to	 the	 Nizam32	of	Hyderabad,	 while	 Nagvidarbha	 (roughly	 Nagpur	 division)	 belonged	 to	 the	 Bhonsala	kingdom.	The	Nizam	had	an	agreement	with	the	Bhonsala	king	to	share	the	revenues	of	the	 Berar	 region.	 In	 1853,	 he	 leased	 out	 the	 Berar	 region	 to	 the	 British	 East	 India	Company,	which	cancelled	the	agreement	with	the	Bhonsalas.	Upset	over	the	Company's	cancellation,	 the	Bhonsalas	 participated	 in	 the	 First	War	 of	 Independence	 against	 the	British	 (or	 the	 Rebellion	 of	 1857),	 lost	 and,	 consequently,	 the	 Nagvidarbha	 districts	were	 annexed	 by	 the	 British	 Central	 Province	 and	 from	 then	 on,	 ruled	 by	 a	 Resident	appointed	 by	 the	 British.	 Around	 1900,	 the	 British	 also	 officially	 annexed	 the	 Berar	districts	 and	 added	 them	 to	 the	 Central	 Province.	 After	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 State	 of	
																																								 																					32	The	title	of	the	hereditary	ruler	of	Hyderabad.	
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Maharashtra	 in	 1956,	 the	 whole	 of	 Vidarbha	 became	 part	 of	 the	 state33	(Phansalkar	2005).	The	negotiations	around	the	creation	of	 the	State	of	Maharashtra	after	1956	became	a	basis	for	discussing	and	addressing	regional	inequality	within	the	new	state.	Since	then,	Vidarbha	 was	 brought	 under	 the	 protection	 of	 Article	 371(2)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 of	India.	This	article	gives	special	responsibilities	to	the	states	of	Maharashtra	and	Gujarat	to	 provide	 sufficient	 resources	 to	 less	 developed	 regions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Maharashtra,	many	 resolutions	 in	 this	 direction	 have	 been	 adopted	 by	 both	 houses	 of	 the	 state's	parliament.	 To	 name	 an	 example,	 the	 winter	 session	 of	 the	 legislative	 assembly34	of	Maharashtra	was	shifted	from	Mumbai	(the	capital	of	the	state)	to	Nagpur,	the	capital	of	the	 Nagpur	 division.	 However,	 much	 like	 this	 example,	 other	 attempts	 to	 foster	 the	marginalized	 region	 have	 been	 limited	 to	 merely	 symbolic	 gestures.	 Instead	 of	 more	substantial	measures,	the	elites	have	tried	to	undermine	the	issues	of	regional	inequality	(Phansalkar	2005).	This	 is	very	well	 illustrated	by	a	quote	by	then	Chief	Minister	V.	P.	Naik,	a	big	landholder	from	Vidarbha.	He	said	in	1969	that	
"we	 should	 now	 reject	 the	 view	 that	 a	 certain	 district	 or	 a	 certain	 region	 is	
underdeveloped	 and	 hence	 should	 be	 given	 additional	 assistance.	 Instead	 we	 should	
direct	 our	 efforts	 to	 secure	 a	 balanced	 development	 of	 all	 the	 regions	 of	 the	 state,	 the	
whole	of	which	is	more	or	less	underdeveloped"	(Mohanty	2009,	66).		In	the	1980s,	there	was	a	renewed	interest	in	regional	inequalities	and	the	government	appointed	 a	 Fact	 Finding	 Committee	 that	 indicated	 a	 huge	 developmental	 backlog	 in	Vidarbha,	 Marathwada	 and	 Konkan	 (Mohanty	 2009).	 In	 1994	 again,	 three	 regional	development	 boards	 were	 established	 in	 Maharashtra	 in	 order	 to	 remove	 regional	disparities	 in	 the	 above-mentioned	 divisions.	 A	 committee	 was	 established,	 reviewed	the	 development	 indicators	 anew	 and	 found	 that	 between	 1984	 and	 1994,	 regional	disparities	 had	 further	 widened	 (GoI	 2006,	 2007;	 Lalvani	 2009).	 In	 2013,	 the	 latest	report	 on	 balanced	 regional	 development	 analysed	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 three	regions	 of	Maharashtra:	 Vidarbha,	Marathwada	 and	Rest	 of	Maharashtra.	 The	 authors	found	 that	 during	 the	 1990s,	 the	 disparities	 between	 Vidarbha	 and	 Marathwada	compared	 to	 the	Rest	of	Maharashtra	decreased	but	again	 increased	during	 the	2000s	(GoM	2013b,	2).	The	backlog	of	Vidarbha	compared	to	 the	Rest	of	Maharashtra	comes	out	clear	(see	below).	But	also	within	Vidarbha	itself	there	are	big	differences.	Nagpur	is	relatively	 well–off,	 Buldhana	 and	Wardha	 are	much	worse	 but	 still	 much	 better	 than	Yavatmal	(GoI	2007;	GoM	2013b).	The	 state	 government	 began	 to	 allocate	 special	 outlays	 for	 these	 regions	 from	 1985	onwards.	But	 in	 the	non–backlog	 schemes35,	 the	distribution	of	 funds	 continued	 to	be																																									 																					33	Vidarbha	belonged	to	the	state	of	Madya	Pradesh	earlier.	34	The	 Maharashtra	 Legislative	 Assembly	 (often	 called	 assembly)	 is	 the	 lower	 house	 of	 the	bicameral	legislature	of	the	state	and	is	directly	elected	from	single–seat	constituencies.	35	These	 are	 the	 funds	 that	 were	 not	 directed	 particularly	 towards	 regions	 with	 a	 so-called	development	backlog,	e.g.	Vidarbha.	
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uneven	(Mohanty	2009).	Today,	the	distinction	between	backlog	and	non–backlog	funds	has	been	abolished.	All	 funds	are	 subjected	 to	a	 formula	 that	 considers	 the	size	of	 the	backlog,	 the	 population	 size,	 the	 net	 sown	 area	 and	 on–going	 projects.	 The	implementation	 –	 the	 actual	 expenditure	 against	 the	 allocation	 –	 is	 a	 different	 issue.	Previous	 track	records	showed	a	 lack	of	effective	monitoring,	 implementation	systems	and	political	will	 (GoI	2006;	 see	particularly	GoM	2013b,	 for	a	detailed	overview	over	reports,	policies	and	the	distribution	of	resources).	Recently,	a	fact–finding	commission	once	again	examined	the	reasons	for	Vidarbha's	poor	development	(for	more	details	see	section	2,	later	in	this	chapter).		Table	5	below	shows	selected	developmental	indicators	for	Vidarbha,	Marathwada	and	the	Rest	of	Maharashtra	(GoM	2013b).	The	table	clearly	shows	the	differences	between	Vidarbha	and	Marathwada	on	the	one	hand	and	the	Rest	of	Maharashtra	on	the	other.	
Table	5:	Major	development	indicators	for	Maharashtra’s	regions	Vidarbha,	Marathwada	and	Rest	of	Maharashtra	(GoM	2013b,	based	on	data	of	2010).	
	 Vidarbha	 Marathwada	 Rest	of	M.	
Human	
development	index	
0.720	 0.691	 0.770	
Infant	mortality	
rate	
39.5	 35.0	 28.8		
Under-five	
mortality	rate	
53	 46	 34	
Malnutrition	 12.9%	 8.6%	 11.6%		
1.2 Cotton:	The	Diminishing	Value	of	White	Gold	The	 story	 of	 Vidarbha	 cannot	 be	 told	without	 narrating	 the	 story	 of	 cotton,	 a	 crop	 of	immense	significance	for	the	Western	districts	of	Vidarbha.	Under	colonial	rule,	the	total	cultivated	area	witnessed	an	increase,	as	the	British	were	keen	on	growing	commercial	crops,	particularly	cotton.	The	demand	for	cotton	in	Bombay	for	export	to	England	was	high.	 This	 demand	became	 even	 higher	 during	 the	American	Civil	War	when	America	did	not	export	cotton	to	England,	causing	the	“Cotton	Famine”	in	England.	Consequently,	the	British	demand	for	Indian	raw	cotton	increased	and	so	did	the	area	in	Maharashtra	under	cotton	cultivation.	Despite	the	end	of	the	American	Civil	War,	this	trend	continued	and	 finally	 led	 to	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 Nagpur	 branch	 of	 the	 Great	 Indian	 Peninsula	Railway	 in	 1866.	 Through	 this	 facilitated	 transportation,	 production	 was	 again	expanded;	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	one	third	of	the	cultivated	land	of	Berar	(today	roughly	 Amravati	 division)	 was	 under	 mostly	 rain-fed	 cotton	 cultivation	 (Mohanty	2005).	Cotton	 production	 was	 profitable	 yet	 vulnerable	 since	 it	 was	 mostly	 dependent	 on	monsoon	rains.	In	the	Berar	districts	with	a	high	area	under	cotton	cultivation,	famines	occurred	 often	 and	 affected	 many	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 and	 labourers.	Nevertheless,	cultivators	from	the	communities	of	Maratha–Kunbis,	Rajputs	or	Telis	who	
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were	 mostly	 large	 and	 medium	 farmers	 and	 had	 surplus	 of	 food	 grains	 did	 well	(Mohanty	 2005).	 Most	 farmers	 did	 not	 have	 resources	 to	 make	 the	 necessary	investments	 to	 produce	 high	 quality	 cotton	 and	 hence	 could	 not	 realize	 high	 prices.	Furthermore,	 traders	 did	 not	 pay	 proper	 prices	 and	 took	 away	 the	 surplus	 because	typically	farmers	were	in	urgent	need	of	money	at	the	time	of	sale.	In	these	conditions,	the	 lower	 peasantry	 underwent	 a	 process	 of	 de-peasantisation	 and	 fell	 into	 petty	tenancy	and	labour	(Bharadwaj	1985;	Patnaik	1999).	The	following	quote	from	an	interview	with	a	farmer	provides	a	historical	glimpse	into	how	 cotton	 has	 shaped	 agriculture	 and	 rural	 society	 in	 Vidarbha.	 One	 of	 the	interviewees	reminisced	that:	
“before	1980,	1990,	kisans	felt	that	the	cotton	price	and	price	of	gold	were	equal.	If	they	
sold	one	quintal	of	cotton	to	the	market,	they	brought	10g	gold	back	to	the	house.	Now	
the	price	of	gold	has	increased	very	much.	Then	why	the	price	of	cotton	has	not	increased	
in	the	last	20	years?	(…)	Cotton	was	the	gold	of	Vidarbha.	But	now	no	prices.	It	is	no	gold	
anymore.”	Talking	about	the	role	that	cotton	played	in	the	development	of	Vidarbha	and	about	the	inequalities	between	regions	makes	sense	only	when	juxtaposing	cotton	to	other	crops	in	 other	 regions.	 While	 in	 Vidarbha,	 cotton	 continues	 to	 be	 a	 very	 important	 crop,	Western	 Maharashtra	 has	 shifted	 to	 sugarcane.	 In	 the	 recent	 period,	 large	 parts	 of	Western	Maharashtra	went	into	horticulture	where	the	income	per	acre	is	significantly	higher.	This	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	Western	Maharashtra	developed	faster	than	other	regions	(Jadhav	2006).	
1.3 Caste,	Class	and	Sugar:	the	Maratha-Kunbis	Western	Maharashtra’s	shift	to	export	oriented,	profitable	cash	crops	in	recent	times	is	not	by	sheer	coincidence.	It	can	be	understood	through	a	closer	investigation	of	the	class	and	caste	basis	of	agrarian	changes	and	distribution	of	public	resources	 in	the	State	of	Maharashtra,	 particularly	 when	 one	 examines	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Maratha-Kunbis	 of	Western	Maharashtra.	Technically,	 the	Maratha-Kunbis	do	not	constitute	a	caste	either	in	 the	 ritualistic	 or	 historical	 sense.	 The	 Marathas	 claim	 to	 be	 Kshatriyas	 –a	 varna	category	of	the	Hindu	caste	system,	while	Kunbis	are	mostly	cultivators	(Menon	2009).	But	 the	Maratha-Kunbi	 nexus	 existed	 and	 continued	 to	 flourish.	 A	 certain	 section	 of	
Marathas	were	recognised	by	larger	society	as	Kshatriyas	owing	to	their	self-identity	as	a	 martial	 caste	 associated	 with	 Shivaji	 Maharaj,	 a	 famous	 Maharashtrian	 leader.	 But,	historically,	the	Maratha	army	had	a	lot	of	peasant	representation,	many	of	whom	came	from	 the	 Kunbi	 caste	 (see	 Habib	 1983).	 In	 the	 present	 day,	 the	 two	 castes	 are	 both	mostly	(landed)	farmers	who	intermingle	freely	with	each	other	in	terms	of	kinship	and	socio-cultural	exchange	and	derive	patronage	from	state	and	political	institutions.	Caste	solidarity	along	with	the	possibilities	of	social	mobility	has	given	rise	to	the	category	of	
Maratha-Kunbis	(Menon	2009	in	The	Hindu).	The	 power	 of	 the	Maratha-Kunbis	 developed	 differently	 in	Western	Maharashtra	 and	Vidarbha.	 In	Western	Maharashtra,	 two	dominant	classes	emerged	after	 independence	
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and	became	closely	interlinked.	The	first	group	was	the	educated	urban	middle	class	–	often	 of	 higher	 castes	 such	 as	Brahmins	 –	 that	 belonged	 to	 government	 services	 and	business	 elites.	 This	 group	 had	 close	 linkages	with	 the	 rural	 areas	 because	many	 had	migrated	 to	 urban	 and	 industrial	 centres,	 when	 the	 position	 of	 rural	 Brahmins	weakened.	 In	 the	 urban	 areas,	 they	 gained	 control	 of	 public	 and	 private	 sector	industries,	 bureaucracy,	 educational	 institutions	 and	 the	 Indian	 National	 Congress	(henceforth:	 Congress)	 (Rodrigues	 1998).	 The	 second	 group	 was	 the	 commercial	peasantry,	 the	 rich	 farmers,	 who	 were	 mostly	 Marathas	 and	 Kunbis.	 They	 became	increasingly	 powerful	 in	 the	 countryside	 and	 the	 Brahmins	 aimed	 to	 ally	 with	 these	
Maratha–Kunbi	 elites.	 Together,	 these	 two	 groups	 established	 agricultural	 sugar	 co-operatives36	in	Western	Maharashtra	and	controlled	the	sugar	factories	(Attwood	1992).	Using	 this	 alliance,	 the	Maratha-Kunbis	 of	 Western	 Maharashtra	 started	 to	 dominate	power	politics	in	the	state,	particularly	in	the	realm	of	agriculture.	By	taking	control	of	these	 sugar	 co-operatives	 as	 well	 as	 the	 newly	 created	 democratic	 institutions	 (the	
panchayati	 raj	 bodies)	 and	 by	 making	 use	 of	 caste	 and	 kinship	 relations,	 they	 could	increase	and	consolidate	 their	power	(Attwood	1992;	Dahiwale	1995;	Mohanty	2009).	Through	 the	 patronage	 of	 state	 power,	 they	 gained	 and	 sustained	 access	 to	 new	technologies	 and	 strategies	 for	 production	 (Sirsikar	 1995).	 This	 modernization	 of	agriculture	 was	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 both	 the	 rich	 farmers	 as	 well	 as	 the	 industrial	bourgeoisie	of	Bombay.	It	provided	the	latter	with	markets	in	close	proximity,	allowed	them	to	establish	agro–processing	 industries	and	provided	 them	with	 labour	 force	 for	Bombay's	 industries	 (Sirsikar	1995).	 In	 this	 fashion,	 rural	and	urban	elite	helped	each	other	 to	protect	 their	mutual	 interests.	The	Maratha-Kunbis,	 together	with	 their	allies,	created	 and	 realized	 their	 own	 ideology	 of	 agrarian	 development,	 an	 ideology	 of	globalization	of	agriculture	with	a	focus	on	export–oriented	cash	crops.	Consequently,	Western	Maharashtra’s	agriculture	(and	sugarcane	in	particular)	was	and	still	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 Maratha-Kunbi	 caste-complex	 and	 they	 have	 become	 a	powerful	 force	 in	 the	entire	 state	of	Maharashtra.	But	unlike	 in	Western	Maharashtra,	the	 Maratha–Kunbis	 could	 not	 dominate	 society	 and	 politics	 in	 Vidarbha	 or	Marathwada37	to	 such	 an	 extent	 (Phansalkar	 2005).	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 reason	 is	that	 the	 internal	 cohesion	 and	 relative	 power	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 elites	 of	Marathwada	 and	Vidarbha	were	much	more	 fragmented	 (see	 also	 Parthasarthy	 2015,	820-821).	 This	 weakened	 the	 position	 of	 Vidarbha’s	 rich	 farmers	 to	 negotiate	 the	distribution	of	public	resources	and	the	direction	of	the	state’s	agricultural	policies.	
																																								 																					36	Sugar	 co-operatives	were	 established	 after	 independence.	 The	 sugar	mills	 belong	 to	 the	 co-operative,	which	is	made	up	of	the	supplying	farmers.	The	sugar	co-operatives	have	become	an	important	source	of	power	in	Western	Maharashtra.	(Lalvani	2008)	37Marathwada	experienced	little	democracy	and	capitalist	modernisation	along	with	British	rule	and	 remained	 in	 a	 rigid	 framework	 of	 communities	 based	 on	 castes	 and	 religion.	 The	 urban,	industrial	 elites	 in	Hyderabad	had	 little	 roots	 in	 the	 region	 (Mohanty	2009).	 Still,	Marathwada	performs	much	worse	 in	 the	major	developmental	 indicators,	 often	 even	worse	 than	Vidarbha	(GoM	2013b).		
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There	are	three	main	reasons	for	this	fragmentation	in	Vidarbha	(Mohanty	2009).	First,	the	Maratha-Kunbis	themselves	were	 fragmented	 in	 terms	 of	 classes:	 Some	were	 rich	cotton	 cultivators/traders	 while	 others	 were	 small	 cultivators	 or	 even	 manual	labourers.	 The	 conflicting	 interests	 between	 these	 classes	 within	 the	Maratha-Kunbis	have	 created	 disunity	 among	Maratha–Kunbis.	 The	 second	 reason	 is	 that	 there	 were	other	powerful	groups.	On	the	one	hand	the	Marwaris	and	Komtis,	both	belonging	to	the	Hindi-speaking	 areas	 of	 Madhya	 Pradesh,	 were	 the	 moneylender-cum-traders	 in	 the	region	with	a	lot	of	power	in	the	regional	economy	(see	also	Phansalkar	2005).	This	led	to	 animosity	 between	 these	 groups	 and	 the	 Marathi	 speaking	Maratha-Kunbis,	which	only	weakened	the	latter	group.	Also,	the	tiny	business	and	industrial	class	that	emerged	in	 Nagpur	 because	 of	 textile	 and	 other	 associated	 concerns	 came	 from	 non-Marathi	communities,	 had	 little	 interest	 in	 agriculture	 and	 therefore	 few	 linkages	 with	 the	
Maratha-Kunbis	 of	 rural	Vidarbha.	The	nexus	of	urban	bourgeoisie	 and	 rich	peasantry	that	 developed	 in	 Western	 Maharashtra	 did	 not	 exist	 much	 in	 Vidarbha.	 Third,	 the	
Marathas	 are	 less	 numerous	 and	 there	 are	 more	 Scheduled	 Tribe	 and	 OBC	 groups	(Deshpande	2006;	Palshikar	2004).	Fourth,	the	tensions	between	Scheduled	Castes	(and	later	 Buddhists)	 and	 higher	 castes	 were	 particularly	 strong	 in	 Vidarbha	 because	 of	Ambedkar's	 social–political	movement	 (Mohanty	2009).	All	 this	 leads	 to	 the	dominant	reality	 of	 contemporary	 Maharashtra:	 Western	 Maharashtra	 elites	 drive	 the	 state	structure	 and	 policies	 and	 this	 region	 has	 historically	 been	 able	 to	 corner	 a	 lot	 of	resources	from	the	state	to	develop	faster	than	other	regions	of	Maharashtra	(Baviskar	2013;	Tambe	2004).	In	 the	 last	 few	 sections,	 I	 analysed	 the	 disadvantaged	 position	 of	 Vidarbha	 within	Maharashtra.	But	inequality	is	quite	high	within	the	region	of	Vidarbha.	To	understand	this	inequality,	I	take	the	landholding	pattern	as	an	exemplar,	which	has	its	roots	in	pre-colonial	and	colonial	land	tenure	systems.		
1.4 Inequality:	Landholding	in	Vidarbha	In	the	mid	19th	century,	the	whole	region	of	Vidarbha	came	under	the	Ryotvari	system	of	landholding.38	In	 the	 Ryotvari	 land	 tenure	 system,	 property	 rights	 are	 vested	 in	 the	cultivators	and	the	land	revenue	was	collected	directly	by	the	government,	eliminating	middlemen	 with	 hereditary	 positions	 such	 as	 the	 zamindars	 (Omvedt	 1973a).	 The	colonial	 state	 reduced	 the	 land	 revenue	 demand	 initially,	 but	 then	 increased	 it	significantly,	 creating	an	elaborate	bureaucratic	network	 to	ensure	 revenue	collection.	The	colonial	authorities	 later	delegated	 the	administrative	 task	of	 tax	collection	 to	 the																																									 																					38	In	most	of	the	Berar	areas,	the	ryotvari	system	was	present	since	an	earlier	period.	The	second	system	 present	 in	 the	 old	 Central	 Province	 areas	 was	 the	malguzari	 system.	 A	malguzar	 was	allotted	 some	 villages,	 where	 he	 collected	 land	 revenues.	 A	malguzar	 could	 be	 described	 as	 a	middleman,	 somewhere	 between	 a	 collection	 agent	 and	 a	 zamindar.	 He	 had,	 though,	 absolute	right	over	all	village	land	except	the	plots	owned	by	farmers.	Further,	the	malguzar	rights	were	transferable.	 So	 even	 though	 he	was	 a	 petty	 landlord,	 he	 had	 the	 same	 absolute	 power	 as	 the	
zamindars.	 (Strictly	 speaking,	 there	 have	 been	 three	 systems.	 But	 the	 ijardari	 system	 that	was	similar	to	a	zamindari	system	(ijardars	were	permanent	landlords	with	dependent	tenantry)	was	only	present	in	some	kolam	regions.)	(Phansalkar	2005)	
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upper	 castes.	 These	 positions	 were	 prestigious	 ones	 and	 were	 mostly	 occupied	 by	
Maratha	and	Kunbi	farmers.	Besides	the	position	of	a	tax	collector,	they	received	plots	of	land	and	rights	over	the	village	commons	(Dutt	1904;	Mohanty	2005,	2009;	Phansalkar	2005).		The	 particularity	 of	 the	Ryotvari	 system	was	 that	 the	 tenants	were	 legally	 entitled	 to	occupy	 land	 permanently	 and	 dispose	 of	 it	 freely,	 which	 had	 severe	 consequences.	Vidarbha	 is	 a	 dry	 land	 area	 and	 there	 have	 been	 many	 crop	 failure	 periods.	Consequently,	many	 low	 caste	 farmers	 and	 landless	 labourers	were	 forced	 to	 borrow	money	 from	 large	 landholders,	 cotton	and	grain	dealers,	mostly	belonging	 to	Brahmin	and	merchant	communities.	Many	farmers	became	indebted	and	had	to	sell	their	lands;	a	significant	proportion	of	them	eventually	migrated	to	Bombay,	Nagpur	and	other	cities	for	employment	in	cotton	mills,	docks,	or	railways	(Borpujari	1973;	Mohanty	2005).	The	ones	who	stayed	on	their	plots	were	no	 longer	owner-cultivators	but	de	 facto	tenants.	Therefore,	 the	Maharashtrian	Ryotvari	regions	had	 fewer	owner-cultivators	 than	other	regions	of	India	with	similar	tenurial	systems	in	the	early	20th	century	(Omvedt	1973a).	The	Kunbis	accumulated	 a	 large	 part	 of	 agricultural	 holdings	 during	 that	 period.	 They	often	cultivated	the	land	by	leasing	it	out	mostly	to	lower	caste	cultivators,	 leaving	the	ones	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 rural	 hierarchy	 –	 the	 Scheduled	 Caste	 communities	 –	 to	 be	agricultural	labourers.	If	they	had	access	to	any	land,	it	was	of	poor	quality	(Brahme	and	Upadhyaya	1979;	Satya	1997).	In	terms	of	landholdings	in	Maharashtra,	there	is	a	close	connection	between	caste	and	size	 of	 ownership	 holdings.	 According	 to	 Arora	 (2001),	 big	 landowners	 (more	 than	 8	acres)	 are	mostly	Maratha–Kunbis,	Nomadic	Tribes	 (NT)	or	 a	 few	Brahmins	and	OBCs.	Middle	farmers	(2–8	acres)	are	also	mostly	Maratha–Kunbis,	Telis	or	other	middle	caste	communities,	some	belong	to	artisan	castes,	a	few	Dalits,	OBCs	and	Adivasis.	The	class	of	small	farmers	(less	than	2	acres)	and	the	landless	is	constituted	mainly	by	Dalits,	OBCs,	
Adivasis	 and	 a	 few	Maratha–Kunbis.	 The	 category	of	 small	 farmers	 and	 landless	 is	 the	most	 heterogeneous	 one	 because	 it	 serves	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 for	 farmers	who	 have	 lost	their	basis	of	 livelihood	 (Kumar	2004;	Mohanty	2005;	Phansalkar	2005;	Parasuraman	and	Rajaretnam	2011;	Ramachandran	2011).	Furthermore,	the	population	belonging	to	the	 categories	 of	 Scheduled	 Tribes	 in	 Maharashtra	 still	 operates	 mostly	 on	 marginal,	sloping	land	(GoM	2013b;	Rajasekaran	2004).	In	1958,	an	act	 in	Maharashtra	ordained	 that	 leased	 land	needs	 to	be	 transferred	 into	the	 ownership	 of	 the	 tenant;	 and	 in	 1961,	 Maharashtra	 installed	 land	 ceilings	 that	defined	an	upper	limit	to	the	amount	of	landownership	(Mohanty	2005).	Despite	many	loopholes	 and	 the	 process	 being	 thwarted	 by	 many	 forces,	 there	 was	 some	 positive	impact	 on	 redistribution	 of	 land	 in	 Maharashtra	 and	 also	 Vidarbha.	 Maharashtra	 in	particular	has	a	slightly	better	track	record	than	most	other	states.	In	1995,	11%	of	the	total	 land	 was	 redistributed.	 The	 Gini	 coefficient	 of	 land	 distribution	 in	 Maharashtra	slightly	 decreased	 from	 0.528	 in	 1970	 to	 0.481	 in	 1990	 (Mohanty	 2001;	 Rajasekaran	1998,	 2004).	 This	 indicates	 an	 improvement,	 however	 modest,	 one	 that	 does	 not	
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contradict	the	conclusion	that	the	land	reforms	in	India	were	a	major	failure	(see	section	1.4,	chapter	II;	section	3.2,	chapter	VI).		In	 the	 rural	 areas	 of	 Maharashtra,	 the	 importance	 of	 agricultural	 incomes	 has	 not	declined	 compared	 to	 non-agricultural	 incomes.	 This	 can	 have	many	 causes.	 It	 is,	 for	example,	possible	that	the	urban	centres	attract	particularly	the	non-agricultural	labour	away	from	agriculture	(Jha	2006,	20).	In	contemporary	Vidarbha,	67%	of	the	workforce	depends	on	agriculture.	25%	own	 land,	while	42%	are	agricultural	workers	 (based	on	GoM	2013b,	 87).	 Among	 the	 landowners,	 around	30%	are	marginal	 farmers	with	 less	then	2.5	acres	of	cultivated	landholding,	35%	are	small	farmers	with	2.6–5	acres	of	land,	30%	 are	 middle	 farmers	 with	 5.1–25	 acres	 and	 5%	 have	more	 than	 25	 acres.	 These	numbers	differ	among	different	districts.	Buldhana	has	an	exceptionally	high	percentage	of	 landed	 farmers	 (more	 than	 70%),	 but	 also	 a	 significant	 share	 of	marginal	 farmers.	About	 60%	 of	 farmers	 in	 Wardha	 and	 Yavatmal	 hold	 some	 amount	 of	 land	 but	 a	significant	share	consists	of	small	and	marginal	farmers.	Wardha	has	a	high	percentage	of	farmers	with	irrigated	land	–	around	one	fourth	–	while	Yavatmal	and	Buldhana	only	have	 around	 15%	 (Parasuraman	 and	 Rajaretnam	 2011).	 In	 whole	 Vidarbha,	 the	fragmentation	of	landholdings	is	an	on-going	process.	The	share	of	farmers	owning	less	then	5	acres	of	land	is	increasing	annually	by	15%	(GoM	2013b,	267;	see	also	section	3.4	in	chapter	II).	When	looking	at	 landholding,	 the	caste	structure	of	ownership	is	extremely	 important.	There	are	four	major	categories	in	Vidarbha’s	rural	areas.	The	first	are	people	belonging	to	 the	 categories	 of	 Scheduled	 Tribes	 or	Nomadic	 and	De-Notified	 Tribes,	 namely	 the	
Gonds,	Kolams,	Pradans	or	Korkus.	 The	Banjara	 also	 fall	 under	 this	 category,	 although	they	are	more	developed	and	settled	all	over	the	Deccan	plateau	and	Western	Vidarbha.	Together,	they	constitute	nearly	one	fourth	of	the	rural	population.	The	second	category	is	the	Scheduled	Castes	(around	one	fifth	of	the	population),	among	which	Mahars39	are	the	largest	group.	Scheduled	Tribes	and	Scheduled	Castes	are	mainly	small	or	marginal	farmers	or	agricultural	labour.	Scheduled	Tribes	often	live	close	to	forests	and	make	use	of	 its	 resources	 and	 are	 at	 the	 bottom	 in	 terms	 of	many	 development	 indicators.	 The	third	 category	 consists	 of	 Marathi	 speaking	 people	 within	 the	 Maratha–Kunbi	 caste	complex	 together	with	Telis	as	 another	major	 group.	Maratha–Kunbis	are	 numerically	strongest	and	the	main	castes	of	 farmers	and	 landholders.	They	are	the	ruling	caste	 in	Western	 Vidarbha,	 while	 Telis	 are	 numerically	 superior	 in	 Eastern	 districts	 and	
Brahmins	 mostly	 in	 urban	 centres.	 The	 fourth	 category	 consists	 of	 relatively	 recent	migrants	 from	 Gujarat	 and	 other	 states,	 mainly	 the	 Marwaris	 (Mohanty	 2005;	Phansalkar	2005;	Parasuraman	and	Rajaretnam	2011).		Last	but	not	least,	the	landholding	patterns	are	evolving	with	the	rise	in	land	prices	and	development	 of	 a	 land	 market.	 According	 to	 Deshpande	 and	 Arora	 (2010),	 the	 land	market	 is	skewed	in	favour	of	 large	owners.	Small	and	marginal	 farmers	–	particularly																																									 																					39	Many	Mahars	 in	 Vidarbha	 (as	 opposed	 to	 other	 regions	 in	 Maharashtra)	 were	 landholders	(Kumar	2004).		
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those	from	low	castes	–	have	often	 lost	 land.	 If	 the	situation	is	particularly	difficult	 for	small	and	marginal	farmers,	large	owners	or	actors	from	the	corporate	sector	offer	high	land	 prices	 to	 induce	 farmers	 sell	 their	 land.	 The	 Census	 of	 Maharashtra	 shows	 that	many	small	and	marginal	farmers	sell	their	 land	and	join	the	army	of	the	landless	(see	section	 3.4,	 chapter	 II).	 Furthermore,	Deshpande	 and	Arora	 argue	 that	 because	 of	 the	restrictions	 on	 tenancy,	 an	 undercover	 tenancy	 market	 has	 emerged	 which	 is	 highly	exploitative.	As	an	important	consequence,	these	tenants	are	then	not	entitled	to	state-led	schemes	such	as	loan	waivers.	
2 Agriculture	in	Vidarbha	Since	 1999,	 the	 growth	 of	 agriculture	 and	 the	 productivity	 in	 Vidarbha	 is	 remarkably	lower	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 regions.	 The	 rate	 of	 agricultural	 growth	 has	 been	statistically	 zero	 for	 the	 period	 of	 2000-2011,	 often	 even	 negative.	 Additionally,	 the	fluctuations	of	 the	year	on	year	growth	rates	are	exceptionally	high	 in	Vidarbha	(GoM	2013b,	93).		
2.1 Prices	and	Costs	Earlier,	 the	 government	 used	 to	 make	 most	 of	 the	 procurement	 operations	 for	agricultural	 products,	 but	 in	 the	 1990s	 this	 market	 was	 liberalized	 (GoI	 2006,	 see	chapter	II).	Before	the	these	new	policies	in	the	1990s,	agencies	of	the	state	government	in	Maharashtra,	namely	the	Maharashtra	State	Co–operative	Marketing	Federation	and	the	Maharashtra	 State	Co–operative	Tribal	Development	Corporation40	carried	out	 the	procurement	on	behalf	of	the	Government	of	India	(GoM	2013a).		For	 cotton,	 Maharashtra	 has	 a	 particular	 history	 with	 the	 scheme	 of	 Monopoly	Procurement	 of	 Cotton	under	Maharashtra	Raw	Cotton	Act	 in	1971.	This	Act	 puts	 the	marketing	of	cotton	under	complete	state	control,	not	allowing	the	farmers	to	sell	cotton	to	 anyone	 but	 the	 Maharashtra	 State	 Co–operative	 Cotton	 Growers	 Marketing	Federation	Limited	 (MSCCGMF,	part	 of	 the	Maharashtra	 State	Co–operative	Marketing	Federation).	During	this	time	of	state	monopoly,	the	farmers	were	paid	fixed	prices	that	did	not	change	during	one	season.	Aside	from	eliminating	the	middlemen,	the	act	sought	to	 stabilize	 incomes	and	production	and	 therefore	 to	create	a	 steady	supply	of	quality	cotton.	This	monopoly	ended	in	2004	after	heated	debates	in	the	parliament.		Outside	Maharashtra,	the	cotton	trade	has	been	routed	through	the	Cotton	Corporation	of	India	since	1970.	In	1994,	cotton	lint	came	under	Open	General	Licence41	and	so	did	raw	 cotton	 in	 2001.	 This	 meant	 that	 cotton	 could	 be	 freely	 imported	 or	 exported.	However,	the	Government	of	India	still	has	the	right	to	ban	exports	or	to	define	export	quotas,	if	it	finds	the	deficit	in	supply	to	be	too	high.	Normally,	though,	the	cotton	price																																									 																					40	The	Maharashtra	State	Co–op	Tribal	Development	Corporation	is	responsible	for	the	so-called	tribal	areas.		41	Open	General	Licence	means	 that	 the	product	can	be	 freely	 traded	as	per	rules	of	 the	World	Trade	Organization.		
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follows	the	international	cotton	price,	as	long	as	it	does	not	fall	below	the	MSP.	In	that	case,	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 will	 guarantee	 procurement	 at	 the	 MSP	 rate.	 In	Maharashtra,	the	MSCCGMF	had	often	paid	a	price	higher	than	the	MSP	to	the	cultivators	and	 in	 this	 process	 MSCCGMF	 experienced	 huge	 losses.	 Consequently,	 after	 2000	 it	gradually	gave	up	its	monopoly	character	and	only	paid	the	MSP	(Godbole	1999;	Shroff	2006).	It	is	not	only	the	prices	but	also	the	costs	of	production	that	determine	the	profitability	of	 agriculture.	 The	 costs	 of	 production	 have	 increased	 tremendously	 with	 the	 Green	Revolution	 technologies.	 High	 Yielding	 Varieties	 (HYV)	 seeds	 have	 replaced	 local	varieties.	 Chemical	 fertilizers	 are	 used	 more	 often	 and	 have	 increased	 in	 importance	over	farm	manure	and	other	kinds	of	local	fertilizers.	If	these	inputs	are	of	high	quality	and	appropriate	 to	 local	 conditions,	 if	 they	are	used	with	knowledge	and	extension,	 if	the	 soils	 are	 fertile,	 irrigation	 is	 secured	 and	 no	major	 catastrophe	 (such	 as	 a	 flood)	harms	 the	 crops,	 these	 technologies	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 increase	 the	 yield.	 If	 one	 of	these	 conditions	 is	 not	 fulfilled,	 the	 costs	 of	 production	 threaten	 to	 overrun	 the	MSP	(GoI	2006;	Pant	2012,	63).	In	agricultural	 input	markets	in	rural	and	semi-urban	Maharashtra,	many	dealers	offer	seeds,	fertilizer	and	pesticides.	The	seeds	are	often	found	spurious	(GoI	2006).	There	is	a	 lack	 of	 a	well–known,	 government-approved	 seal	 of	 quality	 to	 assure	 the	 quality	 of	seeds	and	other	 inputs.	Dealers	promise	 that	with	HYV	seeds,	 the	protection	 from	 the	cotton	bollworm	 is	 improved	and	 fewer	pesticides	are	needed.	 In	 this	way,	 the	higher	costs	 of	 seeds	 is	 offset	 by	 the	 lower	 cost	 of	 pesticides	 and	 higher	 yields.	 In	 case	 of	spurious	seeds,	farmers	who	buy	hybrid	or	Bt	cotton42	seeds	have	to	nevertheless	invest	in	pesticides.	The	government	is	certainly	aware	of	the	problem	but	there	is	no	proper	certification	system	yet	 in	place.	Further,	most	of	the	HYV	are	not	adjusted	to	rain–fed	conditions	and	do	not	render	yields	under	these	conditions.	Because	high	quality	seeds	are	very	expensive,	farmers	often	mix	seeds	of	different	qualities.	This,	however,	results	in	 bad	 quality	 and	 low	 yield.	 In	 this	 way,	 we	 can	 infer	 that	 the	 price	 realization	 in	agriculture	with	HYV	and	Bt	cotton	is	far	from	satisfactory	(GoI	2006).	These	two	main	factors,	low	and	volatile	prices	as	well	as	high	input	costs	and	risks,	can	lead	 to	 yield	or	price-related	 shocks.	Many	 cotton	 farmers	 live	below	 the	poverty	 line	despite	their	relatively	big	land	holdings	(GoI	2006).	
2.2 Irrigation	One	of	 the	most	 crucial	 inputs	 in	dry	 land	areas	 is	water	 for	 irrigation.	About	80%	of	Maharashtra's	 agriculture	 is	 rain–fed.	 In	 the	 area	 cultivated	 under	 cotton,	 only	 4%	 is	irrigated	(Deshpande	and	Arora	2010).	Cotton	is	a	cash	crop	and	without	irrigation,	crop	failures	 are	 common	 and	 yields	 are	 low.	 Even	 if	 the	 irrigated	 area	 in	Maharashtra	 is																																									 																					42	Bt	cotton	refers	 to	genetically	modified	cotton	varieties	 that	produce	 insecticides	against	 the	cotton	 bollworm.	 The	 insecticides	 are	 Bt	 toxins	 and	 are	 originally	 produced	 by	 the	 bacterium	
Bacillus	thuringiensis.	
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slowly	 increasing,	 the	 situation	 continues	 to	 be	 very	 problematic.	 Sugarcane	 accounts	for	a	majority	of	the	irrigation	water	in	the	state,	even	though	sugarcane	is	only	grown	on	 less	 than	3%	of	 the	gross	cropped	area.	The	area	under	sugarcane	 is	 increasing	all	over	 Maharashtra	 despite	 the	 water	 scarcity	 (GoI	 2007).	 This	 trend	 is	 particularly	disturbing,	because	the	net	return	per	unit	of	water	generated	by	sugarcane	is	estimated	to	be	very	low	when	compared	to	food	grains	(Kalamkar	2011).	It	is	a	highly	contested	endeavour	 to	 give	 so	 much	 water	 to	 a	 water	 intensive	 crop	 in	 a	 semi–arid	 region,	instead	of	giving	the	water	to	wider	areas	of	other	crops.		Because	most	of	 the	 sugarcane	 is	 grown	 in	Western	Maharashtra,	 it	makes	 sense	 that	Western	 Maharashtra	 gets	 the	 major	 share	 of	 irrigation	 resources	 (GoM	 2013b,	 4).	Vidarbha	 on	 the	 contrary,	 gets	 much	 less	 of	 the	 state's	 resources	 for	 irrigation	development.	Vidarbha	has	an	uneven	 terrain,	high	water	 run–off	 and	 shallow	soil,	 so	the	need	for	protection	and	integrated	watershed	development	is	crucial.	But	the	region	lags	far	behind	in	irrigation	development	(GoI	2006).	There	are	many	irrigation	projects	(planned	or	realized)	–	pump	sets,	dams,	and	watershed	projects	–	a	big	share	of	which	has	never	materialised	or	 does	not	 function	properly	 (Phansalkar	 2005).	 In	Vidarbha,	13%	of	the	gross	cropped	area	is	irrigated,	compared	to	14%	in	Marathwada	and	21%	in	 the	 Rest	 of	 Maharashtra.	 Within	 Vidarbha,	 however,	 there	 are	 huge	 differences	between	Amravati	division	(6%)	and	Nagpur	division	(26%)	(GoM	2013b,	87).	There	are	two	main	reasons	for	the	slow	irrigation	development	 in	Vidarbha.	The	first	reason	 is	 that	 the	 elites	 ruling	 the	 state	 have	 more	 incentives	 to	 develop	 Western	Maharashtra	and	its	sugarcane	production	(see	section	1	of	this	chapter).	Additionally,	corruption	is	extremely	high	when	it	comes	to	irrigation	development.	A	case	in	point	is	the	Maharashtra	 irrigation	 scam	 that	 included	 32	 irrigation	 projects	 in	 Vidarbha	 and	more	in	the	Rest	of	Maharashtra	when	the	irrigation	portfolio	was	under	Ajit	Pawar	of	the	 Nationalist	 Congress	 Party.	 The	 scam	 became	 public	 after	 it	 turned	 out	 that	 the	government	has	spent	Rs	70,000	crore	between	1999	and	2009	for	 irrigation,	but	that	the	irrigation	potential	increased	only	by	0.1%	in	the	entire	state.	The	government	was	accused	of	a	fraud	amounting	to	Rs	35,000	crore.	In	2012,	the	government	gave	a	clean	chit	 to	 Ajit	 Pawar.	 But	 the	 new	 government	 elected	 in	 2014	 has	 reopened	 the	investigations	(dna	2015;	Jog	2012	in	The	Business	Standard).		The	second	reason	for	the	slow	irrigation	development	in	Vidarbha	though,	 is	the	high	forest	cover	in	Vidarbha,	particularly	in	the	East.	Many	irrigation	projects	in	the	region	involve	 some	 forestland	and	 therefore	 attract	 the	provision	of	 the	Forest	Act	 of	1980,	which	 further	 stalls	 their	 construction	 (GoI	2006;	Phansalkar	2005).	There	 is	 one	 last	point	 that	 makes	 the	 irrigation	 of	 agricultural	 land	 in	 Vidarbha	 difficult:	 the	 load	shedding	for	about	12	hours	a	day	impedes	the	functioning	of	pumps	for	irrigation.		Consequently,	 Vidarbha’s	 agriculture	 heavily	 depends	 on	 rainfall.	 This	 leads	 to	major	problems	 caused	 by	 erratic	 rains	 during	 monsoon,	 moisture	 stress	 during	 post–monsoon	season	and	drought	stress	in	the	dry	season	(GoI	2006).	
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2.3 Crops,	Yields	and	Profitability	The	majority	of	farmers	grow	a	variety	of	different	crops,	even	the	marginal	farmers.	In	
kharif	 (monsoon	 season)	 nearly	 all	 farmers	 cultivate,	 but	 in	 rabi	 (dry	 season),	when	cultivation	depends	on	soil	moisture,	only	roughly	20%	of	the	farmers	cultivate	–	mostly	the	bigger	landowners	and	others	with	access	to	irrigation.	In	kharif,	the	major	crops	are	cotton,	 sorghum,	 soybean,	 green	 gram	 and	 some	 pulses.	 Cotton	 can	 easily	 count	 for	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 cultivated	 area	 (rice	 is	 also	 grown,	 but	 mostly	 in	 the	 Eastern	districts).	However,	soybean	is	catching	up.	In	rabi,	mostly	pulses	such	as	gram	as	well	as	wheat	are	grown.	Most	of	the	farmers	use	several	mixed	crop	systems,	e.g.	cotton	and	pigeon	 pea.	 There	 are	 considerable	 differences	 between	 various	 districts.	 Buldhana	grows	 little	 soybean,	 cotton	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 sorghum	 and	 some	 sunflowers	 in	 kharif	 and	mainly	gram	in	rabi.	Wardha	grows	a	 lot	of	soybean	in	kharif	and	also	cotton	but	 little	sorghum,	 and	 in	 rabi	 gram	and	 a	 lot	 of	wheat.	 Yavatmal,	 like	Buldhana,	 grows	mainly	cotton,	but	also	soybean	in	kharif,	and	gram	and	wheat	 in	rabi	(GoI	2007;	GoM	2013b;	Phansalkar	2005).	The	yields	differ	greatly	across	the	regions.	For	cotton,	Maharashtra	(with	Vidarbha	and	Marathwada	as	the	major	cotton	growing	areas)	has	an	average	productivity	of	343	kg	lint	 per	 ha.	 That	 is	 very	 low	 compared	 to	 the	 Indian	 average	 of	 510	 kg	 lint/ha.	 For	soybean	 region-wide	 data	 is	 available.	 Vidarbha	 has	 a	 very	 low	 productivity	 of	 1445	kg/ha	 compared	 to	 the1900	 kg/ha	 in	Western	Maharashtra	 (GoM	 2013b,	 237	 ff;	 also	Kannan	 2015).	 The	 Government	 of	 Maharashtra	 posited	 low	 area	 of	 irrigation,	 low	quality	 of	 soil	 as	 well	 as	 small	 landholdings	 as	 the	main	 reasons	 for	 relatively	 lower	productivity	 (GoI	 2007;	 GoM	 2013b).	 In	 recent	 years,	 soil	 erosion	 is	 increasing	 and	rainfall	patterns	are	changing,	which	has	affected	productivity.	Rainfall,	in	particular,	is	inadequate	 and	 has	 changed	 in	 terms	 of	 temporal	 distribution,	 which	 greatly	 affects	agricultural	yields	in	quantity	as	well	as	year-to-year	fluctuations	(GoM	2013b,	231).	When	 it	 comes	 to	 profitability,	 a	 Government	 of	 India	 report	 on	 Vidarbha	 (GoI	 2006)	calculated	that	agriculture	had	the	potential	to	be	profitable	also	in	Vidarbha.	In	reality,	however,	 agriculture	 is	 far	 from	 being	 profitable	 for	 many	 farmers	 –	 having	 a	 gross	profit	(revenue	minus	costs)	of	often	less	than	4–5000	Rs/ha.	The	report	compares	the	MSP	 for	 cotton,	 sorghum,	 and	 soybean	 for	 the	 year	 2004-2005	 under	 irrigated	conditions.	They	find	that	in	case	of	sorghum	and	cotton,	the	MSP	is	higher	than	all	paid	costs	(including	rent	for	land	and	family	labour),	but	lower	than	the	cost	of	production	if	interest	on	owned	capital	and	the	rental	value	of	the	owned	land	is	 included.	The	fact-finding	 report	 (GoI	 2006)	 found	 very	 high	 net	 returns	 of	 about	 12,500	 Rs/ha	 for	irrigated	 Bt	 cotton	 in	 Vidarbha,	 and	 for	 local	 cotton	 varieties	 only	 4300	 Rs/ha.	 For	soybean,	the	MSP	is	also	higher	than	the	costs,	including	interest	on	owned	capital	and	the	 rental	 value	 of	 the	 owned	 land.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Pant	 (2012,	 84)	 analysed	 the	profitability	 of	 agriculture	 in	 Vidarbha	 (based	 on	 reports	 of	 the	 Commission	 for	Agricultural	 Costs	 and	Prices	 and	Reports	 on	Cost	 of	 Cultivation	 on	Principle	 Costs	 in	India)	 and	 found	 that	 for	 all	 crops	 the	 MSP	 was	 lower	 than	 the	 costs	 of	 production	(including	the	interest	of	owned	capital	assets	and	the	rental	value	of	owned	land).	Pant	
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concludes	 that	 the	 MSP	 does	 not	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	 production	 and	 often	 leads	 to	negative	farm	incomes,	which	also	fluctuate	strongly	from	year	to	year	(ibid,	94;	Shroff	et	al.	2015,	63).		However,	 these	 are	 only	 average	 values	 and	 as	 has	 become	 clear	 in	 chapter	 II,	 it	 is	important	 to	 differentiate	 between	 the	 different	 sizes	 of	 landholdings.	 Pant	 (2012)	 as	well	 as	 Ramakumar	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 have	 conducted	 case	 studies	 in	 Vidarbha	 villages	 to	analyse	 the	 agricultural	 costs,	 profitability	 and	 incomes	 depending	 on	 different	landholding	sizes	and	castes.	The	cost	of	production	per	acre	is	much	higher	for	smaller	landholdings	and	 the	profitability	declines	with	declining	 landholdings.	Ramakumar	et	al.	 (2009,	 144)	 showed	 that	 the	 costs	 per	 acre	 decrease	 from	 4810	 Rs/acre	 for	households	 cultivating	 one	 acre	 to	 1668	 Rs/acre	 for	 households	 cultivating	 18	 acres.	This	also	shows	in	the	profitability	ratio	per	acre	that	increases	from	1.7	to	2.5.	In	terms	of	 castes,	 the	 profitability	 ratios	 per	 households	 were	 2.1	 for	 castes	 of	 the	 general	category,	2.0	for	OBCs,	1.7	for	SCs	and	only	1.6	for	STs	(ibid,	146).		The	study	by	Pant	showed	that	the	total	farm	incomes	per	household	range	from	3000	Rs/household	 for	 the	 smallest	 landholdings	 to	 more	 than	 Rs	 150,000	 per	 household	(Pant	2012,	93),	or	from	Rs	6621	per	household	(for	households	cultivating	one	acre)	to	Rs	40,078	per	household	(for	households	cultivating	12	acres)	or	even	Rs	130,540	(for	households	 cultivating	 51	 acres)(Ramakumar	 et	 al.	 2009,	 145).	 Additionally,	Parasuraman	and	Rajaretnam	(2011)	have	found	in	their	study	that	landless	labourers	and	marginal	 farmers	 earn	 roughly	 Rs	 45,000	 per	 year	 per	 household,	 small	 farmers	around	Rs	60,000,	semi–medium	farmers	more	 than	Rs	90,000	and	medium	and	 large	farmers	as	much	as	Rs	180,000.	Along	with	Ramakumar	et	al.,	Pant	reaffirms	that	there	are	not	only	big	differences	in	profitability	between	the	different	sizes	of	landholdings,	but	also	between	the	different	castes.	OBC	farmers	had	considerably	higher	profitability	than	ST	farmers	(ibid,	94).	Ramakumar	et	al.	(2009,	146)	showed	that	farm	incomes	per	households	range	from	Rs	23,115	for	general	category,	Rs	15,783	for	OBC,	Rs	12,772	for	SC	and	Rs	5214	for	ST.	An	 additional	 factor	 that	 determines	 the	 income	 is	 the	 (cotton)	 varieties	 used.	 In	particular,	 there	 is	 a	 debate	 about	 the	 productivity	 of	 Bt	 cotton.	While	 Hybrid	 cotton	with	the	associated	increase	of	inputs	was	already	introduced	by	the	state	in	the	1970s,	Bt	cotton	was	introduced	in	2002	to	control	bollworm	and	other	lepidopteron	pests.	It	has	 spread	 rapidly	 and	 is	 now	 grown	 on	 90%	 of	 India’s	 cotton	 growing	 area.	 Most	studies	 suggest	 that	 Bt	 cotton	 can	 generate	 high	 yields	 particularly	 in	 irrigated	situations,	 while	 it	 can	 create	 negative	 cost–benefit	 ratios	 under	 rain–fed	 conditions.	Pant	 (2012,	 37)	 reviews	 the	 evidence	 and	 suggests	 that	 Bt	 cotton	 has	 mostly	 led	 to	increased	farm	incomes	(see	also	Rawal	and	Swaminathan	2011,	for	a	comment	on	the	topic).	 Partially	 in	 contradiction	 to	 this	 assessment,	 a	 recent	 study	 comes	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 this	might	 be	 true	 for	 irrigated	 farming.	 But	 the	 study	 found	 that	 the	costs	 of	 the	 Bt-seeds	 combined	 with	 the	 costs	 for	 insecticide	 increase	 the	 risk	 for	bankruptcy	in	low-yield,	rain-fed	cotton	(Gutierrez	et	al.	2015,	for	an	overview	over	the	debate	see	Herring	2015).	In	the	same	line,	Deshpande	and	Arora	(2010)	argue	that	the	
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low	level	of	 irrigation	together	with	heavy	infestation	of	pests	is	the	reason	why	many	cotton	 farmers	 in	 Vidarbha	 live	 below	 the	 poverty	 line	 despite	 their	 relatively	 big	landholdings.	
2.4 Credit	Availability	A	 large	 portion	 of	 all	 farmers	 is	 indebted	 and	marginal	 farmers	 are	most	 likely	 to	 be	indebted.	In	Vidarbha,	there	is	a	credit–gap	of	roughly	50%	between	agricultural	credit	demand	 and	 availability.	 Earlier,	 co-operative	 banks	 were	 very	 important	 in	Maharashtra	 but	 now	only	 a	miniscule	 part	 of	 the	 demand	 for	 rural	 credit	 is	 covered	through	 institutional	 credits	 from	 banks	 or	 rural	 co-operative	 societies.	 Now	 the	 co-operative	 banks	 have	 a	 high	 level	 of	 outstanding	 loans	 as	well	 as	 high	 interest	 rates.	Increasingly,	the	people	on	the	list	of	defaulters	of	banks	and	co-operative	societies	fall	out	 of	 the	 formal	 credit	 system	 and	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 their	 social	 network	 or	moneylenders	 (GoI	 2006).	 This	 is	 the	 same	 trend	 observed	 all	 over	 India,	 where	particularly	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 face	 increasing	 difficulties	 in	 accessing	institutional	loans	and	thus	have	to	rely	on	moneylenders	(see	section	2.3,	chapter	II)	The	following	table	illustrates	the	differences	in	loans	per	hectare	between	the	regions	(GoM	 2013b,	 247).	 Again	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 farmers	 in	 the	 regions	 of	 Vidarbha	 and	particularly	Marathwada	get	much	less	credit	per	hectare	and	have	much	lower	access	to	loans	than	those	in	the	Rest	of	Maharashtra.		
Table	6:	Loan-related	indicators	for	different	regions	of	Maharashtra	(GoM	2013b,	247).	
	 Vidarbha	 Marathwada	 Rest	of	
Maharashtra	
Loan	per	ha	(in	%	of	cost	of	cultivation)	 7.3%	 6.3%	 14.3%	
Loan	per	cultivator	 4487	Rs	 3354	Rs	 6060	Rs	
Average	number	of	cultivators	(during	
last	5	years)	availing	credit	
21%	 24%	 55%	
Loan	distribution	per	ha	 2098	Rs	 1727	Rs	 3909	Rs		The	data	from	researchers	and	the	government	on	the	agricultural	situation	in	Vidarbha	clearly	show	that	the	situation	is	severe	for	farmers	with	marginal,	small	and	medium	–	particularly	 rain-fed	 –	 landholdings.	 The	 disparity	 in	 irrigation	 between	 the	 Vidarbha	(and	Marathwada)	and	other	regions	of	Maharashtra	has	far-reaching	consequences.	It	is	 expressed	 in	 terms	of	 gross	 cropped	area	or	 electrical	 consumption	or	 the	 share	 in	outstanding	loan	and	overdues	in	the	credit	co-operative	societies,	all	of	which	are	much	higher	in	Western	Maharashtra.	In	Western	Maharashtra,	where	all	these	indicators	are	better,	 farmers	 can	 apply	 higher	 doses	 of	 agricultural	 inputs,	 utilise	 low	 cost	 credit	capital	for	high	valued	agricultural	assets	and	also	have	higher	ownership	of	high	valued	agricultural	machinery.	 For	 less	 developed	 regions	 like	 Vidarbha,	 it	 is	 a	 vicious	 cycle	(Mohanty	2009).	
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3 Voices	from	Vidarbha	In	the	context	of	the	above	evidence,	I	now	analyse	how	the	farmers	in	Vidarbha	(i.e.	in	the	villages	covered	by	this	study)	themselves	perceive	their	situation,	what	their	most	severe	problems	are	and	how	they	analyse	the	situation	of	different	classes	of	 farmers	and	 labourers.	 To	 start	 with,	 I	 introduce	 the	 five	 villages	 where	 I	 have	 conducted	interviews.	In	section	3.2,	I	explore	what	the	people	see	as	their	most	pressing	problems,	what	explanations	they	come	up	with,	and	how	they	themselves	analyse	their	situation.		
3.1 Villages	in	Vidarbha	As	I	already	mentioned	(chapter	I,	section	3),	I	have	chosen	the	villages	according	to	the	‘movement’	groups’	activities,	and	the	interviews	that	I	have	conducted	mostly	focus	on	‘movement’-relevant	 issues.	 The	 following	 descriptions	 are	 therefore	 short	introductions	 of	 the	 study	 villages,	 based	 on	 discussions	 with	 members	 of	 the	 gram	
panchayat43,	often	the	sarpanch44,	or	other	persons	who	know	the	village	well.		
Village	SSS45	Village	SSS	 is	 located	 in	Buldhana,	 the	Western	most	of	Vidarbha’s	districts	 (Amravati	division).	It	is	a	big	village,	has	a	hospital	at	the	village	entrance	and	a	bank	branch.	Most	of	 the	 houses	 are	 small,	 made	 of	 mud,	 wood,	 and	 pieces	 of	 metal.	 But	 in	 the	neighbourhoods	 belonging	 to	 labourers,	 the	 huts	 are	 very	 small	 and	 stand	 in	 sharp	contrast	to	the	bigger	houses	at	the	centre	of	the	village.	In	the	central	area,	houses	are	mostly	built	in	a	traditional	style,	are	bigger,	have	several	rooms	or	even	two	floors.	The	village	 had	 roughly	 3,000	 inhabitants	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 study.	 The	 predominant	communities	 are	 Nomadic	 Tribes	 (NT)	 who	 mostly	 control	 the	 land,	 as	 well	 as	Buddhists.	A	majority	of	the	population	is	involved	in	agriculture.	There	is	quite	a	high	level	of	out–migration	 of	 young	 men,	 particularly	 by	 marginal	 and	 small	 farmers'	 and	 labourers'	households.	The	young	men	migrate	mostly	on	a	seasonal	basis	and	go	to	nearby	towns	to	work	on	construction	sites	at	 times	of	 low	agricultural	workload.	These	young	men	often	complain	that	there	was	no	local	industry	nearby	that	would	provide	employment	opportunities	and	that	could	purchase	the	agricultural	produce	at	a	better	price.	About	half	of	the	farmers	are	marginal	and	small	farmers	who	own	less	than	five	acres	of	land.	 About	 one	 fourth	 of	 the	 villagers	 have	 no	 land	 at	 all.	 Another	 fourth	 are	 semi–medium	or	medium	 farmers,	 very	 few	of	whom	have	more	 than	25	acres	of	 land.	The	main	 crops	 are	 cotton,	 sorghum,	 onion	 and	 soybean.	 Many	 farmers	 reported	 having	invested	in	bore	wells	and	about	half	of	the	total	land	cultivated	is	irrigated.	
																																								 																					43	A	gram	panchayat	is	the	self-government	on	the	level	of	village	or	small	town,	part	of	the	three-tier	government	system	of	Maharashtra	(see	section	3.4,	chapter	II).		44	A	sarpanch	is	an	elected	head	of	the	gram	panchayat.	45	As	mentioned	before	(chapter	I,	section	3),	I	name	the	villages	according	to	the	group	that	had	led	me	there.	
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Village	KAA	Village	KAA	is	located	in	Wardha	district	(Nagpur	division),	about	a	two	hours	journey	by	bus	from	the	city	of	Nagpur.	It	consists	of	three	parts	–	an	old	colony,	a	new	colony	and	another	village	a	five-minute	walk	away	under	the	same	gram	panchayat.	The	road	goes	first	to	the	small	new	colony	of	not	even	a	dozen	houses.	Here,	half	of	the	houses	are	 quite	 big	 and	 made	 of	 bricks,	 while	 the	 other	 half	 are	 small	 or	 very	 small	 mud	houses.	The	bigger	houses	stand	mostly	apart	from	each	other	and	are	lined	up	along	the	main	road.	In	the	middle,	near	to	the	main	road,	there	is	a	big	well	and	a	small	grocery	stall.	 From	 here,	 the	 road	 leads	 further	 through	 a	 tiny	 forest	 and	 then	 enters	 the	 old	colony.	 The	 houses	 here	 are	 rather	 smaller	 and	 narrower.	 Even	 the	 big	 houses	 are	mostly	mud	houses	with	wooden	carvings.	Just	after	entering	the	new	colony,	there	is	a	small	village	temple	next	to	a	huge	tree.	The	third	part	of	the	village	is	again	towards	the	road	and	north	of	the	new	colony.	Here,	most	houses	were	very	small	with	only	one	or	two	rooms.		
Picture	2:	New	colony	in	village	KAA		
	Village	KAA	is	a	small	but	wealthy	village.	At	that	time,	the	population	consisted	of	more	than	 1,000	 people.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 population	 belongs	 to	 the	 Hindu	 religion.	Considerable	minorities	are	Buddhists	and	Muslims.	Around	one	fifth	of	the	population	belonged	 to	 the	 Nomadic	 Tribes	 (NT).	 Many	 of	 them	 belong	 to	 a	 sub-caste	 whose	original	occupation	was	masonry.	The	ex–sarpanch,	also	from	this	sub–caste,	explained	that	 their	 forefathers’	occupation	had	been	“to	make	houses	for	other	people,	but	not	for	
us.	We	were	just	wandering	from	place	to	place	for	a	livelihood,	with	a	couple	of	livestock.”	Once	his	 father	had	been	working	 in	 this	village	and	one	man	had	suggested	that	 they	settle	 down	 and	 buy	 some	 land.	 This	 dominance	 of	masons,	 so	 he	 explained,	was	 the	reason	for	the	many	big,	solidly	constructed	houses	with	hardly	any	furnishings.		There	was	considerable	out–migration	in	the	late	20th	century;	particularly	agricultural	labour	 had	 migrated	 to	 towns	 and	 cities	 or	 nearby	 industrial	 areas	 to	 find	 work.	Consequently,	 there	was,	 according	 to	 the	 sarpanch	 and	many	 interviewed	 farmers,	 a	
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scarcity	 of	 labourers	 for	 agricultural	 work,	 particularly	 in	 seasons	 of	 sowing	 and	harvesting.	While	many	labourers	from	this	village	had	left	some	time	back,	the	village	is	now	 experiencing	 an	 in–migration.	 The	 sarpanch	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 farmers	would	often	 need	 to	 hire	 agricultural	 labour	 from	 other	 villages.	 Sometimes	 “they	get	settled	
here	because	they	get	good	wages	and	work	throughout	the	year.“	About	200	people	have	come	and	settled	down	in	the	village	in	the	last	five	years.		There	are	some,	but	relatively	fewer,	marginal	farmers	in	this	village.	Most	farmers	are	small,	medium	or	even	semi–medium	with	up	to	10	acres	of	land.	Landholdings	of	more	than	10	acres	and	even	big	landholdings	of	25	acres	or	more	are	not	uncommon,	though.	Furthermore,	quite	a	high	number	of	farmers	have	leased	10–30	acres	each.	Considering	that	 around	 half	 of	 the	 fields	 are	 irrigated,	 the	 farmers	 have	 a	 reasonable	 amount	 of	landholdings.	This	high	level	of	irrigation	is	due	to	a	dam	close	to	the	village.	The	canals	flow	through	many	fields	and	for	an	annual	fee,	the	farmers	can	use	the	water	to	irrigate	their	fields.	Consequently,	these	farmers	can	grow	cotton	–	the	main	crop	–	in	the	kharif	season	and	wheat	or	vegetables	in	the	rabi	season.	Farmers	also	grow	sorghum,	soybean	and	tur.		
Village	VJAS	Village	 VJAS	 is	 located	 in	 Yavatmal,	 one	 of	 the	 remotest	 areas	 in	 Western	 Vidarbha	(Amravati	division).	A	large	part	of	Yavatmal	is	hilly	and	covered	with	forest.	Most	of	the	fields	 are	 rain-fed	 and	 the	 standing	 crops	often	 look	quite	poor.	The	houses	of	 village	VJAS	are	almost	exclusively	very	small,	consist	of	one	or	two	small	rooms,	and	are	made	of	mud,	wood,	 leaves	 or	 straw.	Hardly	 any	 houses	 are	made	 out	 of	 bricks,	 let	 alone	 a	second	 floor.	 Some	 of	 the	 owners	 of	 those	 houses	 are	 big	 landholders	 or	 have	 a	moneylending	 business;	 others	 have	 found	 another	 profitable	 business	 outside	agriculture.		
Picture	3:	Village	VJAS	and	surrounding	hills		
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Village	VJAS	was	a	very	small	village	and	had	a	population	of	roughly	1,000	people	at	the	time	of	the	study.	A	large	majority	(roughly	two	third)	of	the	people	belong	to	Scheduled	Tribes	 (ST)	 communities.	 Earlier,	many	 STs	 families	 lived	 in	 the	 forests	 and	 they	 still	stay	close	to	the	forest.	They	use	minor	forest	produce	to	support	their	livelihood.	About	one	third	of	the	village	belong	to	NTs	–	mostly	to	Banjaras	–	including	the	village	activist.	The	 rest	 of	 the	 population	 belonged	 to	 OBCs.	 All	 inhabitants	 belong	 to	 the	 Hindu	religion.		This	 village	 is	 the	poorest	 and	most	 remote	 village	 by	 far.	 The	next	 town	 is	 far	 away,	houses	are	small	and	so	are	the	farmers'	plots.	For	the	huge	majority	of	the	population,	agriculture	 is	 the	 main	 income	 source.	 About	 two	 third	 are	 farmers,	 one	 third	 are	landless	labourers.	Many	farmers	share	their	few	acres	among	big	joint	families.	Nearly	half	of	villagers	are	marginal	farmers;	around	one	fourth	are	small	farmers.	There	are	a	few	semi–medium	farmers	(more	than	5	acres),	while	there	are	only	very	few	farmers	owning	more	 than	 10	 acres.	 The	main	 crop	 in	 this	 village	 is	 cotton,	 but	 farmers	 also	grow	 soybean,	 sorghum,	 some	wheat	 and	 gram.	Hardly	 any	 of	 the	 fields	 are	 irrigated	through	wells	on	farms	or	streams.	Village	VJAS	lies	in	the	so-called	Naxalite	area	and	so	there	is	no	load	shedding.	
Village	BKS	Village	BKS	 is	 located	 at	 a	 big	 highway	 in	 the	Northeast	 of	Nagpur	 (Nagpur	 division).	One	part	of	the	village	borders	the	highway	and	consists	of	the	typical	shops	and	stalls	selling	samosa,	poha,	bread	pakoda	and	chai,	chocolate,	chips	and	soft	drinks.	This	part	of	 the	village	has	a	paved	road	and	concrete	houses.	A	 little	more	 towards	 the	market	square	and	the	centre	of	the	village,	the	houses	become	older	and	are	made	out	of	mud	and	wood,	but	are	still	decent.	The	village's	market	square	 is	 large	and	surrounded	by	many	grocery	 shops	of	 all	 sorts.	 Leaving	 the	market	 away	 from	 the	highway,	 the	new	colonies	begin,	with	small	houses	made	out	of	mud,	wood	and	leaves.		The	village	had	over	9,000	 inhabitants	at	 that	 time.	Most	of	 the	people	are	 involved	 in	farming	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another.	 Of	 the	 people	 whose	 main	 source	 of	 income	 is	agriculture,	most	 are	 small	 farmers,	marginal	 farmers	or	 labourers.	But	 there	are	also	many	 medium	 and	 large	 farmers,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 big	 landholders	 who	 own	 up	 to	hundred	 acres	 of	 land46.	 The	major	 crops	 are	 cotton,	 soybean,	wheat,	 gram	 and	 some	orange	orchards.	Most	of	the	cultivated	land	is	rain-fed	and	only	about	10%	is	irrigated.	The	village,	however,	is	wealthy	and	well	connected.	Many	of	its	people	have	some	other	businesses	in	nearby	towns	or	cities,	where	they	earn	their	money.	The	main	religion	is	Hindu,	while	there	are	some	Muslim	and	Buddhist	families.	The	proportions	of	SC	(less	than	 10%)	 and	 ST	 (around	 5%)	 are	 quite	 small.	Main	 castes	 are	Teli,	Mali,	Kunbi	 (all	OBC).	
																																								 																					46	The	 land	 is	 then	 mostly	 registered	 in	 the	 name	 of	 several	 family	 members	 in	 order	 to	circumvent	the	ceiling	laws	for	land	ownership.		
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Villages	AIKS	Interviews	from	the	AIKS	group	came	from	three	different	villages	(all	Wardha	district,	Nagpur	division).	The	largest	village	is	located	at	the	edge	of	the	district’s	capital,	a	small	town	south	of	Nagpur.	At	the	time	of	the	study,	the	village	had	around	7,000	inhabitants;	this	number	has	been	increasing	in	recent	years.	The	majority	of	the	village	are	Hindus	(many	 Telis)	 and	 some	 are	 Buddhists.	 The	 village	 is	 divided	 into	 an	 old	 and	 a	 new	colony.	Small	mud	houses	dominate	the	old	part,	where	the	majority	of	the	population	is	still	 closely	 connected	 to	 agriculture.	 In	 the	 new	 part,	 houses	 are	 bigger,	 made	 of	concrete,	 and	 most	 inhabitants	 are	 involved	 in	 non-agricultural	 business.	 The	 main	crops	 are	 cotton,	 soybean,	 wheat,	 tur	 and	 gram,	 while	 cotton	 is	 by	 far	 the	 most	important	one.	More	 than	half	of	 the	 land	 is	 irrigated,	 and	most	of	 these	 landholdings	are	small	or	semi-medium.	The	 new	 colony	 has	 been	 particularly	 responsible	 for	 the	 high	 growth	 in	 population.	Because	 the	 village	 is	 so	 close	 to	 the	 district	 headquarters,	 people	 involved	 in	 non-agricultural	 business	 migrated	 to	 the	 new	 colony,	 especially	 staff	 from	 the	 nearby	hospital.	 Many	 farmers,	 especially	 from	 the	 old	 colony,	 have	 sold	 off	 their	 land,	 for	example	 to	 the	 near-by	 hospital,	 and	 started	 to	 work	 in	 the	 nearby	 ginning	 factory	(based	on	Wynistorf	2012).		The	 other	 two	 villages	 are	 located	 in	 the	 same	district	 but	 are	 further	 away	 from	 the	district	 capital.	 The	 two	 villages	 are	 independent	 from	 each	 other,	 but	 close	 to	 one	another.	One	village	had	about	1,300	inhabitants	at	the	time	of	the	study,	and	the	other	one,	 about	 1,200.	 Like	 in	 the	 first	 village,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 population	 is	Hindu	 and	some	 are	 Buddhists.	 Many	 Teli	 live	 in	 these	 villages.	 In	 both	 villages,	 nearly	 all	inhabitants	are	 involved	 in	agriculture.	The	major	crops	are	similar	 to	 the	 first	village,	but	sugarcane	is	an	additional	important	crop.	About	half	of	the	fields	are	irrigated	and	there	are	many	semi-medium	and	even	medium	landholdings.		The	 description	 of	 the	 villages	 studied	 is	 summarized	 in	 the	 following	 table.	 It	 shows	that	 the	 villages	 differ	 in	 many	 respects.	 In	 all	 villages,	 I	 interviewed	 mostly	 those	farmers	 that	 support	 the	 ‘movement’47	groups	 in	 question	 and	 asked	 them	about	 how	they	perceive	their	own	situation	and	what	they	see	as	the	main	problems	of	agriculture	in	general	and	among	the	different	groups	of	farmers	in	particular.		
																																								 																					47	To	 clarify,	 in	 this	 part,	 the	 interviews	 of	 activists	 and	 leaders	 of	 the	 ‘movement’	 are	 not	included.	It	is	only	the	interviewed	supporters	and	some	non-supporters.		
	 83	
Table	7:	Overview	over	visited	villages	
Village	 District	 Inhabi-
tants	
Major	Caste	and	
religious	groups	
Crops	 Irri-
gation	
Landholdings	
SSS	 Buldhana	 3,000	 NT,	Neo-Buddhists	 Cotton,	sorghum,	onion,	soybean	 Half		 About	a	fourth	landless/labour,	half	marginal	and	small,	one	fourth	medium	and	semi-medium,	few	rich	
KAA	 Wardha	 1,000	 NT,	Neo-Buddhists	and	Muslims	 Cotton,	wheat,	vegetables	 Half	 Labour	often	from	elsewhere,	few	marginal	and	many	small,	most	medium	and	semi-	medium	,	some	rich	(often	leased-in)	
VJAS	 Yavatmal	 1,000	 ST,	NT,	OBC	 Cotton,	soybean,	sorghum	 Nearly	none	 One	third	landless/labour,	half	marginal	forth	small,	few	medium	and	semi-	medium	,	very	few	rich	
BKS	 Nagpur	 9,000	 Muslim,	Neo-Buddhist	 Cotton,	soybean,	wheat,	orange	 	 Some	marginal	and	small,	some	medium	and	semi-	medium	,	some	rich	(also	very	rich)	
AIKS	 Wardha	 7,000	1,300	1,200	
caste?,	Neo-Buddhist		 Cotton,	soybean,	wheat	Sugarcane	 Majority	Half	Half	 Some	marginal/landless,	many	small	and	semi-medium	Some	marginal	and	small,	many	semi-medium	and	medium	
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3.2 Farmers’	Perceptions	about	Agriculture	In	 the	 following,	 I	 will	 depict	 the	 interviewed	 farmers’	 appraisals	 of	 the	 costs	 and	availability	 of	 inputs,	 their	 yields	 and	 the	 profitability	 of	 their	 cultivation,	 and	 the	importance	of	land.	
Land	Land	was	a	prominent	 issue	 in	all	 the	villages,	 though	in	different	ways.	 In	village	SSS,	many	 participants	 said	 that	 they	 had	 to	 sell	 off	 some	 of	 their	 land	 because	 of	 "family	
issues",	most	often	either	an	illness	or	accident	of	a	family	member,	high	education	fees	for	children,	the	bribe	for	a	family	member’s	job	somewhere	or	–	last	but	not	least	–	the	dowry	to	marry	away	a	daughter.	Dowry	payments	were	tremendously	high	and	were	an	issue	in	many	interviews,	particularly	in	this	village.	Many	talked	about	having	had	to	sell	much	 of	 their	 land	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 dowries.	 “Whenever	there	was	crop	failure,	my	
father	sold	some	land.	He	also	married	my	three	sisters	with	this	amount”,	 a	 small	 farmer	said.	Many	interviewees	reported	that	these	days,	the	price	of	the	land	was	increasing.	Some	expressed	their	regret	about	having	sold	their	land	earlier	and	not	waiting	for	the	price	of	 land	to	increase.	Others	said	that	 in	spite	of	the	high	prices,	they	would	not	want	to	sell	their	land,	else	they	would	have	to	quit	farming.	”See,	the	prices	of	the	land	increase.	
But	 it	means	 nothing	 for	 a	 kisan.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 land	 doesn’t	 increase”,	 stated	 a	 small	farmer.	 Interviewees	 reported	 that	 possible	 buyers	 were	 plenty:	 businessmen	 and	traders	 from	 nearby	 towns	 as	 well	 as	 big	 companies.	 There	 were	 no	 examples	mentioned	 of	 other	 farmers	 as	 buyers.	 “Because	 of	 the	 demand,	 the	 price	 for	 land	 is	
increasing.	Those,	who	are	traders	and	who	have	black	money,	they	are	the	owners	of	this	
land.	Only	for	these	people	it	is	possible	to	buy	land,	for	kisans	it	is	not	possible	anymore”,	said	a	medium	farmer.	Also	in	village	KAA,	several	interviewees	reported	that	“some	big	
industry	owners	(…),	foreign	companies	are	coming	here.	They	want	our	land	for	industry	
plantations.	Here	the	environment	is	good	for	wheat	and	soybean.”	Further,	in	village	VJAS	in	particular,	the	government	was	a	player	in	the	land	market.	Five	years	ago,	when	the	government	had	started	building	a	dam	near	 the	village,	many	 farmers	were	 forced	to	sell	their	land	and	received	a	small	compensation	(see	section	2.1,	chapter	V).	More	 than	 in	other	villages,	 farmers	often	 leased	 land	 in	village	VJAS,	mostly	 from	big	landowners	 from	other	 villages.	 The	 ones	who	 leased	 land	 for	 cultivation	 complained	that	 if	 the	 rent	 for	 the	 land	 had	 to	 be	 paid	 as	 well,	 production	 became	 even	 more	expensive	 and	 they	 were	 not	 able	 to	 pay	 the	 yearly	 rent.	 In	 village	 SSS,	 several	interviewees	complained	that	they	had	to	lease	in	a	few	or	many	acres	in	order	to	earn	a	decent	living	out	of	agriculture.	Others	wished	they	could	lease,	but	they	had	no	money.	Further,	 some	 said	 they	 needed	 urgent	 money	 and	 instead	 of	 selling	 their	 land,	 they	would	 rather	 lease	 it	 out.	 In	 village	 BKS,	 interviewees	 rather	 thought	 about	 leaving	farming	all	together,	selling	or	leasing	out	their	land,	and	looking	for	a	more	profitable	occupation	in	nearby	towns	or	cities.	
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Labour	In	all	villages,	interviewed	farmers	often	complained	that	the	wages	for	labour	were	too	high	and	the	government	would	pamper	the	labourers	by	giving	them	subsidized	food.	Interviewees	often	argued	that	through	the	Public	Distribution	System	(PDS)	that	allows	people	who	officially	 live	below	the	poverty	 line	to	buy	the	most	 important	goods,	e.g.	wheat,	 sugar	 and	 kerosene,	 at	 subsidized	 rates,	 labour	 would	 get	 cheap	 food	 and	therefore	 they	 would	 drink	 and	 not	 work.	 In	 villages	 KAA	 and	 AIKS,	 interviewees	reported	that	the	scarcity	of	labour	because	of	out-migration	meant	that	farmers	had	to	hire	 labour	 from	other	 villages.	 These	 labourers	 at	 times	 asked	higher	wages	 and	 the	farmers	would	have	to	pay	for	the	transportation	costs.	In	village	BKS,	where	among	the	interviewees	hardly	anyone	worked	as	agricultural	 labour,	 these	complaints	about	 the	high	wages	for	and	unavailability	of	labour	were	particularly	prominent.		Labour	 in	 all	 other	 villages,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 reported	 the	 same	 story	 of	 one	 labourer	who	told	me	 that	“the	wage	is	not	enough	to	fill	the	stomach”.	All	 interviewed	 labourers	complained	that	their	wages	were	too	low	and	at	the	same	time,	that	the	price	for	food	was	 increasing.	 It	 was,	 so	 many	 labourers	 argued,	 impossible	 to	 negotiate	 wages,	because	 the	 farmers	 would	 simply	 fix	 them.	 When	 there	 was	 no	 rain	 and	 therefore	hardly	any	work,	 the	wages	were	very	 low	or	they	got	no	wages	at	all.	 In	VJAS	village,	virtually	all	farmers	also	worked	as	labourers	because	of	the	small	size	of	landholdings	and	the	 lack	of	 irrigation.	The	returns	 from	agricultural	production	being	 low,	 farmers	said	that	they	relied	on	agricultural	work	on	other	farmer's	fields	or	also	on	other	forms	of	 labour48	–	e.g.	 tendu49	leaf	cutting	 in	 the	 forest.	There	were	no	complaints	about	 the	high	cost	of	labour,	but	only	about	the	low	wages	in	village	VJAS.	
Inputs	Apart	from	land	and	labour,	other	inputs	were	reasons	for	complaints	as	well.	Farmers	from	all	villages	reported	that	fertilizer,	seed	and	pesticides	were	of	low	quality	but	high	cost.	In	village	SSS,	a	small	farmer	explained	that	
“sometimes	the	prices	go	up	or	down.	These	trade	people	are	making	good	profit,	because	
the	government	doesn’t	fix	the	prices	for	crops	and	fertilizer.	In	June,	the	prices	for	seeds	
are	low,	but	the	kisans	they	don’t	have	money	that	time,	very	few	have,	only	rich	kisans	
have.	In	July,	the	prices	of	seeds	will	be	high,	so	it	is	difficult	for	the	kisans	to	buy	it.”		But	even	if	farmers	would	manage	to	bring	up	the	money	to	buy	the	inputs	in	time,	there	could	 be	 supply	 shortages	 in	 local	 markets.	 Additionally,	 farmers	 are	 not	 sure	 of	 the	quality	of	the	inputs,	particularly	the	seeds,	and	often	realize	only	after	sowing	that	their	seeds	are	spurious	or	that	the	fertilizers’	chemical	composition	is	useless.	Additionally,	many	farmers,	as	one	marginal	farmer	explained,	would	be	unable	to	read	and	understand	the	direction	for	use	on	the	packages	and	would	therefore	not	be	well																																									 																					48	Migration,	though,	seemed	a	negligible	issue	in	village	VJAS.	People	could	name	only	one	family	that	had	gone	away	and	only	very	few	other	families	migrated	seasonally.	49Tendu	leaves	are	used	as	wrapping	paper	for	the	local	beedi	cigarettes.	
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informed.	 “The	 educated	 kisans	 will	 see	 the	 expiry	 date	 on	 the	 seeds	 packet	 or	 on	 the	
fertilizer	 packet,	 this	 is	 different	 between	 educated	 and	 uneducated	 kisans.	 (…)	 In	 the	
market,	traders	are	making	fools	of	the	uneducated	kisans”,	a	young	medium	farmer	said.	
Yield	and	Irrigation	Concerning	 yield,	 the	 interviewed	 farmers’	 estimations	 differed.	Most	 interviewees	 in	village	SSS	said	that	their	yields	had	been	quite	satisfactory.	Most	of	the	interviewees	in	village	 KAA	 reported	 that	 their	 yields	 were	 good.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 farmers	 in	 village	VJAS	 as	well	 as	 several	 from	 the	 other	 villages	 complained	 that	 their	 yields	 had	 been	very	 low	 and	 that	 they	 very	 often	 experienced	 total	 or	 partial	 crop	 failure.	 Natural	calamities	 and	 particularly	 the	 unreliability	 of	 rains	 had	 hit	 the	 farmers	 hard.	 Many	complained	 that	 in	 some	years	 there	 is	 "excessive	rain	that	washes	away	everything,	all	
fertilizer,	 the	whole	 yield	 is	 gone",	 while	 in	 other	 years	 there	 were	 droughts,	 as	 rains	came	late	or	insufficiently.	In	village	SSS,	interviewees	complained	about	too	little	rain,	while	 in	 the	 other	 villages,	 excess	 rain	was	 the	problem.	Many	 interviewees	 observed	that	in	the	recent	years,	the	rains	had	become	less	and	less	predictable.	A	small	farmer	of	village	VJAS	 felt	 that	"before,	the	weather	was	in	favour	of	kisans.	But	now,	rains	don't	
come	in	time."	Many	 argued	 that	 those	who	 had	 access	 to	 irrigation	 could	 be	 sure	 of	 their	 yields.	 A	medium	farmer	 in	village	SSS	owning	only	 rain–fed	 land	said	 “it	depends	on	the	type	of	
land.	Some	have	good	irrigation	facilities,	they	will	make	good	yields.	(…)	But	I	don’t	have	
money	to	construct	the	water	well”.	 A	 small	 farmer	without	 irrigation	 complained	 that	
“those	 who	 have	 irrigation,	 they	 are	 always	 happy”.	 In	 village	 VJAS,	 irrigation	 is	 an	important	matter	of	concern.	In	this	village,	only	a	marginal	part	of	the	fields	is	irrigated	and	 interviewees	 were	 aware	 that	 with	 irrigation	 measures,	 agricultural	 production	would	 be	 higher	 and	 more	 reliable.	 In	 village	 KAA,	 where	 most	 of	 the	 fields	 were	irrigated,	several	interviewees	mentioned	that	irrigation	was	a	matter	of	luck.	One	small	farmer	 complained,	 “some	kisans	have	their	fields	close	to	the	canals.	But	I	need	one	lakh	
Rupees	to	construct	a	well	in	my	field.	And	I	get	no	benefit	from	the	government	schemes.”	Those	 farmers	 with	 irrigated	 fields,	 however,	 complained	 about	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 crop	failures	 even	 in	 irrigated	 fields,	 be	 it	 due	 to	 floods,	 excess	 rain,	 crop	 diseases	 or	 the	ravaging	 of	 of	 wild	 animals.	 Many	 of	 them	 also	 complained	 about	 deteriorating	 soil	conditions	as	well	as	decreasing	water	levels	in	their	wells.	For	these	farmers,	electricity	and	 load	 shedding	 are	 a	major	 problem.	 In	 village	 SSS,	where	 about	 half	 of	 the	 fields	were	irrigated,	interviewees	complained	that	they	did	not	get	the	amount	of	electricity	that	had	been	promised	to	them.	“As	per	the	central	government,	there	is	supply	of	17–18	
hours	each	day,	but	this	MSEB	[Maharashtra	State	Electricity	Board],	they	give	the	power	
only	for	6–7	hours.	So	where	is	the	rest?”,	a	medium	farmer	asked.	Without	any	electrical	supply,	even	farmers	with	irrigation	facilities	cannot	properly	irrigate	their	fields.		The	 interviewed	 farmers	 had	 two	 different	 explanations	 for	 the	 differences	 in	 yields.	First,	 some	 farmers	 (namely	 a	 few	medium	 and	 rich	 farmers	 in	 village	 SSS	 and	 KAA)	emphasized	that	 the	 incorrect	use	of	 inputs	was	the	reason	 for	 the	 low	yields	of	other	
	 87	
farmers.	One	argued	 that	 “I	worked	very	hard	in	the	field	and	I	have	done	the	cultivation	
properly.	So	my	yield	was	good”.	A	farmer	of	village	KAA	who	owned	5	acres	of	land	and	leased	 another	 17	 acres	 said	 that	 “my	yield	was	good	(…).	To	make	 farming	profitable,	
there	is	a	need	to	give	all	treatment	on	time,	water	also.	Then	only	there	will	be	good	yield.	
The	other	kisans	are	not	doing	these	things	on	time.	(...)	Kisans	have	no	knowledge	which	
seeds	 they	need	 to	use,	when,	which	 fertilizer.”	Many	 interviewees	 in	 villages	 KAA	 and	AIKS	 emphasized	 the	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 and	 training	 on	 how	 to	 farm	 properly,	particularly	how	to	use	organic	and	other	low-cost	practices.	Some	of	the	interviewees	pointed	 out	 that	 farmers	 don’t	 know	 when	 to	 apply	 fertilize	 or	 pesticides,	 in	 what	amount	 and	 which	 product	 should	 be	 applied.	 Several	 interviewees	 mentioned	 that	farmers	need	to	be	aware	of	the	condition	of	their	fields.	So	if	one	field	was	salty,	rain–fed	or	prone	to	 floods,	 the	 farmer	should	not	 invest	 too	much	money	in	 it	because	the	yield	would	most	 likely	 not	 be	 very	 satisfactory.	 So	 even	with	 low	yields,	 the	 farmers	would	not	be	in	loss.	Many	 other	 farmers,	 of	 course,	 saw	 this	 differently,	 which	 leads	 to	 the	 second	explanation.	 Small	 and	marginal	 farmers,	 particularly	 in	 village	VJAS,	 emphasized	 that	the	 lack	 of	 money	 was	 the	 cause	 for	 their	 low	 yields,	 along	 with	 irrigation,	 which	 is	connected	 to	available	 capital.	Because	 they	didn’t	have	enough	money,	 farmers	 could	not	buy	seeds	and	fertilizer	in	time	and	therefore	could	not	sow	their	crops	at	the	right	time	or	fertilize	properly.	In	case	of	a	pest	attack	or	an	outbreak	of	a	disease,	they	were	unable	to	buy	and	apply	the	necessary	pesticides	and	therefore	suffered	from	a	high	risk	of	crop	failure.	Marginal	and	small	farmers	of	other	villages	shared	this	view	as	well.	A	marginal	farmer	for	example,	concluded	that	“I	have	no	money	to	buy	all	this	in	time.	This	
is	the	problem”.	
Profitability	One	important	variable	for	profitability	is	the	price	for	agricultural	outputs.	In	general,	MSPs	defined	by	 the	 government	were	perceived	 to	 be	 too	 low.	According	 to	 a	 semi–medium	farmer	from	village	SSS,	“it	is	not	possible	to	survive	from	these	minimum	support	
prices”.	The	interviewees	often	repeated	that	the	prices	of	all	products	had	increased,	for	agricultural	 inputs	 as	 well	 as	 due	 to	 general	 inflation	 or	 the	 wages	 of	 government	officials.	 Only	 the	 output	 price	 for	 agricultural	 products,	 particularly	 cotton,	 did	 not	increase	at	the	same	pace.	Furthermore,	for	many	interviewees,	the	price	of	their	outputs	was	as	unpredictable	as	the	 rains.	Many	of	 them	explained	 that,	 the	year	before,	 the	price	 for	 cotton	had	been	high	 and	 that	 they	were	 expecting	 high	 prices	 this	 year	 as	well.	 However,	 prices	 had	fallen	far	below	the	previous	years'	prices.	A	small	farmer	from	village	KAA	summarized	a	widely	held	view:	 “We	cannot	count	on	the	prices.	When	I	have	good	yield,	there	are	no	
prices.	And	when	there	are	 [good]	prices,	 there	 is	no	yield	 in	my	hands.”	 And	 a	 medium	farmer	from	village	SSS	suspected	that	“the	prices	are	good	only	when	kisans	do	not	have	
their	crops	in	their	hands”.	A	rich	farmer	from	AIKS	summarized	that	“this	means	there	is	
no	 guarantee,	 no	 guarantee	 at	 all.”	 The	 MSP	 was	 often	 perceived	 as	 too	 low,	 and	therefore	hardly	relevant,	or	farmers	reported	that	 it	could	not	be	realized	in	the	local	
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market	 place	 because	 the	 local	 procurement	 agencies	 of	 the	 state	 did	 not	 function	properly.		While	 the	 complaints	went	mostly	against	 the	government	who	 fixed	 too	 low	an	MSP,	the	 traders	were	 held	 equally	 responsible.	 The	 government	 and	 the	 traders,	 so	many	interviewees	said,	were	hand	in	glove	with	each	other.	The	government	was	accused	of	creating	policies	 that	 favoured	 the	 traders	over	 the	 farmers	and	of	having	a	hands–off	approach	towards	the	traders’	unfair	business	practices.	Because	the	MSCCGMF	centres	(see	 section	 1.2,	 this	 chapter)	 were	 no	 longer	 working,	 the	 farmers	 had	 no	 other	possibility	 than	 to	 sell	 their	 products	 to	 the	 traders.	 Consequently,	 the	 traders,	 so	interviewees	 said,	 had	 relatively	more	 power	 in	 price	 negotiations.	 "The	traders	work	
against	 the	 kisans	 and	 cheat	 them.	 They	 are	 flying	 in	 planes	 because	 of	 the	 kisans",	 a	medium	farmer	of	village	SSS	complained.	Particularly	 in	 villages	 SSS	 and	 AIKS,	 people	 complained	 strongly	 about	 the	 traders.	Most	 farmers	did	not	have	storage	 facilities	or	were	 in	urgent	need	of	money,	 so	 they	had	 to	 sell	 immediately	 after	 harvest.	 The	 traders	 took	 advantage	 of	 the	 farmers’	urgency	to	sell	and	purchased	the	produce	at	cheap	prices.	After	having	purchased	the	cotton	from	the	farmers,	the	traders	would	store	it	to	sell	it	later	when	prices	had	gone	up.	A	marginal	farmer	said	that	“last	year,	the	yield	was	good,	but	I	have	sold	it	as	soon	as	
I	got	the	yield.	And	later	the	prices	 increased	(…).	The	trade	people	are	storing	the	grain	
and	 later	 they	 are	 selling	 it.”	 To	 store	 the	 harvest	 at	 least	 for	 some	 weeks,	 many	farmhouses	were	 stuffed	with	 cotton	 after	 the	 harvest.	 But	 one	 farmer	 explained	 that	while	this	was	a	way	to	wait	until	the	prices	would	rise,	the	farmers	would	live	in	fear	that	 the	 cotton	 would	 catch	 fire	 and	 their	 whole	 yield	 would	 be	 gone.	 One	 cotton	cultivator	 summarized,	 “it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 store	 the	 crops,	 that	 is	 why	 I’m	 in	 loss.”	Several	rich	farmers,	however,	had	built	separate	storage	houses	and	managed	to	earn	a	much	higher	price.	Consequently,	 only	 a	 few	medium	 and	 large	 farmers	 in	 all	 villages	 reported	 that	 they	made	a	good	profit	on	their	crops.	 In	village	KAA	as	 in	AIKS,	 interviewees	often	talked	about	 good	yields	 and	even	 satisfactory	prices.	The	 sarpanch	 of	 village	KAA	even	 said	that		
“we	have	seen	 those	who	had	once	 left	 the	village	 for	education	and	 jobs,	 they	are	now	
doing	farming	because	they	are	earning	more	from	farming.	(…)	There	are	some	Muslim	
people	[in	this	village]	who	are	educated	and	belong	to	well–to–do	families.	They	are	also	
doing	farming.”	However,	 the	majority	 of	 farmers	 believed	 that	 even	 if	 they	 earned	 some	 profit,	 that	would	not	be	enough	to	send	their	kids	to	a	good	school	or	to	pay	for	other	basic	family	expenditures.	 Two	marginal	 farmers	 even	 took	 their	 kids	 out	 of	 school	 so	 they	 could	work	 in	 the	 field.	 Also	 in	 the	 village	 KAA,	 despite	 the	 sarpanch’s	 observation,	 many	interviewees	 reported	 that	 they	 "couldn't	 even	 cover	 the	 expenses".	A	 middle	 farmer	complained	
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“there	 is	 less	 yield,	 the	 expenditure	 is	 too	 high.	 There	 is	 no	 rain	 also.	 Those	 who	 have	
irrigation	 facilities,	 they	 are	 happy.	 Some	 land	 is	 very	 bad	 in	 terms	 of	 soil	 quality	 and	
therefore	 we	 are	 unable	 to	 cover	 the	 expenditure.	 So	 we	 are	 unable	 to	 give	 proper	
education	to	the	children,	to	pay	the	marriage	of	our	daughter	or	health	treatments.“	For	others,	the	situation	was	even	worse.	A	small	farmer	from	village	KAA	observed	that	
“I	 can	 just	 cover	 my	 expenses.	 These	 4	 acres	 are	 hardly	 enough	 for	 the	 family	 needs.	 I	
cannot	make	any	profit.”	 Another	 small	 farmer	 reported	 that	 he	 had,	 “good	 yield,	 but	
there	was	no	profit.	I	could	not	even	cover	the	expenses	for	agriculture.”	In	SSS	and	AIKS,	many	interviewees	said	that	they	had	been	at	loss	in	their	agricultural	operations.	And	in	 village	 VJAS,	 where	 the	 situation	 was	 the	 worst,	 all	 interviewees	 reported	 that,	regardless	of	 the	 input	costs	or	 the	yields,	agricultural	production	"does	not	even	cover	
the	expenses	for	farming"	–	indicating	a	negative	 income.	 In	all	villages,	but	particularly	in	village	VJAS,	many	 interviewees	emphasized	 that	 they	work	very	hard	 in	 the	 fields,	that	they	do	not	have	any	addictions	–	i.e.	do	not	drink	any	alcohol	–	and	that	they	still	can’t	make	ends	meet.		
Picture	4:	Stored	cotton	in	a	farmers’	house	
	
Credits	In	 this	 difficult	 agricultural	 situation	 combined	with	 some	 family	 problems,	 nearly	 all	interviewed	 farmer	 families	 reported	 that	 they	 had	 to	 take	 up	 a	 loan.	 Several	interviewees	narrated	how	they	had	applied	for	an	agricultural	loan	and	then	had	to	use	the	money	 for	 another	urgent	purpose,	 be	 it	 education,	 the	marriage	of	 a	daughter	or	medical	treatment.	If	later	the	yield	was	better,	the	loan	could	be	repaid.	But	if	the	crop	failed,	the	farmers	ended	up	in	a	debt	trap.	While	the	situation	was	serious	in	all	villages,	it	was	worst	in	village	VJAS.	The	overwhelming	majority	of	interviewees	mentioned	that	they	were	indebted.	Being	unable	to	pay	the	monthly	interest	rates	or	the	land	rents,	the	debts	of	the	farmers	grew	and	piled	up.		
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To	make	it	worse,	 in	all	villages	and	particularly	in	village	VJAS,	 interviewees	said	that	they	 preferred	 to	 borrow	 from	 a	 co-operative	 bank,	 but	 they	 never	 received	 enough	credit,	so	they	had	to	approach	moneylenders,	mostly	big	landholders	or	input	traders.	A	small	farmer	from	village	SSS	reported	that	“the	bank	doesn’t	give	loan	to	small	kisans.	
But	moneylenders	ask	for	10%	interest	rate	per	month”.	These	moneylenders	then	would	come	 and	 take	 away	 the	 valuables	 from	 the	 farmers’	 home.	 This	 constituted	 a	 big	humiliation	for	farmers,	as	it	was	pointed	out	during	interviews.		
Employment	and	Government	Schemes	In	 all	 villages,	 interviewed	 farmers	 as	 well	 as	 labourers	 said	 that	 their	 situation	 was	difficult	because	they	did	not	have	any	other	income	source	besides	agriculture.	Reports	of	family	members	migrating	to	nearby	towns	were	rare,	particularly	in	remote	villages	such	 as	 VJAS.	 In	 villages	 KAA,	 AIKS	 and	 SSS,	 many	 interviewees	 reported	 that	 jobs	outside	agriculture	were	difficult	to	get.	One	labourer	narrated	his	experience	of	seeking	a	 job	outside	 agriculture	 for	his	 son:	 “Job	is	not	for	poor	people.	Because	the	rich	people	
will	give	money	for	the	job	opportunity.”	However,	many	 farmers	owned	some	 livestock	and	were	 involved	 in	 the	 dairy	 business.	 Small	 farmers	 in	 particular	 emphasised	 that	livestock	 and	 livestock-related	 income	 were	 crucial	 for	 their	 livelihood.	 But	 then,	livestock	was	often	the	first	asset	farmers	sold	in	case	of	their	daughters’	marriage	or	a	family	member’s	illness.		Despite	 the	 tendency	 of	 many	 interviewees	 to	 complain	 about	 the	 government,	 the	interviewees	 also	 indicated	 that	 schemes	 to	 support	 farmers	 did	 exist.	 While	 some	interviewees	were	not	aware	about	available	schemes	or	had	never	applied,	others	had	received	some	benefit.	However,	schemes	were	difficult	to	access.	First	because	“even	if	
they	[government]	give	money	after	the	17th	time	[we	try],	we	have	to	travel	there,	meet	
the	officer,	and	even	they	ask	for	money	to	get	the	money”,	a	marginal	 farmer	 explained.	Second,	a	small	farmer	from	village	SSS	told,	“the	leaders	are	giving	these	schemes	for	the	
relatives	(…).	The	schemes	are	only	on	paper,	the	local	leaders	will	not	implement	them	in	
the	 village,	 they	 do	 not	 reach	 the	 kisans”.	 A	 marginal	 farmer	 from	 village	 KAA	summarized	 his	 experiences	 with	 schemes	 as	 follows:	 “those	 who	 are	 close	 to	 the	
powerful	people,	they	are	getting	benefits	from	the	schemes.	For	a	kisan	it	is	not	possible	to	
go	there	many	times	and	ask.”		The	problem	that	schemes	did	not	reach	the	intended	beneficiaries	was	understood	also	in	 a	 regional	 dimension.	 In	Western	Maharashtra,	 as	many	 interviewees	 pointed	 out,	where	many	powerful	politicians	came	from,	the	prices	were	higher,	there	was	less	load	shedding	and	the	general	situation	was	incomparable.	“See,	the	packages	are	coming,	but	
the	fund	will	transfer	to	Western	Maharashtra,”	a	medium	farmer	suspected.	In	village	VJAS	in	particular,	interviewees	highlighted	issues	related	to	their	ST	identity.	Interviewees	 mentioned	 that	 their	 forefathers	 had	 lived	 in	 the	 forests	 and	 now	 they	lived	in	villages	as	farmers.	But	still,	they	said,	the	government	neglected	them	and	shied	away	from	providing	infrastructure	or	education.	Further,	it	was	difficult	for	them	to	get	caste	certificates	or	other	official	documents.	Interviewees	also	complained	that	they	did	
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not	know	about	government	schemes	and	even	 if	 they	 tried	 to	access	 them,	 it	 seemed	impossible	for	them	to	get	any	benefits.	This	chapter	showed	 that	 the	 topics	 that	 the	 interviewed	 farmers	 talked	about	always	circled	 around	 the	 same	 issues:	 prices,	 the	 costs	 of	 inputs,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 irrigation.	However,	 there	 were	 also	 considerable	 differences	 in	 the	 ways	 different	 classes	 of	farmers	 described	 their	 situation.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 will	 conclude	 this	 chapter	 by	comparing	 the	 farmers’	 perceptions	 –	 a	 comparison	 that	 again	 hints	 at	 the	 contested	notion	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	as	discussed	in	chapter	II.		
4 Concluding	Thoughts:	What	Kind	of	Crisis	in	Vidarbha?	The	 issues	that	 the	 interviewees	brought	 forward	closely	correspond	with	the	debates	in	the	literature	(see	chapter	II;	section	2,	this	chapter).	Local	issues	concerning	traders	and	 moneylenders,	 however,	 have	 a	 higher	 importance	 in	 farmers’	 perceptions	 than	they	 have	 in	 the	 literature.	 The	 interviewees	 all	 complained	 about	 agricultural	profitability	 and	 they	 highlighted	 many	 problems.	 At	 first	 sight,	 this	 would	 rather	correspond	 to	 the	 arguments	 for	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 that	 see	 farmers	 in	 trouble	irrespective	 of	 their	 landholdings.	 But	 at	 a	 closer	 look,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 these	problems	 exist	 to	 very	 different	 extents	 depending	 on	 ownership,	 landholdings	 and	available	capital.		Interestingly,	 when	 I	 asked	 interviewees	 explicitly	 whether	 there	 were	 farmers	 who	were	 more	 severely	 affected,	 even	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 maintained	 that	 all	farmers	 were	 equally	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis	 because	 nobody	 received	 remunerative	prices	 for	 their	 produce.	 But	when	 they	 started	 explaining	 their	 problems	 in	 detail,	 it	became	 clear	 that	 many	 farmers	 did	 in	 fact	 distinguish	 between	 different	 classes	 of	farmers.	First,	when	farmers	spoke	about	their	yields,	they	underlined	huge	differences	in	yields	between	 different	 classes	 of	 farmers.	 It	 was	 also	 because	 the	 determining	 factor	 for	higher	 yield	 was	 not	 understood	 as	 climate	 or	 pests,	 but	 irrigation.	 All	 interviewees	concurred	 that	 irrigation	 was	 the	major	 factor	 behind	 a	 good	 and	 reliable	 yield.	 One	small	 farmer	 said	 that	 "my	land	is	rain-fed.	If	there	is	irrigation	facility,	then	there	are	a	
lot	of	possibilities.	But	we	are	fully	depending	on	rain,	we	are	suffering."	Second,	 the	 capital	 available	 to	 invest	 in	 agriculture	 was	 another	 important	 factor	underlined	by	 farmers.	Many	 small	 and	marginal	 –	 and	even	medium	–	 farmers	 could	not	 afford	 seeds,	 fertilizer	 or	 pesticides.	 According	 to	 them,	 this	 resulted	 in	 meagre	yields	on	the	one	hand	and	in	a	high	risk	of	crop	failure	on	the	other	hand.	One	medium	farmer	talked	about	the	risk	of	crop	failure	due	to	pests	and	explained	"those	who	have	
money,	they	are	using	pesticides,	but	we	are	poor,	for	us	it	is	not	possible	to	use	it.	So	the	
leaves	of	my	cotton	became	red	and	I	had	no	yield".	Some	 rich	 farmers	mentioned	 these	aspects,	but	from	a	completely	different	perspective.	They	said	that	they	were	able	to	get	better	yields	because	they	put	the	right	inputs	at	the	right	time	for	the	cultivated	crops.	
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The	 other	 farmers,	mostly	 small	 and	marginal,	 did	 not	 have	 the	 necessary	 training	 or	knowledge	to	do	so.		In	 terms	 of	 profit,	 farmers	 mostly	 emphasized	 that	 their	 profit	 was	 meagre.	 Some	interviewees	 explained	 that	 not	 only	 the	 yield,	 but	 also	 the	 realization	 of	 good	 prices	depended	on	the	capital	available	to	a	farmer.	The	ones	who	could	afford	to	store	their	crops	 for	 a	 long	 time	 made	 use	 of	 fluctuating	 market	 prices,	 while	 the	 others	 felt	helpless	exposed	to	the	same	fluctuations.	Other	interviewees,	on	the	contrary,	opposed	this	view	and	argued	that	all	farmers	faced	the	same	problems.	One	said	that	"those	who	
are	rich	kisans,	they	have	more	problems	and	those	who	have	small	landholding,	they	have	
small	problems.	But	the	situation	is	the	same	for	all."	When	farmers	spoke	about	the	low	prices	and	therefore	low	profitability,	the	majority	of	interviewees	 complained	 that	 they	 could	 “not	cover	the	expenses”.	 But	 this	 expression	had	different	meanings.	Farmers	with	small	and	rain-fed	fields	often	reported	that	they	had	 not	 even	 been	 able	 to	 cover	 their	 expenses	 for	 agricultural	 inputs.	 Other	interviewees	referred	to	basic	family	expenses.	On	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	were	the	 rich	 farmers	who	 complained	 about	 low	 prices,	 but	 their	 point	 of	 reference	were	rather	people	in	other	professions	such	as	government	officials	or	urban	workers.	They	complained	that	they	could	not	afford	to	send	their	children	to	English	medium	schools	or	marry	off	their	daughters	according	to	their	social	status.	The	crux	of	the	matter	can	be	gauged	from	the	radically	different	perspectives	emerging	from	the	 interviews	about	 land,	 labour	and	regional	disparities.	The	 large	 farmers	and	landlords	 emphasised	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 “labour	shortage”	 (which	 purportedly	 arose	because	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 and	 landless	 labourers	 were	 pampered	 by	government	 schemes,	 turning	 them	 into	 lazy	 drunkards)	 which	 lowered	 their	 profits	from	agriculture.	On	the	other	hand,	the	interviews	and	observations	were	sufficient	to	conclude	that	high	wages	were	a	myth	perpetuated	by	large	farmers.	Living	and	working	conditions	for	the	large	mass	of	small	and	marginal	farmers	and	labourers	were	pitiable	and	extreme.		To	conclude,	while	almost	all	farmers	highlighted	similar	problems,	they	varied	among	the	 different	 groups	 of	 farmers.	 This	 clearly	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 taking	 a	differentiated	 look	at	what	 is	 generally	 labelled	as	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’.	 In	 spite	of	 this	differentiation,	 though,	 it	became	clear	 that	many	farmers	 felt	a	need	to	 improve	their	situation.	A	 contradiction	 emerged	when	 I	 discussed	 land	 and	 labour	 issues	 on	which	different	 classes	 of	 farmers	 had	 radically	 different	 perspectives.	 Thus,	 several	 groups	are	actively	trying	to	mobilize	'the	farmers'.	It	is	uncontested	that	the	situation	of	most	people	 living	 in	 villages	 is	 severe,	 although	 it	 is	 increasingly	 important	 to	 reiterate	 a	differentiated	 take	 on	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 when	 discussing	 these	mobilisations	 in	 the	following	chapters.		
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IV. Mobilisation	around	the	‘Agrarian	Crisis’	in	Vidarbha	Who	are	the	groups	and	activists	who	mobilize	farmers	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	(see	section	2,	chapter	II),	and	how	and	why	do	people	become	active	and	mobilize	for	their	issues?	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 am	going	 to	map	 the	mobilisations	around	agrarian	 issues	 in	Vidarbha	and	describe	the	different	activities	and	demands.		When	I	came	to	Maharashtra	for	the	first	time,	virtually	everyone	outside	Vidarbha	told	me	that	there	was	no	longer	any	farmer	movement.	The	New	Farmers’	Movement	of	the	late	20th	century	(see	section	2.3,	this	chapter)	had	weakened	and	supposedly	nothing	had	come	to	fill	the	void.	In	Vidarbha	itself,	however,	people	started	to	indicate	that	even	if	 there	 was	 no	 longer	 any	 big	 farmer	 ‘movement’,	 there	 were	 several	 groups	 and	individual	activists	mobilizing	around	agrarian	 issues.	 I	 found	 that	 the	old	movements	had	indeed	fallen	apart,	but	that	some	fragments	were	still	active	(see	sections	2.4	and	3,	this	 chapter).	 In	 addition,	 new	 groups	 had	 appeared	 and	 gained	 influence.	 Several	journalists	and	 individual	activists	were	actively	keeping	the	debate	over	the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	alive.	These	groups,	 though,	were	very	diverse	and	only	 loosely	connected.	This	multitude	of	groups	and	activists	are	in	the	centre	of	this	study.		First,	 I	will	delve	 into	 the	 theoretical	debate	about	concepts	of	 social	mobilisation	and	movements	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 necessary	 analytical	 framework.	 In	 section	 2,	 I	describe	 the	recent	history	of	 farmer	movements	 in	Vidarbha	as	well	as	 their	political	context	before	I	turn	to	the	contemporary	mobilizations	in	section	3.	
1 Approaching	Social	Mobilisation	At	 a	 theoretical	 level,	 debates	 about	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 social	 movements	 are	ongoing.	 In	 chapter	 I,	 I	 touched	upon	 the	different	 strands	of	 social	movement	 theory	and	how	they	have	 increasingly	developed	 into	complementing	rather	 than	competing	strands.	 Similarly,	 the	 different	 definitions	 of	 social	 movements	 have	 developed	increasingly	towards	broad	conceptualizations.	In	this	section	I	aim	to	find	an	analytical	nomenclature	for	the	phenomena	I	have	observed	in	the	field.		
1.1 Social	Movements,	Mobilisations	and	Contentious	Politics	Contentious	politics	mean	“episodic,	public,	collective	interaction	among	makers	of	claims	
and	their	objects”	 (Tarrow	2013,	1)	and	 in	a	simpler	sense	 it	means	“collective	political	
struggles”	(ibid).	This	notion	can	include	a	very	broad	spectrum	of	mobilisations:	 from	little	sustained	forms	of	contention,	such	as	riots	or	strikes,	to	very	extensive	ones	like	civil	wars	or	revolution,	as	well	as	parts	of	routine	political	processes	like	elections	and	interest	group	politics.	Somewhere	along	this	broad	spectrum	lie	the	social	movements.	Tarrow	(2013)	understood	them	as	“sustained	challenges	to	power	holders	in	the	name	of	
a	 population	 living	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 those	 power	 holders	 by	 means	 of	 public	
displays	of	that	population’s	worthiness,	unity,	numbers,	and	commitment”	(ibid,	1).	While	this	definition	situates	social	movements	within	the	broader	field	of	contentious	politics,	
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there	 are	 other	 definitions	 that	 seek	 to	 define	 which	 groups	 or	 multitude	 of	 groups	might	be	considered	a	social	movement.		Della	 Porta	 and	 Diani	 (2006)	 reviewed	 the	 definitions	 that	 stem	 from	 the	 different	schools	 of	 social	 movement	 theory.	 They	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 all	 these	definitions	 can	 be	 merged	 into	 four	 basic	 characteristics.	 Social	 movements	 are	 (1)	informal	networks,	based	on	(2)	shared	beliefs	and	solidarity,	which	mobilise	about	(3)	conflictual	issues	through	(4)	frequent	use	of	various	forms	of	protest	(see	also	Crossley	2002).	 Snow,	 Soule,	 and	 Kriesi	 (2011),	 after	 the	 same	 endeavour,	 came	 to	 five	 main	characteristics.	They	argue	that	a	social	movement	consists	of	(1)	 joint	action	with	(2)	some	degree	of	organization	and	(3)	change-oriented	goals.	Further,	the	action	needs	to	be	 (4)	 extra	 or	 non-institutional	 and	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 (5)	 a	 temporal	 continuity.	Compared	to	Della	Porta	and	Diani,	they	focus	more	on	action	than	networks	and	more	on	shared	goals	than	on	shared	beliefs,	solidarity	and	–	in	other,	earlier	definitions	(see	Diani	1992)	–	on	collective	identity.		To	distinguish	social	movements	from	singular	outbursts	of	protest,	the	fifth	point	of	the	latter	 definition	 is	 important:	 temporal	 continuity.	 During	 their	 lifetime,	 social	movements	 can	 change	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 set	 of	 actions	 and	 actors,	 their	 visions	 and	particularly	their	level	of	activity.	These	so	called	cycles	of	protest	describe	periods	with	a	high	level	of	activity,	followed	by	less	active	periods	when	groups	persist	at	a	low	level	of	activity	(see	Koopmans	2011;	Tarrow	1998).	At	these	low	levels	of	activity	is	where	a	broad	approach	 is	useful	 to	still	 recognize	 them	as	social	movements.	These	phases	of	low	 activity	 are	 important	 for	 understanding	movements	 in	 their	 temporal	 continuity	and	particularly	for	understanding	when	and	how	the	movements	do	or	do	not	sustain	or	become	strong	again,	but	they	are	under-researched	(Koopmans	2011).	Social	 movements	 are	 central	 to	 a	 society	 rather	 than	 a	 “marginal	 rejection	of	order”	(Tourraine	 1981,	 29),	 as	 was	 conceptualized	 earlier	 (see	 section	 1.3,	 chapter	 I).	Arguably,	 the	 number	 of	 causes	 as	 well	 as	 constituencies	 represented	 by	 social	movements	 has	 increased	 and	 the	 social	 movement	 repertoire	 of	 protest	 actions	diffused	across	a	broader	political	and	economic	spectrum.	At	the	same	time,	the	general	public	 has	 become	 increasingly	 tolerant	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 protest	 and	 the	 state	authorities	 have	 tended	 to	 develop	 negotiation	 strategies.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 social	movement	 groups	 –	 as	 parts	 of	 social	 movements	 –	 have	 become	 increasingly	formalized	 and	 activists	 have	 often	 developed	 a	 professional	 identity.	 Some	 social	movement	 groups	 have	 narrowed	 down	 their	 tactics	 and	 often	 decided	 for	 less	disruptive	 and	 less	 threatening	 tactics	 that	 in	 turn	 promise	 to	 attract	 broader	participation.	 Through	 all	 these	 processes,	 social	 movements	 have	 established	 a	permanent	 presence	 in	 today's	 society	 (Meyer	 and	 Tarrow	 1998,	 Meyer	 2013).	 This	omnipresence	of	political	 activity	 that	 can	be	 labelled	as	 social	movement	activity	has	also	made	it	increasingly	difficult	to	provide	one	overarching	definition.		Thus,	 more	 inclusive	 and	 fuzzy	 definitions	 have	 emerged.	 There	 is,	 for	 example,	 a	consensus	 that	 no	 single	 organization,	 whatever	 its	 nature,	 can	 constitute	 a	 social	movement,	 but	 only	 a	 multitude	 of	 organizations	 and	 individuals	 (see	 e.g.	 Johnston	
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2014).	Koopmans	(1993)	emphasized	that	the	defining	feature	of	a	social	movement	is	in	fact	that	 is	difficult	to	grasp.	He	argues	that	“social	movements	are	characterized	by	a	
low	degree	of	institutionalization,	high	heterogeneity,	a	lack	of	clearly	defined	boundaries	
and	decision	making	structures,	a	volatility	matched	by	few	other	social	phenomena”	(ibid,	637).	 Along	 the	 same	 lines,	 Bebbington's	 (2009)	 definition	 stuck	 to	 the	 term	 social	movement,	but	emphasizes	processes	and	fuzzy	shared	beliefs.	He	writes	that	(ibid,	8):		
“a	social	movement	is	a	form	of	collective	action	but	it	is	not	itself	an	actor,	rather	it	is	a	
process,	 sustained	 by	 a	 set	 of	 actions	 and	 actors,	 in	 which	 what	 prevails	 is	 an	 action	
motivated	 by	 shared	 grievances	 and	 senses	 of	 injustice,	 and	 therefore	 by	 a	 vision	 –	
perhaps	not	specified	–	of	the	need	to	find	another	way	of	organizing	society	and	thinking	
about	development.”		I	found	this	definition	very	useful	in	order	to	capture	the	complexity	of	social	processes	in	my	field	sites	(see	section	2	of	this	chapter),	particularly	also	because	in	a	study	about	social	 movements	 and	 governing	 poverty,	 Bebbington	 (2010)	 also	 mapped	 groups	active	on	the	ground	and	found	this	exercise	helpful	to	understand	that	“the	sector	is	also	
fractured,	 with	 many	 movements	 co-existing	 (and	 overlapping)	 in	 sometimes	 confusing	
ways”	 (ibid,	 1321).	 I	 will,	 therefore,	 adopt	 this	 definition	 to	 analyse	 the	 multitude	 of	groups	and	activists	mobilizing	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha.	In	 the	 Indian	 context,	 SinghaRoy	 (2010)	 reviewed	 the	 debate	 about	 different	conceptions	of	social	movements	from	the	perspective	of	rural	India.	Very	much	in	line	with	 Bebbington,	 he	 introduced	 the	 characteristic	 of	 ‘fluidarity’	 to	 the	 description	 of	movements.	He	said	 that	 they	are	 loosely	 formed,	based	on	“temporarily	perceived	and	
articulated	ideals	and	common	interests,	and	that	many	participants	tend	to	be	members	
of	more	 than	one	collectivities	 simultaneously”	 (ibid,	 155).	 Membership,	 therefore,	 is	 a	fluid	concept	and	can	be	of	varying	strengths.	It	is	even	possible	that	those	collectives,	of	which	one	person	is	part,	have	contradictory	interests	or	goals.	He	further	argued	that	this	omnipresence	of	social	movement	activity	that	Meyer	and	Tarrow	(1998)	described	can	also	be	observed	 in	 India,	where	social	movements	have	become	a	normal	part	of	contemporary	rural	society	(SinghaRoy	2010).		These	 broad	 definitions	 of	 Bebbington	 (and	 SinghaRoy)	 are	 helpful	 in	 describing	 the	complex	realities	on	the	ground,	but	they	bring	along	a	series	of	questions	that	will	come	up	repeatedly	in	the	course	of	this	thesis:	What	are	“shared	grievances”	(see	chapter	II)	or	a	“shared	vision”	–	which	may	not	even	be	specified	–	and	how	different	can	they	be	in	order	to	still	belong	to	a	"shared"	vision	(see	chapter	VI)?	Where	does	 ‘one’	movement	end	and	another	movement	begin	with	another	set	of	actions	and	actors	distinct	 from	the	first	one	(this	chapter)?	Which	groups	should	be	included	in	the	‘movement’	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha?	Can	we	even	speak	of	‘one	movement’?		
1.2 Groups	within	a	Movement	Following	the	broad	definition	of	social	movements	by	Bebbington,	the	form	and	nature	of	 groups	 constituting	 a	 social	 movement	 are	 not	 limited.	 Usually	 the	 groups	constituting	a	social	movement	are	called	‘social	movement	groups’	or	‘social	movement	
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organizations’.	Some	of	these	groups	might	also	be	political	parties	or	NGOs.	Concerning	political	 parties,	 I	 agree	 with	 Diani	 (1992)	 who	 argued	 that	 it	 would	 not	 matter	 if	different	specific	social	movement	groups	decide	to	include	participation	in	the	electoral	system	in	their	repertoire	of	activities,	because	this	depends	upon	external	factors	such	as	 political	 opportunity	 as	 well	 as	 tactical	 or	 ideological	 considerations.	 Such	 groups	would	 then	 “be	part	 of	 two	different	 systems	of	 action	 (the	party	 system	and	 the	 social	
movement	system),	where	they	will	play	different	roles”	(Della	Porta	et	al.	2006,	27).	I	will	come	back	to	this	rather	difficult	distinction	in	chapter	VI.		Concerning	 NGOs,	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 more	 helpful	 to	 distinguish	 between	 those	 that	explicitly	raise	political	demands	and	groups	that	concentrate	on	providing	services.	For	India,	 groups	 that	 understand	 themselves	 as	 movement	 groups	 sharply	 distance	themselves	 from	philanthropic,	non-political	NGOs.	Movement	groups	 (including	more	political	NGOs)	 tend	 to	have	a	more	radical	approach	 to	development	and	 try	 to	build	the	collective	capabilities	of	their	constituency	to	demand	rights	(Sahoo	2014).	But	there	are	also	movement	groups	that	are	neither	NGOs	nor	political	parties.	For	an	Indian	context,	Sheth	 (2004)	 introduced	 the	 term	micro-movement	 to	refer	 to	distinct	organizations.	He	specifically	refers	to	groups	that	became	prevalent	in	the	1970s	(often	developed	out	of	fragments	of	earlier	political	and	social	movements)	and	grew	until	the	late	1980s.	The	early	1990s	were	a	difficult	time	for	micro-movements	in	India,	but	they	have	started	to	grow	again	and	find	strength	since	the	mid	1990s.	While	they	had	only	
“sporadic	successes	 in	changing	or	 influencing	government	policy,	and	certainly	have	not	
managed	to	reverse	the	tide	of	neo-liberalism”,	(Sahoo,	495)	they	have	been	important	in	articulating	the	interests	of	the	poor	and	in	opposing	neoliberal	policies.		Sheth	 (2004)	 further	 defines	 these	 micro-movements	 and	 says	 that	 their	 politics	 are	“not	 linked	 vertically	 to	 the	 macro	 structures	 of	 power	 and	 ideology;	 (…)	 nor	 (…)	
parochially	 local”	 (ibid,	 56).	 He	 further	 explains	 that	 “although	the	movements	usually	
work	 in	 local	areas	 they	 invariably	define	 local	 issues	 in	 trans-local	 terms”	 (ibid).	 Sheth	further	 says	 that	 the	 politics	 of	 those	micro-movements	“expands	horizontally	through	
several	micro-movements”	 (ibid,	 56).	 I	 find	 the	 concept	 of	micro-movements	 useful	 to	describe	 the	 single	mobilizing	 groups.	 I	 would	 propose	 that	 in	 terms	 of	 organisation,	actors	and	visions,	a	number	of	micro-movements	can	constitute	a	social	movement	in	the	 sense	 defined	 by	 Bebbington	 above.	 In	 the	 larger	 sense,	 micro-movements	 do	profess	 a	 politics	 and	 vision	 of	 their	 own	 by	 associating	 and	 dissociating	 themselves	from	certain	ideological	strands,	although	in	their	everyday	activity	they	might	speak	of	immediate	demands.		In	 section	 3	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 map	 out	 the	 different	 groups	 and	 actors	mobilizing	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha	and	relate	them	to	the	definitions	and	concepts	outlined	here.	But	I	would	like	to	introduce	terms	I	find	suitable	to	describe	the	phenomena	 I	 found	on	 the	ground:	With	 ‘movement’	 I	 refer	 to	 the	multitude	of	actors	and	 groups	 that	 mobilise	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha;	 to	 refer	 to	 the	individual	 groups	 within	 this	 movement	 I	 use	 ‘movement	 group’	 or	 simply	 ‘group’	
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(henceforth	I	use	both	terms	without	quotes).	This	anticipation	helps	the	clarity	of	the	description	in	section	3.	
2 History	and	Politics	in	Maharashtra	Before	coming	to	the	contemporary	movement	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha,	it	 is	 important	to	understand	the	context	 in	which	these	mobilisations	take	place.	This	includes	the	political	landscape	of	Maharashtra,	because	the	movement	actors	formulate	their	 demands	 and	 organize	 their	 activities	 within	 this	 landscape.	 It	 also	 includes	 a	history	 of	 movements	 of	 peasants	 and	 farmers,	 because	 this	 is	 where	 many	 of	 the	contemporary	groups	have	their	roots	and	where	they	make	many	references	to.		
2.1 Political	Landscape	of	Maharashtra	Activists	and	supporters	I	interviewed	often	expressed	their	discontent	with	the	Indian	National	Congress	(henceforth:	Congress)	in	particular,	which	was	in	power	at	the	state	as	well	 as	 the	national	 government	 level	during	 the	 time	of	 this	 study.	To	understand	these	anti-Congress	sentiments,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	political	landscape	of	the	state	of	Maharashtra.		Since	 Independence,	 Congress	 has	 been	 in	 power	 in	Maharashtra	 (as	well	 nationally)	until	1978,	when	fissures	appeared	in	its	leadership	and	Sharad	Pawar	left	the	Congress.	Pawar,	who	was	Chief	Minister	of	Maharashtra	three	times,	was	an	important	figure	in	the	(agricultural)	politics	of	the	state	and	also	at	the	national	level,	where	he	later	held	different	positions	as	a	Minister,	 including	as	Agricultural	Minister	from	2004	to	2014.	He	 is	 a	 politician	who	 emerged	 from	Western	Maharashtra’s	 sugar	 co-operatives	 and	who	 stands	 for	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Maratha-Kunbis	 of	 Western	 Maharashtra	 (Lalvani	2009).	From	1978	to	1980,	Congress	was	not	in	power	and	Pawar	was	Chief	Minister.	In	1980,	after	 a	 President’s	 rule,	 Congress	 came	 back	 into	 power	 in	 the	 State.	 1987	 Pawar	reunited	with	 Congress	 and	 became	 Chief	Minister	 (1988-1991	 and	 1993-1995).	 This	constellation	held	until	1995,	when	a	coalition	of	BJP	and	Shiv	Sena	 (henceforth:	Sena)	came	 to	 power.	 They	 lost	 after	 only	 one	 5-year	 legislative	 term	 (Lalvani	 2009)50.	 In	1999,	Sharad	Pawar	founded	his	own	Party,	 the	Nationalist	Congress	Party	(NCP),	and	won	 the	 subsequent	 assembly	 election	 in	 coalition	 with	 the	 Congress.	 This	 coalition	remained	 in	 power	 until	 2014	 (Lalvani	 2009;	 Palshikar,	 Birmal,	 and	 Ghotale	 2010;	Palshikar,	Deshpande,	 and	Birmal	2009).	 It	was	 therefore	 in	power	at	 the	 time	of	 this	study.		In	 the	national	 elections	of	2014	however,	 the	BJP-Sena	alliance	was	 the	 clear	winner	and	won	42	of	the	48	seats	in	the	Lok	Sabha51	–	an	increase	of	21	seats	compared	to	its																																									 																					50	The	 coalition	 holds	 despite	 Shiv	 Sena’s	 split	 up	 before	 the	 2009	 elections.	 The	Maharashtra	
Navnirman	Sena	was	 founded,	 but	 could	 not	 build	 up	 considerable	 strength	 outside	 the	 urban	centres	of	the	state.	51	The	Lok	Sabha	(engl:	House	of	the	People)	is	the	lower	house	of	India's	Bicameral-Parliament.	
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2009	 share.	 The	 Congress-NCP	 alliance	 won	 only	 6	 seats,	 a	 heavy	 defeat	 (Diwakar	2014).	The	2014	elections	 for	 the	 legislative	 assembly	 in	Maharashtra	 state	 showed	a	very	similar	picture	(GoI	2014).	The	first	major	reason	for	the	failure	of	the	Congress	in	Maharashtra	is	generally	seen	as	its	 inability	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 minimal	 program	 of	 actions	 to	 mobilize	 the	 rural	 people	(Kumar	2004).	A	second	reason	comes	out	of	the	history	of	the	Congress.	The	Congress	in	Maharashtra	relies	heavily	on	the	Maratha-Kunbis,	which	started	in	the	1920s,	when	Indian	 National	 Congress	 first	 grew	 big	 and	was	 joined	 increasingly	 by	 non–Brahmin	elites	 .	 Many	 educated	 Brahmins,	 in	 contrast,	 left	 the	 Congress	 and	 joined	 the	 Hindu	
Mahasabha	or	the	Rashtriya	Swayamsevak	Sangh	(RSS),	both	of	which	have	a	right–wing	Hindu	nationalist	ideology	(Rodrigues	1998).	Therefore,	the	Congress	became	the	main	party	of	Maratha–Kunbis	 in	Maharashtra	and	their	power	steadily	grew	(Pandit	1979).	The	Maratha–Kunbis	managed	to	capture	the	elites	of	other	caste	groups,	particularly	in	Western	 Maharashtra,	 and	 brought	 the	 powerful	 Congress	 under	 their	 control.	 But	nowadays,	 the	Maratha–Kunbis	 are	 an	 increasingly	 shaky	 voter	 base	 in	Maharashtra’s	politics	(Mohanty	2009).	Vidarbha	 too	was	once	a	Congress	stronghold,	but	 it	 started	 to	 lose	ground	already	 in	the	1980s.	In	Vidarbha,	the	Maratha-Kunbi	caste	complex	has	never	grown	as	strong	as	it	 has	 in	Western	Maharashtra	 (see	 section	1.3,	 chapter	 III)	 and	even	 today,	Marathas	are	 less	numerous	while	 there	are	more	Scheduled	Tribe	and	OBC	groups	(Deshpande	2006;	 Palshikar	 2004).	 This	 also	weakens	 the	 Congress’	 voter	 base.	 In	 other	 parts	 of	Maharashtra	as	well,	the	voices	of	Maratha–Kunbis	and	OBCs	have	become	fragmented,	which	 has	 further	 weakened	 Congress.	 One	 reason	 is	 that	 Kunbis	 are	 OBC	 in	Maharashtra,	 but	Marathas	 are	 not.	 Therefore,	 the	 Kunbis	 have	 reservation	 and	 the	
Marathas	do	not.	Marathas	have	opposed	reservation	policies	but	have	recently	started	demanding	reservation	as	well.	This	demand	is	seen	as	absurd	by	many	considering	the	
Marathas'	 dominance	 in	 the	 state	 (Bureau	 2013	 in	 the	 Economic	 Times	 India).	 The	
Kunbis	therefore,	are	part	of	non–OBC	Maratha	identity	socially	and	politically	but	at	the	same	time	they	do	not	belong	to	the	OBC	category.	 In	Maharashtra,	Maratha-Kunbis	as	well	as	OBCs	each	constitute	around	30%	of	Maharashtra’s	population	(both	 including	the	Kunbis	of	roughly	10%).	A	third	reason	for	the	weakening	of	Congress	in	Vidarbha	is	that	communalist	forces	like	the	BJP	grew	very	strong	 in	 the	region.	The	party	has	a	mostly	urban	and	upper	caste	leadership,	 but	managed	 to	 attract	masses	 of	OBC	people	 even	 in	 rural	 areas	 through	their	 Hindutva	 and	 anti–Congress	 rhetoric,	 which	 at	 the	 same	 time	 facilitated	 a	reconfiguration	of	caste	politics.	Additionally,	the	government	of	BJP–Sena	in	the	1990s	explicitly	 promised	 to	 ‘develop’	 Vidarbha	 (Kumar	 2004;	 Lalvani	 2009).	 However,	 the	two	 allies	 Shiv	 Sena	 and	 BJP	 disagree	 on	 the	 demand	 for	 separate	 statehood52	for	Vidarbha.	BJP	is	in	favour,	while	Sena	is	against	the	demand	(Rodrigues	1998).	
																																								 																					52	Some	political	groups	and	activists	demand	a	separate	statehood	for	Vidarbha	(namely	the	11	most	 eastern	 districts	 of	 Maharashtra)	 within	 the	 Republic	 of	 India.	 The	 arguments	 are	 the	
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A	fourth	reason	for	the	rise	of	the	communalist	forces	in	Vidarbha	points	to	the	state	of	agriculture.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Maratha-Kunbis	 who	 supported	 Congress	 are	 the	dominant	 landowning	 caste	 and	 some	 families	 have	 managed	 to	 accumulate	considerable	wealth,	 especially	 the	 sugar	barons	of	Western	Maharashtra	 (see	 section	1.3,	this	chapter).	However,	a	majority	of	them	in	Vidarbha	have	remained	dependent	on	rain-fed,	 subsistence	 agriculture.	 Consequently,	 there	 are	 huge	 differences	within	 this	caste-complex.	Congress	has	proven	to	be	open	only	for	the	first,	but	not	for	the	second	group	and	thus	represented	the	rich	farmers’	interests,	rather	then	that	of	the	poor.	The	latter	consequently	shifted	to	BJP-Sena	and	temporarily	to	other	organisations	such	as	
Shetkari	Sanghatana	(Deshpande	2006;	Palshikar	2004;	Palshikar,	Birmal,	 and	Ghotale	2010).	Support	for	different	parties	naturally	differs	among	the	districts	in	the	region.	In	2013’s	
zilla	 parishad	 elections,	 Congress	 and	 NCP	 had	 built	 a	 coalition	 only	 in	 Wardha	 and	Buldhana	and	won	 in	 these	 two	districts.	 In	 the	other	 five	districts,	NCP	 joined	hands	with	other	political	parties,	including	BJP	and	Sena,	despite	the	Congress	still	being	the	single	 largest	 party	 in	most	 of	 these	 districts.	 In	 Yavatmal,	NCP	won	with	 this	 former	coalition	(Bhagwat	2013	in	The	Times	of	India).	Regarding	the	‘agrarian	crisis’,	it	is	very	interesting	to	note	that	not	only	Congress	but	all	the	coalitions	of	political	parties	that	have	ruled	Maharashtra	since	the	1970s	supported	the	 liberalization	policies	 in	 the	state:	 the	Congress	governments,	Sharad	Pawar	of	 the	Nationalist	Congress	Party	and	also	the	Bharatiya	Janata	Party	(BJP)–Sena	coalition.	 In	the	 realm	 of	 agriculture	 and	 rural	 society,	 all	 parties	 have	 tried	 to	 find	 a	 balance	between	 populist	 politics	 and	 neoliberal	 policy–making.	 While	 the	 coalitions	emphasized	 differences	 in	 details,	 they	 all	 had	 the	 same	 development	 perspectives	(Palshikar,	Birmal,	and	Ghotale	2010).	To	 understand	 political	 landscape	 of	 Maharashtra	 is	 crucial	 to	 understanding	 the	context	 of	 the	 mobilisations	 around	 an	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’.	 But	 apart	 from	 the	 political	parties,	there	have	been	what	we	might	call	social	reformers	as	well	as	important	farmer	movements	 that	 have	 shaped	 the	 context	 of	 the	 groups	 active	 today.	 I	 start	 with	 a	Maharashtrian	 social	 reformer,	 whose	 name	 is	 still	 omnipresent	 in	 contemporary	agricultural	mobilization.		
2.2 Maharashtra’s	Social	Reformers	In	Western	 Maharashtra	 in	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 social	 reformer	 Jyotirao	Govindrao	 Phule	 established	 a	movement	 called	 Satyashodhak	Samaj.	 At	 that	 time,	 an	educated	 middle	 class	 and	 petty	 bourgeoisie	 emerged	 among	 non–Brahmins,	particularly	 among	 Maratha-Kunbis.	 They	 were	 English–educated	 and	 criticised	 the	existing	 social	 system.	 It	 was	 from	 among	 this	 class	 that	 Phule’s	 Satyashodhak	Samaj	emerged	 as	 a	 direct	 attack	 on	 the	 caste	 system.	 While	 it	 sought	 in	 particular	 to	 end	
Brahmin	 domination,	 it	 was	 also	 opposed	 to	 other	 upper	 castes,	 merchants	 and																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														geographical	distance	from	Maharashtra’s	capital	Mumbai,	the	historical	and	cultural	differences,	as	well	as	the	perceived	domination	of	Western	Maharashtra	(see	section	1.1,	part	III).	
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moneylenders	 (Omvedt	 1973a;	 Pandit	 1979).	 Even	 if	 Phule's	 supporters	 stemmed	mostly	from	urban	centres	and	his	influence	on	the	peasantry	was	modest,	he	strongly	sympathised	 with	 agriculturalists.	 He	 urged	 the	 British	 government	 to	 improve	 the	peasants'	 situation	 through	 the	 introduction	 of	 compulsory	 primary	 education,	 the	provision	of	credit	and	other	facilities.	After	the	First	World	War	and	the	strengthening	of	 democratic	 institutions,	 political	 awareness	 increased	 and	 the	 situation	 of	 the	
Satyashodhak	 Samaj	 changed.	 A	 sizable	 minority	 of	 Brahmins	 supported	 the	 non–
Brahmin	movement's	 association	with	 Indian	National	 Congress	 and	worked	 together	with	 other	 Satyashodhak	 Samaj	 activists	 in	 going	 from	 village	 to	 village	 promoting	Phule’s	 and	 Gandhi’s	 ideas.	 It	 has	 even	 been	 argued	 that	 Satyashodhak	Samaj	 had	 by	then	become	a	peasant–based	mass	movement	(Omvedt	1973b;	Rodrigues	1998).	Later	with	increasing	political	power,	the	Satyashodhak	Samaj	activists’	enthusiasm	for	social	reforms	 decreased	 and	 the	 movement	 dissociated	 itself	 from	 Ambedkar’s	 emerging	movement	 against	 untouchability.	 Therefore,	 "Phule's	 dream	of	 a	 united	 revolutionary	
movement	of	the	shudras53	and	the	untouchables	proved	to	be	ephemeral”	 (Pandit	 1979,	431).	Phule	nevertheless	remains	an	important	idol	for	many	farmer	activists,	long	after	his	death	in	1890.		Phule	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 leader	 of	 the	 farmer	movement	 both	 in	 the	 literature	 and	 in	interviews.	But	 the	 talk	about	 the	conflict	of	Maratha-Kunbis	 and	Brahmins	 should	not	conceal	the	 immense	importance	of	another	movement	that	arose	at	the	same	time.	 In	the	 1920s,	 Bhimrao	 Ambedkar	 launched	 a	 major	 anti-untouchability	 movement	 and	fought	for	the	political	rights	of	the	Scheduled	Castes.	Ambedkar’s	movement	rigorously	aimed	 at	 abolishing	 the	 caste	 system	 and	 succeeded	 in	 mobilizing	 masses	 of	 the	Scheduled	 Castes.	 Following	 Ambedkar’s	 public	 conversion	 to	 Buddhism	 in	 Nagpur,	many	 SCs	 converted	 to	 Buddhism	 too,	 showing	 a	 strong	 rejection	 of	 the	 low	 status	ascribed	 to	 large	 portions	 of	 the	 society	 in	 caste	 hierarchy	 and	 of	 the	 structural	impossibility	 of	 changing	 this	 kind	 of	 discrimination	 (Dahiwale	 1995;	Mohanty	 2009;	Pandit	1979).	Although	the	movement	started	in	Maharashtra,	it	had	a	huge	influence	all	over	the	country.	In	Vidarbha,	the	SCs,	unlike	the	Marathas,	did	not	have	any	tradition	of	political	 power.	 The	 SCs	 were	 poor	 farmers	 and	 agricultural	 labourers	 and	 faced	extreme	oppression	through	the	caste	system;	therefore,	Ambedkar’s	movement	gained	major	influence	(Mohanty	2005).	Ambedkar’s	movement	has	had	a	huge	importance	for	Indian	society.	However,	because	Ambedkar	is	not	specifically	mentioned	as	a	farmer	leader	and	agricultural	issues	were	not	his	focus,	I	concentrate	on	major	peasant	and	farmer	movements	that	have	shaped	the	landscape	of	peasant	mobilization	in	India	after	Independence.54	
																																								 																					53	The	Shudras	are	the	lowest	social	order	of	the	Hindu	caste	system.	Traditionally	they	belong	to	the	service	class	and	labourers.		54	There	are	different	ways	to	categorize	farmer	movements	in	India.	A	major	one	distinguishes	between	 pre-British,	 British	 or	 colonial	 and	 post-Independence	 (for	 an	 overview	 see	 Shah	2004a).	For	this	study,	I	concentrate	on	the	post-Independence	movements.	
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I	would	like	to	make	one	remark	about	the	terminology.	In	section	1,	I	elaborated	on	the	different	 definitions	 and	 conceptualizations	 of	 social	 movements.	 The	 next	 section	 is	about	what	we	call	peasant	movements	and	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	in	India	after	Independence	 –	 both	 terms	 generally	 used.	 In	 order	 to	 analyse	whether	 or	 not	 these	different	 historical	movements	would	 qualify	 as	 a	movement	 in	 the	 sense	 outlined	 in	section	1	or	rather	as	movement	groups,	I	would	need	to	go	into	greater	depth	about	the	different	groups	and	activists	that	constituted	these	movements.	This	is	not	the	focus	of	this	study	and	I	therefore	adopt	the	widely	used	terminology.	
2.3 Movements	of	Peasants	and	Farmers	Omvedt	(1993)	suggested	categorizing	post-Independence	movements	into	old	and	new	movements.	She	conceptualizes	the	old	movements	as	peasant	movements	and	the	new	movements	as	farmers’	movements.	In	this	argumentation,	the	term	‘peasant’	refers	to	the	 subsistence-oriented	peasantry	and	 the	 term	 ‘farmers’	 refers	 to	a	market-oriented	agricultural	 population.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 am	 going	 to	 introduce	 the	 characteristics	 of	these	 two	 different	 types	 of	 movements	 as	 well	 as	 the	 debate	 that	 has	 followed	 this	categorization.	The	old	movements,	as	Omvedt	argued,	had	a	distinct	class	character	as	movements	of	the	 rural	 proletariat.	 Their	 major	 demands	 were	 “land	 to	 the	 tiller”,	 namely	 land	reforms,	 as	well	 as	 the	 abolition	 of	 landlordism	and	usury.	 They	 succeeded	 in	 uniting	farmers,	 tenants	 and	 agricultural	 labourers.	 In	 the	1940s,	 the	 old	 peasant	movements	had	been	strong	and	 led	major	peasant	struggles,	most	 importantly	the	Telengana	and	Tebhaga	 struggles	 in	 Andhra	 Pradesh	 and	 West	 Bengal	 respectively55.	 These	 leftist	peasant	 movements	 were	 also	 successful	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 but	 they	 became	weaker	in	the	1970s.		The	 leading	 leftist	 organization	 was,	 however,	 the	 All	 India	Kisan	Sabha	 (AIKS)	 (Shah	2004a),	 the	 farmers’	 wing	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 India	 (Marxist)	 (CPI(M)).	 The	Russian	Revolution	brought	socialist	 ideas	into	play	in	Indian	politics,	which	led	to	the	founding	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party.	 Its	 leadership	 was	 mainly	 from	 upper–caste	intellectuals,	 though	 its	 followers	 were	 from	 the	 industrial	 proletariat.	 Consequently,	after	Independence,	intellectuals	of	non–Brahmin	castes	founded	another	socialist	party,	the	Peasants	 and	Workers	Party	 (Shetkari	Khamgar	Paksha).	 It	 survived	only	 in	 a	 few	urban	areas	and	 failed	 to	gain	mass	 support	 in	 rural	 areas.	The	Communist	Party	and	other	 left-wing	 forces	 gained	 ground	 in	 many	 regions	 of	 India,	 namely	 Kerala,	 West	Bengal	 and	Tripura	 (Omvedt	1973a).	The	Communist	Party	 experienced	 several	 splits	and	therefore,	several	sections	exist	even	today,	most	prominently	the	Communist	Party	of	 India,	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 India	 (Maoist)	 and	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 India	(Marxist).	 Spontaneous	 and	 organized	 peasant	 struggles	 along	with	 the	 foundation	 of																																									 																					55	The	 Telangana	 rebellion	 was	 a	 peasant	 rebellion	 against	 the	 feudal	 landlords	 in	 the	 later	Andhra	Pradesh	between	1946	and	1951.	The	Tebhaga	movement	was	a	peasant	movement	 in	Bengal	 in	 1946	 and	 1947.	 The	 peasants	 demanded	 that	 the	 share	 of	 the	 harvest	 that	 the	sharecropping	peasants	needed	to	pay	to	the	landowners	should	be	reduced	from	one	half	to	one	third.	 
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the	Communist	Party	of	India	led	to	the	foundation	of	AIKS	in	1936.	AIKS	developed	out	of	 local	peasant	organizations	and	became	a	 countrywide	organization	of	 farmers	and	labourers.	 This	 unity	 between	 farmers	 and	 workers	 is	 very	 important	 for	 the	 self-conception	of	AIKS	(Surjeet	1996).	While	 all	 these	 peasant	 movements	 had	 huge	 successes,	 they	 lost	 importance	 in	 the	1970s,	when	there	was	a	shift	of	political	power	from	the	big	landlords	to	the	so-called	“bullock-capitalists”,	 the	“small	and	medium-sized	self-employed	independent	agricultural	
producers”	 (Rudolph	 and	 Rudolph	 1987,	 50),	 often	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 both	 Green	Revolution	 and	 land	 reforms	 (see	 sections	 1.2	 and	 1.4,	 chapter	 II).	 These	 farmers	typically	started	to	organize	separately	and	consequently	what	are	known	as	the	 ‘New	Farmers	 Movements’	 rapidly	 gained	 importance.	 Some	 scholars,	 most	 prominently	Omvedt	 and	 Lindberg	 (Lindberg	 1990;	 Omvedt	 1993,	 1994),	 argued	 that	 these	 New	Farmers’	Movements	are	‘new’	under	several	perspectives.		The	‘new’	refers	here	to	the	New	Social	Movement	theory	(NSM	theory).	Its	proponents	argue	 that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 old	 social	 movements,	 NSMs	 are	 not	 class–oriented	 and	transcend	class–boundaries.	The	 reason	 is	 that	 they	do	not	primarily	mobilize	around	economic	issues,	but	focus	on	identity	and	seek	to	challenge	and	transform	entrenched	values	and	ideas	of	social	 justice,	personal	 identities	and	symbols.	They	do	not	aim	(in	the	first	place)	to	increase	their	influence	and	power	in	the	political	realm,	but	instead	they	raise	 ‘social’	demands	and	aim	to	introduce	new	lifestyles	or	transform	identities.	Importantly,	 NSM	 theorists	 often	 conceptualize	 these	 identities,	 as	 well	 as	 the	grievances,	 as	 being	 constructed	 rather	 than	 given	 through	 the	 social	 and	 economic	position	of	 a	particular	 group	 (Buechler	1995;	Fuentes	 and	Frank	1989;	 Shah	2004a).	However,	 the	NSM	 theory	 is	 contested.	 The	 critics	 argue	 that	 the	NSMs	 possessed	 no	traits	that	are	unique	and	that	they	conceal	their	class	interests	with	‘social’	arguments	(Buechler	 1995;	 Pichardo	 1997).	 This	 argumentation	 of	 NSM	 theorists	 would	 as	 a	consequence	depoliticise	the	social	realm	(Dhanagare	and	John	1988).	Omvedt	(1993)	based	her	analysis	on	the	NSM	theory,	but	creates	her	own	definition	of	New	 Social	 Movements.	 She	 argued	 that	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movements	 were	revolutionary	 in	 their	 aspirations	 and	 anti-systemic	 in	 their	 impact.	With	 their	 single-issue	 agenda	 of	 a	 higher	 price	 for	 agricultural	 output,	 they	 ultimately	 aimed	 at	 social	change,	because	they	rejected	class	politics,	 ideology,	and	the	leading	role	of	the	urban	proletariat	 in	 class	 struggles.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	New	Farmers’	Movements,	 this	means	that	they	are	non-class	movements	fighting	for	the	demands	of	a	united	peasantry.	They	are	pictured	as	multi-caste	and	multi-class	movement	without	subordinate	interests.		This	 view	 corresponds	 closely	 to	 the	movements’	 own	 understanding.	 Sharad	 Joshi,	 a	major	 leader	 of	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movement	 in	 Maharashtra,	 defined	 a	 farmer	 as	anyone	associated	with	agriculture.	As	mentioned	above,	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	claimed	to	have	a	single-issue	program:	remunerative	prices	for	the	agricultural	output,	namely	sugarcane,	tobacco,	cotton	and	milk.	They	emphasized	that	farmers	do	not	want	alms,	but	a	 “reward	for	their	sweat”	 (Arora	2001).	They	 therefore	demanded	an	end	to	the	 discrimination	 of	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 through	 the	 state	 as	 well	 as	 the	 entire	
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economic	 and	 political	 system.	 Prominent	 leaders	 of	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movements,	namely	 Sharad	 Joshi,	 Charan	 Singh	 and	 Mahendra	 Singh	 Tikait,	 pictured	 an	 urban,	industrial	India	that	exploited	rural,	agricultural	Bharat	and	emphasized	to	struggle	for	a	united	peasantry	(see	e.g.	Omvedt	2005;	see	section	3.1	and	3.2,	chapter	II).		Authors	 like	Dhanagare	 (1995)	 or	Brass	 (1995)	 strongly	 opposed	 the	 view	 that	 these	New	Farmers’	Movements	represented	a	united	peasantry	 that	 included	 the	small	and	marginal	 farmers	 and	 the	agricultural	 labourers.	They	 claimed	 that	 the	 rhetoric	 about	poor	 farmers	 (and	 in	 some	 cases	 environmental	 issues)	 only	 masked	 rich	 farmers’	interests.	Therefore,	they	argued,	these	New	Farmers	Movements	were	essentially	rich	farmer	movements	(for	an	overview	over	the	debate	see	Shah	2004a;	see	chapter	VII).		However,	even	if	the	‘new’	refers	back	to	the	NSM	theory,	‘New	Farmers’	Movement’	has	become	a	rather	neutral	term	for	these	movements	in	India	in	the	1970s	and	80s,	a	term	that	can	be	used	without	assuming	that	those	movements	were	‘new’	in	the	NSM-sense.	I	will	also	use	that	term	to	refer	to	these	movements,	most	often	to	Shetkari	Sanghatana	in	Maharashtra.		Last	but	not	 least,	 I	very	briefly	 introduce	an	additional	group	of	 farmer	struggles	that	have	become	important	since	the	late	1990s:	the	struggles	against	land	acquisitions	for	Special	Economic	Zones	(SEZ)	or	large-scale	industrial	projects.	SEZs	are	a	kind	of	free	trade	 or	 manufacturing	 enclave	 that	 became	 widespread	 in	 India	 in	 the	 late	 1990s.	Mostly	 located	 in	 rural	 and	 coastal	 areas,	 they	 were	 established	 to	 attract	 foreign	investments	 by	 offering	 concessions	 in	 terms	 of	 subsidies,	 tax	 exemptions,	 and	derogations	 from	 labour	 laws	and	export	 regulations.	They	have	also	 faced	 significant	resistance	 from	 the	 displaced	 farmers,	 fisher	 folk	 or	 pastoralists	 who	 saw	 their	livelihood	 taken	away,	often	with	 little	or	no	compensation	 (see	e.g.	 Jenkins,	Kennedy,	and	 Mukhopadhyay	 2014;	 Parthasarathy	 2015).	 Ahmed	 (2012)	 studied	 the	 struggle	against	 the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	between	 the	Maharashtra	State	Electricity	Board	 and	 Enron	 in	 1992	 for	 the	 Dabhol	 Power	 Project,	 at	 that	 time	 the	 largest	corporate-led	commercial	venture	 in	 Indian	history.	He	 frames	 these	 land	struggles	as	“militant	particularism”	that	can	be	understood	as	a	part	of	the	working	class’	struggles	against	neoliberalism.	This,	however,	meets	strong	criticism	regarding	the	social	differences	among	the	people	affected	 by	 such	 projects.	 Vijayabaskar	 (2010)	 for	 example,	 states	 that	 it	 is	 the	landowners	 who	 fight	 against	 those	 projects	 and	 cites	 a	 member	 of	 the	 legislative	assembly	 who	 says	 that	 “if	 agriculture	 needs	 to	 be	 saved,	 agricultural	 labor	 has	 to	 be	
saved	from	agriculture”	(ibid,	42).		Such	 struggles	 are	 important	 even	 if	 they	 are	 not	 in	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study.	 This	controversy	again	shows	that	these	struggles	can	be	understood	as	fueled	either	by	the	suffering	 of	 the	 peasantry,	 or	 it	 can	 be	 analyzed	 in	 terms	 of	 different	 groups	 of	 rural	people	who	are	very	differently	affected	by,	and	have	different	hopes	for,	SEZs.		I	 now	 come	 back	 to	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movements.	 In	 India,	 several	 organizations	belonged	to	the	New	Farmers’	Movements,	namely	Shetkari	Sanghatana	in	Maharashtra,	
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Karnataka	Rajya	Raitha	Sangha	 in	 Karnataka	 and	 the	Bharatiya	Kisan	Union56	in	 Uttar	Pradesh.	In	the	following,	I	am	going	to	introduce	Shetkari	Sanghatana	and	particularly	shed	light	on	the	reasons	for	its	decline	since	the	1990s.	
2.4 Rise	and	Fall	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana57	Sharad	 Joshi	 started	Shetkari	Sanghatana	 in	 the	 late	1970s,	and	 the	movement	had	 its	heyday	in	the	late	80s.	Shetkari	Sanghatana	emerged	in	Pune	and	Nashik	and	was	active	in	whole	Maharashtra,	but	 its	strongholds	were	 in	Marathwada	and	Vidarbha,	 the	 two	most	economically	backward	regions	of	Maharashtra	as	depicted	in	chapter	III.	Because	of	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 sugarcane	 co-operatives,	 the	 state's	 policies	 had	 favoured	sugarcane	 over	 other	 crops	 such	 as	 cotton,	 the	 crops	 cultivated	 in	 Vidarbha	 and	Marathwada.	Therefore,	Shetkari	Sanghatana	was	particularly	successful	in	those	areas	where	sugar	co-operatives	were	not	present	(Arora	2001).	During	 that	 time,	 the	 agricultural	 economy	 was	 highly	 regulated	 by	 the	 state,	 which	fixed	the	prices	and	had	procurement	monopolies	in	certain	fields;	in	Maharashtra	it	had	the	Maharashtra	 Cotton	Monopoly	 Procurement	 Scheme	 (see	 section	 2.1,	 chapter	 III).	Despite	 what	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 called	 a	 “one-issue	 program”	 focussing	 on	remunerative	 prices,	 they	 have	 had	 additional	 demands	 such	 as	 subsidies	 for	agricultural	 inputs.	 Later,	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 embraced	 even	more	 issues	 related	 to	gender58,	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 power	 and	 the	 environment.	 They	 have	 seen	themselves	 in	 the	 long	 tradition	 of	 movements	 like	 Phule’s	 movement.	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana’s	activism	was	marked	by	high	flexibility	and	an	ad-hoc	nature	that	used	a	broad	 array	 of	 agitations.	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 regularly	 organized	 large–scale	demonstrations,	collective	withholdings	of	crops	from	reaching	the	market	or	refusals	to	pay	bills,	as	well	as	small–scale,	locally	based	spontaneous	protests59	(Arora	2001).	The	 movement	 was	 characterized	 by	 informal	 organisation	 without	 a	 concept	 of	membership,	 and	 in	 their	 opinion,	 all	 people	working	 in	 agriculture	were	 part	 of	 the	movement.	Therefore,	a	 large	debate	started	 to	assess	 the	class	base	of	 the	movement	(for	a	short	overview	see	Brass	1995,	9-12).	Dhanagare	(1990)	or	Banaji	(1995)	argued	that	Shetkari	Sanghatana	was	 led	by	the	 land–owning	rural	population	with	a	market–oriented	production	and	also	reflected	their	interests;	in	other	words,	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	mainly	represented	the	agrarian	elite.	 In	 terms	of	 leadership,	Sharad	 Joshi																																									 																					56	Despite	the	very	similar	name,	this	group	is	not	to	be	confused	with	the	Bharatiya	Kisan	Sangh	(see	section	3.1	in	this	chapter).	57	I	base	this	section	on	Arora	(2001),	who	has	written	an	extensive	overview	of	the	literature	on	
Shetkari	Sanghatana.	In	the	second	part	of	the	section,	where	I	have	not	given	any	sources,	I	rely	on	my	own	data.		58	Some	argue	that	their	voluntary	action	to	donate	land	to	their	wives	also	served	to	bypass	the	land	ceiling	laws.		59	These	 included	rasta–roko	(blockage	of	 roads	or	 railways	 to	disturb	 the	 rural	 transportation	linkages),	bandh	(civic	strikes),	chakka	jam	(different	type	of	road	blockages),	gav	bandi	(prevent	politicians	or	officials	from	entering	villages),	kisan	panchayat	in	cities	(farmers	occupied	public	places	 in	 cities),	 and	 satyagrahas	 and	 padyatras	 (fasts	 and	 foot	 marches	 to	 mobilise	 farmers,	which	refer	to	the	protests	of	Gandhi)	(Arora	2001).	
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was	a	Brahmin,	not	a	Maratha	and	a	former	civil	servant	from	an	urban	area.	Most	of	the	other	 leaders	were	 prosperous	 farmers	with	medium	 or	 large	 landholdings	 and	 from	dominant	agricultural	castes	(Arora	2001).	As	a	consequence	of	representing	mostly	the	agrarian	 elite,	 their	 repertoire	 of	 protest	 activities	 is	 often	 called	 the	 "weapons	of	the	
strong"	 (see	 Arora	 2001).	 Other	 authors	 on	 the	 contrary,	 most	 prominently	 Omvedt	(1993),	emphasized	that	Shetkari	Sanghatana	also	drew	its	strength	from	the	support	of	poorer	 farmers.	 Authors	 like	 Rudolph	 and	Rudolph	 (1987)	 or	 Lenneberg	 (1988)	 then	argued	that	it	was	the	middle	farmers	that	were	the	base	of	such	movements,	what	are	called	 “bullock-capitalists”.	 This	 includes	 those	 “cultivators	 who	 rely	 more	 on	 family	
labour	and	 their	own	human	capital	 than	on	wage	workers	and	machines”	 (Rudolph	 as	cited	in	Dhanagare	1995,	82).	
Shetkari	Sanghatana	was	able	to	unite	thousands	of	people	at	its	rallies	and	agitations	in	the	1970s	and	80s.	 In	 the	1990s,	however,	 its	 strength	dwindled.	There	are	 two	main	reasons	 for	 this	 development.	 The	 first	 were	 ideological	 differences	 on	 the	 New	Economic	 Policies.	 In	 the	 early	 1990s,	 the	 leaders	 of	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 started	 to	disagree	on	 these	new	policies.	The	major	 leader	Sharad	 Joshi	was	convinced	 that	 the	New	Economic	Policies	would	bring	a	fair	price	and	consequently	wealth	to	the	farmers	(Arora	2001).	While	he	advertised	the	New	Economic	Policies,	other	leaders	of	Shetkari	
Sanghatana.	 most	 notably	 Vijay	 Jawandhia,	 disagreed	 openly.	 Consequently,	 Vijay	Jawandhia	 left	 the	 movement.	 He	 and	 other	 activists	 opposing	 the	 New	 Economic	Policies	accused	Sharad	Joshi	of	betraying	the	farmers	and	leading	them	straight	into	a	trap.	 Jawandhia	 feared	 that	 the	 farmers	would	 not	 know	about	 their	 leaders’	 political	stands	 and	 articulations	 and	 hence	 they	would	 refuse	 to	 believe	 in	 any	 farmer	 leader	anymore	 after	 this	 betrayal.	 According	 to	 Jawandhia,	 this	 was	 one	 reason	why	 it	 has	become	difficult	 to	mobilize	 farmers	now.	Raju	Shetti,	 an	 important	 leader	of	Shetkari	
Sanghatana	 in	 Western	 Maharashtra,	 stayed	 with	 Joshi	 and	 was	 in	 line	 with	 him	ideologically.	 In	 2004,	 however,	 he	 founded	 his	 own	 group,	 Svabhimani	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana60.	 These	 differences	 in	 ideology,	 particularly	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 New	Economic	 Policies,	 were	 pointed	 out	 most	 often	 by	 higher-level	 activists	 who	 were	aware	of	the	movement’s	history	and	its	political	context.		The	 farmers	 I	 interviewed,	 however,	 felt	 that	 another	 reason	was	more	 important	 to	explain	the	decline	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana,	namely	the	political	career	of	Sharad	Joshi.	Joshi	once	promised	that	he	would	never	join	electoral	politics,	and	if	he	ever	did	so,	his	followers	should	slap	him	with	their	chappels,	their	sandals.	But	then	he	did	and	created	alliances	with	many	parties	in	the	1980s.	Later	he	was	a	member	of	parliament	for	his	own	party,	Swatantra	Bharat	Paksha,	 closely	 related	 to	 the	BJP–Sena	 coalition	 (Assadi	1995,	 217).	 The	 fact	 that	 he	 did	 eventually	 join	 politics	 and	 break	 his	 own	 promise	seemed	 unforgivable	 to	 the	 farmers.	 This,	 many	 claimed,	 was	 the	 reason	 they	 would	never	 trust	 Joshi	 again	 –	 and	 indeed	 why	 they	 have	 difficulties	 trusting	 any	 farmer	activist	at	all.																																										 																					60	There	 is	 one	more	 faction	 active	 in	Western	Maharashtra	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Ragunath	Patil.	He	has	no	relevance	in	Vidarbha.		
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There	 is	 also	 a	 third	 reason	 mentioned	 by	 a	 major	 former	 activist	 of	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana	still	 active	 in	 Wardha	 district.	 She	 says	 that	 the	 main	 reason	 is	 that	 the	demands	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana	were	now	fulfilled	and	the	prices	were	determined	by	the	market.	 Therefore,	 Shetkari	Sanghatana	had	 nothing	 left	 to	 fight	 for.	 According	 to	the	former	activist,	exponents	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana	were	close	to	the	people	in	power	now	 and	 consequently	 it	 was	 no	 longer	 necessary	 to	 block	 railways.	 If	 they	 disagree	with	 certain	policies,	 they	 can	 simply	 call	 the	 relevant	politicians	 and	negotiate.	Their	remaining	demand,	such	as	 lower	prices	 for	electricity	or	no	 load	shedding,	would	not	be	suitable	for	these	forms	of	popular	protest	anyway.		Sharad	 Joshi	 and	 some	of	 the	 earlier	Shetkari	Sanghatana	 activists	were	 still	 active	 in	Vidarbha	 at	 the	 time	 of	 this	 study.	 However,	 the	movement	 was	 far	 from	 having	 the	presence	it	once	held	in	the	region.	In	interviews	with	Joshi’s	activists,	talking	about	the	past	glory	of	the	movement	was	much	more	important	than	current	activities.	Joshi	was	still	well	known	among	farmers,	and	if	farmers	could	name	any	other	farmers'	activists	beside	the	one	that	they	were	supporting,	Joshi	was	among	them,	and	often	the	only	one.	But	the	politically	informed	farmers	who	knew	more	than	just	his	name	connected	Joshi	more	 with	 the	 past	 than	 with	 the	 present,	 telling	 stories	 about	 how	 they	 had	participated	in	his	agitations	in	younger	years	or	had	attended	with	their	parents.	So	if	not	in	contemporary	Vidarbha,	Shetkari	Sanghatana	is	still	very	vivid	in	many	peoples'	–	and	particularly	interviewees’	–	memories.		Even	 if	 the	Sharad	Joshi	 faction	of	 the	movement	was	no	 longer	very	active,	several	of	the	current	major	activists	and	groups	stem	from	this	movement.	Some	of	 the	 factions	have	 gained	 influence,	 others	 have	 become	 marginal	 and	 new	 groups	 have	 emerged	agitating	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	Even	if	none	of	these	groups	could	fill	in	the	lacuna,	they	are	active	in	mobilizing	farmers.	
3 Mapping	Groups	and	Activists	in	Vidarbha	A	multitude	 of	 groups	 and	 individual	 activists	mobilise	 around	 the	 issues	 of	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 and	 claim	 to	 speak	 for	 the	 farmers.	 They	 all	 call	 themselves	 farmer	movement	groups.	 In	 the	 following,	 I	 introduce	 the	 groups	 I	 selected	 (see	 section	 3.1,	 chapter	 I)	with	their	demands,	activities	and	organizational	structures.		
3.1 The	Movement	Groups	in	Vidarbha	Before	I	start	with	a	description	of	the	five	movement	groups	that	are	in	the	focus	of	this	study,	I	would	like	to	give	an	overview	in	the	following	table.	
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Table	8:	Overview	over	the	movement	groups	in	Vidarbha,	mobilising	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	
	 (Main)	activists	 Information	
SSS	(Svabhimani	Shetkari	Sanghatana)	 Raju	Shetti	Ravikanth	Tupkar	Shyam	Avthale	 Founded	out	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana,	by	Raju	Shetti	Strong	in	Western	Maharashtra;	Buldhana	district	Involved	in	electoral	politics	
KAA	(Kisan	Adikar	Abiyan)	 Avinash	Kakade	Suddham	Pawar	 Founded	following	Gandhian	ideas	by	Avinash	Kakade	Strong	in	Wardha	district	Has	a	political	and	a	“constructive”	leg	
VJAS	(Vidarbha	Jan	Andolan	Samiti)	 Kishor	Tiwari	Raju	Rathod	 Founded	by	Kishor	Tiwar	Strong	in	parts	of	Yavatmal	district	Strong	focus	on	farmer	suicides	
BKS	(Bharatiya	Kisan	Sangha)	 No	names	 Founded	by	an	RSS	thinker	in	1979	Strong	in	other	parts	of	India;	mostly	Gujarat	Part	of	sangh	parivar	
AIKS	(All	India	Kisan	Sabha)	 No	names	 Founded	in	1936	out	of	peasant	struggles	Strong	in	other	parts	of	Mahrashtra/India;	also	in	Wardha	district	Part	of	the	Communist	Party	of	India	(Marxist)	
Major	political	parties	(Congress	and	BJP)	 No	names	 Kisan	Congress	virtually	non-existing	in	Vidarbha	Certain	leaders	of	BJP	have	cooperation	with	some	movement	groups	
NGOs	(none)	 No	names	 No	NGOs	found	with	political	demands	that	saw	themselves	(or	were	seen)	as	part	of	a	movement	
Individual	activists	(Other	activists	and	journalists)	 Vijay	Jawandhia		Sharad	Joshi	Palagummi	Sainath	Jaideep	Hardikar	Chandrakant	Wankhade	
Jawandhia	and	Joshi	are	(former)	activists	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana	without	a	base	nowadays;	Sainath,	Hardikar	and	Wankhade	are	journalists	that	are	committed	to	and	engage	with	the	same	issues	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	
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SSS:	Farmer	Movement	with	Self	Respect	
Svabhimani	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 (SSS)	 literally	 means	 "farmer	 movement	 with	 self	respect”	 and	 developed	 out	 of	 Raju	 Shetti’s	 faction	 of	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana.	 SSS	 had	acquired	 considerable	 influence	 among	 farmers,	 particularly	 among	 the	 sugarcane	farmers	 of	 Western	 Maharashtra,	 and	 Raju	 Shetti,	 once	 a	 marginal	 farmer,	 was	 a	member	of	parliament	 in	Lok	Sabha	 representing	a	district	 in	Western	Maharashtra	at	the	 time	 of	 this	 study.	 After	 having	 been	 so	 successful	 in	 those	 areas,	 they	 are	 now	expanding	 to	 Vidarbha,	 at	 the	 moment	 mainly	 to	 the	 district	 of	 Buldhana.	 The	 SSS	activists	 said	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 expansion	 to	 Vidarbha	was	 the	 severe	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	and	 the	 farmer	suicides.	Raju	Shetti	comes	 to	Buldhana	only	rarely	and	another	activist,	 Ravikanth	Tupkar,	 is	 the	main	 activist	 for	 SSS	 in	Vidarbha.	He	 is	 the	 son	 of	 a	farming	 family	 from	 Buldhana	 married	 to	 a	 successful	 lawyer	 who	 shares	 his	involvement	and	political	activism.	Already	in	his	college	days,	Tupkar	had	decided	to	be	involved	with	the	farmers’	struggles	and	he	has	worked	for	SSS	in	Vidarbha	full–time	for	more	than	ten	years.		According	to	Tupkar,	SSS	does	not	have	memberships.	He	said	that	“membership	is	not	so	
important.	 (…)	 If	we	 call,	 people	will	 come	 in	 lakhs,	 so	 there	 is	 no	 time	 for	membership	
questions.”	Therefore,	 “we	ask	for	money	and	the	supporters	can	just	give	how	much	they	
want”.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 funds	 come	 from	 these	 donations	 of	 supporters	 from	Vidarbha,	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 an	 important	 part	 comes	 from	 the	 Western	Maharashtra	 part	 of	 the	 group 61 .	 According	 to	 activists	 and	 supporters,	 the	constituencies	of	SSS	were	mostly	marginal	and	medium	farmers.	Tupkar	explained	that	labourers	were	 the	most	down–trodden	people	 in	 the	 rural	 society,	 but	because	 SSS’s	main	demands	were	 agriculture-based,	 labourers	were	 left	 out	 from	 the	 constituency.	SSS’s	 main	 demand	 –	 which	 was	 mentioned	 time	 and	 again	 –	 is	 higher	 prices	 for	agricultural	 output.	 They	 also	 focus	 on	 infrastructural	 demands	 (no	 load	 shedding,	electrical	supply	during	day	time	and	better	irrigation	facilities),	credits,	as	well	as	good	quality	and	cheap	agricultural	inputs	(see	chapter	VI).		SSS	 is	very	particular	about	being	a	 farmer	movement	group	and	not	a	political	party.	But	 they	do	participate	 in	 electoral	politics	 and	 try	 to	 gain	political	 influence	 to	 reach	their	 goals	 from	within	 the	 parliament.	 Therefore,	 the	 organization	 has	 two	 different	parts	–	a	sanghatana	 (movement	group)	and	a	paksha	(party).	This	 is	a	rather	difficult	balancing	act	 for	SSS	 (see	 section	2.2,	 chapter	V).	However,	 the	agitations	of	both,	 the	party	 and	 the	 movement	 group,	 are	 very	 political.	 SSS’	 main	 way	 of	 agitation	 is	 to	conduct	demonstrations.	They	have	organised	major	agitations	in	Buldhana	and	Nagpur	(during	the	session	of	the	Legislative	Assembly),	where	they	raised	their	slogans	about	higher	prices	for	cotton	or	soybean.	In	the	following,	I	describe	one	typical	SSS	agitation.	
																																								 																					61	It	was	very	difficult	to	get	information	about	how	(or	even	how	much)	funds	are	raised	in	the	groups.	When	this	question	was	asked,	interviewees	either	replied	very	reluctantly,	not	at	all	or	they	 seemed	 offended.	 Therefore,	 the	 information	 about	 the	 financial	 situation	 of	 the	 groups	remains	scarce.		
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SSS	supporters	gathered	in	a	town	close	to	Nagpur.	Most	of	them	wore	a	white	shirt,	a	
Gandhi–topi	 with	 the	 characters	 “I’m	 a	 kisan”	 as	 well	 as	 red	 “Svabhimani	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana”-badges.	 They	 stood	 on	 the	 street	 in	 front	 of	 a	 small	 restaurant	 next	 to	 a	little	 truck	with	 banners	 on	 it	 and	 loudspeakers.	 Somebody	was	 talking	 and	 shouting	slogans,	while	songs	blared	out	of	the	loudspeakers.	Tupkar	was	discussing	with	other	activists	 about	 how	 to	 organize	 the	 agitations.	 The	 plan	was	 to	 block	 the	 road	 (rasta	
rokko).	 Before	 the	 agitation	 started,	 one	 man	 announced	 on	 the	 speaker	 that	 “our	
agitation	 is	 fully	dependent	on	non–violence,	 so	all	kisans	should	keep	quiet.	 (…)	We	will	
not	injure	any	one	or	will	not	damage	any	public	as	well	as	private	property.	We	will	block	
the	roads	from	all	sides.”	 All	 farmers	 started	 shouting	 the	 slogan	 “who	said	that	we	will	
not	succeed?	We	will	demand	for	it	until	we	get	it”.	Tupkar	was	standing	at	 the	speakers	trying	 to	motivate	 the	 supporters.	 He	 shouted	 that	 “in	the	past,	the	Indians	had	fought	
against	the	British	for	freedom	and	the	freedom	fighters	went	to	the	 jail.	This	 is	the	time	
for	us	now	to	go	to	jail	for	freedom	and	justice	for	the	kisans.	We	will	never	step	back.”	He	went	further,	saying	that	if	the	farmers	wanted	a	fair	price	for	their	crops,	they	needed	to	join	Raju	Shetti.	For	this	purpose,	he	argued,	they	had	to	remove	their	caste	identity,	religious	 identity	 as	 well	 as	 their	 class	 identity	 and	 come	 together	 on	 one	 platform.	Shortly	 after	 that	 speech,	 policemen	 tried	 to	 arrest	 Tupkar	 and	 the	 whole	 group	 of	activists	ran	away	quickly.	Soon	after,	the	demonstration	dissolved.		
Picture	5:	Agitation	of	SSS	as	described	above	
	Demonstrations	of	this	size	are	a	rare	thing	for	the	organisation,	but	Tupkar	constantly	travels	 through	villages	of	Buldhana	to	hold	public	meetings.	He	claimed	that	a	 typical	day	 for	him	involved	going	to	villages	and	talking	to	 farmers.	On	other	days,	he	would	talk	to	his	“journalist	friends”	or	government	officials.	He	would	discuss	with	the	 latter	or	threaten	them	if	necessary.	Tupkar	is	Shetti’s	right	hand	and	has	the	ambition	to	have	a	political	 career	himself.	 In	his	newly	built	house,	 for	example,	he	wanted	 to	have	an	office	and	a	visitors’	room	to	welcome	guests	and	listen	to	their	issues.		
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While	Tupkar	is	the	main	SSS	activist	for	the	region	of	Vidarbha,	there	are	several	lower	level	activists	who	are	active	mostly	in	their	respective	villages	or	are	heads	of	other	SSS	sub-units,	such	as	the	student	wing.	 In	village	SSS,	Shyam	Avthale,	a	young	man,	 is	 the	main	activist.	He	is	responsible	for	activities	and	supporters	in	the	village	and	he	is	also	standing	 for	 the	 district	 level	 zilla	 parishad	 elections.	 He	 supported	 Tupkar	 during	elections.	Besides	holding	meetings	in	village	SSS,	Avthale	often	follows	Tupkar	for	other	meetings.	SSS	 strongly	 spoke	 against	 the	 ruling	 Congress	 party.	 According	 to	 Tupkar,	 their	 goal	was	 to	 get	 the	 Congress	 out	 of	 power,	 even	 if	 this	 made	 alliances	 with	 communalist	forces	necessary.	The	next	group,	on	the	contrary,	had	a	very	different	approach	to	the	ruling	Congress	and	was	entangled	with	it.	
KAA:	Farmers’	Rights	Group	
Kisan	 Adikar	 Abiyan	 (KAA,	 literally	 ‘farmer’s	 rights	 group’)	 was	 started	 by	 Avinash	Kakade	 in	 1995.	 At	 first,	 he	was	 not	 involved	 in	 agriculture,	 as	 he	 had	 completed	 his	diploma	in	engineering.	He	then	became	fascinated	with	Gandhi	and	came	to	agriculture	through	his	interest	in	the	farmer	suicides	as	well	as	his	agricultural	work	in	a	Gandhian	Ashram.	This,	in	his	own	words,	was	the	turning	point	of	his	life	and	he	decided	to	"live	a	
life	in	hardworking".	So	he	had	started	KAA	to	“tackle	the	roots	of	the	problem”,	namely	to	change	 the	 "awareness	 of	 kisans".	 KAA	 is	 a	 young,	 geographically	 limited	 but	 well–connected	group.	Their	villages,	activists	and	activities	are	all	located	around	Wardha.		The	group	does	not	have	a	formal	hierarchical	structure,	but	the	activists	take	decisions	together.	 Kakade	 and	 the	 other	 activists	 meet	 each	 other	 frequently	 to	 discuss	 what	issues	to	tackle	next.	Kakade	said	that	anyone	could	become	an	activist	if	he	was	ready	to	 get	 involved	 in	 the	 group	 and	 was	 known	 and	 recommended	 by	 another	 activist.	However,	Kakade	 still	 plays	 a	 very	 important	 role.	One	 supporter	 told	 that	 “Kakade	is	
taking	the	decisions	(…).	But	if	there	is	any	important	decision	than	all	activists	will	come”.	Also	Kakade	himself	emphasized	the	importance	of	hearing	the	opinions	of	activists	as	well	as	possible	supporters.	The	local	activist	of	village	KAA,	Suddham	Pawar,	explained	that		
“we	take	all	activists’	opinions	on	the	subject	of	our	agitations.	We	arrange	meetings	 in	
villages	where	 our	 activists	 are	 active	 (…).	We	 review	 our	work,	 to	 discuss	 the	 annual	
plan	and	monthly	plans	with	kisans.	(…)	Later	we	are	making	a	list	of	the	problems,	and	
make	pamphlets.	Through	newspapers	and	pamphlets	we	are	 trying	 to	 inform	a	 larger	
number	of	kisans.”	According	to	their	own	figures,	KAA	has	around	3,000	supporters,	mainly	medium	and	small	farmers	as	well	as	some	marginal	ones.	The	membership	fee	is	Rs	10	for	one	year	and	 another	 Rs	 10	 for	 the	 group's	 badge.	 Kakade	 explained	 that	 it	 didn’t	 matter	 if	somebody	 is	 a	 member	 or	 not,	 and	 that	 the	 group	 kept	 no	 membership	 records.	 If	anyone	went	 to	one	of	KAA's	 agitations,	 they	generally	 contributed	a	 sum	of	Rs	50	or	whatever	 amount	 they	 wanted.	 Kakade	 emphasized	 that	 "some	contribution	should	be	
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from	their	[supporters]	own	side	only.	We	do	this	kind	of	agitations	only	two	or	three	times	
in	a	year".	The	 group	 demands	 first	 and	 foremost	 a	 higher	 minimum	 support	 price	 for	 crops.	Second,	they	want	various	infrastructural	improvements	such	as	irrigation	facilities	and	a	better	power	supply,	 fences	against	 the	ravages	of	wild	animals,	provision	of	proper	pesticides	 and	 seeds,	 extension	 services,	 and	 roads.	 The	 third	 issue	 is	 that	 the	government	 should	 provide	 loans	 to	 farmers.	 A	 fourth	 set	 of	 demands	 is	 that	 the	government	 should	 treat	 farmers	 fairly.	 They	 criticised	 the	 criteria	 for	 obtaining	compensation	in	case	of	drought/excess	rain	or	suicide,	which	according	to	them	were	not	fair	and	did	not	allow	the	money	to	reach	the	farmers,	e.g.	because	of	problems	with	their	‘7/12–extracts’62.		Corresponding	 to	 this	 broad	 range	 of	 demands,	 KAA	 also	 has	 a	 broad	 variety	 of	agitations	 that	 go	 far	 beyond	 rallies	 and	 roadblocks.	 Kakade	 as	 well	 as	 Pawar	emphasised	strongly	that	KAA	“walks	on	two	legs”.	This	meant	that	they	have	political	as	well	 as	 “constructive”	 activities.	 I	 will	 first	 describe	 the	 political	 ones,	 where	 KAA	addresses	 its	 general	 demands	 at	 various	 government	 officials	 –	 often	 called	 "ask	 a	
question	 to	 the	 Minister".	 In	 one	 occasion,	 KAA	 had	 calculated	 the	 expenditure	 and	income	for	soybean,	sorghum	and	cotton.	Based	on	these	numbers,	they	sent	a	request	letter	to	the	State	Minister	of	Agriculture.		There	 have	 been	 several	 small	 agitations,	where	 at	 the	 end	KAA	handed	 over	 a	 letter	with	 demands	 to	 the	 District	 Collector.	 In	 one	 of	 them,	 about	 fifty	 supporters	 started	gathering	at	 the	roadside	 in	Wardha,	 close	 to	a	 small	 teashop.	They	sat	on	 the	 floor,	a	banner	 with	 their	 main	 demands	 hanging	 next	 to	 them.	 Kakade,	 Pawar	 and	 a	 few	supporters	 held	 speeches	 and	 talked	 about	 their	 problems	 with	 prices,	 traders	 and	compensations.	Then,	chanting	and	chatting,	 the	whole	group	started	marching	on	 the	road	 towards	 the	Block	Development	Office.	 Kakade	 and	Pawar	had	prepared	 a	 letter	with	 their	 most	 important	 demands	 to	 be	 given	 to	 the	 District	 Collector.	 When	 they	reached	 the	block	development	office,	a	 couple	of	 journalists	were	already	waiting	 for	them.	 Pawar	 and	 Kakade	 said	 that	 the	 district	 officer	 should	 come	 out	 and	 listen	 to	them.	 If	he	did	not	 talk	 to	 them,	 they	 threatened	 to	 lock	him	 in	his	office.	The	district	officer	 was	 ready	 to	 talk	 to	 Pawar,	 Kakade	 and	 some	 supporters	 and	 accepted	 their	letter	 of	 demands.	He	promised	 to	hand	over	 the	 letter	 to	 the	 agricultural	Minister	 of	Maharashtra.		
																																								 																					62	The	7/12-extract	is	an	extract	from	the	land	register	maintained	by	the	revenue	department	of	the	Government	of	Maharashtra.	It	gives	basic	information	about	the	plot	of	land,	the	name	of	the	owner	and	its	cultivator	as	well	as	the	records	of	loans	extended	to	the	landowner	or	cultivator	given	by	the	government	agencies.	In	rural	areas	the	ownership	of	a	particular	plot	of	land	can	be	established	on	the	basis	of	the	7/12-extract.		
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Picture	6:	Agitation	of	KAA	described	above	
	Pawar	narrated	what	they	did	in	another	agitation,	when	the	officer	did	not	want	to	talk	to	them:		
“We	went	to	the	District	Collector	office,	about	six	or	seven	kisans	for	five	days.	We	stayed	
in	 their	 offices	 and	 we	 slept	 there	 also.	 (…)	 But	 we	 cleaned	 everything,	 we	 were	 very	
friendly.	We	have	tried	to	win	the	hearts	of	the	people.	In	the	beginning	they	did	not	like	
us,	but	 in	the	end	they	did	not	want	us	to	 leave.	Our	demand	was	that	we	get	a	written	
certificate	 of	 the	 Chief	 Minister	 [CM],	 that	 they	 will	 give	 us	 the	 MSP.	 The	 Minister	 of	
agriculture	 said	 ‘ok,	 I	 ask	 the	 CM’.	 So	 the	 CM	 signed	 urgently	 and	 he	 faxed	 it	 to	 the	
District	Collector	office.	So	we	left	and	it	was	a	success.”	For	KAA,	as	Kakade	emphasised,	it	was	very	important	to	concentrate	their	agitations	on	these	 issues	with	 the	 largest	chances	of	success.	The	 issues,	according	to	 them,	should	be	close	to	people's	problems,	feasible,	and	the	corresponding	agitation	must	happen	at	the	right	place.	According	to	Kakade’s	own	words,	he	decided	strategically	who	to	invite	for	which	agitation	in	order	not	to	make	supporters	tired	of	agitations.	He	argued	that	“kisans	should	walk	only	a	few	times	per	year	[on	the	road].	If	we	have	a	discussion	with	
the	District	Collector,	then	why	would	we	need	100	people?	There	is	only	a	need	of	two	or	
five	people.	This	is	sufficient	for	the	discussion.”		The	 argument	 above	 leads	 to	 the	 “second	 leg”	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 group:	 the	constructive	work,	which	 consists	mainly	 of	 three	 activities.	 First,	 KAA	 is	 very	 closely	connected	to	a	shop	for	organic	farm	products	in	Wardha.	A	group	of	farmers	active	in	the	Gandhian	Ashram	nearby	began	selling	organic	products.	The	shop	has	grown	over	the	years	and	 is	now	in	a	 large	room	in	the	centre	of	Wardha.	They	sell	khadi	(cotton)	clothes,	natural	cosmetics,	spices,	mostly	processed	food	as	well	as	few	fresh	vegetables.	In	 the	 backyard	 there	 is	 a	 restaurant	 where	 they	 sell	 zunka	 bhakri	 during	 lunch,	 a	traditional	meal	 of	 sorghum	 chapatis,	 lentils	 and	 onions.	 This	 restaurant	 is	 a	meeting	place	 for	 many	 activists	 and	 journalists	 when	 they	 are	 in	 Wardha.	 Besides	 the	promotion	of	organic	production	and	consumption,	the	idea	is	also	that	"the	kisans	have	
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their	 own	 market,	 they	 can	 decide	 their	 prices,	 through	 this	 also	 the	 farming	 can	 be	
profitable",	as	one	farmer	working	in	the	shop	explained.	Kakade	was	part	of	the	group	of	farmers	that	founded	the	shop.	Later,	he	decided	that	he	wanted	to	go	more	towards	political	agitations	and	mobilization.	But	the	idea	of	"constructive	programs"	is	still	very	important	for	KAA,	as	the	following	quote	from	Kakade	illustrates.	
“Without	constructive	programs	we	cannot	have	success	 in	our	movement	group.	For	a	
struggle	you	need	a	constructive	program	(…).	Through	this	only	 the	change	will	come,	
but	 slowly,	 slowly.	 (…)	 Kisans	 are	working	 hard	 in	 the	 field,	 but	 they	 don’t	 get	 a	 good	
price.	(…)	To	come	on	the	road	doesn’t	make	a	movement	group.”	As	 a	 second	 constructive	 activity,	 KAA	 organizes	 trainings	 for	 farmers	 about	 how	organic	farming	works	and	how	it	can	help	the	farmers	to	"get	back	some	independence"	by	 producing	 their	 own	 inputs.	 In	 general,	 as	 both	 Pawar	 and	 Kakade	 emphasized,	farmer	 awareness	 is	 crucial.	 They	 deem	 it	 important	 to	 distribute	 the	 results	 of	 their	discussions	 as	 well	 as	 information	 about	 government	 schemes	 or	 new	 technologies	among	the	farmers	through	the	activists.	In	the	eyes	of	the	activists,	this	should	actually	be	done	by	the	gram	panchayats,	but	they	were	mostly	found	to	be	unwilling	to	fulfil	this	role	and	therefore	KAA	was	taking	over	the	task	of	building	awareness.		The	 third	 constructive	 activity	was	 the	 "Root	Milk”	project	 that	was	 set	 up	 in	 2013.	 A	KAA	supporter,	a	Wardha-based	economist	working	as	a	consultant	for	the	World	Bank,	explained	 to	 me	 that	 milk	 production	 was	 too	 low	 in	 Vidarbha.	 This	 was	 surprising,	considering	the	importance	that	livestock	and	diary	production	held	for	the	livelihood	of	farmers.	 The	 reason	 was,	 he	 argued,	 that	 the	 government	 had	 neglected	 diary	production	 and	 therefore	 the	 price	 was	 very	 low.	 So	 Kakade	 together	 with	 a	 local	journalist,	 the	aforementioned	economist	as	well	 as	a	 few	 investors	 from	Wardha	and	Nagpur	 decided	 to	 found	 the	 "Root	Milk	 Company".	 The	 idea	 was	 that	 the	 company	would	pay	a	higher	milk	price	 to	 the	 farmers	and	guarantee	a	high	quality	of	milk	 for	consumers	 in	 nearby	 towns	willing	 to	 pay	 a	 premium.	 In	 2015,	 however,	 this	 project	proved	 to	 be	 a	 failure.	 The	 economist	 held	 that	 the	 “the	kisans	killed	it”,	 because	 they	cheated	with	the	quality	of	milk	they	delivered.	There	are	plans	to	start	it	anew,	but	on	a	much	smaller	basis.	
VJAS:	Vidarbha	People’s	Movement	Committee	
Vidarbha	Jan	Andolan	Samiti	 (VJAS,	 literally	 ‘Vidarbha	People’s	Movement	Committee’)	is	 probably	 the	 most	 prominent	 group,	 particularly	 among	 people	 outside	 Vidarbha.	VJAS	even	claimed	to	be	the	only	advocacy	group	taking	up	the	issues	of	farmer	suicides	in	Vidarbha.	The	leader,	Kishor	Tiwari,	explained	that	they	were	“working	on	the	ground,	
but	close	 to	 the	world”.	 Virtually	 every	 journalist	 from	 different	 (international)	 media	reporting	about	farmer	suicides	in	Vidarbha	has	spoken	to	Tiwari.		Tiwari	emphasized	that	 in	VJAS,	 the	 farmers	and	 labourers	were	the	activists,	not	“the	
students	 and	 scientists”.	 VJAS	 has	 a	 main	 office	 in	 Yavatmal	 district	 (see	 figure	 2).	Concerning	 their	 funds,	 Tiwari	 assured	 that	 they	 received	 no	 funds	 from	 foreign	 or	government	 bodies,	 but	 only	 from	 their	 supporters	 and	 other	 private	 donors,	 for	
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example	 Tiwari’s	 own	 family.	 Tiwari,	 a	 businessman	 from	 Nagpur,	 founded	 VJAS	 in	1997.	 He	 estimated	 that	 their	 constituency	 was	 10,000	 farmers,	 mainly	 in	 Yavatmal,	however,	 like	 other	 groups	 VJAS	 did	 not	 have	 formal	 memberships.	 The	 main	constituencies,	 he	 maintained,	 were	 dry	 land,	 debt–trapped	 farmers	 belonging	 to	 the	category	of	 Scheduled	Tribes.	The	 local	 activist	 of	 village	VJAS,	Rajesh	Rathod,	 argued	that	VJAS	was	also	fighting	for	labour.	But	others	–	also	labourers	themselves	–	asserted	that	nobody	fought	for	labour.	While	Tiwari	is	the	main	leader	of	the	group,	Mohan	Jadav	is	also	an	important	activist	in	 Yavatmal.	 Further,	 there	 is	 a	 main	 activist	 in	 each	 village	 where	 VJAS	 is	 active.	 In	village	VJAS,	the	village	activist	Rajesh	Rathod	was	also	the	sarpanch	at	the	time	of	the	study.	But	when	there	is	an	agitation,	he	spends	all	his	time	working	for	VJAS.	Farmers	are	 informed	of	VJAS	 activities	 through	pamphlets	 printed	by	Tiwari	 or	 by	 the	 village	level	activists.	About	twice	a	month,	the	activists	from	all	the	villages	come	together	and	discuss	 future	 demands	 and	 activities.	 Tiwari’s	 role	 as	 the	 leader	 is	 nevertheless	immensely	important	in	this	group.	This	is	also	expressed	in	the	answer	of	one	activist	to	the	question	why	they	were	asking	for	higher	prices:	“our	Tiwari	is	demanding	this,	so	
we	are	also	demanding	this”.	Compared	to	the	previous	groups,	the	focus	of	VJAS	is	more	diverse	and	not	restricted	to	higher	prices.	The	important	demands	besides	prices	for	cotton	were	irrigation	facilities	as	well	as	a	 loan	waiver	scheme	that	should	apply	to	people	who	borrowed	from	self–help–groups.	VJAS	focuses	especially	on	activities	related	to	farmer	suicides.	Therefore,	activists	as	well	as	villagers	considered	support	for	families	of	farmers	who	committed	suicides	 as	 one	 of	 VJAS’	 major	 activities.	 VJAS	 also	 demands	 a	 pension	 scheme	 for	farmers	as	well	as	for	widows	in	particular.	Another	related	topic	is	banning	alcohol,	an	issue	 brought	 up	 mainly	 by	 women.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 more	 general	 demands	include	 better	 infrastructural	 facilities	 such	 as	 roads,	 the	 development	 of	 small–scale	industries	 and	 employment	 opportunities,	 health	 facilities,	 education	 in	 rural	 areas,	better	distribution	of	grain	under	the	PDS-scheme	and	better	salaries	for	labourers.		The	group	has	four	principal	means	of	agitation.	According	to	Tiwari	and	Jadav,	the	main	one	 involves	approaching	 the	High	Court	of	Maharashtra	 (at	 state	 level).	They	 fight	 in	front	 of	 the	Human	Rights	 Commission	 or	 in	 front	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 to	 approach	lawmakers	and	regulatory	bodies.	They	have	brought	more	than	hundred	public	interest	litigations	 before	 the	 High	 Court,	 according	 to	 their	 own	 information.	 As	 an	 example,	Rathod	pointed	out	how	Tiwari	fought	for	people	to	get	food	from	the	PDS.	The	village	was	 in	what	 is	 known	 as	 a	 tribal	 area	 and	 people	were	 dying	 of	 starvation	 in	 nearby	villages.	Rathod	 complained	 that	 the	poorest	 of	 the	poor	were	 supposed	 to	 get	wheat	and	rice	at	a	cheaper	rate,	but	that	food	never	reached	them.	Consequently,	Tiwari	filed	a	 case	 in	 the	 High	 Court	 “because	 people	 were	 dying”.	 VJAS	 was	 successful	 and	 the	government	 started	a	 survey	on	 the	 food	situation	 in	 this	 region.	As	another	example,	one	supporter	mentioned	a	scheme	run	by	the	Integrated	Rural	Development	Program	that	failed	to	deliver	the	promised	loans	to	families	below	the	poverty	line.	He	said	that	
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VJAS	 "had	 taken	 initiative	 in	 this	 issue,	 due	 to	which	 around	 150	 families	 got	 a	 loan	 of	
25,000	Rs.”	Second,	 VJAS	 performs	 charitable	 activities,	 mostly	 for	 widows	 of	 farmers	 who	committed	 suicide.	 According	 to	 the	 village	 activist	 Rathod	 as	 well	 as	 Jadav,	 these	charitable	 activities	 included	 financing	 a	 school	 for	 “daughters	 of	 kisans”	 to	 learn	 IT	skills.	 VJAS	 also	 supports	 local	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 ban	 on	 alcohol	 in	 village	 VJAS.	Some	women	of	the	village	established	a	ban	independently	from	VJAS.	But	to	keep	it	up,	Tiwari	organized	cultural	programs	with	songs	and	dramas	to	make	people	aware	about	the	dangers	of	alcohol,	as	Rathod	reported.	Third,	 VJAS	 actively	 uses	 media	 channels,	 from	 interviews	 in	 newspapers	 and	 TV	 to	social	media	 and	blogs,	 to	 raise	 the	 awareness	 about	 the	 situation	 in	Vidarbha	 and	 to	enhance	their	publicity.	However,	it	is	the	agitations	and	charitable	activities	that	were	better	known	among	lower	level	activists	and	supporters.		The	fourth	means	of	action	is	the	organization	of	demonstrations	and	agitations	such	as	roadblocks	and	giving	demand	 letters	 to	 the	District	Collector.	VJAS	also	 tries	 to	reach	influential	politicians	with	their	agitations	in	order	to	make	them	aware	of	the	situation	of	farmers	in	Vidarbha.	In	2007,	then	Prime	Minister	of	India,	Manmohan	Singh,	planned	to	 visit	 a	 village	 near	 village	 VJAS.	 VJAS	 wanted	 to	 make	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 meet	suicide-affected	families.	At	the	last	minute,	the	visit	was	cancelled,	officially	because	of	heavy	rains,	but	the	activists	suspected	that	it	actually	was	because	Maharashtra’s	Chief	Minister	 was	 afraid	 that	 Tiwari	 would	 state	 some	 “ugly	 facts”.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 village	activist	Rathod	told	me,	Singh	came	to	a	neighbouring	village,	but	people	who	were	not	residents	 of	 that	 village	 were	 not	 allowed	 to	 participate.	 Compared	 to	 other	 groups,	these	political	agitations	against	the	government	were	not	central	to	VJAS.	Few	farmers	had	ever	participated	in	such	an	agitation	and	even	the	activists	did	not	emphasize	them	much.	Direct	support	for	certain	farmers	or	labourers	was	much	more	in	focus.	
BKS:	India's	Farmer	Association	The	Bharatiya	Kisan	Sangha	 (BKS,	 literally	 ‘India’s	 farmer	association’)	was	 founded	 in	1979	 by	 an	 RSS	 thinker	 and	 is	 an	 organization	 of	 sangh	 parivar.	 The	 sangh	 parivar	(literally	the	‘family	of	organisations’)	consists	of	organizations	promoting	Hindutva	and	seeking	to	increase	the	predominance	of	Hinduism	in	India	in	terms	of	its	social,	political	and	 cultural	 presence.	 Among	 its	 leading	 organisations	 are	 the	 BJP,	 the	 Rashtriya	
Swayamsevak	 Sangh	 (RSS)	 as	 well	 as	 Shiv	 Sena	 (Assadi	 1995;	 Gupta	 1997;	 Omvedt	1993).	 Members	 and	 activists	 of	 BKS	 very	 often	 mention	 that	 BKS	 was	 closely	cooperating	with	RSS,	 that	"RSS	and	the	shakhas63	are	our	base".	The	BKS	also	works	 in	close	cooperation	with	the	BJP.	One	member	said	that	"we	work	together	with	our	whole	
group,	you	know,	this	BJP,	then	RSS	and	Bajrang	Dal64".	Many	activists	of	BKS	are	at	 the	same	time	active	in	RSS,	BJP	or	Shiv	Sena.	But	according	to	them,	BKS	was	not	a	political																																									 																					63	Shakha	 refers	 to	 the	 daily	meetings	 of	 the	Rashtriya	Swayamsevak	Sangh	 (RSS)	 and	 includes	sports	and	prayers.		64	A	Hindu	right–wing	youth	organization	belonging	to	the	sangh	parivar.	
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party	and	had	no	electoral	activities.	Their	finances	come	from	a	yearly	membership	fee	of	Rs	10	and	donations.	They	are	recognized	as	a	charitable	trust.		BKS	is	organized	at	a	national	level.	Their	organization	is	hierarchical	and	has	national	level,	 state	 level,	 district	 level,	 block	 level	 as	 well	 as	 village	 level	 committees.	 The	supporters	 who	 had	 participated	 in	 BKS	 agitations	 spoke	 about	 agitations	 that	 took	place	 in	 Nagpur	 to	 demand	 for	 better	 prices,	 compensation	 payments	 and	 better	infrastructure.	But	most	agitations	that	people	talked	about	were	in	Delhi	or	even	other	states,	 mostly	 Gujarat.	 Rather	 than	 agitations	 organized	 by	 BKS,	 supporters	 often	mentioned	 that	 they	 would	 now	 participate	 in	 agitations	 of	 BJP	 or	 Shiv	Sena.	 So	 the	presence	 and	 activity	 of	 BKS	 in	Maharashtra,	 including	 Vidarbha,	 is	 low	 compared	 to	other	states	and	to	the	other	movement	groups	of	this	study.		Activists	did	mention	that	they	had	organized	marches	and	participated	in	agitations	to	hand	over	letters	of	demands	to	the	District	Collectors	in	nearby	villages	together	with	200–300	 other	 activists	 present.	 Another	 important	 part	 of	 their	 activities,	 so	 the	activists	 emphasized,	 was	 trainings	 for	 "traditional	 agriculture"	 to	 increase	 farmer	awareness.	According	to	a	main	activist,	they	were	not	in	favour	of	roadblocks	because	
"these	are	distractive	activities.	(...)	 In	a	village,	 there	 is	a	poor	kisan,	doesn't	have	seeds.	
We	support	him.	That	is	the	base	of	our	activities.	This	gives	us	respect	in	the	villages".	 In	contrary,	 the	 only	 agitations	 in	 village	 BKS	 that	 some	 supporters	 mentioned	 was	 a	roadblock	to	demand	for	higher	prices,	better	electrical	supply	and	7/12–extracts.	However,	 among	 the	 interviewed	 supporters,	 very	 few	 mentioned	 that	 they	 had	participated	or	even	heard	of	any	agitations	recently.	Also	the	village	activist	mentioned	that	 it	was	in	the	1990s	when	BKS	in	village	BKS	was	active,	organizing	agitations	and	giving	 demand	 letters	 to	 District	 Collectors.	 Nevertheless,	 activists	 maintained	 that	there	were	regular	meetings	of	activists	on	different	levels.	In	village	BKS,	however,	the	village	activist	was	the	only	one	talking	about	regular	meetings.	One	member	said	that	in	 this	 village	 "the	current	body	members	they	are	not	really	interested	in	arranging	the	
program	and	meeting	for	the	kisans".		Congruently,	 in	 the	 program	 that	 I	 attended,	 the	majority	 of	 people	 participating	 and	organising	were	activists	 from	other	places,	mostly	Gujarat.	 It	 took	place	 in	a	college	a	few	kilometres	away	from	Nagpur.	About	thirty	people	were	present;	all	but	one	were	elderly	men	 above	 fifty	 years	 old.	 The	 chairman	 and	 the	 board	 sat	 in	 the	 front	 of	 the	crowd,	opposite	 the	others	 in	a	 row.	They	discussed	about	how	 to	get	more	members	and	brought	up	the	idea	that	each	member	should	find	at	least	two	new	members.	Later,	the	 chairman	 lectured	 on	 the	 new	 farming	 methods	 that	 BKS	 should	 take	 up	 as	 an	organisational	tool	as	well	as	on	the	importance	of	the	cow	in	agriculture.	In	 this	 line,	 BKS	 activists	 claimed	 often	 that	 their	 main	 aim	 was	 the	 "welfare	 of	 the	
kisans".	One	is	that	farmers	should	go	back	to	“traditional	agriculture”	using	local	seeds	as	well	 as	 natural	 products	 for	 their	 production.	 Cow	 dung	 in	 particular	was	 praised	often	for	its	quality	as	a	fertilizer	as	well	as	a	pesticide.	BKS	activists	further	wanted	to	fight	against	the	"killing	of	the	cows"	to	improve	the	situation	in	Vidarbha.	
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AIKS:	All	India	Farmers	Committee65	I	have	already	introduced	AIKS	in	section	2.3	above.	Compared	to	the	other	groups,	AIKS	is	 an	 old	 organization;	 it	 was	 the	 major	 one	 among	 the	 left-wing	 ’old’	 peasant	movements.	 The	 organisation	 has	 fought	 against	 the	 exploitation	 of	 peasants,	 against	landlordism	 and	 for	 land	 reforms.	 AIKS	 has	 been	 critical	 of	 the	 New	 Agricultural	Strategies	 and	 it	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 those	 policies	 was	 not	 to	 abolish	landlordism	 but	 only	 to	 turn	 feudal	 into	 capitalist	 land	 relations.	 When	 the	 New	Farmers’	 Movements	 grew	 bigger,	 AIKS	 joined	 several	 agitations	 with	 them.	 They	shared	 the	 demand	 of	 a	 remunerative	 price	 for	 agricultural	 produce.	 However,	 they	remain	 critical	 of	 the	New	Farmers’	Movements,	which,	 according	 to	 them,	 effectively	fought	for	the	interests	of	rich	farmers	(Surjeet	1996).		AIKS	 and	 the	 left-wing	 movement	 in	 general	 have	 never	 managed	 to	 expand	significantly	 in	Maharashtra	 compared	 to	 other	 Indian	 states.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 are	regions	within	Maharashtra	where	AIKS	 is	quite	 successful	 (i.e.	Nashik	and	Thane).	 In	Vidarbha,	 AIKS	was	 introduced	 in	 1956	 and	 its	 influence	 remains	modest.	 An	 activist	from	a	city	in	Vidarbha	said	that	AIKS	did	not	have	considerable	presence	on	the	ground	in	 Vidarbha.	 Only	 in	 Wardha	 district,	 there	 are	 some	 activists	 and	 AIKS	 is	 present.	According	 to	 their	 own	 information,	AIKS	had	over	 200,000	members	 in	Maharashtra	(Wynistorf	2012).		In	Wardha,	 where	 AIKS	 is	 strongest,	 the	 group	 has	 about	 7,000	 members	 and	 about	thirty	higher-level	activists.	 In	villages	AIKS,	there	are	about	50	active	and	around	100	passive	members	who	do	not	come	to	agitations	but	who	pay	the	membership	fee.	The	membership	fee	is	Rs	5	and	the	village	level	activist	emphasized	that	AIKS	did	not	take	donations	 from	 persons	 such	 as	 traders.	 This	 village	 activist	 is	 also	 the	 sarpanch	 of	villages	AIKS	and	AIKS	had	a	majority	 in	 the	gram	panchayat	at	 the	 time	of	 the	 study.	The	 activists	 reported	 that	 AIKS	 was	 very	 strong	 in	 this	 village	 compared	 to	 other	villages	 in	Vidarbha.	Still,	 they	are	 losing	members	and	mobilization	has	become	more	difficult.	 One	 reason,	 the	 activist	 argued,	 was	 that	 many	 farmers	 had	 changed	 their	occupation	and	left	agriculture.	Consequently,	only	about	half	of	the	supporters	of	AIKS	are	 still	 farmers.	 The	 others	 have	 another	 occupation	 but	 still	 support	 the	 group	(Wynistorf	2012).		AIKS	holds	many	meetings	 for	 supporters	 and	 activists.	 First,	 these	meetings	 serve	 to	establish	 and	maintain	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 group	 and	 possible	 supporters	 and	members.	 Second,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 AIKS	 to	 connect	 with	 the	 other	 levels	 of	 the	organization	as	well	as	the	other	wings	of	CPI(M).	Third,	 these	meetings	and	seminars	aim	 at	 educating	 and	 “awakening”	 the	 farmers.	 Activists	 emphasized	 often	 that	education	 and	 training	 of	 farmers	were	 among	 the	most	 important	 activities	 of	 AIKS.	There	are	about	six	meetings	per	year	at	a	district	level	as	well	as	about	four	per	year	at	the	 village	 level.	 At	 these	 meetings	 they	 discuss	 which	 issues	 to	 take	 up	 or	 how	 to																																									 																					65	As	mentioned	 in	section	3.1	chapter	 I,	 this	description	relies	mostly	on	 the	Masters	 thesis	of	Andrea	Wynistorf	(Wynistorf	2012).		
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increase	their	constituency.	From	time	to	time,	activists	hold	speeches,	e.g.	in	the	village	temple,	and	about	200	people	typically	come	to	listen	(Wynistorf	2012,	own	data).	Besides	 these	meetings	and	workshops,	AIKS	also	organizes	rallies	and	demonstration	or	brings	AIKS’	demands	to	the	office	of	the	District	Collector.	A	village	level	activist	said	that	 AIKS	 would	 first	 organize	 agitations	 for	 prices	 on	 the	 block	 level,	 then	 on	 the	district	 level	and	if	 they	remained	unsuccessful	they	would	conduct	an	agitation	at	the	state	 level.	 For	 being	 part	 of	 CPI(M),	 elections	 are	 also	 an	 important	 and	 frequent	activity	 for	 AIKS.	 As	 one	 activist	 emphasized,	 direct	 action	 was	 also	 very	 important.	Without	that,	 the	activist	argued,	change	could	never	be	achieved	in	India.	The	activist	gave	an	example	where	 the	black	market	 for	 inputs	was	 flourishing	and	traders	asked	for	horrendous	prices.	AIKS	threatened	the	government	that	it	should	either	provide	the	farmers	with	inputs	from	their	storage	or	AIKS	would	break	into	their	storage	places	to	take	inputs.		Their	 most	 important	 issues	 are	 better	 prices	 for	 agricultural	 output	 as	 well	 as	 an	improvement	of	the	public	services,	namely	irrigation	facilities,	no	load	shedding	as	well	as	 a	 better	 infrastructure	 in	 general.	 Further,	 they	demand	 a	 secure	 and	 cheap	public	provision	 of	 inputs,	 available	 loans	 with	 low	 interest	 rates	 and	 improved	 extension	services	 to	 make	 technological	 advances	 in	 agriculture	 available	 for	 the	 farmers	(Wynistorf	2012,	own	data).	 In	contrast	 to	 the	other	groups,	 land	 is	an	 issue,	even	 if	a	rare	 one.	 The	 village	 activist	 has	 demanded	 land	 reforms	 to	 benefit	 the	 small	 and	marginal	farmers.	To	conclude,	 the	different	movement	groups	differ	 in	 their	 size	and	 in	whether	or	not	they	are	part	of	a	 larger,	national	organisation.	But	 in	Vidarbha	itself,	 the	geographical	reach	of	all	the	groups	is	very	limited.	They	are	strong	in	those	villages	where	they	have	a	strong	activist.	Typically	they	are	not	even	known	by	farmers	a	few	villages	away.	As	mentioned	 in	 section	3.1,	 chapter	 I,	 I	 have	 chosen	 those	 villages	 for	 this	 study,	where	one	 particular	 movement	 group	 was	 active	 and	 strong.	 The	 other	 movement	 groups	were	typically	hardly	known	by	supporters,	or	not	known	at	all.	Therefore,	I	analyse	one	movement	group	per	village.	Situation	of	competition,	therefore,	do	not	occur	between	the	 different	movement	 groups	 but	 rather	 between	 these	 groups	 and	 the	 big	 political	parties.	
3.2 Other	Involved	Actors66	Apart	 from	 those	 five	 movement	 groups,	 there	 are	 also	 other	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	movement	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha.	This	section	compiles	those	actors	–	activists,	politicians	and	journalists	–	who	have	been	mentioned	by	the	movement	actors	themselves,	those	that	seemed	most	important	to	the	movement	groups.	
																																								 																					66	In	 contrast	 to	 the	groups	described	before,	 I	base	 the	description	of	 the	 farmer	wings	of	 the	two	major	political	parties	as	well	as	NGOs	on	a	few	interviews	with	leaders	and	activists	without	having	interviewed	followers	or	beneficiaries.	
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Major	Political	Parties	In	the	context	the	political	struggles	of	the	five	movement	groups,	there	are	clearly	two	party	coalitions	that	came	up	as	the	most	important	ones:	Congress–NCP	and	BJP–Sena.	Among	those,	BJP	in	particular	was	perceived	by	activists	as	well	as	supporters	of	other	groups	 to	 be	 an	 important	 player.	 Congress	 (and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 NCP)	 were	 also	mentioned	often,	but	rather	as	opponents	than	as	allies,	because	they	ruled	the	state	at	the	time	of	the	study	(see	2.1,	this	chapter).	The	search	 for	a	representative	of	 the	Kisan	Congress,	the	 farmer	wing	of	 the	Congress	was	in	vain.	I	did	not	hear	about	an	agitation	for	farmers	organized	by	Congress,	nor	did	I	come	across	any	leaders.	I	did	find	a	veteran	activist,	but	trying	to	talk	to	any	present	day	 politician	 involved	 with	 farmer	 issues	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 impossible.	 While	 I	 had	mobile	 numbers,	 scheduling	 even	 the	 shortest	 of	 interviews	was	 denied.	 Therefore,	 I	called	a	sympathizer	of	KAA,	a	well-educated	influential	man	who	it	was	said	was	close	to	Congress.	He	agreed	and	 said	 that	 “we	[himself	and	other	KAA	activists]	are	Congress	
men,	but	we	don’t	belong	to	Congress”.	He	explained	that	they	believed	in	the	ideology	of	Congress	and	would	like	to	get	involved	in	the	party.	But	the	structure,	particularly	on	the	 local	 level,	 was	 so	 “crooked”,	 that	 it	 was	 literally	 impossible	 for	 people	 from	 the	wrong	caste,	class	and	without	 the	right	connections	to	become	active	 in	Congress.	He	was	 convinced	 that	 the	 local	 Congress	 leaders	were	 so	 corrupt	 and	 incompetent	 that	even	if	 I	did	manage	to	talk	to	them,	they	were	incapable	of	giving	any	information.	 In	Vidarbha,	he	concluded,	there	were	no	leaders	of	Congress	or	Kisan	Congress	who	raised	their	voice	for	farmer	issues.		In	contrast	to	the	invisibility	of	Congress	activism,	BJP	is	very	visible.	Many	interviewees	mentioned	 that	 they	 had	 taken	 part	 in	 BJP	 agitations	 or	 had	 at	 least	 heard	 of	 some	organisational	 activity.	 I	was	 able	 to	 talk	 to	 a	major	 BJP	 leader	 in	 Vidarbha	who	was	particularly	involved	in	farmer	issues.	BJP,	as	the	major	opposition	party	at	the	time	of	the	 study,	 raised	 the	 same	 demands	 for	 higher	 MSPs	 and	 cheaper	 input	 costs,	 more	regional	equality	 in	the	distribution	of	state	resources,	 irrigation	systems,	 loans	at	 low	interest	and	insurances.	There	were,	the	BJP	activist	argued,	already	many	schemes,	but	they	were	not	working	because	of	the	corruption	of	politicians	and	officials.	He	claimed	that	“people	with	integrity”	needed	to	come	to	power	to	solve	these	problems.	Therefore,	he	said,	they	organized	both	trainings	for	the	farmers	and	rallies,	at	times	violent	ones.	He	 confirmed	 that	 BJP	 organised	 frequent	 agitations	 and	 had	 become	 increasingly	important	in	Vidarbha	villages	(see	also	2.1,	this	chapter).		
Non-Governmental	Organizations	Besides	 the	 political	 parties,	 the	 interviewees	 also	 mentioned	 a	 few	 NGOs	 active	 in	Vidarbha.	 But	 when	 I	 talked	 to	 them,	 it	 turned	 out	 that	 among	 all	 the	 NGOs	 I	encountered,	 none	 of	 them	 raises	 political	 demands	 or	 organizes	 political	 activities.	There	 are	 no	 NGOs	 that	 have	 significance	 for	 the	 interviewees	 apart	 from	 the	organisation	 of	 the	 globally	 well-known	 activist	 Vandana	 Shiva,	 Navdanya.	 But	 even	Shiva’s	 organisation	 was	 hardly	 involved	 in	 what	 interviewees	 considered	 political	farmer	struggles,	although	it	certainly	helped	them	establish	seed	banks.		
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Additionally,	 many	 activists	 were	 critical	 of	 NGOs.	 Tiwari	 of	 VJAS	 radically	 criticised	NGOs	arguing	that	“they	do	it	only	for	the	show.	They	have	the	same	arguments	[than	me],	
but	don’t	reach	the	conclusions.”	And	 Jawandhia,	 another	 activist	 (see	below),	 said	 that	he	was	willing	to	cooperate	with	NGOs	but	only	with	“those	who	have	the	same	views	on	
economical	policy	or	who	have	some	political	views	at	all.”	
Individual	Activists	Last	 but	 not	 least,	 there	 are	 individual	 activists	 who	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 within	 these	mobilizations.	 Some	of	 them	belong	 to	 a	 particular	 group	 and	others	do	not.	But	 they	were	all	 linked	 to	activists	of	different	groups,	 stand	with	 the	 latter	and	engage	 in	 the	same	struggles.		Probably	 the	most	 influential	 and	 important	 individual	 activist	 is	 Vijay	 Jawandhia.	He	was	the	first	leader	to	leave	Shetkari	Sanghatana	after	Joshi	had	decided	to	support	the	New	 Economic	 Policies.	 Jawandhia	 still	 considered	 himself	 leader	 of	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana.	 Because	 there	 was	 neither	 a	 formal,	 hierarchical	 structure	 nor	 a	 formal	membership,	Shetkari	Sanghatana	 simply	means	movement	of	 farmers.	 Jawandhia	still	feels	a	part	of	that,	even	if	he	no	longer	gas	a	support	base	in	the	class	of	farmers	who	once	supported	him,	as	he	himself	admitted.	Anyway,	as	he	said,	he	is	an	old	man	now	and	he	doesn’t	want	to	lead	agitations	anymore.	But	he	still	has	many	contacts	to	other	activists	in	different	parts	of	India	and	even	abroad,	whom	he	meets	sometimes.	He	still	gives	 lectures	 on	 the	 situation	 of	 agriculture	 at	 universities	 as	 well	 as	 interviews	 in	newspapers.	According	to	other	activists,	he	did	still	have	an	important	role	for	them	as	a	mentor	and	advisor.	He	was,	as	a	journalist	put	it,	"the	only	sane	voice".		Sharad	 Joshi,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 is	 quite	 important	 as	 a	 farmer	 leader	 in	 people’s	memories.	He	is	still	the	person	known	by	the	largest	number	of	farmers.	As	mentioned	above,	 at	 least	 a	 section	of	 supporters	belonging	 to	all	 of	 the	groups	 reported	 to	have	been	 part	 of	 his	 agitations	 or	 remember	 their	 fathers	 or	 relatives	 being	 part	 of	 the	
Sanghatana.	Sharad	Joshi,	for	many,	is	a	“kisan	leader”	who	had	turned	into	a	“politician”	and	had	lost	the	trust	of	the	farmers	by	doing	so.	Nevertheless,	many	supporters	saw	the	contemporary	 groups	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 struggles	 of	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana.	 One	supporter	of	KAA	said	that	“Shetkari	Sanghatana	is	old	and	KAA	is	new,	but	the	demand	is	
the	same.”	Besides	 Joshi	 and	 Jawandhia,	who	 are	 dinosaurs	 of	Shetkari	Sanghatana,	 interviewees	also	mentioned	other	leaders	who	they	perceived	to	be	fighting	for	farmer	issues.	One	is	Raju	Shetti,	 the	 leader	of	SSS	 introduced	above.	Some	 interviewees	knew	him	through	television	 and	 were	 impressed	 about	 “what	 he	 has	 done	 for	 kisans	 in	 Western	
Maharashtra”.	 Others	 mentioned	 Sadabhau	 Khot,	 another	 activist	 of	 SSS,	 or	 –	 very	prominently	 –	 Pasha	 Patel.	 The	 latter	was	 also	 once	 part	 of	 Shetkari	Sanghatana	 and	later	 joined	 the	NCP	before	he	defected	 to	 the	BJP	(Indian	Express	2000;	Takle	2012).	During	 the	 time	 of	 the	 study,	 Patel	 led	 a	 “kisan	 march”	 from	 Latur	 in	 Marathwada	(Patel’s	 stronghold)	 to	Nagpur	 in	Vidarbha.	He	 took	up	 the	 issues	of	MSP	and	rain-fed	agriculture	 and	 got	 supported	 by	 farmers	 from	 very	 different	 political	 backgrounds	
	 121	
(Takle	2012,	own	data).	Despite	Patel’s	association	with	the	BJP,	 interviewees	referred	to	him	as	a	“kisan	leader”	rather	than	as	a	BJP	politician.67		Apart	 from	 these	 activists	 and	 politicians,	 there	 were	 several	 journalists	 who	 have	committed	 themselves	 to	 the	 “cause	of	the	kisans”,	as	one	of	 them	has	put	 it.	The	most	prominent	among	them	is	Palagummi	Sainath.	He	is	a	renowned	journalist	reporting	on	rural	issues	who	has	written	often	about	farmer	suicides.	Not	so	much	among	ordinary	farmers,	 but	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 among	 activists,	 Sainath	 is	 an	 important	 figure.	 Jaideep	Hardikar,	a	close	confidant	of	Sainath,	lives	in	Nagpur	and	focuses	on	similar	issues.	He	is	well	known	and	active	in	Vidarbha	and	works	with	many	farmer	groups.	Activists	of	all	 groups	 know	 him	 and	 talk	 about	 him	 sympathetically.	 In	 particular,	 he	 is	 closely	connected	both	with	KAA	as	well	as	VJAS	and	he	has	provided	them	with	support	and	advice.	Another	 journalist	who	 is	 important	 in	 the	discussion	about	 farmer	suicides	 in	Vidarbha	is	Chandrakant	Wankhade,	who	has	written	a	book	about	the	farmer	suicides	in	Vidarbha	(Wankhade	2010).		
3.3 Cooperation	among	Movement	Groups	and	Activists	
Cooperation	and	joint	activities	The	activists	of	the	different	groups	know	each	other	well	and	most	of	the	groups	have	some	basic	cooperation	with	each	other.	They	sometimes	meet	 to	discuss	basic	 issues.	An	 activist	 of	 KAA	 told	 that	 “last	 year	 we	 started	 a	 communication	 with	 them	 [other	
activists]	 such	 as	 Tiwari,	 Prakash	 Pohare68,	 Svabhimani	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana.	 We	 sat	
together	 and	 talked	 with	 each	 other.	We	 will	 come	 to	 a	 common	 opinion,	 then	 we	 will	
come	together.”	In	Wardha,	where	KAA	and	 Jawandhia	 are	based,	 there	 are	occasional	meetings	 to	 discuss	 the	 problems	 of	 farmers	 in	 Vidarbha.	 One	 supporter	 of	 KAA	 said	that	 he	 participated	 in	 one	 recently:	 “It	was	 for	 three	days.	Vijay	 Jawandhia	and	 some	
other	activists	were	there.	Only	the	strong	activists	and	kisans	of	KAA	came.”	According	 to	their	own	information,	they	invited	everybody	who	was	interested	and	therefore,	some	activists	from	AIKS	and	Shetkari	Sanghatana	as	well	as	Tiwari	came.		Further,	 several	 activists	 said	 that	 the	 individual	 activists	 were	 important	 for	 the	cooperation	 between	 the	 groups	 because	 they	 knew	 about	 the	 different	 on-going	activities	 and	 were	 in	 contact	 with	 different	 activists	 as	 well	 as	 outsiders	 who	 could	increase	publicity	of	an	activity	or	provide	finances.		Generally,	 cooperation	 happens	mostly	 at	 the	 level	 of	 such	 discussions	 and	meetings.	When	 it	comes	 to	agitations,	 there	 is	hardly	any	cooperation	between	the	groups.	One	example	 of	 this	 is	 that	 when	 the	 winter	 session	 of	 the	 state’s	 parliament	 opened	 in	Vidarbha's	 capital	Nagpur,	 all	 the	 groups	 conducted	 separate	 agitations.	Nevertheless,																																									 																					67	Interviewees	 hardly	 ever	 mentioned	 names	 of	 activists	 that	 were	 not	 at	 all	 connected	 to	
Shetkari	Sanghatana.	The	only	one	that	was	mentioned	sometimes	was	Bachchu	Kadu.	Kadu	is	an	MLA	who	has	founded	the	Prahar	Yuvashakti	Sanghatana	and	often	takes	up	farmers’	issues	and	in	particular	farmer	suicides.	68	Prakash	Pohare	is	the	editor	of	a	Marathi	newspaper	in	Vidarbha	and	was	mentioned	by	some	interviewees.	
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cooperation	 is	 an	 important	 issue	 in	 many	 interviews	 and	 the	 interviewees	 often	reflected	on	the	reasons	that	have	made	cooperation	so	difficult.		
Difficulties	in	Cooperation	According	 to	 the	 interviewed	activists	 as	well	 as	 supporters,	 cooperation	was	difficult	for	three	major	reasons.	First,	activists	often	mentioned	the	limited	geographical	reach	of	 their	 groups	 as	 the	main	 reason	why	 the	 cooperation	was	not	 closer.	KAA	activists	emphasized	 that	 they	were	 interested	 in	 cooperating	with	 other	 groups.	 But,	 as	 their	leader	 Kakade	 said,	 “in	Wardha	KAA	is	basically	the	only	movement	group	for	kisans.	I	can	say	
that	other	kisans’	movement	groups	are	very	rare.	Actually	it	is	very	sad.	I	feel	that	kisans	can	go	in	
any	movement	group.	But	they	should	go,	they	should	not	stay	alone.”	He	assured	 that	 they	had	good	 relationships	 with	 SSS,	 for	 example,	 but	 that	 they	 were	 active	 in	 different	geographical	areas.		The	second	reason	 is	 that	 the	 ideologies	of	 the	groups	differed.	Even	 if	 their	demands	are	surprisingly	similar,	the	groups	have	very	distinct	ideologies,	especially	outside	the	area	of	agriculture.	To	take	again	the	cooperation	of	KAA	and	SSS	as	an	example,	Kakade	explained	that	
	“unfortunately	they	[SSS]	are	doing	violent	rallies.	But	I	believe	in	non-violence.	
(…)	When	they	are	in	our	rally,	they	should	not	react	violently	[when	police	beats	
them],	 otherwise	 it	 will	 be	 quite	 difficult	 to	 bring	 success	 to	 the	 movement	
group.”	Many	 activists	 of	 KAA	 and	 SSS	 asserted	 that	 it	was	 impossible	 for	 them	 to	 cooperate	with	 the	 Hindu-nationalist	 forces	 or	 with	 activists	 close	 to	 them.	 But	 activists	 often	pointed	out	 that	making	 such	decisions	was	difficult.	This	 can	be	exemplified	by	SSS’s	cooperation	with	 different	 groups.	 SSS	 sometimes	 supported	BJP,	 but	 also	 cooperated	with	AIKS	as	well	as	 the	Peasants	and	Workers	Party	(Shetkari	Khamgar	Paksha),	both	distinctly	leftist	parties.	When	I	asked	an	AIKS	activist	why	they	would	agree	with	such	a	cooperation,	he	 said	what	 the	SSS	activist	had	 told	me	as	well:	 “they	[SSS]	are	the	only	
sane	people	around”.		The	cooperation	of	SSS	with	BJP	 is	 full	of	problems.	They	closely	 cooperate	on	a	 state	level,	 but	 on	 a	 local	 level	 the	 cooperation	 is	 limited	 to	 single	 agitations.	 The	 leader	Tupkar	said	that	he	did	not	like	the	ideology	of	BJP.	But	
“the	reason	we	cooperate	with	BJP	or	Shiv	Sena	is	only	that	they	are	against	Congress.	We	
really	need	to	change	the	Congress	government	and	there	should	be	a	broad	alliance	with	
all	 other	parties	 against	 Congress.	 So	we	will	 not	 cooperate	with	BJP	alone,	 but	 only	 if	
there	 is	a	broad	alliance	of	Anti-Congress.	 I	am	against	all	 their	Hindutva	 ideology.	But	
we	have	no	choice.”	Apart	 from	 these	 ideological	 issues	 in	 cooperation,	 there	 are	 also	 very	 concrete	 local	issues	 that	 hinder	 cooperation	 between	 SSS	 and	 BJP.	 There	 was	 a	 scandal	 over	 a	district’s	co-operative	bank	that	has	been	shut	down	(for	details	see	section	2.3,	chapter	V).	 Tupkar	 from	 SSS	 believed	 that	 this	 was	 the	 fault	 of	 high-ranking	 politicians	 and	
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political	 leaders	 from	big	parties.	SSS	organised	agitations	 in	 the	streets	of	 the	district	capital,	publicly	disclosing	the	names	of	the	politicians	at	fault,	including	BJP	politicians.	Tupkar	 reported	 that	 “for	 example	 now	 in	 this	 bank	 issue,	 I	 have	 attacked	 them	
[politicians	 of	 Congress	 and	BJP]	and	 they	 threatened	me	also.	 So	 I	 can	never	 cooperate	
with	 them	 again.”	 Obviously,	 such	 agitations	 make	 cooperation	 on	 a	 local	 level	 very	difficult.	 Even	 if	 he	 added	 later	 that	 “if	 the	state	 level	authorities	[of	SSS]	decide	that	a	
cooperation	should	be	there,	we	have	to	follow.”	This	points	to	the	third	reason	that	makes	cooperation	difficult,	namely	differences	and	distrust	between	the	different	activists.	To	take	the	example	of	VJAS’s	leader	Tiwari,	he	assured	that	he	wanted	cooperation	with	everybody	and	“if	a	common	platform	is	there	
and	we	are	invited,	we	will	always	go.	But	the	others	do	not	invite	us”.	He	said	that	he	was	in	contact	with	many	leaders	of	other	groups,	but	he	also	criticised	them	a	lot,	arguing	that	they	were	“media	people.	They	are	only	interested	in	media	and	in	giving	lectures	and	
make	no	meetings	with	kisans.”	While	Tiwari	was	 strongest	 in	his	 criticism	of	 others,	 a	number	of	activists	had	a	common	complaint	against	other	groups	of	activists,	namely	that	they	were	only	“interested	in	politics”.		Considering	 all	 this	 –	 cooperation	 but	 also	 difficulties	 therein,	 the	 similarities	 in	demands,	but	also	the	differences	in	terms	of	geographical	area	of	work,	ideology	as	well	as	 political	 rivalries	 –	 the	 question	 remains	 whether	 the	 different	 activists	 and	supporters	 themselves	perceive	 the	multitude	of	 groups	as	belonging	 together,	 as	one	‘movement’	that	engages	with	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.		
Emic	Understanding	as	a	‘Movement’	The	 interviewed	 activists	 and	 supporters	 used	 the	 word	 ‘movement’	 or	 ‘movement	group’	 for	 their	 particular	 group	 and	 not	 for	 the	 multitude	 of	 groups.	 But	 in	 several	statements,	it	becomes	clear	that	they	saw	themselves	as	being	part	of	a	greater	group	of	 activists	 that	 all	 fight	 for	 the	 same.	Many	 activists,	 for	 example,	 emphasized	 that	 I	could	“ask	any	activist	in	Vidarbha,	they	will	all	tell	you	the	same	about	the	situation	of	the	
kisans”,	 and	 they	 really	 did	 to	 some	 extent;	 the	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 agricultural	demands	were	small	at	 the	concrete	 level.	Tiwari	of	VJAS	–	despite	all	his	criticisms	of	other	activists	–	said	that	there	were	many	activists	 fighting	for	farmer	 issues.	He	said	that	
“for	example	Jawandhia	is	there.	Shetkari	Sanghatana	is	there.	The	small,	small	activists	
throughout	 Vidarbha	 are	 there.	 I’m	 also	 one	 of	 them,	 a	 small,	 small,	 smallest	 of	 one,	
working	in	one	remote	place	of	Maharashtra.”	As	could	be	seen	above,	these	activists	and	groups	are	active	locally	in	the	villages	where	they	have	strong	activists.	While	the	leaders	know	each	other,	the	supporters	know	only	those	groups	active	in	their	respective	village.	Farmers	from	neighbouring	villages	have	often	not	even	heard	of	 the	group.	Most	 interviewees	 in	 the	villages	did	not	know	any	other	groups	when	asked.	Those	who	did	mostly	said	 that	 they	saw	 little	difference	 in	these	groups’	demands	or	activities	and	that	all	these	different	groups	or	activists	were	doing	good	work.	Sometimes	they	said	that	the	group	they	were	following	was	the	only	
	 124	
honest	one	while	the	others	were	only	“political”.	But	they	mostly	argued	that	it	would	“not	 matter	 under	 which	 banner	 we	 are	 marching,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 about	 prices”,	 as	 a	supporter	of	SSS	claimed.	A	supporter	of	KAA	got	to	the	point	that	“each	group	wants	to	
maintain	 its	 self-image	among	 the	 kisans.	But	 for	normal	 kisan	 the	dream	 is	 only	prices	
(…).	Those	[kisans]	who	are	interested,	they	are	also	coming,	not	only	under	one	banner	–	
whoever	is	calling,	we	are	going	there.”	
4 Concluding	Thoughts:	One	‘Movement’?	Can	 we,	 thus,	 talk	 of	 a	 broader	 ‘movement’	 in	 Vidarbha	 that	 addresses	 issues	 of	 the	‘agrarian	crisis’,	or	do	we	 find	 isolated	attempts	by	 individual	groups	only?	To	discuss	this	question,	I	come	back	to	the	definitions	and	concepts	that	I	introduced	in	section	1	of	this	chapter.	A	 possible	 entry	 point	 into	 this	 discussion	 is	 Sheth's	 (2004)	 notion	 of	 ‘micro-movements’	(see	section	1.2,	chapter	IV).	Micro-movement	refers	to	groups	that	are	not	linked	 to	 macro	 structures	 of	 power	 and	 ideology,	 but	 rather	 expand	 horizontally	through	 several	 micro-movements.	 However,	 Sheth	 gave	 only	 a	 vague	 definition	 of	micro-movements.	 In	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 feasibility	 of	 this	 notion	 in	 the	 case	 of	Vidarbha,	 I	 argue	 that	 there	are	 four	 characteristics	 that	are	 important	 in	 such	micro-movements.	 First,	 Sheth	 said	 that	 micro-movements	 are	 not	 linked	 vertically	 to	 the	macro	 structures	 of	 power	 and	 ideology.	 This	 criterion	 only	 partially	 holds	 for	 the	groups	that	are	part	of	this	study.	All	the	groups	have	links	to	macro	structures	of	power	and	 ideology	 in	 the	 form	 of	 political	 parties.	 For	 KAA,	 SSS	 and	 VJAS	 these	 links	were	weaker	and	less	formalized	and	they	recognized	each	other	as	being	farmer	‘movement’	groups	at	least	to	some	extent.	BKS	on	the	contrary	has	stronger	links	with	established	parties	 (namely	 BJP)	 and	 was	 considered	 too	 communalist	 to	 work	 with.	 AIKS	 is	officially	part	of	a	national	political	party.	The	distinction	between	being	linked	to	those	“vertical	structures	of	power”	or	not	 is	also	difficult	to	establish	because	these	links	can	have	 various	 forms	 and	 intensities.	 But	 the	 associated	 question	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	powerful	proved	to	be	an	important	argument	in	the	mobilization	process	of	the	groups,	as	I	will	analyse	in	chapter	V.	Sahoo	(2014)	added	the	second	characteristic	at	another	level	to	the	meaning	of	micro-movements.	 ‘Movement’	 groups	 should	demand	 rights,	 have	political	demands	and	do	more	than	philanthropic	support.	The	interviewed	activists	often	also	expressed	similar	views	 (see	 section	 3.2,	 this	 chapter):	 the	 activities	 and	 demands	 of	 the	 groups	 were	explicitly	political.	Even	if	groups	did	have	NGO-like	activities,	at	the	same	time	they	had	political	demands	(like	KAA	and	VJAS).		The	 third	 characteristic–	 coming	 again	 from	 Sheth	 –	 is	 that	 the	 politics	 of	 the	micro-movements	should	expand	horizontally	through	other	similar	micro-movements,	which	are	 in	 themselves	 often	 issue-based	 (see	 also	 Sangvai	 2007).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 in	section	 3	 of	 this	 chapter	 that	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 groups	 under	 study	 indeed	 expanded	
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horizontally	 in	 terms	 of	 cooperation	 and	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 own	conceptualization	of	being	part	of	a	farmer	‘movement’.		The	fourth	characteristic	is	that	the	micro-movements’	politics	are	not	merely	local,	but	defined	in	trans-local	terms.	I	will	show	in	chapter	VI	that	the	demands	and	ideas	of	the	groups	 –	 implicitly	 and	 explicitly	 –	 do	 refer	 to	 broad	 debates	 of	 global	 (farmer)	movements.		Following	Sheth,	 I	 thus	perceive	 the	groups	 I	 studied	as	 ‘micro-movements’.	However,	Sheth	 is	 not	 very	 particular	 about	 the	 nomenclature	 and	 does	 not	 insist	 on	 the	word	micro-movement.	 He	 states	 that	 he	 uses	 the	 terms	 grassroots	 movements,	 social	movements,	 non-party	 political	 formations	 or	 processes,	 community	 based	 or	 mass	based	 organisation	 and	 social-action	 groups	 and	 movement-groups	 interchangeably.	Therefore,	 I	 want	 stay	 as	 close	 as	 I	 can	 at	 the	 interviewees’	 own	 language.	 The	interviewees	 of	 this	 study	 used	 “movement	group”,	 “movement”	 or	 “group”	 mostly	 to	refer	to	their	small,	rather	well	defined	groups.	I	adopt	the	two	terms	“movement	group”	and	“group”.	 I	 leave	aside	the	term	“movement”,	because	I	use	that	term	already	 in	the	sense	of	Bebbington	for	the	sum	of	these	micro-movements.		The	 question	 remains	whether	 all	 these	micro-movements,	 in	 sum,	 present	 a	 broader	and	coherent	‘social	movement’	as	such.	For	this	discussion	on	a	concept	for	the	whole	multitude	of	groups	and	activists,	I	return	to	Bebbington’s	definition	(2009).	It	includes,	I	would	argue,	five	characteristics	that	constitute	a	broader	social	movement.		The	first	characteristic	is	collective	action.	The	activists	and	supporters	engaged	in	these	mobilizations	in	Vidarbha	organize	different	collective	actions	as	I	showed	in	section	3	of	this	chapter	(and	also	in	section	2	of	chapter	V).	Second,	these	collective	actions	need	to	be	sustained	over	time.	Even	if	–	compared	to	the	heydays	of	the	peasant	and	farmers’	movements	(according	to	the	literature,	see	section	2.3,	this	chapter)	–	the	strength	and	activities	 of	 the	 present-day	 groups	 has	 decreased,	 they	 still	 persist	 at	 a	 low	 level	 of	activity	 and	 continue	 to	 be	 active	 locally.	 The	 third	 characteristic	 is	 that	 a	 social	movement	consists	of	a	set	of	actions	and	actors.	My	empirical	data	showed	that	there	are	many	groups	and	individual	activists	who	mobilize	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	‘farmers’	 issues.	 Most	 activists,	 leaders	 and	 supporters	 belonging	 to	 different	 groups	recognized	certain	individual	activists	as	being	important	farmer	leaders	and	had	some	level	 of	 cooperation.	 The	 fourth	 characteristic	 is	 shared	 grievances	 and	 sense	 of	injustice.	 The	 groups	 and	 individual	 activists	 acknowledged	 that	 they	 have	 similar	demands	and	analyses	of	 injustice	as	 far	as	agricultural	 sector	was	concerned.	For	 the	supporters,	 it	was	clear	that	all	the	groups	fought	for	prices.	Taking	into	consideration	these	 four	 characteristics,	 the	different	micro-movements	 and	 individual	 activists	 that	mobilize	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha	 can	 be	 conceptualized	 as	 a	 social	movement	in	the	sense	of	Bebbington.	But	the	fifth	characteristic	that	comes	out	of	Bebbington’s	definition	is	more	difficult	to	apply	to	the	many	groups	in	Vidarbha.	It	 is	that	the	movement	should	share	a	“vision	–	
perhaps	not	specified	–	of	the	need	to	find	another	way	of	organizing	society	and	thinking	
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about	development”	(Bebbington	2009).	Sangvai	(2007)	argued	that	if	one	understands	these	groups	as	micro-movements,	 their	 struggles	should	not	be	understood	 in	a	 local	sense.	Rather,	each	group	brings	forth	“distinct	yet	interrelated”	(ibid,	111)	experiences	and	strategies	to	deal	with	the	reality	of	neoliberal	development,	be	it	in	the	agricultural	realm	or	not.	However,	because	these	experiences	“were	part	of	the	same	macro	reality,	
the	 resistance	 and	 creative	 responses	 too	 formed	 –	 sometimes	 unintentionally	 and	
sometimes	deliberately	–	an	 interrelated	and	multi-front	battle”	 (ibid).	 When	 analyzing	the	demands	of	the	different	groups	or	micro-movements	more	clearly,	it	becomes	clear	that	while	the	demands	are	indeed	very	similar,	the	political	and	ideological	views	of	the	activists	were	 sometimes	 diametrically	 opposed	 to	 one	 another.	 Similar	 demands	 can	gloss	 over	 differences	 between	 the	 groups	 in	 terms	 of	 ideologies	 as	 well	 as	constituencies	and	material	 interests.	Therefore,	 this	characteristic	would	rather	point	to	not	conceptualising	the	heterogeneous	multitude	of	groups	as	one	 ‘movement’.	This	complexity	of	similar	demands	linking	to	different	ideologies	will	be	analysed	in	chapter	VI.	Despite	these	difficulties	with	the	fifth	characteristic,	the	first	four	characteristics	show	a	 concurrence	 between	 Bebbington’s	 definition	 and	 the	 situation	 on	 the	 ground.	Therefore	 and	 to	 conclude,	 I	 conceptualize	 this	 multitude	 of	 groups	 that	 mobilize	around	agricultural	issues	in	Vidarbha	as	a	‘social	movement’	–	a	social	movement	that	consists	of	a	heterogeneous	range	of	‘micro-movements’	and	individual	activists.		
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V. Mobilizing	with	Trustworthiness	One	 of	 the	 main	 tasks	 of	 the	 movement	 groups	 is	 to	 mobilise	 people.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Vidarbha	and	the	‘agrarian	crisis’,	I	did	find	such	mobilisations.	The	next	issue,	then,	is	to	understand	what	 reasons	people	had	 for	 being	 active	 in	 a	movement	 group	 and	what	activists	did	 in	order	 to	motivate	people	 to	participate.	 I	 found	 that	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	movement	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha,	supporters	decided	to	take	part	in	a	group’s	 activities	 and	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 movement	 mainly	 based	 on	 the	 perceived	trustworthiness	of	the	respective	activists	and	leaders.	The	movement	actors	struggled	to	maintain	the	reputation	of	 trustworthiness	because	 it	was	decisive	 for	participation	from	the	side	of	ordinary	farmers.		The	struggles	and	the	importance	of	leaders	and	activists	in	mobilization	are	the	focus	of	this	 chapter,	 but	 I	 also	 describe	 other	 reasons	 for	 (non-)participation	 in	 section	 2.	 I	analyse	 the	 strategies	 of	 leaders	 for	 maintaining	 trust,	 mobilizing	 and	 organizing	supporters.	I	also	look	at	the	supporters’	view	of	the	activists	and	their	strategies.	I	will	start	this	chapter	with	an	overview	of	the	conceptual	approaches	to	different	functions	of	 leadership	in	social	movements	in	general	(section	1.1)	and	South	Asia	in	particular	(section	1.2).	
1 Leaders	in	Mobilization	Morris	 and	 Staggenborg	 (2011)	 as	well	 as	Goodwin	 and	 Jasper	 (2015)	 are	 interesting	entry	points	into	the	conceptual	and	theoretical	debates	over	the	role	of	leaders	in	social	movements.	 They	 all	 claim	 that	 leadership	 has	 been	 neglected	 in	 social	 movement	theory	 compared	 to	 other	 issues.	 More	 recently	 though,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 renewed	interest	in	an	analysis	of	leadership	that	takes	into	account	“the	numerous	ways	in	which	
leaders	 generate	 social	 change	 and	 create	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 agency	 of	 other	
participants”	(Morris	and	Staggenborg	2011,	174).	
1.1 The	Importance	of	Bridge	Leaders	Leaders	 are	 conceptualized	 differently	 in	 the	 different	 social	movement	 theories	 (see	chapter	 I,	 section	 1.2).	 For	 the	 collective	 behaviour	 theorists,	 Lang	 and	 Lang	 (1961)	argue	 that	 leaders	 “create	 impetus	 for	 movements	 by	 providing	 examples	 of	 action,	
directing	 action,	 and	 defining	 problems	 and	 proposing	 solutions”	 (cited	 in	 Morris	 and	Staggenborg	2011,	 173).	However,	 Smelser	 (1962)	 specified	 that	 though	 leadership	 is	an	essential	factor,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	facilitate	collective	action.	The	political	process	theorists	have	also	focussed	on	political	process	and	therefore	on	political	opportunity	structures	 and	have	 largely	neglected	 the	 role	 of	 leaders	 in	 recognizing	 and	 acting	 on	political	opportunities	(Goldstone	2001,	Morris	and	Staggenborg	2011).	In	 the	 resource	mobilization	 theory,	 leaders	 are	 seen	as	political	 entrepreneurs.	Their	task	 is	 to	 mobilize	 resources	 and	 found	 organizations	 responding	 to	 incentives	 and	risks.	The	‘rational	supporters’	then	follow	those	leaders	who	manage	these	tasks	most	effectively	 (see	 e.g.	 Zald	 and	 McCarthy	 1977).	 Within	 this	 theory,	 particularly	 its	
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entrepreneurial-organizational	version,	however,	there	is	both	an	overemphasis	as	well	as	 a	 neglect	 of	 leadership.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 its	 proponents	 overemphasize	 agency	 of	leaders	 in	 arguing	 that	 “issue	 entrepreneurs	 can	manufacture	 grievances”	 (Morris	 and	Staggenborg	 2011,	 173).	 On	 the	 other,	 the	 theory	 neglects	 the	 leaders’	 agency	 when	analysing	mobilizing	structures.	Despite	the	implicit	assumption	that	leaders	can	direct	a	 movement,	 there	 is	 no	 examination	 of	 the	 emergence	 or	 the	 consequences	 of	leadership	or	the	concrete	work	of	mobilization	(ibid).		One	 of	 the	 scholars	 who	 showed	 a	 renewed,	 novel	 interest	 in	 leadership	 is	 Gorringe	(2010),	who	has	argued	that	most	studies	analysing	leadership,	focus	on	leader-centred	movements	 and	 tend	 to	 use	 the	 concept	 of	 charisma.	 Therefore,	 they	 cast	movement	participants	 without	 leadership	 functions	 as	 ‘devotees’	 or	 ‘followers’.	 The	 concept	 of	charisma,	however,	remains	rather	nebulous	and	blurs	the	social	relationships	between	the	 leaders	and	 the	masses	 that	 follow	 them	(Melucci	1996).	Rather,	Gorringe	argued,	leadership	 needs	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 "relational"	 and	 leaders	 as	 "strategic	decision	makers".	The	leaders’	task	is	then	to	inspire	and	organize	their	supporters	and	get	them	involved	in	 collective	 action.	 In	 contrast	 to	 earlier	 theories,	 Gorringe	 argued	 that	 studies	 on	leadership	 need	 to	 include	 the	 interface	 between	 the	 leaders	 and	 the	 led.	 Further	 he	called	to	take	away	the	spotlight	 from	the	grand	leaders	and	focus	on	the	“painstaking	
work	[on	the	ground],	which	is	the	essence	of	political	mobilisation”	(Gorringe	2010,	122).		Leadership	in	social	movements	performs	different	functions	and	tasks.	Arguably,	those	who	 do	 this	 painstaking	 work	 on	 the	 ground	 are	 the	 ‘bridge	 leaders’,	 a	 concept	developed	 by	 Robnett	 (1997).	 Morris	 and	 Staggenborg	 (2011),	 building	 on	 Robnett	(1997),	argued	that	there	are	three	ideal	types	of	leadership	functions	that	exist	within	movements.	 The	 first	 type	 occupies	 the	 formal	 leadership	 positions	 of	 the	 social	movement	 organizations.	 The	 second	 type	 consists	 of	 leaders	 who	 occupy	 secondary	positions	 in	 social	 movement	 organizations	 and	 constitute	 the	 immediate	 leadership	team	of	the	first	type	of	leaders.	The	third	type	represents	the	bridge	leaders.69	Robnett	(1997)	argued	that	bridge	leaders	are	responsible	for	mobilizing	supporters	on	the	ground	and	maintaining	their	trust	and	interest	in	the	movement.	They	operate	at	a	grassroots	 level	 and	 create	 a	 connection	between	 the	movement	organization	and	 the	supporters’	 everyday	 life.	 Goldstone	 (2001)	 has	 taken	 up	 the	 concept	 and	 defines	 a	bridge	leader	as	the	one,	
“which	carries	both	the	ideology	and	the	organizational	tasks	of	mobilizing	down	to	the	
grass-roots	level.	Bridge	leaders	are	those	neighborhood	and	community	organizers	who	
mediate	between	top	leadership	and	the	vast	bulk	of	followers,	turning	dreams	and	grand	
plans	into	on-the-ground	realities”	(Goldstone	2001,	158)	I	 will	 adopt	 the	 concept	 of	 these	 three	 types	 of	 leaders,	 particularly	 the	 idea	 of	 the	bridge	leaders,	to	analyse	leadership	in	Vidarbha.	The	focus	of	this	chapter	lies	strongly	on	the	leaders’	tasks	and	on	the	"painstaking	work"	of	mobilization.																																										 																					69	Morris	and	Staggenborg	(2011)	added	a	 fourth	 type	referring	 those	bridge	 leaders,	who	also	routinely	engage	in	other	leadership	tasks.	
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1.2 Strategies	of	Leadership	All	 the	above-mentioned	types	of	 leaders	use	different	strategies	 to	earn	and	maintain	the	 trust	 of	 people,	 to	mobilize	 them	and	 to	 increase	 their	 own	power.	 Jeffrey	 (2009)	analysed	 two	 contradicting	 strategies	 of	 student	 leaders:	 social	 reformers	 and	 fixers.	Fixing	here	means	 to	successfully	promote	one’s	own	 interests	and/or	 those	of	others	by	 mediating	 between	 people	 and	 higher	 levels	 of	 a	 movement,	 group	 or	 the	government	 (Manor	2000).	These	services	are	a	necessity	 for	many	poor	people,	even	those	 reluctant	 to	 political	 participation	 (Abraham	 2014).	 Pure	 fixers	 would	 have	 no	political	 ambitions	 beyond	 their	 locality	 and	 exclusively	 concentrate	 on	 their	 fixing	skills.	Jeffrey	(2009)	argued	that	activists	can	be	only	either	fixers	or	social	reformers,	a	choice	that	depends	on	the	individual	activists.		Price	 and	 Ruud	 (2010),	 in	 the	 foreword	 to	 their	 edited	 book	 on	 leadership	 in	 India,	made	a	similar	 though	not	 identical	distinction.	They	argue	that	 the	people	who	try	 to	become	successful	in	the	social	or	political	sphere	need	to	prove	their	abilities	as	fixers	first.	 Having	 achieved	 this,	 leaders	 can	 adopt	 three	 different	 leadership	 styles	 that	 of	course	can	be	combined.	For	 the	case	of	 the	relatively	small	and	powerless	movement	groups	in	this	study,	two	of	those	styles	are	relevant.	70	The	first	type	is	the	‘boss’.	This	refers	 to	 leaders	 having	 an	 amoral	 imperative	 of	maintaining	 first	 and	 foremost	 their	own	interests.	To	do	so,	bosses	redistribute	resources	on	a	relatively	small-scale	 level.	They	 might	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 political	 party	 and	 act	 as	 middleman	 between	supporters	on	the	ground	and	powers	higher	up.	In	contrast	to	pure	fixers,	they	usually	have	 political	 ambitions.	 Second,	 the	 ‘lord-type’	 of	 leadership	 has	 more	 pronounced	normative	elements.	Lords	strongly	 rely	on	maintaining	a	 reputation	of	honesty.	Price	and	 Ruud	 (2010),	 based	 on	 Burghart	 ([1996]	 2008),	 argued	 that	 “constituents’	
perceptions	of	their	head	as	a	benevolent	person	of	expansive	agency	form	a	major	element	
of	allegiance	to	 lordly	 leadership	in	the	South	Asian	context”	 (ibid,	 XXIV-XXV).	 In	 Hindu	societies,	the	traditional	model	for	a	lordly	leadership	style	is	a	god/goddess.	But	a	more	secular	form	of	lordship	is	again	the	social	reformer	(Price	and	Ruud	2010).	Price	and	Ruud	claimed	that	all	ambitious	leaders	also	need	to	have	fixer	qualities,	even	if	they	later	rely	on	their	reputation	of	honesty.	Alm	(2010)	described	what	this	means	for	 an	 individual	 activist.	 He	 analysed	 how	 politically	 ambitious	 people	 in	 an	 Indian	village	 try	 to	 build	 a	 constituency.	 He	 focused	 on	 new,	 emerging	 leaders	 who	 do	 not	necessarily	 belong	 to	 families	 of	 large	 landowners	 or	 high	 castes	 and	 like	 to	 call	themselves	social	reformers	or	social	workers.	In	Alm’s	case	study,	there	are	many	such	leaders	 in	one	village	 competing	 for	 support.	Alm	described	how	 these	activists	 try	 to	become	men	to	whom	people	look	up	to,	asking	them	for	advice	and	help.	They	strive	for	a	reputation	of	being	someone	who	can	achieve	 things.	However,	 to	gain	power	at	 the	village	 level,	Alm	 showed	 that	 it	 is	 not	 only	 important	 to	 gain	 a	 reputation	 as	 an	 able	fixer,	but	one	must	at	the	same	time	maintain	one’s	reputation	as	a	social	worker.	Alm																																									 																					70	The	 third	 leadership	 style	 is	 captaincy.	 Captaincy	 denotes	 a	 political	 leadership	 over	 large	polities,	typically	states	of	provinces.	For	the	small	groups	in	focus	of	this	study,	captaincy	is	not	relevant.	
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uses	 the	 term	 social	worker	 but,	 as	 Price	 and	 Ruud	 (2010,	 XXV)	 argue	 that	 it	 can	 be	understood	synonymously	with	social	reformer	(e.g.	in	Gorringe	2010).		Interestingly,	 a	 similar	 example	 comes	 from	China	where	Xi	 Chen	 analyses	 conditions	for	trust	 in	 leaders	 in	worker	movements	during	 industrial	restructuring	(Chen	2015).	In	 China	 too,	 Chen	 argued,	 corruption	 was	 so	 widespread	 that	 anyone	 with	 public	authority	 was	 easily	 suspected	 of	 not	 being	 trustworthy.	 He	 described	 how	 while	powerful	leaders	are	crucial	for	movements	to	emerge	and	grow,	the	suspicion	against	them	is	higher.	Often,	“selfish	motives”	(ibid,	139)	attributed	to	a	leader	by	workers	is	the	criterion	for	considering	him	untrustworthy.	And	once	the	workers	lost	trust	in	a	leader,	the	damage	tended	to	be	extensive.	The	reputation	of	the	whole	group	could	be	severely	affected,	 even	 if	 the	 leadership	 had	 changed.	 One	 more	 example	 comes	 from	 Auyero	(2003)	and	the	study	of	popular	contention	in	Argentina.	He	described	how	suspicion	of	protest	 leaders	 can	 easily	 develop	 in	 movements	 and	 turn	 the	 people	 against	 the	leadership.	In	addition,	Alm	(2010)	pointed	 towards	a	very	 interesting	contradiction.	He	said	 that	being	a	good	fixer	is	closely	related	to	being	close	to	the	powerful,	to	being	able	to	use	pressure	 to	 gain	 benefits	 for	 one’s	 supporters.	 This	 contradicts	 the	 expectations	 of	 a	social	reformer,	who	is	supposed	to	work	for	the	good	of	all	people,	be	nonpartisan	and	incorruptible.	 At	 a	 local	 level,	 it	may	be	possible	 to	 combine	 the	 two.	But	 at	 a	 certain	point	 in	time,	 the	 local	 leader	will	have	to	decide	between	improving	his	reputation	of	honesty	as	a	social	worker	and	sharpening	his	strategies	as	a	fixer.	Nielsen	 (2012)	 showed	 this	 contradiction	 by	 describing	 the	 career	 of	 a	 social	 activist	who	wanted	to	join	politics	(Nielsen	also	used	social	activist,	social	reformer	and	social	worker	 as	 synonyms	 (ibid,	 436f)).	 This	 is	 a	 big	 step,	 because	 activists	 and	 supporters	tend	 to	 see	 politics	 as	 an	 “unprincipled	 game	 of	 dishonesty	 and	 corruption	 morally	
upright	people	should	never	engage	in“	 (Nielsen	2012,	436).	While	 the	 social	worker	 in	the	focus	of	Nielsen’s	study	in	India	had	high	credibility	in	the	beginning,	he	lost	it	when	he	 entered	 politics.	 Those	who	 engage	 in	 politics	 are	 seen	 as	 non-trustworthy	 per	 se,	while	social	activists	can	more	easily	maintain	their	good	reputation.	Social	activists	can	transcend	the	boundary	between	activism	and	politics,	but	they	experience	difficulties.	This	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 description	 of	 lordly	 leaders	 by	 Price	 and	 Ruud	 (2010).	Social	reformers,	they	argue,	emphasize	their	disillusionment	with	conventional	politics.	They	 want	 to	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 latter	 and	 make	 sure	 that	 their	 involvement	 in	political	mobilization	is	perceived	as	disinterested.	If	eventually	they	stand	for	elections,	they	are	often	heard	arguing	that	they	would	be	only	social	workers	and	therefore	only	serving	others.		This	discussion	eventually	 leads	 to	Partha	Chatterjee’s	 separation	of	political	 and	civil	society	 in	globalised	India	(Chatterjee	2004).	He	argued	that	the	political	society	has	a	set	 of	 rules	 that	 is	 sharply	 different	 from	 the	 ones	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 often	 includes	recourse	 to	actors	and	 institutions	 that	are	extra-constitutional.	Chatterjee	viewed	 the	persistence	of	political	 society,	mostly	 formed	by	 farmers	and	 the	urban	poor,	 against	the	 bourgeois	 civil	 society	 reflecting	 the	 failure	 to	 establish	 complete	 capitalist	
	 131	
hegemony	in	the	society.	In	the	political	society,	according	to	Chatterjee,	negotiations	of	political	 nature	 define	 the	 rules	 of	 engagement	 between	 people,	 state	 and	 markets.	Corbridge	et	al.	(2005)	challenge	this	notion	and	argue	that	local	political	society	is	often	engaged	 in	 providing	 links	 and	 brokering	 deals	 between	 the	 government	 and	 people.	Price	and	Ruud	(2010,	xxix)	take	up	Corbridge’s	critique	and	argue	that	the	boundaries	between	 social	 and	 political	 activism	 still	 exist	 but	 have	 become	 permeable,	 which	implicitly	 challenges	 Chatterjee’s	 sharp	 separation.	 These	 discussions	 can	 only	 be	touched	upon	here,	because	the	focus	 lies	on	the	work	of	mobilisation.	Still,	 they	build	the	background	of	this	chapter	when	I	focus	on	the	movement	actors’	concrete	efforts	to	negotiate	these	borders.	In	order	 to	analyse	and	conceptualize	 the	 strategies	of	 the	 leaders	 in	 this	 study,	 I	will	base	myself	on	the	contradiction	between	being	a	fixer	on	the	one	hand	and	maintaining	one’s	 reputation	 as	 a	 social	worker	on	 the	other.	This	 contradiction	 is	 inherent	 in	 the	studies	 of	 Jeffrey,	 Price	 and	 Ruud,	 Alms	 and	 Nielsen	 and	 is	 also	 very	 helpful	 in	 the	context	of	this	study.		
1.3 Recalling	the	Terms	I	would	like	to	clarify	which	ones	of	the	above-introduced	terms	I	will	use	to	analyse	the	situation	in	Vidarbha	(see	also	the	table	below).	I	have	described	two	systems	of	how	to	classify	 and	 name	 different	 leaders	 in	 a	 movement.	 The	 system	 of	 Morris	 and	Staggenborg	 and	 Robnett	 refers	 to	 the	 different	 position	 a	 leader	 has	 within	 a	movement,	which	naturally	also	includes	different	tasks	(see	1.1).	The	system	described	in	 section	1.2	 refers	 to	 the	different	 strategies	 of	 leadership.	Also	 this	 system	 links	 to	different	tasks	of	leaders,	but	has	a	different	emphasis.		As	far	as	the	system	described	in	section	1.1	is	concerned,	the	scope	of	this	study	needs	to	 be	 considered.	 Some	 of	 the	 groups	 of	 the	 present	 study	 are	 small	 without	 a	 large	organizational	structure	(KAA,	VJAS).	Others	do	have	an	overhead	structure	(SSS,	BKS,	AIKS),	but	the	study	is	focussed	on	the	local	or	regional	level	of	the	movement	activity.	While	 I	was	 able	 to	 interview	 some	 of	 the	 first	 type	 of	 leaders	 (following	Morris	 and	Staggenborg	 2011),	 this	was	more	 about	 visions	 and	 hardly	 about	 the	 concrete	work	related	 to	 the	 movement.	 Consequently,	 in	 this	 section	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 strategies	 of	mobilization	mostly	of	the	second	type	of	leaders	and	third	type,	the	bridge-leaders.	In	 an	 attempt	 to	 stay	 as	 close	 as	possible	 to	 the	movement	 actors’	 own	nomenclature	(for	 the	Marathi	words	see	 table	9),	 I	will	use	 the	word	 ‘activist’	or	sometimes	 ‘village	activist’	for	the	bridge	leaders	and	the	word	‘leader’	for	the	second	type	of	leader.	I	name	as	supporters	the	movement	actors	without	leadership	functions.	I	prefer	‘supporters’	to	followers	 to	 underline	 their	 agency,	 following	 Gorringe	 (2010).	 The	 borders	 between	the	 first	 type	 of	 leaders,	 leaders,	 activists	 and	 supporters	 are	 fuzzy,	 –again	due	 to	 the	groups’	small	size	and	informal	structure.		Concerning	 the	 system	 described	 in	 section	 1.2,	 the	 interviewees	 never	 referred	 to	themselves	 or	 the	 leaders	 of	 a	 group	 in	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study	 as	 a	 social	 worker	 or	reformer.	 Interviewees	 only	 used	 the	 word	 for	 other	 people	 not	 involved	 in	 the	
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movement	(mostly	to	historical	figures	such	as	Phule).	Using	the	same	concepts	(as	I	will	show	 in	 the	next	 section),	 they	 talked	about	 this	difference	by	distinguishing	between	‘movement	leaders’	and	‘political	leaders’	or	‘politicians’.	I	will	adopt	this	nomenclature.	Using	 these	notions,	 I	 show	below	how	different	 leaders	 in	 the	movement	 around	 the	‘agrarian	 crisis’	 struggle	 to	maintain	 their	 supporters’	 trust	 and	 interest	 and	motivate	them	to	participate	in	the	groups’	agitations.		
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Table	9:	Recalling	the	different	terms	for	leadership	positions	and	strategies		
	 Term	used	in	this	study	 Corresponding	words	in	Marathi	 Persons	in	these	positions	in	
the	movement	groups		
(1)	Position	in	a	movement	(based	on	Robnett	1997,	Goldstone	2001,	Gorringe	2010,	Morris	and	Staggenborg	2011)	
First	type	of	leader	 Leader	 mhorakya	 SSS:	Raju	Shetti	KAA:	does	not	exist	VJAS:	does	not	exist	AIKS:	exists,	no	interview	
Second	type	of	leader	 Leader	 mhorakya,	neta	(sometimes:	karyakarta)	 SSS:	Ravikanth	Tupkar	KAA:	Avinash	Kakade	VJAS:	Kishor	Tiwari	AIKS:	no	name	
Third	type	of	leader	
(bridge-leader)	
Activist	Village	activist	 karyakarta	 SSS:	Shyam	Avthale	KAA:	Suddham	Pawar	VJAS:	Rajesh	Rathod	AIKS:	no	name	
Supporter	 	 samarthaka	 	
(2)	Strategies	of	leadership	(based	on	Manor	2000,	Jeffrey	2009,	Alm	2010,	Price	and	Ruud	2010,	Nielsen	2012)	
Fixer	 Fixer	 	 	
Politician	 Political	leader	Politician	 rajakiya	nete,	rajakiya	pudhari	 	
Social	reformer	
Social	worker	
Movement	leader	 sangathana	nete,	chalvaliche	nete	 	
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2 Proving	Trustworthiness	The	guiding	question	 for	 this	chapter	has	been	 to	understand	 the	reasons	 for	people’s	involvement	in	collective	action	as	well	as	for	their	choice	of	one	particular	group.	But	before	I	extensively	explain	the	reasons	for	participation,	I	will	start	with	the	reasons	for	non-participation.	Three	reasons	for	non-participation	were	mentioned	often71.	The	first	was	that	farmers	did	not	have	enough	time	to	go	to	agitations.	If	there	is	only	one	man	in	the	family,	it	is	not	possible	to	leave	the	fields	for	a	day	to	go	to	agitations.	The	second	reason	is	that	they	do	not	know	about	any	groups	or	have	not	been	informed	about	the	on-going	 agitations.	 Third,	 some	 farmers	 argued	 that	 the	 groups	 did	 not	 raise	 their	interests.	 Labourers	 mentioned	 that	 these	 groups	 were	 only	 for	 farmers	 and	 that	nobody	 fought	 for	 labourers.	 Many	 small	 and	 medium	 farmers	 suspected	 that	 big	landholders	would	 not	want	 to	 come	 to	 agitations	 because	 they	 did	 not	 suffer	 due	 to	prices	or	 lack	of	 infrastructure	and	 if	and	when	the	movement	brought	 fruit,	 the	 large	landholders	could	still	profit	from	the	success.	One	 group	 that	 very	 rarely	 participates	 in	 movement	 activities	 are	 the	 women.	 The	reason	 that	 they	 themselves	 as	 well	 as	 the	 male	 supporters	 put	 forth	 was	 that	agricultural	politics	was	no	issue	for	women	and	that	it	was	a	male	realm.	While	women	of	course	play	a	crucial	role	in	agriculture,	it	seems	that	these	political	farmer	movement	groups	are	hardly	a	way	for	women	to	engage	with	agricultural	issues.	Another	reason	might	be	that	women	rarely	own	land	in	their	names	(see	section	3.4,	chapter	II;	section	1.1,	chapter	VII).	As	a	consequence,	they	would,	for	example,	have	difficulties	accessing	the	 schemes	 that	 these	 movement	 groups	 are	 fighting	 for	 and	 they	 would	 therefore	possibly	 have	 very	 different	 claims.	 I	 encountered	 little	 involvement	 by	 women.	Sometimes,	women	or	male	supporters	said	that	women	supported	movement	groups’	activities.	 One	 example	 is	 the	 KAA	 agitation	 to	 block	 the	 road	 after	 an	 accident	 (see	below),	where	women	went	 to	 offer	moral	 support	 and	provide	 food	 for	 the	 activists.	Another	example	is	VJAS,	where	the	group	takes	up	and	supports	women’s	demands	to	ban	alcohol	 (see	section	3.1,	 chapter	 IV).	Last	but	not	 least,	 in	many	villages	 there	are	women’s	 self-help	 groups.	 In	 village	 KAA,	 where	 I	 was	 able	 to	 visit	 a	 self-help	 group	meeting,	 their	 activities	 are	 more	 self-help-oriented	 than	 political.	 However,	 the	movement	 groups	 in	 this	 study	 are	 a	 overwhelmingly	 male	 endeavour,	 and	 its	leadership	is	even	more	so.		Coming	back	to	the	question	of	why	people	decide	to	participate	in	a	movement	or	not,	whether	 or	 not	 the	 leader	 seemed	 trustworthy	 was	 the	 major	 reason	 mentioned.72	Therefore,	 the	 strategies	 of	 leaders	 and	 activists	 to	 establish	 and	 maintain	 this	trustworthiness	are	 interesting	 to	analyse	 from	 the	perspective	of	 leaders,	 activists	as																																									 																					71	It	was	difficult	to	find	people	ready	to	talk	about	their	reasons	for	non-participation.	Therefore,	I	additionally	rely	on	supporters	guessing	about	the	non-supporters’	reasons.	72	Apart	 from	my	own	research,	Wynistorf	 (2012)	has	also	shown	how	particularly	 the	 trust	 in	activists	is	central	for	movement	participation	in	AIKS.	
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well	as	supporters.	The	movement	groups	are	small,	quite	new	and	have	little	power	or	influence	compared	 to	 the	established	political	parties.	 I	argue	 that	 the	different	 traits	that	these	activists	and	leaders	have	to	fulfil	to	maintain	the	trust	contradict	each	other.	This	 creates	 a	 constant	 balancing	 act.	 Supporters	 use	 two	major	 lines	 of	 argument	 to	explain	 why	 they	 trust	 their	 respective	 activists	 and	 leaders	 and	 participate	 in	 their	agitations.	 These	 lines	 of	 argumentation	 for	 trustworthiness	 neatly	 fit	 the	 concepts	introduced	above:	fixing	qualities	and	a	reputation	of	honesty.	
2.1 Fixing	Qualities	If	an	activist	or	leader	wants	to	build	a	broad	constituency	on	a	local	level,	he	needs	to	prove	 that	he	 is	 able	 to	 achieve	 things;	 these	 are	his	 fixing	qualities.	 Supporters	often	emphasized	 the	 concrete	 benefits	 that	 the	 respective	 activist	 or	 leader	 brought	 the	village	or	them	personally.	Consequently,	it	is	one	important	part	of	all	the	groups’	work	that	the	activists	and	leaders	organize	village	level	activities	and	directly	support	their	constituencies.	The	activities	I	found	can	be	categorized	into	three	different	categories.	The	 first	 is	 to	 help	 supporters	 to	 interact	with	 the	 government,	 either	 to	 get	 benefits	they	believe	themselves	entitled	to	or	to	protect	them	from	government	agencies	in	case	the	supporters	feel	treated	unfairly;	second,	activists	and	leaders	help	supporters	with	input	or	output	as	well	as	labour	market	situations;	and	third,	groups	arrange	concrete	help	in	case	of	difficult	personal	situations	as	well	as	charitable	activities.	I	explain	each	of	these	in	more	detail	below.		Before	coming	to	that,	however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	that,	despite	the	 importance	of	the	 village	 activists,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 process	 to	 define	who	 becomes	 an	 activist.	 The	principle	was	rather	that	one	activist	recommended	other	potential	activists.	In	KAA,	an	activist	 explained	 that	 “those	who	 are	 good	 activists,	we	will	 ask	 them,	who	 is	 another	
good	activist.	This	is	the	process	how	we	recommend	each	other.”	 In	SSS,	 the	process	 is	a	little	 different.	 They	 actively	 try	 to	 expand	 to	 new	 villages	 by	 approaching	 the	 “key	
persons	 in	the	village,	 the	ones	that	have	the	control	over	the	village“,	 as	 one	 activist	 of	SSS	explained.	
Benefits	from	and	Protection	against	the	State	In	all	villages,	supporters	shared	stories	about	how	the	activists	helped	them	get	access	to	 government	 schemes,	 for	 example	 compensation	 for	 families	 of	 farmers	 who	committed	 suicide,	 pension	 or	 irrigation	 schemes.	 An	 activist	 of	 VJAS	 said	 that	 the	farmers	participated	in	a	group’s	activities	if	the	activists	
“are	doing	the	work	of	the	people	with	sincerity.	If	they	[farmers]	are	getting	the	result,	
they	will	get	involved	in	your	group,	but	if	you	cheat	them	they	will	not	follow	you.	When	
we	are	calling	for	the	people	to	come	for	the	agitation	they	are	not	saying	‘no’,	they	trust	
on	us	because	we	are	doing	their	work.”		It	 is	 clear	 to	 supporters	 as	 well	 as	 activists	 that	 this	 “work”	 is	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 their	activities.	But	what	exactly	is	it?		
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One	 supporter	 of	 VJAS	 described	 it	 as	 follows:	 “If	the	kisans	have	work	pending	for	the	
District	Collector,	this	work	is	done	by	our	activist.	(…)	One	of	our	activists	can	do	the	work	
and	 pressurize	 the	 officer”.	Another	 supporter	 of	 VJAS,	 a	 young	 farmer,	 had	 lost	 his	mother	and	 father	because	 they	had	both	committed	suicide	on	 the	same	day.	He	said	that	he	had	approached	the	activist,	and	then	the	leader,	Tiwari,	had	helped	him.	He	said	that		
“because	of	 loan	 stress,	both	my	parents	had	 committed	 suicide	on	 the	 same	day,	 same	
place.	 The	 loan	 was	 around	 80,000	 Rupees,	 they	 had	 borrowed	 the	 loan	 from	 the	 co-
operative	society.	Tiwari	came	here,	then	block	development	officer	and	Rathod	[village	
activist]	came	here.	They	helped	me	in	the	process	of	getting	the	compensation	of	1	lakh	
Rupees	[for	suicide	of	parents].”	A	 supporter	 of	 AIKS	 reported	 that	 he	 was	 indebted	 because	 he	 could	 not	 sell	 his	sugarcane	 as	planned.	He	had	 approached	 several	 government	officials	 as	well	 as	 one	BJP	 leader,	but	nobody	had	helped	him.	Eventually,	he	approached	an	activist	of	AIKS.	The	latter	helped	the	supporter	with	the	paperwork	and	got	in	touch	with	the	owner	of	the	respective	sugar	factory,	notably	this	very	BJP	leader.	The	supporter	shared	that	“I	
got	my	money	back	and,	looking	at	me,	other	people	also	came	to	know	that	if	my	problem	
was	solved	by	AIKS,	theirs	was	too.	(…)	From	that	moment,	I	was	in	AIKS	only”	(Wynistorf	
2012).	Supporters	of	KAA	and	SSS	also	talked	about	similar	activities.	But	additionally	and	even	if	the	activist	is	not	there,	the	badges	that	the	groups	distribute	to	their	supporters	are	a	matter	of	support	for	the	farmers	while	dealing	with	the	government.	The	leader	of	KAA,	Kakade,	told	me:		
“Kisans	used	to	go	alone	and	faced	many	problems,	troubles.	Therefore	we	are	giving	this	
token	[badge]	to	kisans.	 If	 the	token	 is	on	his	dress,	government	officials	will	know	that	
this	kisan	belongs	 to	a	group.	This	 creates	pressure	 for	 the	official	and	he	behaves	 in	a	
good	manner.	Kisans	have	good	experiences	from	the	last	four	years.”	Often,	 the	 activists	 and	 leaders	 start	 to	 engage	 when	 several	 farmers	 are	 concerned.	Those	stories	then	become	well	known	in	the	respective	villages.	In	the	village	of	VJAS,	eight	 farmers	 had	 planned	 to	 build	 a	well.	 The	 government	was	 supposed	 to	 pay	 the	wages	of	 the	workers	through	the	MGNREGA	(see	section	2.4,	chapter	II).	The	farmers	had	taken	up	loans,	constructed	the	wells	and	paid	the	wages	to	the	workers.	However,	even	 after	 sixty	 days,	 the	 government	 had	 not	 paid	 back	 the	wages	 to	 farmers.	 They	approached	 the	village	activist,	who	called	 the	 leader	Tiwari	and	 together	with	a	 local	journalist,	 they	 tried	 to	solve	 the	 issue.	After	another	eight	days,	 the	 farmers	got	 their	money.	In	the	words	of	the	activist	“the	problem	occurred	just	because	one	junior	official	
was	lazy	and	did	not	pay	it.	But	because	of	our	pressure,	it	was	solved.”	In	 the	village	of	KAA,	many	supporters	narrated	and	corroborated	an	 incident	when	a	boy	 was	 killed	 by	 a	 truck	 accident	 in	 a	 neighbouring	 village.	 The	 village	 activist	happened	 to	 be	 there,	 and	 he	 started	 to	 block	 the	 road.	 Other	 KAA	 supporters	 got	 in	touch	 and	 blocked	 the	 road	 with	 motorbikes	 for	 several	 hours.	 They	 demanded	 a	
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compensation	 for	 the	affected	 family	as	well	 as	 speed–breakers	 from	 the	government.	The	police	officers	agreed	and	within	the	same	day	the	government	constructed	speed–breakers	on	that	road.	Through	this	incident,	as	one	supporter	of	KAA	said,	"people	from	
the	 other	 village	 realized	 that	 KAA	 is	 fighting	 for	 this	 people,	 so	 they	 joined	 our	
movement".	SSS	 supporters	often	 complained	 that	 the	Maharashtra	State	Electricity	Board	 (MSEB)	received	subsidies	 from	the	government	to	provide	17–18	hours	of	electricity	per	day,	but	 the	 farmers	 got	 only	 6–7	 hours.	 Moreover,	 the	 electricity	 comes	 mostly	 at	 night	making	 it	 very	 difficult	 for	 the	 farmers	 to	 irrigate	 their	 fields,	 if	 they	 possess	 any	irrigation	facilities	at	all.	Once,	the	farmers	did	not	pay	their	electricity	bills.	The	MSEB	argued	 that	 the	 farmers	 should	 first	 pay	 their	 electricity	 bills	 and	 then	 demand	more	electricity.	 SSS	 did	 not	 agree	 and	 they	 organized	 an	 agitation.	 According	 to	 their	supporters,	 MSEB	 officials	 became	 afraid	 of	 the	 SSS	 agitations	 and	 therefore	 they	provided	 electricity	 to	 the	 farmers.	 The	 village	 activist	 described	 what	 the	 agitation	looked	like:		
“We	called	all	kisans	to	gather	in	front	of	MSEB	and	ask	‘why	did	you	cut	off	our	electrical	
supply?’	(...)	If	there	isn’t	any	response	from	their	side,	then	we	block	the	roads	or	we	sit	
down	on	the	main	entry	gate	of	MSEB	to	stop	the	entry	and	exit	of	MSEB	staff	 from	the	
office.”	However,	despite	this	agitation,	the	MSEB	officials	had	come	to	the	village	to	cut	off	the	electric	 supply.	 Villagers	 shared	 that	 the	 SSS	 supporters	 called	 each	 other	 and	 came	together.	 They	 threatened	 the	 officials	 and	 banned	 their	 entry	 into	 the	 village.	 The	village	 activist	 claimed	 that	 the	 officials	 “are	afraid,	because	this	village	belongs	 to	SSS	
and	the	kisans	won’t	let	them	enter.	Even	the	people	from	the	bank	they	are	not	coming	to	
the	 village	 anymore.	 (…)	 And	 the	 result	 of	 this	 was	 that	 the	 kisans	 are	 not	 facing	 any	
problem.”	About	 this	agitation,	an	SSS	supporter	said	 that	 “Avthale	[village	activist]	had	
done	such	activities	for	the	kisans	–	therefore	we	have	trust	on	him.”	Also	in	the	village	of	KAA	and	several	neighbouring	villages,	MSEB	had	cut	the	farmers’	electricity	 because	 they	 had	 not	 paid	 their	 electricity	 bills	 on	 time.	 KAA	demanded	 to	either	waive	the	bills	completely	or	suggested	a	compromise.	The	compromise	was	that	the	MSEB	must	give	the	farmers	more	time	to	pay	the	bills,	namely	until	the	end	of	the	cropping	 season	 when	 the	 farmers	 would	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position.	 Many	 supporters	mentioned	the	agitation	that	ensued.	Kakade,	the	leader	of	KAA,	described	it	as	follows:	
“We	have	collected	the	statistic	how	many	kisans	are	there,	how	much	land	is	there	and	
how	much	it	[power	cut]	will	affect	us.	Then	we	have	submitted	that	data	to	agriculture	
department,	District	Collector	office,	Chief	Minister,	vice–Chief	Minister,	but	there	was	no	
output.	 Therefore	 in	 November	we	 had	 arranged	 the	 rally	 (…).	 But	 nothing	 happened.	
Then	we	said	that,	 in	our	location	whichever	department	is	running	under	your	[MSEB]	
rule,	it	will	not	function,	because	we	will	lock	it.	If	you	are	not	supporting	us	then	we	will	
not	help	you	(…).	And	then	we	had	organized	a	rally	in	four	locations,	in	one	location	100	
kisans	came,	in	another	location	80	kisans	came,	another	location	100–125	kisans	came.	
Four	block	level	offices	we	have	locked,	regional	offices	we	have	locked,	due	to	which	we	
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have	created	a	 lot	of	publicity.	But	before	 locking	the	doors,	we	asked	the	 inside	staff	 if	
they	want	to	come	out	from	the	office,	they	can	come	and	if	they	are	not	coming	then	also	
fine,	 we	 will	 lock	 from	 outside.	 (…)	 During	 this	 issue,	 the	 CM	 [Chief	 Minister	 of	
Maharashtra]	 came	 to	 this	 district,	 and	we	met	 the	District	Collector.	 First	we	want	 to	
meet	 to	CM	and	 if	not	 then	we	stop	his	vehicle	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	road.	But	 finally	we	
talked	with	the	CM	and	the	Minister	of	power	(…).	Finally	they	were	ready,	they	said	that	
if	they	[farmers]	will	stop	the	whole	production,	this	won’t	be	good.	Then	they	have	given	
us	time	till	end	of	March.	Government	didn’t	support	us,	now	they	support	us	and	we	won	
in	our	movement.”	In	village	KAA,	the	MSEB	had	built	electrical	transmission	towers	in	the	fields	of	farmers.	The	affected	farmers	accused	the	MSEB	that	they	had	not	asked	for	permission	and	were	not	paying	proper	compensation.	So	the	supporters	of	KAA	went	to	the	fields	and	tried	to	stop	the	construction	work	 forcefully.	The	affected	 farmers	told	me	how	Pawar,	 the	village	 activist,	 and	 other	 supporters	 of	 KAA	 stopped	 the	work	 of	MSEB	workers	 and	demanded	 compensation.	 In	 the	 end,	 many	 farmers	 reported	 that	 they	 received	compensations	from	the	MSEB.	One	of	these	farmers	expressed	that	the	activists	of	KAA	
“gave	support	to	the	kisans	to	stop	the	construction.	Now	we	feel	that	we	want	to	support	
this	KAA	work".	Moreover,	KAA	supported	 farmers	who	eventually	 filed	a	case	 in	court	against	these	electric	towers.	KAA	provided	information	about	the	price	of	land	and	gave	help	with	the	documents	and	in	writing	applications	and	letters.	In	village	SSS,	the	government	had	planned	to	construct	a	dam	close	to	the	village.	Many	interviewees	 in	 this	 village	 feared	 that	 this	 dam	 would	 use	 the	 same	 water	 that	 the	farmers	 use	 to	 irrigate	 their	 fields	 as	 well	 as	 for	 their	 household	 needs.	 The	 village	activist	was	convinced	 that	 in	 that	 case,	 “the	kisans	of	the	village	will	definitely	die”	 and	the	women	will	face	problems	in	daily	life.	Therefore,	the	SSS	demanded	that	the	village	should	 get	 access	 to	 a	 canal	 or	 pipeline	 distributing	 the	 water.	 The	 activist	 called	 an	assembly	in	the	village	in	order	to	inform	the	whole	population	about	their	complaints	and	 demands.	 “The	purpose	of	 that	assembly	was	to	make	the	kisans	and	 labour	aware,	
that	this	is	not	an	issue	of	farming.	If	the	water	is	going	to	another	village,	irrigation	will	
not	be	 there	and	even	 the	 labour	will	not	get	 the	drinking	water”	 as	 the	 village	 activist	told.	The	sarpanch	of	the	respective	village	needed	to	sign	a	no–objection–certificate	for	the	construction	work	of	the	dam	to	start.	The	assembly	forced	the	sarpanch	to	sign	this	certificate	only	if	the	demands	were	met.	Despite	all	these	efforts,	the	dam	was	built	and	the	village	did	not	get	water	 from	it.	Therefore,	 the	village	activist	 tapped	the	pipeline	running	from	the	lake	to	the	nearby	town	and	redirected	the	water	to	the	village	of	SSS.		In	 the	 village	 of	 VJAS,	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 dam	 has	 been	 on-going	 for	 years.	 The	construction	site	is	close	to	the	village	and	therefore	the	government	took	away	the	land	of	several	 farmers	and	gave	 them	some	compensation.	These	 farmers	complained	that	they	 either	 did	 not	 get	 any	 compensation	 or	 the	 compensation	 they	 received	was	 too	small.	A	small	farmer	complained	that	“I	lost	around	5	acres	of	land,	and	(…)	they	gave	us	
only	the	government	price,	even	if	this	land	was	totally	irrigated	land.”	Further,	 the	water	of	 the	 dam	 did	 not	 go	 to	 their	 village	 for	 the	 irrigation,	 but	 to	 another	 area.	 Some	 of	
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these	 farmers	 approached	 the	 village	 activist.	 VJAS	 organised	 agitations	 in	 a	 nearby	town	and	filed	cases	to	get	higher	compensation.	Some	supporters	reported	that	in	the	end	 they	 received	 compensation	 for	 their	 land	 thanks	 to	 VJAS,	 but	 others	 were	disappointed.	One	 farmer	said	 that	 “we	tried	to	stop	the	construction	of	the	dam,	but	the	
dam	is	completed	now.	(…)	Even	we	do	not	get	the	water	from	this	dam,	the	water	is	going	
to	another	village.	The	main	source	of	income,	land,	we	have	lost	it.	Our	future	will	be	full	
of	problems	due	to	the	dam.”	Another	example	for	activities	targeting	the	state	is	the	following.	KAA	was	not	satisfied	with	the	allocation	of	drought	compensation.	The	decision	whether	or	not	to	consider	an	area	drought-prone	and	therefore	eligible	for	compensation	payments	depends	on	rain	measurement	 instruments	 that	 the	 government	 had	 installed	 at	 the	 block	 level.	According	to	the	leader	of	KAA,	this	led	to	a	crude	solution	and	as	a	consequence	some	villages	were	not	considered	drought-prone,	even	 though	 they	had	received	very	 little	rainfall.	Even	if	 in	the	majority	of	villages	in	a	block	the	rains	are	above	average,	some	villages	 still	 have	drought	problems.	 Consequently,	KAA	demanded	 rain	measurement	instruments	at	the	village	level.	Wynistorf	 (2012)	 also	 described	 an	 example	 where	 AIKS	 interacted	 with	 the	government.	In	a	neighbouring	village,	there	was	a	problem	with	a	veterinary	clinic.	The	doctor’s	post	had	been	vacant	 for	many	years.	Supporters	of	AIKS	narrated	that	a	cow	belonging	 to	 one	 of	 the	 supporters	 died	 because	 it	 could	 not	 be	 treated	 in	 time.	Therefore,	 they	 “took	 this	 question	 to	 Kisan	 Sabha	 [AIKS]	 and	 then	 it	 was	 sent	 to	
agricultural	Minister.	 It	was	 successful	 and	a	 doctor	was	 appointed	 there.	 So	 the	 people	
started	thinking	that	through	Kisan	Sabha	we	can	get	some	solutions”.	
Improving	the	Situation	in	the	Markets	In	many	cases,	supporters	of	groups	shared	incidents	when	the	groups	helped	them	in	the	 input	 market	 and	 in	 one	 case,	 also	 in	 labour	 markets.	 Many	 supporters	 of	 KAA	complained	 that	 once,	 during	 sowing,	 there	was	 a	 seed	 shortage	 on	 the	 local	market.	They	 came	 to	 know	 about	 the	 shortage	 some	 days	 in	 advance	 and	 believed	 that	 the	traders	 created	 it	 artificially.	 So	 KAA	 activists	 met	 the	 Agriculture	 Officer	 and	 the	District	Collector	and	informed	them	of	the	impending	situation.	The	activists	demanded	that	 the	 officials	 should	 do	 something	 about	 it.	 But,	 as	 the	 village	 activist	 argued,	because	 the	 officials	 “have	 not	 worked	 properly	 then	 we	 [farmers	 and	 activists]	 have	
caught	their	shirt	and	asked,	why	we	are	not	getting	the	seeds".	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 District	Collector	intervened	and	the	shortage	was	prevented.		Many	 SSS	 supporters	 reported	 direct	 benefits,	 namely	 higher	 prices,	 for	 the	 farmers	from	agitations	in	the	marketplace.	Several	supporters	told	a	story	about	a	trader	who	used	to	fix	prices	in	the	cotton	market	according	to	his	whims.	The	farmers	approached	the	village	activist	and	he	organized	an	agitation.	The	farmers	went	to	the	marketplace,	blocked	the	offices	of	the	traders	and	negotiated	with	the	traders	for	higher	prices.	In	 the	case	of	VJAS,	not	many	 interviewees	mentioned	activities	 that	were	particularly	addressed	at	the	market.	But	one	supporter	reported	that	“one	trader	cheated	the	kisans.	
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He	has	given	bogus	fertilizer	to	the	kisans.”	The	supporter	approached	the	village	activist	and	“then	we	went	there	in	front	of	that	shop,	and	he	had	returned	the	money	back	to	the	
kisans.	 (…)	From	this	village,	50	kisans	got	back	 their	money.	And	this	was	organized	by	
our	VJAS”.	BKS	is	not	very	active	(see	section	3.1,	chapter	IV),	but	interventions	in	the	markets	are	the	 only	 activities	 the	 supporters	 of	 the	 organisation	 spoke	 about.	 According	 to	 the	farmers,	the	labourers	dealing	with	the	agricultural	products	in	the	nearby	marketplace	often	cheated	while	measuring	the	produce.	One	farmer	said	that	“we	demanded	to	start	
the	electrical	weight	machines	in	the	agriculture	market.	Kisans	had	bad	experience	in	the	
old	weight	machines.”	He	reported	that	the	situation	improved	after	this	agitation.	Importantly,	KAA	has	its	“constructive	leg”,	including	marketing	activities	such	as	a	shop	for	organic	farm	products,	trainings	for	farmers	on	how	organic	farming	works	and	the	“Root	Milk”	project	 (see	 section	 3.1,	 chapter	 IV;	 also	 section	 2.3	 chapter	 VI).	 All	 these	activities	can	also	be	considered	‘fixing’	activities	that	aim	at	improving	the	(long-term)	situation	of	the	farmers	in	the	output	market.		In	the	village	of	VJAS,	many	supporters	said	that	they	had	profited	from	an	initiative	of	VJAS	to	increase	the	wages	for	tendu	leaf	cutters.	After	the	harvest	of	the	tobacco	leaves,	
tendu	 leaves	are	cut	from	the	forest	for	about	one	month	in	May.	The	forest	belongs	to	the	 Forest	 Department,	 which	 holds	 auctions	 to	 allot	 the	 contracts	 for	 tendu	 leaf	collection.	 Thereafter,	 the	 contractors	 hire	 labour	 for	 the	 cutting	 work	 with	 an	obligation	 to	 pay	 the	 minimum	 wages	 as	 decided	 by	 the	 government.	 The	 labourers	collect	 the	 tendu	 leaves	 in	bags,	 each	containing	100	 leaves,	 and	get	paid	per	bag.	But	interviewees	reported	that	the	labourers	received	below	minimum	wage	amounts	while	the	contractors	had	earned	money	by	selling	the	tendu	leaves.	The	leader	as	well	as	the	village	 activist	 called	 for	 an	 agitation	 against	 low	 wages	 and	 the	 group	 organised	 an	agitation	 in	 various	 villages.	 Eventually,	 the	 labourers	 received	 higher	 wages.	 This	agitation	 is	 the	 only	 one	 I	 found	 directed	 at	 higher	 wages	 in	 a	 labour	market.	When	farmers	talked	about	labour,	they	usually	referred	to	labour	market	situations	where	the	farmers	 were	 employers	 or	 both	 employers	 and	 labourers.	 In	 the	 business	 of	 tendu	leaves,	in	contrast,	farmers	were	solely	labourers.		
Immediate	Help	Last	but	not	 least,	 if	 one	 their	 supporters	 is	 in	 a	particularly	difficult	 situation,	 village	activists	asserted	that	 the	group	tries	to	help	him/her.	 If	possible,	activists	and	mostly	leaders	raise	funds	to	help	them	financially.	An	SSS	activist	said	that		
“whenever	the	kisans	are	in	trouble,	we	are	going	there	to	help.	Once	we	had	done	blood	
donation	also.	This	movement	is	very	good	for	the	kisans.	Whenever	any	kisan	is	in	need	
of	economic	help	for	the	medical	treatment,	we	had	contributed	some	money	for	the	help.	
Anything	we	do.”	Beyond	 that,	many	supporters	mentioned	 that	 it	was	an	 important	part	of	 the	groups’	work	 to	encourage	 the	 farmers.	 Supporters	often	 told	me	 that	 they	got	moral	 support	from	the	group,	a	feeling	that	others	are	going	through	the	same	problems.	The	leader	of	
	 141	
SSS	 pointed	 out	 that	 their	 most	 important	 task	 was	 to	 tell	 the	 farmers	 that	 they	
“shouldn’t	 drink	 the	 poison,	 but	 come	 for	 the	 agitation.”	Also	 supporters	 of	 KAA	 saw	emotional	 support	 as	 an	 important	 issue.	One	 supporter	 said	 that	 “this	KAA,	Kakade	is	
fighting.	 They	 are	 also	 unable	 to	 give	 money,	 but	 they	 have	 motivated	 me,	 given	 me	
emotional	 support.”	 And	 Kakade	 himself	 assured	 that	 “we	are	giving	 suggestion	 to	 the	
kisans	 and	 tell	 them	what	 to	 do.	We	 can	 give	 suggestions	 and	 courage	 to	 people	 not	 to	
commit	suicide.”	The	 local	 activist	 of	 VJAS	 also	 reported	 several	 cases	 of	 economic	 support.	 Tiwari	pointed	 out	 often	 that	 he	 supported	 widows	 in	 particular	 and	 provided	 them	 with	training.	But	according	to	the	 local	activist,	 this	did	not	take	place	 in	the	village	of	this	study	and	therefore	the	farmers	did	not	mention	these	activities.	What	they	did	mention,	though,	 was	 that	 the	 leader	 Tiwari	 had	 come	 to	 farmers	 in	 the	 period	 of	 trouble,	particularly	if	someone	had	committed	suicide,	and	had	supported	the	bereaved	morally	as	well	as	financially.	Additionally,	not	only	in	cases	of	a	problem	but	even	if	there	is	a	big	 function	 in	 the	 village,	 Tiwari	 comes	 to	 the	 village	 and	 as	 the	 local	 activist	emphasised,	 “through	him,	other	 important,	 rich	people	 from	nearby	villages	also	come,	
big	politicians	come,	all	activists	will	also	be	there”.	All	these	examples	show	that	it	is	crucial	for	the	groups	to	have	activists	in	the	villages	that	are	‘fixers’	and	can	organize	activities	and	motivate	farmers	to	participate.	
Success	in	Other	Contexts	At	a	higher	 level,	 these	fixing	qualities	do	not	show	up	in	everyday	interactions,	but	 in	the	 successes	 that	 a	 group	 –	 and	 its	 leader	 –	 can	 achieve	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	government	 in	another	 (geographical)	 context.	The	 leader	of	 SSS,	Tupkar,	 emphasized	that	 he	 was	 fascinated	 by	 the	 work	 of	 Raju	 Shetti,	 the	 leader	 of	 SSS,	 in	 Western	Maharashtra.	 Tupkar	 first	 worked	 for	 Raju	 Shetti	 in	 Western	 Maharashtra	 before	 he	established	 SSS	 in	 Vidarbha	 (see	 section	 3.1,	 chapter	 IV).	 He	was	 inspired	 by	 Shetti’s	work	and	success	in	Western	Maharashtra	and	he	sought	to	replicate	his	success	story	in	 Vidarbha.	 Tupkar	 argued	 that	 “we	should	not	talk	about	what	we	have	done,	but	the	
future	is	important.	Raju	Shetti	is	very	powerful.	The	political	leaders	and	the	government	
are	afraid	of	him	and	of	what	he	could	change.”	Tupkar	and	the	activists	of	SSS	therefore	pointed	out	Shetti’s	successes	particularly	in	mobilizing	young	farmers.	Farmers	also	mentioned	Raju	Shetti's	successes	in	Western	Maharashtra.	A	farmer	said	that	 “I	 am	 proud	 that	 I	 am	 in	 SSS.	 Because	 whatever	 they	 had	 done	 in	 Western	
Maharashtra,	 the	 same	 thing	 should	 be	 done	 in	 Vidarbha”.	 Surprisingly,	 Shetti’s	succeeded	 in	 motivating	 supporters	 not	 just	 of	 SSS,	 but	 supporters	 of	 other	 groups,	particularly	 KAA	 and	 AIKS,	 as	 well.	 Farmers	 often	 expressed	 their	 frustration	 that	agriculture	was	not	profitable	and	the	agitations	organized	by	different	groups	had	not	been	 successful.	 But	 in	 Western	 Maharashtra,	 so	 many	 farmers	 imagined	 that	agriculture	was	flourishing	and	profitable.	Consequently,	many	farmers	and	activists	felt	that	Shetti	was	an	inspiration	for	them	because	they	could	see	that	it	was	possible	“to	do	
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something”.	 One	 supporter	 of	 KAA	 argued	 that	 “Shetti	is	a	real	leader	of	kisans	because	
the	government	has	accepted	his	demands.”	These	 fixing	 qualities	 on	 different	 levels	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	 trustworthiness	 and	therefore	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 leaders,	 activists	 and	 movement	 groups.	 To	 achieve	these	fixing	qualities,	the	leaders	and	activists	need	to	be	close	to	the	powerful	and	build	bonds	with	 the	 established	 parties.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 need	 to	 compete	with	 the	established	parties	 in	offering	these	fixing	qualities.	They	can	hardly	win	in	this	realm,	though.	 This	 is	 not	 only	 because	 they	 are	 not	 remotely	 as	 powerful	 as	 the	 political	parties.	 It	 is	 also	 because	being	 close	 to	 the	powerful	 and	 seriously	 engaging	 in	 these	activities	means	to	risk	the	most	important	trait	that	gives	them	an	advantage	over	the	established	parties:	their	reputation	of	honesty.		
2.2 Assuring	Honesty	–	Staying	Out	of	Politics	Honesty	 is	then	the	second,	crucial	argument	for	mobilizing	people,	especially	because	these	 groups	 are	 small	 and	 new.	 Besides	 trying	 to	 keep	 themselves	 distinct	 from	‘political	 leaders’,	 the	 movement	 leaders	 constantly	 need	 to	 reassert	 their	 honest	intentions.	 Supporters,	 particularly	 active	 supporters	 with	 personal	 ties	 to	 village	activists,	often	noted	that	their	respective	activist/leader	was	honest	and	doing	all	this	
“from	the	bottom	of	his	heart”.	 However,	 to	 demonstrate	 honesty	 to	 the	 larger	 base	 of	supporters	 is	 a	 delicate	 issue	 and	 empirically	 this	 means	 distancing	 oneself	 from	‘politics’.	Leaders,	activists	as	well	as	supporters	often	defended	the	group’s	honesty	by	arguing	that	the	group	was	not	“in	politics”.	If	 interviewees	accused	activists	or	leaders	to	 be	 “interested	 only	 in	 politics”,	 it	 meant	 that	 these	 activists	 or	 leaders	 –	 or	 then	politicians	–	did	not	fight	for	a	cause	but	only	for	their	personal	interests.	Therefore,	the	activists	and	leaders	were	eager	to	emphasize	that	they	were	not	a	political	party	but	a	
sanghatana	 –	 a	 movement	 group.	 This	 now	 shows	 one	 more	 balancing	 act	 for	 the	activists	 and	 leaders.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 politics	 is	 seen	 as	 being	 entrenched	 in	 a	dishonesty	 and	 corruption	 that	 honest	 people	 should	 stay	 away	 from.	 On	 the	 other,	supporters	 as	 well	 as	 activists	 and	 leaders	 believe	 that	 real	 change	 can	 only	 happen	through	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 therefore	 electoral	 politics.	 The	 activists	 and	leaders	therefore	find	many	arguments	to	manage	this	paradox	of	staying	a	movement	leader	or	activist	 even	 if	 they	are	 in	one	way	or	another	 involved	 in	electoral	politics.	How	did	this	whole	problem	of	movement	leaders	who	joined	politics	start	in	Vidarbha?	
Movement	Leaders	in	Politics	Sharad	 Joshi	 of	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movement	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 (see	 section	 2.4,	chapter	 IV)	 is	 the	most	 prominent	 example	 of	 a	 ‘movement	 leader’	 who	 after	 having	turned	 into	a	 ‘politician’	 lost	 the	 trust	of	 the	 farmers.	 Joshi’s	entry	 into	politics	caused	many	supporters	to	leave	Shetkari	Sanghatana.	One	farmer	who	now	supports	KAA	said	that	 “I	 was	 part	 in	 Sharad	 Joshi’s	 agitation,	 I	 was	 in	 front	 (…).	 Kisans	 started	 to	 give	
respect	 to	 Sharad	 Joshi	 as	 god	 of	 kisans,	 but	 unfortunately	 he	 entered	 in	 politics”.	 Joshi	
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himself	 argued	 that	 “I	 used	 my	 abilities	 as	 an	 MP	 [Member	 of	 Parliament]73	to	 push	
forward	the	issues	of	kisans”.	He	conceded	that	his	party	joined	the	National	Democratic	Alliance	led	by	the	BJP	but	that,	he	maintained,	did	not	mean	joining	the	BJP.	He	added	that	 his	 party	 remained	 independent	 and	 collaborated	 with	 the	 BJP	 on	 the	 common	issues	of	liberalization	and	globalization.	Joshi’s	 career,	many	activists	and	 leaders	 claimed,	was	 the	 reason	why	 farmers	would	have	difficulties	trusting	any	movement	 leader	again.	This	makes	mobilization	difficult	for	 today’s	movements.	 One	 supporter	 of	 AIKS	 clearly	 stated	 that	 “to	join	politics,	this	
man	did	a	drama.	He	made	use	of	poor	people	and	then	left	these	people	alone.”	Later	 this	supporter	 added	 that	 even	 in	 AIKS	 such	 a	 problem	 existed	 and	 “when	 they	 [the	
activists/leaders]	get	a	post	 they	 forget	everything,	 like	Sharad	 Joshi	did.”	This	 makes	 it	clear	how	important	it	is	to	maintain	a	reputation	of	not	being	in	politics.		Sharad	 Joshi’s	 story	 heightened	 the	 farmers’	 mistrust	 of	 activists	 and	 leaders.	 Many	supporters	 felt	 –	 like	 one	 supporter	 of	KAA	–	 that	 the	 transformation	of	 a	 “movement	
leader	 into	a	political	 leader,	 like	MP	or	MLA	[Member	of	Legislative	Assembly]74”	 was	 a	problem.	In	this	transformation,	an	activist	of	VJAS	argued,	the	leaders	would	“forget	the	
kisans,	and	focus	on	his	own	development	and	increase	his	wealth”.	A	farmer	in	the	village	of	AIKS	said	 that	 “to	join	politics	these	people	make	use	of	the	poor	people	and	then	leave	
them	alone.	Let	it	be	AIKS	or	something	else,	they	do	not	do	anything	for	the	kisans.	If	they	
reach	 heights,	 they	 leave	 the	 kisans	 behind.	 Now	 the	 kisans	 do	 not	 have	 faith	 in	 any	
leaders.”	This	helplessness	in	the	face	of	leaders	who	change	once	they	come	to	power	is	prominent	 in	many	 interviews.	A	 supporter	of	AIKS	stated	 that	 “the	main	enemy	of	the	
kisan	 is	 the	 leader	who	 doesn’t	 fight	 for	 the	 kisans”.	 He	 clarified	 that	 he	 spoke	 of	 the	leaders	who	joined	politics	and	“automatically	become	like	them	[politicians]	only”.	
Selflessness	in	Politics	This	 makes	 it	 clear	 how	 important	 it	 is	 to	 maintain	 the	 reputation	 of	 being	 honest.	Therefore,	 for	 all	 the	 leaders	 and	 activists,	 it	 was	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 the	decision	to	start	or	join	a	movement	group	was	an	altruistic	decision	not	motivated	by	their	 own	 vested	 interest.	 The	 leader	 of	 VJAS	 justified	 his	 activism	 by	 saying	 that	“nowadays	god	is	too	busy	because	there	are	too	many	people,	the	world	is	overcrowded.	
So	 god	 has	 people	 like	 myself	 who	 help	 him	 and	 care	 for	 the	 poor	 people”.	 Later	 he	explained	why	he	founded	a	movement	group	and	not	a	political	party	by	talking	about	his	early	life	when	he	was	
“fascinated	to	do	politics.	But	then	I	 learned	that	politics	is	a	pain.	So	I	shifted	my	focus	
from	politics	to	hardship.	I	saw	that	the	people	we	want	to	represent,	they	are	too	poor,	
they	 cannot	 decide	 on	 their	 own.	 They	 are	 in	 the	 clutches	 of	 administration,	 money	
lenders,	wrong	agricultural	practices.”																																										 																					73	A	Member	of	Parliament	(MP)	is	a	representative	elected	by	the	voters	of	an	electoral	district	to	the	legislature	at	national	level	in	the	Lok	Sabha,	the	lower	house.	74	A	 Member	 of	 Legislative	 Assembly	 (MLA)	 is	 a	 representative	 elected	 by	 the	 voters	 of	 an	electoral	district	to	the	legislature	at	state	level.		
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While	this	shows	a	certain	paternalistic	 tendency,	 the	 leader	of	KAA	ostensibly	argued	that	his	decision	to	join	electoral	politics	was	entirely	dependent	on	the	support	of	other	members	 of	 his	 group.	He	 assured	 that	 “I	don’t	want	to	be	MLA	or	MP.	Working	for	the	
welfare	of	the	people	is	not	an	easy	task.	But	if	 it	 is	a	felt	need	by	the	people,	I	am	ready.	
(…)	It	is	not	a	sacrifice.	My	inherent	happiness	is	based	on	the	work	with	people.”	Activists	of	SSS	also	talked	about	their	solidarity.	Tupkar,	 the	 leader	of	SSS,	repeatedly	expressed	 his	 solidarity	 with	 the	 farmers	 of	 Vidarbha	 and	 his	 anger	 about	 their	suffering.	 But	 the	 village	 activist	 reasoned	 that	 “each	person	has	his	own	dream	 to	do	
something	in	the	whole	life,	someone’s	dream	is	to	do	a	good	job,	buy	a	good	flat	and	stay	
with	the	family	(…).	But	I	enjoy	more	when	I	am	doing	some	work	for	others	rather	than	
for	myself.”	The	 above	 examples	 show	 an	 intention	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 decision	 to	 join	 a	movement	group	was	a	result	of	deep	involvement	and	not	out	of	a	desire	for	political	power.	For	however	hard	all	these	groups	try	to	maintain	their	identity	as	a	movement,	though,	they	are	all	involved	in	political	struggles;	they	cooperate	with	political	parties	and	 some	of	 them	are	even	 involved	 in	electoral	politics.	To	bridge	 this	 contradiction,	activists	 and	 leaders	 find	 interesting	 explanations	 why	 they	 do	 or	 do	 not	 engage	 in	electoral	politics.	For	 SSS,	 the	 distinction	 between	 movement	 and	 political	 party	 is	 most	 delicate.	 SSS	consists	 of	 a	 sanghatana	 (organization,	 movement)	 and	 a	 paksha	 (party)75.	 Leader	Tupkar	explained	that	“the	sanghatana	is	responsible	for	the	agitations,	the	paksha	for	the	
elections”.	But	all	the	same	time,	SSS	activists	and	leaders	argue	against	political	parties.	In	 their	 understanding,	 political	 parties	 are	 only	 the	 big	 parties,	 but	 not	 the	 small,	emerging	ones.	Therefore,	it	is	no	contradiction	to	argue	against	political	parties	and	at	the	same	time	contest	elections	under	the	banner	of	Shetkari	Svabhimani	Paksha.		
																																								 																					75	In	India,	to	participate	in	elections,	one	must	be	officially	registered	as	a	political	party	with	the	Election	 Commission.	 An	 individual	 can	 stand	 for	 elections	 as	 an	 independent,	 but	 no	 one	 is	allowed	to	stand	for	elections	representing	an	organization	that	is	not	registered	as	a	party.	
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Picture	7:	Rally	of	Shetkari	Svabhimani	Sanghatana	and	Paksha	in	Nagpur	
	KAA	has	no	aspirations	to	join	electoral	politics.	They	are	not	connected	to	any	political	party,	but	they	are	close	to	the	former	ruling	Congress	Party.	The	activists	of	KAA	want	to	make	sure	that	they	are	not	a	party,	but	they	did	not	deny	the	option	of	taking	part	in	electoral	 politics.	 Leader	Kakade	 emphasised	 that	whether	 or	 not	KAA	agitated	 inside	electoral	 politics	 “depends	on	what	people	expect	of	us.	(…)	If	a	time	comes	when	public	
says	that	nobody	is	liable	to	go	to	that	position	and	KAA	is	fit	to	get	that	position,	that	time	
we	will	think	about	that	also.”	In	the	case	of	VJAS,	leader	Tiwari	once	tried	entering	politics	but	was	disappointed.	He	said	that	“VJAS	has	good	support	of	the	people.	But	only	at	the	time	of	elections,	people	are	
not	supporting	us.	(…)	We	are	telling	to	people	that	if	we	are	in	a	chair	position,	we	can	do	
many	 things	 for	 the	 kisans.”	During	 the	 time	 of	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 learned	 that	 he	 had	withdrawn	 from	 party	 politics	 but	 cooperated	 with	 Shiv	 Sena	 and	 BJP	 for	 selective	agitations.	 One	 supporter	 explained	 that	 “our	people	 [VJAS	activists	 standing	 for	 other	
parties]	are	standing	for	the	elections,	so	they	need	support.	For	this	purpose	he	[Tiwari]	
came	here,	so	kisans	will	get	price.”	 Compared	 to	 SSS,	Tiwari	 argued	more	 convincingly	against	 NGOs	 than	 against	 political	 parties.	 He	 emphasized	 often	 that	 VJAS	 was	 “an	
activist	organization,	not	an	NGO“.	But	he	also	defined	clearly	what	an	activist	or	leader	of	 a	movement	 group	was	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	 politician	 or	 a	NGO	worker.	 The	 role	 of	 an	activist	was	to	fight	for	the	right	of	farmers	and	organise	them.	Activists	should	not	take	money	or	funds	from	anybody	but	rather	“tell	political	parties	to	agitate”.		For	 all	 groups,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 activists	 and	 leaders	 are	 not	 corrupt.	 Tupkar	 from	SSS,	 for	 example,	 assured	 that	 they	 chose	activists	 as	 candidates	 in	 elections	 “who	are	
not	corrupt,	 those	who	are	really	 fighting	 for	 the	kisans	 from	the	bottom	of	 their	heart.”	One	supporter	of	SSS	argued	that	their	party	candidates	were	not	corrupt	because	they	were	 new.	 Another	 SSS	 supporter	 reasoned	 that	 “all	 political	 parties	 have	 got	 their	
chance	in	the	past	to	be	the	ruling	party.	But	this	time	we	will	give	a	chance	to	SSS	because	
they	are	new.”	
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Wynistorf	(2012)	describes	the	same	desire	to	demonstrate	selflessness	for	AIKS.	AIKS	activists	asserted	that	 they	did	not	get	any	benefit	 from	working	for	or	supporting	the	party	 but	 were	 active	 only	 to	 fight	 for	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 farmers.	 Often,	 supporters	explained	that	AIKS	had	taught	them	how	important	it	is	to	fight	selflessly	and	not	work	for	one’s	own	benefits.	While	AIKS	was	clearly	linked	to	a	political	party,	the	supporters	and	 activists	 distanced	 themselves	 from	more	 established	 political	 parties	 by	 arguing	that	 they	 were	 a	 poor	 party	 working	 for	 the	 poor	 people.	 Activists	 of	 VJAS	 and	 SSS	brought	 forward	 the	 same	 argument.	 Supporters	 and	 activists	 of	 SSS	 argued	 that	 SSS	was	 a	 poor	 party	 and	 survived	 from	 farmers’	 support.	 The	 farmers	 donated	 to	 them	because	 they	knew	that	SSS	worked	 for	 their	 issues.	One	activist	 said	 that	SSS	did	not	have	“too	much	money,	no	vehicle,	but	only	bullock	carts	–	but	we	have	good	ideas.”	This	 went	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 the	 feeling	 of	 some	 supporters,	 that	 a	 new	 and	comparatively	 small	 group	 would	 be	 more	 reachable	 for	 them.	 One	 supporter	 was	convinced	 that	 if	 SSS	 leaders	 would	 come	 to	 power,	 they	 would	 go	 to	 each	 house	 in	Vidarbha	 and	 listen	 to	 the	 farmers’	 problems	 and	 there	 would	 be	 no	 need	 of	appointments	 or	 security	 guards	 –	 “people	 could	 just	 come	 and	meet	 them.”	 Another	farmer,	 supporter	 of	 SSS,	 said	 that	 “they	would	take	money	from	all	corrupt	people	and	
distribute	 it	 to	 the	 kisans	 and	 spend	 it	 for	 development	 activities	 of	 Vidarbha.”	 To	summarize,	the	farmers	hoped	for	a	leader	who	was	easily	accessible	to	them	and	took	their	 concerns	 seriously.	 A	 supporter	 of	 SSS	 argued	 that	 “there	will	be	no	need	to	take	
appointment	 to	meet	 these	 leaders,	 because	 they	 are	 also	 sons	 of	 kisans,	we	 can	 go	 any	
time	to	meet	them.”		The	problem	of	the	unreachability	of	political	 leaders	made	many	activists	and	leaders	and	some	farmers	arguing	in	favour	of	a	separate	state	for	Vidarbha76	–	particularly,	but	not	only,	by	VJAS,	whose	leader	is	one	of	the	leading	proponents	of	this	claim.	An	activist	argued	that		
“the	Minister	will	be	ours	only.	 (…)	Definitely	our	Minister	would	give	better	prices	and	
more	subsidies.	(…)	We	could	control	our	cotton	market	and	get	higher	prices.	(…)	If	we	
would	have	a	small	state,	we	could	ask	to	the	officer	‘ok,	show	me	today	what	work	you	
have	done’.	But	now	our	state	is	too	big,	nobody	is	asking	whether	the	leaders	have	done	
their	work	or	not.”	On	another	note,	 activists	 and	 leaders	mentioned	differences	between	 the	 groups	 and	political	parties	at	the	level	of	the	content	of	their	demands.	While	the	issue	of	prices	for	agricultural	 outputs	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 groups,	 activists	 and	 leaders	 claimed	 that	 other	parties	were	not	consistent	on	this	point.	The	politicians	of	other	parties,	the	SSS	leader	argued,	 flip-flopped	 between	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	 farmer	 suicides	 and	 “demands	 for																																									 																					76	Some	 politicians	 from	 various	 parties	 (e.g.	 BJP)	 are	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 separate	 Vidarbha.	 If	Vidarbha	would	be	a	separate	state,	 so	 the	argument	goes,	 the	administration	and	government	structure	would	be	more	effective	and	more	approachable.	Furthermore,	against	a	background	of	high	 inequality	 in	 terms	 of	 wealth,	 development	 and	 power	 within	 Maharashtra	 state,	 this	request	 is	 quite	 prominent.	 Other	 successful	 succession	 movements,	 i.e.	 Jharkhand	 and	Chhattisgarh,	motivate	these	ambitions.	
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higher	 prices	 for	 agricultural	 products	 on	 one	 day,	 and	 on	 the	 next	 day	 they	 talk	 about	
consumers	 and	 that	 they	 want	 to	 fight	 the	 inflation	 of	 food	 prices.”	 This	 argument,	however,	is	very	delicate	(see	chapter	VI).	These	varied	 justifications	of	 trustworthiness	 and	efforts	 to	maintain	one’s	 reputation	uncover	the	difficulty	of	this	balancing	act.	Clear	distinctions	were	made	in	rhetoric	but	in	 actual	 political	 practice	 of	 movement	 actors,	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 keep	 these	distinctions	up.	First,	 the	groups	often	need	to	cooperate	with	the	established	political	parties,	 and	 at	 times	 they	want	 to	 take	 part	 in	 electoral	 politics.	 Second,	 the	 activists	have	 to	 do	 their	 work	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 village	 where	 they	 compete	 against	 other	activists,	 often	 from	 established	 parties.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 some	 leaders	 themselves	questioned	the	distinction	between	politics	and	social	movements	and	often	looked	for	a	way	out.		
2.3 Challenges:	Blurring	the	Line	
Dealing	with	Political	Parties	All	movement	groups	are	 involved	 in	political	 struggles	and	cooperate	 to	 some	extent	with	political	parties.	Often,	supporters,	activists	and	leaders	argued	like	leader	Tupkar	of	 SSS,	 who	 said	 that	 “you	cannot	clap	with	one	hand	only.	So	our	Svabhimani	Shetkari	
Sanghatana	cannot	fight	alone.	We	have	hopes	that	if	we	support	others	now,	also	political	
parties,	in	future	agitations	they	will	support	us.”	Therefore,	many	groups	do	cooperate	to	some	extent	with	the	established	political	parties.	Because	the	situation	of	the	farmers	is	perceived	as	quite	pitiable,	particularly	under	the	current	Congress/Nationalist	Congress	government,	SSS	 in	particular	does	not	want	to	cooperate	with	these	two	parties.	But	the	parties	in	opposition	at	the	time	of	the	study	(BJP	and	Shiv	Sena)	are	difficult	coalition	partners	too.	Tupkar	complained	that	even	if	the	 big	 parties	 in	 opposition	 had	 their	 seats	 in	 the	 parliament,	 they	 did	 not	 enable	 a	positive	approach	by	the	government	to	farmers.	When	these	parties	took	part	in	street	level	 agitations,	 Tupkar	 asked	 “why	 are	 these	 opposition	 party	 leaders	 fighting	 for	 the	
issues	 of	 kisans	 on	 the	 roads?	 This	 is	 not	 important.	 They	 have	 to	 fight	 in	 the	 Vidhan	
Sabha77.	Therefore	it	is	very	shameful	that	they	are	coming	on	the	road	for	this	agitation”.		Also	at	 the	 local	 level,	Tupkar	had	serious	 troubles	with	 local	BJP	 representatives	and	felt	 that	 it	 was	 impossible	 to	 cooperate	 with	 them	 locally	 anymore	 (see	 section	 3.3,	chapter	 IV).	 In	 Buldhana,	 the	 district	 co-operative	 bank	 that	 used	 to	 give	 loans	 to	farmers	as	well	as	to	implement	loan	waiver	schemes	from	the	government	had	recently	gone	bankrupt.	The	reason	was,	according	to	Tupkar,	that	big	political	 leaders	from	all	the	big	parties,	who	 included	owners	of	big	 sugarcane	 factories,	had	 taken	huge	 loans	and	then	refused	to	pay	them	back	with	impunity.	Tupkar	was	appalled	by	the	fact	that	when	 farmers	don’t	 repay	 their	 loans,	 it	becomes	a	huge	 issue.	The	politicians	did	not	repay	 crores	 of	 Rupees,	 but	 no	 action	 was	 taken	 against	 them.	 Because	 of	 the	bankruptcy,	 there	 were	 no	 longer	 any	 loans	 for	 farmers,	 which	 had	 severe																																									 																					77	The	Vidhan	Sabha,	the	Legislative	Assembly,	is	the	lower	house	on	state	level.		
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consequences,	 particularly	 at	 the	 time	 of	 sowing.	 Farmers	 could	 only	 rely	 on	moneylenders	 for	 loans.	 Therefore,	 so	 Tupkar	 argued,	 it	 was	 crucial	 to	 organize	agitations	against	this	bankruptcy.	Together	with	journalists,	SSS	had	made	the	names	of	these	political	 leaders	public	who	had	 failed	 to	 repay	 their	 loans.	This	had	 resulted	 in	threats	 and	 legal	 charges	 against	 Tupkar.	 Some	 of	 these	 politicians	 wanted	 an	externment	 (eviction)	 order	 against	 him	 to	 prevent	 him	 from	 staying	 in	 Buldhana.	Tupkar	 was	 convinced	 that	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 these	 political	 parties	 would	 never	cooperate	with	him	anymore,	because	they	were	very	upset.		Even	if	a	local	level	cooperation	was	no	longer	conceivable	for	Tupkar,	he	said	that	the	leaders	of	SSS	at	the	state	level	were	considering	cooperating	with	BJP.	If	the	state	level	authorities	of	SSS	decided	that	cooperation	should	be	established,	the	local	group	would	follow.	Tupkar	argued	that		
“in	this	state	[Maharashtra],	National	Congress	and	Nationalist	Congress	Party	they	are	
ruling	and	they	are	exploiting	the	kisans.	We	need	to	change	the	government.	Only	then,	
the	kisans	will	get	their	benefits	and	they	will	be	happier.	(…)	MLA	Raju	Shetti	told	us	that	
wherever	there	are	possibilities	to	support	Shiv	Sena	and	BJP	we	will	support	them	–	so	
the	Congress	will	lose.”		Tupkar	said	that	a	broad	coalition	against	the	Congress	was	really	needed	to	change	the	current	 government.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 did	 not	 want	 to	 join	 hands	 with	 the	communalist	 forces	 in	 the	 opposition.	 Therefore,	 SSS	would	 not	 cooperate	with	 those	parties	 unless	 there	 was	 a	 broad	 anti-Congress	 alliance.	 “We	 have	 no	 other	 choice”,	Tupkar	believed.	He	was	also	convinced	that	uniting	many	different	people	and	groups	–	even	the	ones	he	does	not	like	–	was	the	way	forward.		In	 this	 context,	 SSS	 also	 collaborated	with	 parties	 from	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 political	spectrum,	 such	 as	 Peasants	 and	 Workers	 Party	 (Shetkari	 Khamgar	 Paksha)	 and	
Communist	 Party	 of	 India	 (see	 section	 3.3,	 chapter	 IV).	 But	 when	 SSS	 supported	 BJP,	these	cooperations	between	SSS	and	those	 leftist	parties	ceased.	Still,	 it	was	 important	for	Tupkar	that	SSS	did	not	want	to	join	the	big	parties.	Because,	he	argued,	the	“problem	
with	Sharad	 Joshi	was	not	 that	he	went	 into	politics	but	 that	he	changed	parties	 several	
times.	First	he	went	 to	Congress,	 then	 to	BJP”.	 Therefore,	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 Svabhimani	
Shetkari	Paksha	 stood	 for	 the	zilla	parishad	 and	panchayat	samiti78	elections	with	 their	own	candidates.		Even	if	KAA	was	not	involved	in	electoral	politics,	the	leaders	were	closely	connected	to	the	then	ruling	party,	the	Congress.	They	openly	claimed	to	be	followers	of	the	Congress,	but	they	criticised	the	party	too.	A	supporter	of	AIKS	confirmed	that	KAA	“are	in	support	
of	 Congress,	 but	 they	 are	 fighting.	 Congress	 is	 unhappy	 with	 them”.	 However,	 several	supporters	of	KAA	had	 the	 suspicion	 that	KAA	would	 cooperate	with	 the	government.																																									 																					78	The	zilla	parishad	is	 the	 third	 tier	of	 the	panchayati	raj	 system	(see	chapter	3.4,	part	 II).	The	
panchayat	samiti	 is	 a	 local	 government	body	 at	 the	 level	 of	 development	block.	The	panchayat	
samiti	 is	 the	 link	 between	 the	gram	panchayat	 (village	 council)	 and	 the	 zilla	parishad	 (district	board).	
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One	 of	 them	 accused	 KAA	 of	 being	 “part	of	the	government.	They	cannot	fight	with	the	
government,	because	compromise	is	the	only	way	for	them.”	Though	 the	 activists	 of	 BKS	 strictly	 denied	 being	 involved	 in	 or	 connected	 to	 politics,	cooperation	with	the	BJP	was	strong,	according	to	them.	One	member	said	that	"we	work	
together	 with	 our	 whole	 group,	 you	 know,	 this	 BJP,	 then	 RSS	 and	 Bajrang	 Dal".	 Many	activists	of	BKS	were	at	the	same	time	active	in	RSS,	BJP	or	Shiv	Sena.	A	leader	argued,	however,	that	even	if	“BKS	is	akin	to	politics	because	our	demands	are	political”,	they	did	not	want	 to	associate	with	politics.	BKS,	he	explained,	 “is	like	a	house	and	politics	is	like	
the	shoes	that	kisans	should	take	off	before	entering”.		In	the	case	of	AIKS	being	clearly	linked	to	a	political	party,	this	debate	is	quite	important.	While	many	activists	and	leaders	argued	that	joining	electoral	politics	was	an	important	means	to	bring	about	change	in	a	democracy,	some	supporters	were	more	critical.	One	claimed	that	AIKS		
“should	not	be	connected	to	a	political	party,	it	should	just	be	a	kisans’	movement.	If	it	is	
connected	to	politics	then	they	have	political	intentions	in	this	field,	whereas	it	should	be	
for	 kisan’s	 benefits.	 If	 it	 is	 connected	 to	 politics,	 the	 leaders	 do	not	 do	anything	 for	 the	
kisans	they	just	look	for	their	political	career.”	Despite	the	mistrust	against	the	leaders	from	the	established	political	parties,	activists,	leaders	as	well	as	supporters	of	all	groups	acknowledged	that	there	were	some	activists	who	 did	 not	 belong	 to	 their	 movement	 groups	 who	 nevertheless	 did	 a	 lot	 “for	 the	
kisans”.	These	 leaders	belonged	to	established	political	parties	but	 interviewees	talked	about	them	as	individual	“kisans’	leaders”	(see	section	3.2,	chapter	IV).	Nevertheless,	the	mistrust	 persisted	 and	many	 agreed	with	 one	 supporter	 of	 KAA	who	 argued	 that	 “we	
shouldn’t	 gather	 behind	 any	 political	 leader	 because	 they	 will	 not	 do	 anything	 for	 the	
kisans,	they	are	only	interested	in	votes.”	
Competing	with	Parties	on	a	Village	Level	At	the	local	level,	movement	groups’	activists	competed	with	other	activists	mostly	from	political	 parties.	 Often,	 so	 supporters	 maintained,	 the	 political	 parties	 saw	 the	movement	 groups	 as	 competitors,	 if	 not	 threats	 to	 their	 own	 position.	 Sometimes,	 as	supporters	 of	 VJAS	 explained,	 activists	 of	 political	 parties	 did	 not	 interact	 with	supporters	 of	 VJAS.	 One	 supporter	 described	 how	 parties	 tried	 to	 convince	 people	 to	vote	 for	 them	 but	 did	 not	 approach	 supporters	 of	 VJAS.	 He	 said	 that	 “the	 [other]	
candidates	had	given	money	to	the	voters	to	give	vote	to	them.	And	the	candidates	are	also	
afraid	of	VJAS.	They	will	not	give	money	to	our	people	for	the	voting.”	But	more	often,	 the	competition	was	stronger.	Many	said	 that	 the	problem	came	 from	the	 side	 of	 the	 activists	 of	 other	 parties	 rather	 than	 the	 activists	 of	 the	 movement	groups.	 According	 to	 SSS	 activists,	 the	 former	 tried	 to	 pressure	 farmers	 to	 keep	 them	voting	 for	 their	 own	 parties.	 One	 supporter	 of	 SSS	 said	 that	 the	 rich	 farmers,	 who	supported	 some	 political	 parties,	 tried	 to	 “influence	 and	 pressurize	 the	 small	 kisans.”	Another	 supporter	 explained	 how	 this	 pressuring	 worked.	 “The	political	parties	don’t	
want	this	group	[SSS].	They	tell	the	kisans	 ‘don’t	go	[to	meetings	of	SSS],	you	will	not	get	
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any	benefit	and	advantage’.	 (…)	If	 the	big	politicians	will	come	to	know	that	their	kisans	
are	 giving	 support	 to	 another	 group	 [SSS],	 these	 leaders	will	 stop	 the	 schemes	 for	 these	
kisans.”	 The	 leader	 of	 SSS	 explained	 that	 the	 political	 leaders	 told	 the	 farmers	 that,	 if	they	 attended	 a	 program	 of	 SSS,	 “‘I	will	not	do	your	work	anymore.’	Whatever	work	for	
the	bank	or	the	court,	they	will	not	complete.”	Also	an	activist	of	VJAS	explained	what	the	pressuring	of	supporters	looks	like:		
“Suppose	I	am	big	person,	a	money	lender,	in	the	village,	and	I’m	giving	the	money	to	the	
people	 for	 the	 loans	 for	 seeds,	 for	household	 expenses.	Then	 they	will	 listen	 to	me	only.	
When	 this	Tiwari	 is	 calling	 for	 the	villagers,	people	 they	are	not	 coming,	because	 these	
moneylenders	will	say	that	this	Tiwari	is	not	a	good	person,	don’t	go	for	the	agitation.”	However,	Tupkar	and	other	activists	were	aware	that	their	group	did	not	have	the	same	power	as	an	established	party	to	support	the	farmers	at	the	local	level.	But	still,	Tupkar	assured,	 “even	the	MLAs	and	MPs	they	are	afraid	that	if	the	kisans	join	SSS	they	will	stand	
on	their	own	legs.	(…)	That	is	why	they	are	pressurizing	the	villagers.”	A	similar	point	was	also	important	for	activists	of	AIKS	who	argued	that	the	established	parties	deliberately	tried	 to	 keep	 the	 farmers	 uneducated	 and	 uninformed	 to	 keep	 them	 from	 protesting	(Wynistorf	2012).	Most	of	 the	 farmers	 in	villages	belonged	 to	a	political	party	already.	An	activist	of	SSS	said	 that	 “while	 talking	 to	 kisans,	 some	 said	 ‘I	 belong	 to	BJP’,	 some	 belong	 to	 Congress.	
These	people	also	said	that	‘we	will	support	SSS	now,	because	in	the	future	this	group	will	
do	something’”.	For	SSS	activists,	there	was	no	problem	with	supporting	a	party	and	SSS	at	the	same	time.	One	supporter	explained	that		
“political	parties	are	 in	each	village.	They	have	a	party	board	in	the	village.	SSS	doesn’t	
have	a	board,	but	our	name	[SSS]	is	in	the	mind	of	kisans,	people	know	how	this	SSS	had	
fought	 for	 the	 kisans	 in	Western	Maharashtra.	 Some	 people	 are	 directly	 active	 in	 SSS,	
some	are	indirectly	involved	in	this	group.	Some	people	belong	to	another	party	but	they	
will	vote	for	Svabhimani	Shetkari	Paksha	[party	part	of	SSS].	Because	they	are	also	sons	
of	kisans.”	SSS	activists	as	well	as	supporters	agreed	that	it	was	possible	to	support	a	party	and	SSS	at	 the	same	time.	But	 if	SSS	became	a	party	and	asked	farmers	to	vote	 for	them,	many	thought	that	this	double	support	would	cease	to	exist.	Consequently,	some	farmers	did	not	think	that	SSS’s	step	into	politics	–	as	Svabhimani	Shetkari	Paksha	–	was	a	good	idea.	One	supporter	argued	that	 “the	party	is	creating	hierarchy	among	the	kisans.	This	brings	
us	troubles.	(…)	We	will	support	movement,	not	the	party”.	Furthermore,	 people	 in	 the	 villages	 often	 did	 not	 agree	 with	 the	 sharp	 distinctions	between	politics	and	movements,	and	more	particularly	about	who	was	in	politics	and	who	was	part	of	a	movement.	In	all	villages,	there	were	critical	voices.	Generally,	it	was	the	 political	 parties	 that	 were	 suspected	 of	 being	 only	 interested	 in	 votes.	 Many	supporters	 of	 several	 groups	 accused	 them	 of	 “coming	 only	 at	 times	 of	 elections”	 or	“being	 only	 interested	 in	 their	 own	 benefits”.	 While	 most	 supporters	 thought	 that	 the	groups	were	different	from	political	parties,	others	argued	that	they	were	just	the	same.	
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One	supporter	of	KAA	reported	that	“other	[kisans]	don’t	have	any	hopes,	they	think	that	
we	 [KAA]	are	 taking	money	 from	other	people.”	 In	 village	 SSS,	 one	 supporter	 said	 that	“there	are	some	opponents	also	[in	the	village].	(…)	Some	kisans	have	hopes	that	Avthale	
[the	 activist	 on	 village	 level]	 is	 doing	 good	work,	 some	 kisans	 think	 he	 doesn’t	 have	 any	
other	work	and	therefore	he	is	doing	this	work	and	taking	money	from	the	kisans.”	 In	case	of	 VJAS,	 the	 critical	 remarks	 went	 against	 the	 leader.	 One	 farmer	 from	 village	 VJAS	reported	that	“some	people	think	that	he	[Tiwari]	is	doing	all	this	work	for	his	own	benefit.	
They	 are	 saying	 that	 this	 Tiwari	 is	 taking	money	 from	 the	 officers	 and	 he	will	 keep	 his	
mouth	shut.	There	 is	an	 incident	of	 this	 type	also.	But	sorry,	 I	cannot	speak	more	on	this	
topic”.	 The	 same	 farmer	 explained	 simply	 that	 he	 had	 not	 benefited	 at	 all	 and	 was	disappointed,	but	he	would	still	be	part	of	the	group	because	he	did	not	want	to	break	any	relationships	with	the	activists.	Another	 way	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 movement	 groups	 and	 political	 parties	 also	causes	 friction	 between	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 formations.	 Many	 supporters	 and	 activists,	particularly	of	SSS	and	AIKS,	mentioned	that,	as	opposed	to	the	political	leaders,	SSS	or	AIKS	activists	did	not	give	money	to	farmers	to	come	to	their	agitations.	An	activist	said	that		
“the	kisans	they	are	coming	for	the	programs	and	meetings	by	spending	their	own	money	
for	traveling	–	but	political	 leaders	 for	their	programs	and	meetings,	 they	are	spending	
money	from	their	own	pockets	[for	the	farmers	to	come].	Therefore	kisans’	participation	
is	higher	in	the	political	parties.”	In	 AIKS,	 supporters	 often	 argued	 that	 political	 parties	 actively	 gave	money	 to	 attract	people	 or	 get	 them	 to	 support	 AIKS.	 They	 also	 said	 that	 if	 these	 people	 joined	 other	parties,	they	would	get	benefits.	AIKS	was	neither	capable	nor	willing	to	give	such	kind	of	 money	 to	 potential	 supporters.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 AIKS’s	 self-conception	that	working	for	or	supporting	the	group	must	not	result	in	a	direct	benefit	(Wynistorf	2012).	
Starting	from	the	Grassroots	These	 examples	 show	 that	 the	movement	 actors	 are	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 inconsistency	implicit	 in	 their	 notions	 of	 trustworthiness.	 Cooperation	 and	 competition	 with	established	 parties	 or	 participation	 in	 electoral	 systems	 are	 part	 of	 the	 movement	groups’	 political	 practice.	 Therefore,	 leaders	 in	 particular	 sometimes	 reflected	 about	their	position	from	an	emic	perspective,	as	illustrated	below.	Despite	 all	 the	 criticism	 of	 politicians,	 there	 are	 some	 voices	 among	 supporters	 and	activists	who	question	the	anti-politics	narrative.	Activists	of	KAA	and	SSS	reflected	on	how	 to	 position	 themselves	 within	 the	 political	 system.	 Tupkar,	 leader	 of	 SSS,	 was	convinced	 that	 “it	 is	 better	 to	 be	 in	 the	 political	 system	 than	 trying	 to	 change	 it	 from	
outside.	Because	 in	the	parliament	 is	 the	place	where	things	are	decided.”	 Supporters	 of	KAA	said	that	they	lived	in	a	democracy	and	that	the	farmers	had	the	power	to	control	politics.	One	supporter	argued	that	“we	can	complain	about	politics,	but	this	is	democracy	
and	we	have	elected	these	politicians	ourselves.”	
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Kakade	 further	 argued	 that	 people	 should	 rethink	 their	 conception	 of	 politicians.	
“Nowadays	we	are	thinking	that	today’s	politicians	have	not	studied	people’s	problems	and	
they	also	don’t	have	a	mission	 for	what	 they	are	 in	politics.	But	 they	have	a	mandate	of	
voters	today.”	He	argued	that	the	only	goal	was	to	raise	the	standard	of	living	for	people	and	that	they	needed	activists	working	towards	that	goal.	He	further	reflected	that		
“in	 our	 democracy,	 people	 studying	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 people	 and	 taking	 them	 to	 the	
state	authority,	they	are	politicians.	(…)	If	politicians	are	those,	who	think	of	the	welfare	
of	 the	 state,	 then	 I	 am	 the	 person	 of	 politics.	 Politics	 is	 not	 only	 to	 take	 power.	 (…)	
Therefore	KAA	is	a	political	organization.”	Kakade	 believes	 that	 to	 achieve	 trust	 regardless	 of	 one’s	 involvement	 in	 electoral	politics	 or	 not,	 they	 had	 to	 build	 up	 leadership	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 He	 suggested	 that	“Suddham	 [local	 activist]	 is	 a	 unique	 example	 of	 how	 a	 public	 representative	 should	 be	
somebody	who	knows	peoples’	problems.	We	try	to	strengthen	the	capabilities	of	such	local	
leaders.”	On	the	other	hand,	another	supporter	of	KAA	who	appreciated	the	very	leader	under	discussion	also	said	that	“Suddham	is	a	good	leader,	but	he	is	not	a	political	leader,	
only	a	movement	leader.	A	political	leader	is	needed	to	fight	for	the	issues	of	the	kisans.”	
3 Concluding	Thoughts:	Powerless,	but	Honest?	Based	 on	 the	 insights	 gained	 through	 the	 interviews,	 I	 found	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	important	 reasons	 for	 supporters	 to	 support	 a	 movement	 group	 was	 the	trustworthiness	of	its	leaders	or	activists.	It	is	to	a	great	extent	the	activists	or	‘bridge-leaders’	(Robnett	1997,	see	section	1.1)	who	construct	this	trustworthiness	at	the	local	level.	To	manage	the	balancing	act	between	being	a	good	‘fixer’	(Manor	2000,	see	section	1.2)	and	being	honest	is	very	difficult	and	relies	strongly	on	the	bridge-leader	qualities	of	 the	 activists	 as	 well	 as,	 sometimes,	 the	 leaders.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 leaders	 and	activists	play	 a	pivotal	 role	 in	 this	painstaking	work	of	mobilizing	people,	 as	Gorringe	(2010)	describes	in	his	work.		I	 agree	with	Alm	 (2010)	 that	 the	 activists	 and	 leaders	 constantly	 struggle	 to	maintain	the	balancing	act	to	stay	trustworthy.	On	the	one	hand,	they	need	to	be	good	fixers	and	therefore	 close	 to	 the	 powerful	 and	 part	 of	 the	 electoral	 politics.	 On	 the	 other,	maintaining	honesty	by	staying	out	of	politics	and	being	morally	upright	is	their	major	advantage	 over	 established	 political	 parties.	 Many	 of	 the	 interviewed	 supporters,	leaders	and	activists	offered	a	lot	of	thoughts	about	the	perceived	need	to	gain	political	power	in	order	to	change	things	on	the	one	hand	and	the	deep	mistrust	towards	political	leaders	on	the	other.		A	very	interesting	finding	is	that	the	activists	and	leaders	constantly	struggle	with	issues	of	perception,	i.e.	the	tendency	that	the	people	see	the	movement	leaders	as	those	who	are	 honest,	 and	 the	 political	 leaders	 as	 those	 corrupt	 but	 able	 to	 bring	 change.	 The	trusted	and	widely	admired	‘movement	leader’	of	KAA	who	is	perceived	not	to	achieve	big	change	because	he	was	no	‘political	leader’	is	one	good	example	of	this	contradiction,	which	is	in	line	with	Nielsen	(2012)’s	study	(see	section	1.2,	chapter	V).	In	their	constant	
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interaction	 with	 their	 supporters,	 the	 leaders	 and	 activists	 try	 to	 define	 their	 place	between	being	a	political	leader	and	being	a	movement	leader,	and	even	to	challenge	the	power	of	 this	distinction.	 I	 therefore	partly	agree	with	Sahoo	 (2014),	who	argues	 that	movement	groups	have	 the	potential	 to	expand	 “the	arena	of	politics	beyond	the	sphere	
of	representational	institutions	of	elections	and	political	parties”	(ibid,	70).	However,	 it	 is	important	 to	 consider	 that	 the	constituencies	of	 these	movement	groups	might	not	be	the	most	oppressed	or	underprivileged	 sections	of	 society	 in	 terms	of	 class,	 caste	 and	gender.	 Therefore,	 the	 non-electoral	 activities	 of	 those	 movement	 groups	 can	 be	understood	also	as	weapons	of	the	strong	(expression	borrowed	from	Arora	2001,	91;	see	 section	2.4,	 chapter	 IV)79,	 just	 as	 it	 is	 the	 strong	who	have	 the	power	 to	 resort	 to	such	activities.	Whereas	electoral	politics	is	a	sphere,	wherein	the	poor	in	India	tend	to	increasingly	participate	(see	e.g.	Sahoo	2010).		I	argue	that	in	the	discourses	of	the	activists	and	leaders,	‘being	political’	or	not	is	very	important	 and	 those	 borders	 are	 maintained	 with	 considerable	 rhetorical	 effort.	However,	 in	 the	 movement	 actors’	 actual	 practices,	 the	 distinction	 between	 those	parties	 in	 power	 and	 the	 many	 groups	 and	 parties	 that	 are	 not	 seems	 much	 more	important.	This	is	supported	by	the	tendency	of	both	activists	and	leaders	of	groups	that	are	 not	 involved	 in	 electoral	 politics	 as	 well	 as	 activists	 and	 leaders	 of	 groups	 that	clearly	 are	 involved	 to	use	 this	 argument.	The	movement	groups	are	newly	emerging,	local	 or	 simply	 lack	 power	 in	 the	 region	 and	 therefore	 they	 cannot	 outdo	 established	parties	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 fixing	 qualities.	 For	 this	 reason,	 their	 reputation	 of	 honesty	becomes	their	main	mobilizing	argument.		I	started	with	a	discussion	of	trustworthiness	because	empirically,	this	turned	out	to	be	the	main	mobilising	factor.	However,	leadership,	as	Kakade	said,	is	also	about	long-term	ideas	and	visions	for	the	future	of	agriculture	in	Vidarbha.		 	
																																								 																					79	Arora	here	refers	to	Scott	(1985)‘s	concept	of	the	weapons	of	the	weak	as	the	everyday	forms	of	resistance	of	the	most	oppressed	and	underprivileged.		
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VI. Visions	worth	Fighting	for	In	 the	 last	 chapters,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 all	movement	 groups	 talk	 about	 the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha	and	demand	a	higher	price	for	agricultural	products	(see	section	3.1,	chapter	IV).	However,	when	one	pays	more	attention	to	their	ideas	about	how	the	prices	should	be	 constituted	 or	 their	 visions	 for	 a	way	out	 of	 the	 crisis,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 the	notion	of	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 is	 a	 contested	 space	with	different	 frames	of	 arguments	and	thoughts.	While	leadership	might	be	more	important	for	mobilization	on	the	ground,	it	is	 important	not	 to	 limit	 the	analyses	 to	 these	practices.	Eventually,	 social	movements	and	 protests	 aim	 at	 social	 change	 or	 at	 preventing	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 change.	 Talking	about	 the	 visions	 of	 movement	 actors	 is	 crucial	 because	 they	 can	 serve	 as	 frames	 to	mobilize	supporters	at	all	 levels.	At	 the	same	 time,	 there	 is	also	a	 lively	debate	on	 the	future	 of	 agriculture	 not	 only	 among	movements,	 but	 in	 the	 academic	 sphere	 as	well	(see	 section	1.1,	 chapter	 I).	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	 also	understand	 the	visions	and	ideas	of	actors	on	the	ground:	the	leaders,	activists	and	supporters.		In	this	chapter	therefore,	I	begin	by	emphasizing	the	need	for	new	visions	of	agriculture.	Second,	I	depict	the	four	main	frames	for	the	future	of	agriculture	that	emerged	from	the	interviews.	In	the	final	section,	I	discuss	these	frames	along	two	main	questions,	namely	how	these	 frames	of	arguments	relate	 (a)	 to	current	academic	and	movement	debates	and	 (b)	 to	 ideas	 of	 earlier	 peasant	 and	 famers’	 movements	 in	 the	 region.	 Finally,	 I	analyse	how	these	frames	influence	the	movements’	strategies	of	struggle.	
1 Framing	a	Future	for	Agriculture	In	 chapter	 II,	 I	 described	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	 how	 agriculture	 is	perceived	 as	 being	 increasingly	 unprofitable,	 although	 I	 illustrated	 the	 difference	between	those	who	see	the	entire	peasantry	 in	crisis	and	those	who	see	especially	the	medium,	 small	 and	 marginal	 farmers	 as	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis.	 This	 goes	 to	 such	 an	extent	that	Chatterjee	(2008a,	based	on	Sanyal	2007)	claimed	that	farmers	themselves	–	particularly	 the	 younger	 generation	 –	 believe	 that	 there	 is	 no	 future	 in	 small	 scale	agriculture	 and	 that	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	 farmers’	 “principal	motivation	seems	to	be	to	
stop	being	peasants”	(ibid,	59).	According	to	Sainath	(2013),	over	2000	farmers	per	day	have	 stopped	 being	 farmers	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 in	 India	 as	 a	whole,	 even	 though	many	 of	 them	 do	 not	 find	 work	 in	 the	 cities	 of	 India’s	 jobless	 growth.	 Gupta	 (2005)	noted	 that	even	 if	 the	 farmers	are	protected	 to	some	extent	by	 the	government,	 “their	
futures	are	left	unplanned”	(ibid,	755).	At	the	same	time,	Basu	(2013)	and	others	argued	that	 the	 peasantry	 will	 persist	 in	 the	 decades	 to	 come	 because	 “the	 consolidation	 of	
large-scale	 capitalist	 farming	 and	 the	 permanent	 absorption	 of	 surplus	 labour	 into	 the	
industrial	and	service	 sectors	 seem	unlikely	 in	 the	near	 future”	 (ibid,	 379).	 Today	 more	than	half	of	India’s	working	population	depends	on	agriculture,	and	the	number	of	small	and	marginal	farmers	is	actually	growing	(Lerche	2013;	Reddy	and	Mishra	2010a).		In	 this	 context	 where	 it	 seems	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 a	 future	 in	 and	 for	 small-scale	agriculture,	 the	movement	groups	claim	to	speak	 for	 these	small	and	medium	farmers	and	 to	 formulate	 different	 visions	 for	 the	 future	 of	 agriculture.	 McMichael	 (2010,	 3)	
	 156	
argued	that	the	“market	and	its	‘invisible	hand’	assumptions”	have	become	the	dominant	lens	through	which	development	is	seen,	which	has	led	to	the	“inability	or	unwillingness	
to	imagine	alternatives	to	development	as	we	know	it”.	 But	 even	 if	movement	 actors	 do	often	 not	 have	 an	 alternative	 vision	 at	 the	 ready,	 they	 stimulate	 discussions	 about	alternatives	and	might	be	able	 to	change	policies	and	realities	on	the	ground	(see	also	Bebbington	2009).	Therefore,	movement	actors	continuously	engage	in	making	sense	of	their	 present	 situation	 and	 in	 showing	 opportunities	 for	 change.	 Within	 the	 field	 of	social	 movement	 studies,	 these	 activities	 are	 often	 analysed	 using	 the	 concept	 of	‘framing’.	 Intentionally	or	unintentionally,	movement	actors	deploy	different	 frames	 in	order	 to	 influence	what	 seems	worth	 fighting	 for.	 Frames	 are	 complex	 interpretative	schemata,	 not	 just	 isolated	 ideas	 (Oliver	 and	 Johnston	 2000),	 and	 their	 articulation	“involves	 the	 connection	 and	 coordination	 of	 events,	 experiences,	 and	 strands	 of	 one	 or	
more	 ideologies	 so	 that	 they	 hang	 together	 in	 a	 relatively	 integrated	 and	 meaningful	
fashion”	 (Snow	 2011,	 400).	 Framing	 can	 help	 a	 movement	 not	 only	 to	 stimulate	 and	influence	discussions,	but	also	to	attract	supporters	or	allies	and	ultimately	to	reach	the	movements’	goals	(Benford	1997;	section	1.2,	chapter	I).	In	 the	 field	 of	 agriculture,	 transnational	 agrarian	 movements	 like	 La	 Vía	 Campesina,	which	claims	to	represent	the	small	farmers	of	the	world,	have	grown	and	reshaped	the	debate	 over	 the	 future	 of	 peasant	 production.	 La	 Vía	 Campesina	 has	 been	 crucial	 to	developing	 and	 promoting	 the	 concept	 of	 food	 sovereignty	 and	 is	 thus	 credited	 for	having	 reframed	 the	 notion	 of	 agricultural	 development	 (Desmarais	 2002).	 Such	movements	influence	which	visions	of	a	future	agriculture	are	conceived,	discussed	and	eventually	 put	 into	 practice	 (Borras,	 Edelmann,	 and	 Kay	 2008;	 McMichael	 2007).	Movements	 challenge	 debates	 over	 the	 future	 of	 agriculture	 not	 only	 on	 a	 global,	 but	also	 on	 a	 local	 level.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 engage	 not	 only	 with	 the	 ideas	 of	transnational	 agrarian	 movements	 and	 their	 intellectuals,	 but	 also	 with	 the	 ideas	 of	small,	grassroots	farmer	movements	on	a	local	level,	as	I	will	do	in	this	chapter.	Therefore,	in	this	chapter,	I	analyse	the	different	frames	of	arguments	that	activists	and	supporters	of	the	local	farmer	movement	in	Vidarbha	apply	to	understand	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	articulate	their	ideas	for	the	future	of	agriculture	and	the	peasantry.	I	argue	that	 while	 the	 demands	 have	 superficially	 stayed	 the	 same,	 they	 have	 fundamentally	changed	 from	 challenging	 the	 state	 to	 challenging	 the	 logic	 of	 a	 free	market,	 and	 that	price	is	a	key	indicator	of	this	free	market.	With	this	focus	on	price,	and	the	articulation	of	 demands	 around	 prices,	 the	 movement	 actors	 invoke	 several	 tensions	 that	 they	struggle	 to	 recognize.	 In	 the	 end,	 though,	 the	 market	 seems	 a	 mysterious	 force	 to	movement	actors,	and	this	makes	it	difficult	for	them	to	organize	effective	contestations.	Consequently,	 the	movement	actors	address	 their	demands	mostly	 to	 the	 state.	At	 the	same	time,	they	hardly	talk	about	decision-making	and	the	distribution	of	power	in	the	government	once	they	would	achieve	a	certain	influence. 
2 Movement	Actors’	Four	Frames	I	found	that	the	interviewees	had	clear	ideas	about	what	was	wrong	and	what	needed	to	change	in	agriculture.	The	Grounded	Theory	method	(section	3.3,	chapter	I)	allowed	me	
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to	 engage	 with	 the	 interview	 material	 and	 develop	 codes,	 and	 later	 frames	 and	 new	concepts	 that	 I	 could	 eventually	 link	 to	 existing	 concepts	 about	 agricultural	development.	 I	 group	 the	 interviewees’	 statements	 into	 four	 frames,	 which	 are	generalisations	of	what	I	found	in	the	interviews.	The	frames	paint	different	pictures	of	the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’,	 multifaceted	 and	 contesting	 visions	 for	 possible	 short-term	solutions	and	long-term	visions	for	agricultural	production	in	Vidarbha.	In	the	following	sections,	 I	 describe	 the	 four	 main	 frames	 I	 found	 within	 this	 movement	 through	 the	empirical	material.		Before	coming	to	the	frames,	I	start	with	the	question	whether	most	farmers’	principal	motivation	is	indeed	to	stop	farming.	I	asked	all	interviewees	what	they	would	do	for	a	living	 if	 they	 had	 a	 choice.	 Would	 they	 prefer	 working	 in	 agriculture	 or	 in	 another	sector?	Would	they	stay	in	rural	areas	to	move	to	the	city?	And	would	their	preferences	change	 if	 the	prices	would	be	higher?	The	answers	were	manifold	and	did	not	show	a	clear	trend	towards	aspirations	to	stay	in	agriculture	or	to	move	to	other	sectors.	Non-agricultural	 rural	 employment	 though,	 was	 not	 seen	 as	 an	 option.	 Farmers	 often	mentioned	 good	 education	 and	dreams	of	 an	 easier	 life	 –	 particularly	 for	 the	 younger	generation	 –	 as	 advantages	 of	 living	 in	 city.	 The	 advantages	 of	 farming	were	 that	 this	was	 their	 ‘traditional’	 occupation.	 The	 life	 as	 a	 farmer,	 some	 argued,	was	 the	 life	 of	 a	land	 owner	 and	 that	 this	 would	 make	 them	 feel	 more	 independent	 and	 free.	Furthermore,	 if	 prices	 were	 good,	 farming	 would	 reward	 them	 for	 their	 hard	 work.	While	some	farmers	brought	up	these	emotional	reasons,	most	answers	focused	heavily	on	material	 concerns.	 The	most	 common	 answer	was	 that,	 if	 prices	were	 better,	 they	would	remain	in	agriculture,	even	if	only	because	they	saw	no	realistic	opportunities	in	the	city	or	elsewhere.	The	first	frame	that	I	will	describe	is	the	‘free	market’-frame	that	was	mostly	deployed	by	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana,	a	 movement	 that	 was	 already	 past	 its	 prime.	 However,	 this	frame	echoed	also	in	interviews	with	other	activists	and	leaders.	
2.1 ‘Free	Market’	Frame:	“The	Government	Should	Not	Interfere”	The	vision	behind	these	activists’	ideas	is	a	free	market	where	technologically	advanced	farmers	 can	 grow	whatever	 the	market	 demands	 and	 compete	with	 other	 farmers	 all	around	 the	 world	 without	 the	 need	 for	 governmental	 protection.	 Sharad	 Joshi,	 the	leader	of	Shetkari	Sanghatana,	was	convinced	that	“if	you	ask	me	‘Do	Indian	kisans	stand	
for	economic	globalization	and	liberalization?’,	I	would	give	a	unequivocal	‘yes’.	Kisans	in	
India	are	pro	 freedom.”	 However,	 in	 my	 own	 interviews	 with	 farmers,	 no	 one	 argued	explicitly	within	this	frame.	Activists	of	KAA	and	SSS	sometimes	used	these	arguments,	but	 mostly	 this	 was	 limited	 to	 the	 activists	 of	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana.	 The	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana	made	the	demand	for	remunerative	prices	 in	the	1980s,	and	 it	has	always	fought	against	a	state-controlled	market.	After	the	New	Economic	Policies	in	1991,	when	agricultural	markets	were	continuously	 liberalized,	 the	most	 important	demands	were	fulfilled	 (see	 section	1.3,	 chapter	 II).	One	activist	 of	 Joshi’s	Shetkari	Sanghatana	 stated	that	 “Shetkari	 Sangathana	 people	 were	 satisfied	 with	 the	 prices	 and	 no	 struggles	 were	
needed	anymore.”		
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While	 this	 activist	 of	 Shetkari	Sangathana	saw	 no	 need	 to	 fight	 anymore,	 activists	 of	other	 groups	 argued	within	 this	 frame	 but	were	 not	 yet	 satisfied.	 For	 them,	 the	 open	market	was	 a	 promise	 to	 prosperity	 and	 the	 current	 problem	 of	 agriculture	was	 that	
“the	market	 is	not	 free”	and	 “the	policies	are	politicized”.	 Tupkar,	 leader	 of	 SSS,	 clearly	said	 that	 “we	 want	 a	 free	market.	We	 are	 able	 to	 compete	 with	 China	 and	 Brazil”.	He	assured	 that	 “whatever	price	comes	 from	the	world	market,	kisans	are	ready	to	accept”.	But	 he	was	 convinced	 that	 the	 government	 “deliberately	depresses	the	prices”.	 Another	activist	of	 SSS	 complained	 that	 “the	import	and	export	policies	are	used	like	a	water	tab.	
Whenever	they	[the	government]	feel	like,	they	will	close	or	open	it.”	With	its	 ‘export	bans’	the	 federal	 government	 can	 decide	 to	 close	 the	 borders	 for	 a	 certain	 crop	 because	 of	high	prices	or	an	expected	scarcity.	This	activist	argued	that	the	policies	would	benefit	only	the	cotton	traders	and	industry.	The	MSPs	were	also	rejected.	Tupkar	argued	that	“the	government	should	not	interfere	in	our	matters.	(…)	The	government	should	step	back	
and	there	should	be	free	market.	(…)	We	don’t	want	MSP.	As	long	as	the	government	leaves	
us	in	peace,	we	will	accept	any	price.”	Tupkar	in	particular	sometimes	argued	in	favour	of	MSPs,	sometimes	against	them.	He	himself	 seemed	unsure	 about	 the	 free	market	but	 explained	his	belief	 in	 free	markets	with	the	example	of	the	mobile	phone	companies.	He	said	that	earlier,	the	government	company	had	a	monopoly	and	the	services	were	very	expensive,	but	with	liberalization	services	 had	 become	 much	 cheaper.	 Only	 the	 government	 company	 had	 remained	expensive.	 Therefore	 he	 insisted	 that	 “the	government	has	failed	us	badly.	I	don’t	know	
why,	but	maybe	this	free	market	system	will	work	better	for	us.	We	have	hope.”	Proponents	of	what	 I	 label	 as	 the	 ‘free	market’	 frame	acknowledged	 that	 farming	was	particularly	 unrewarding	 for	 small	 farmers.	 An	 activist	 from	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	started	 by	 arguing	 that	 there	were	 no	 small,	medium	 or	 big	 landholders,	 but	 farmers	were	all	the	same	and	a	better	price	would	support	them	all.	Later,	however,	this	same	activist	 added	 that	 “small	 kisans	 can	 anyway	 not	 survive	 in	 any	 system”	and	 therefore	there	 would	 be	 no	 point	 in	 supporting	 them.	 In	 a	 similar	 line	 but	 with	 a	 different	conclusion,	an	activist	of	KAA	argued	that	despite	the	low	prices,	there	was	no	point	in	telling	these	farmers	to	stop	growing	cotton	and	soybean.	They	would	do	so	“because	of	
the	principles	of	the	free	market,	until	you	present	them	a	better	option.	But	to	do	this	 is	
not	the	role	of	the	state.	They	have	to	find	business	themselves.”	This,	he	further	explained,	was	 where	 movement	 groups	 (or	 NGOs)	 should	 support	 the	 farmers	 to	 become	competitive.	
2.2 ‘Protection’	 Frame:	 “The	 Government	 Should	 Take	 Care	 of	 the	
Kisans”	The	 ‘protection’-frame	bundles	 ideas	that	the	government	and	the	markets	are	equally	responsible	for	the	difficult	situation	of	the	farmers	and	that	currently	both	are	failing	to	provide	sufficient	 incomes	in	agriculture.	Eventually,	 though,	 it	 is	the	government	who	must	improve	the	situation	and	create	policies	that	protect	and	enable	farmers.	Pawar,	an	 activist	 of	 KAA,	 dreamed	 that	 “the	kisan	should	be	able	to	stand	on	his	own	legs.	(…)	
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But	the	government	should	and	must	protect	us	to	enable	it.”	This	frame	is	by	far	the	most	prominent	one	articulated	by	activists	from	all	groups	and	particularly	by	farmers.	In	 this	 frame,	 it	was	 important	 for	all	activists	 to	emphasize	 that	 the	unprofitability	of	farming	 is	 not	 the	 farmer’s	 fault.	 Rather,	 as	 an	 activist	 of	AIKS	 argued,	 “in	this	market	
economy,	kisans	can	never	be	saved	without	the	help	of	the	government”.	 Others	 did	 not	formulate	 it	 that	 clearly,	 but	 in	 the	 view	of	 virtually	 all	 the	 interviewees,	 the	problem	was	that	“the	government	is	not	giving	the	right	prices”.	They	felt	that	the	MSPs	were	too	low	and	would	not	even	cover	their	expenses	for	farming	or	everyday	life.	Therefore,	in	their	opinion,	the	government	should	fix	the	MSP	based	on	the	agricultural	expenditure	of	 the	 farmers	by	 taking	 into	consideration	 individual	or	region-specific	particularities	of	 expenditures	 and	 yields.	 This	 would	 imply	 fundamental	 changes	 in	 the	 way	 of	calculating	 the	 MSPs,	 as	 I	 will	 show	 in	 the	 following	 paragraph.	 Currently,	 the	Commission	for	Agricultural	Costs	and	Prices	considers	the	cost	of	production,	expected	demand	and	supply,	trends	in	market	prices,	inter–crop	price	parity,	but	also	effects	on	costs	of	living	of	the	consumers	for	the	calculation	of	MSPs.	The	same	MSPs	are	valid	all	over	India	(CACP	2013;	section	1.2,	chapter	II).	The	demand	to	consider	the	differences	 in	expenditure	 implies	three	different	aspects.	First,	MSPs	should	be	higher	in	dry	land	regions	like	Vidarbha	than	in	other	regions	of	India.	Movement	 actors	 often	 explained	 that	 because	of	 the	 lack	of	 irrigation	 they	 are	unable	 to	 compete	 with	 the	 agriculture	 of	 other	 regions.	 Many	 activists,	 particularly	activists	of	SSS,	brought	 this	point	 forward.	Second,	an	MSP	based	on	expenditure	and	yields	 could	 also	 entail	 different	 MSPs	 for	 different	 farmers	 within	 a	 region,	 e.g.	depending	on	their	access	to	irrigation	facilities.	One	activist	of	KAA	explicitly	demanded	different	 prices	 for	 rain-fed	 and	 irrigated	 land	 because	many	 felt	 that	 those	who	 had	access	 to	 irrigation	made	 a	 good	 profit.	 Third,	 the	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 price	would	have	 to	 decrease.	 Currently,	 this	 uncertainty	 is	 a	major	 issue	 for	many	 farmers.	 “The	
kisan	depends	only	on	hopes”,	a	small	farmer	reasoned.	To	conclude,	to	base	the	MSPs	on	the	individual	expenditures	or	yields	of	a	landholder	or	on	the	particularities	of	a	region	would	mean	to	change	the	system	for	MSP	calculation	fundamentally.	This	is	what	many	activists	 of	 SSS	 and	KAA	 and	 some	 farmers	 proposed	because,	 as	 Suddham	Pawar,	 an	activist	 of	 KAA,	 explained,	 “each	year,	we	are	agitating	for	a	better	price	for	cotton	and	
soybean.	We	do	not	succeed.	Thus	we	have	to	change	our	strategy.	There	should	be	no	need	
to	come	out	[for	agitations]	every	year.”	Apart	 from	 a	 remunerative	 price,	 movement	 actors	 demanded	 for	 schemes	 for	agricultural	 inputs.	 First,	 loan	 waiver	 schemes	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 loans	 at	 low	interest	 rates	 from	the	side	of	 the	government	were	considered	crucial.	Many	 farmers	told	 me	 that	 “a	 debt-free	 life	would	 be	my	 dream.”	The	 activists	 highlighted	 that	 loan	policies	were	biased	against	rain-fed	lands	(if	a	farmer	mortgages	one	acre	of	land,	the	amount	of	 loan	depends	on	the	productivity	of	the	land	and	therefore	loans	are	higher	for	 irrigated	 land).	 The	 farmers,	 particularly	 the	 small	 and	 marginal	 ones,	 expressed	their	fear	of	moneylenders	and	their	wish	that	the	government	would	protect	them	by	giving	 credit	 that	 is	 easily	 available	 and	 that	 has	 flexible	 due	 dates.	 Second,	 many	
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farmers	 dreamt	 that	 “Vidarbha	should	be	green”	and	 there	 should	 be	 more	 irrigation.	One	medium	 farmer	 emphasized	 that	 “rain-fed	kisans	should	get	water	well	 loans	from	
the	bank,	and	loans	for	motor	pumps.	(…)	Those	with	new	water	wells	need	water	pumps.	
Those	 who	 have	 irrigation	 need	 drip	 irrigation.”	 There	 are	 other	 surface	 irrigation	systems	 still	 in	 place	 in	 Vidarbha	 –	mostly	 plenty	 of	 small	 dams	 –	 but	 activists	 of	 all	groups	complained	that	they	are	not	maintained	correctly	and	therefore	do	not	benefit	anyone.	 So	 the	demands	 ranged	 from	 loans	 for	well	 construction	and	better	 irrigation	infrastructure;	 electricity	 without	 load	 shedding	 and	 at	 subsidized	 electricity	 rates;	giving	 water	 priority	 for	 agriculture	 before	 the	 industry,	 and	 measures	 against	groundwater	depletion.	Third,	many	interviewees	complained	that	fertilizer,	pesticides	and	seeds	were	sometimes	not	available,	sometimes	of	very	low	quality	and	always	far	too	expensive.	Therefore,	many	farmers	expected	the	government	to	step	in.	A	few	said	that	there	was	a	need	for	a	separate	scheme	for	the	rain-fed	farmers	that	would	ensure	different	 prices	 for	 inputs	 together	 with	 special	 guidance	 about	 how	 to	 apply	 those	inputs	best	under	rain-fed	conditions.		The	 proponents	 of	 the	 ‘protection’-frame	 clearly	 expected	 schemes	 and	 remunerative	prices	from	the	government	on	the	grounds	that,	as	Tiwari,	leader	of	VJAS,	put	forward,	“there	should	be	a	fundamental	right	of	the	kisans	to	have	profitability.”	On	this	logic,	they	rejected	 packages	 that	 are,	 in	 contrast	 to	 MSPs,	 one-time	 payments	 from	 the	government	to	 farmers	 in	particular	situations,	e.g.	when	they	suffer	 from	droughts	or	floods.	Many	 farmers	and	activists	 felt	 that	packages	are	 “like	beggary	for	poor	people”	and	 that	 the	 government	 only	 tries	 to	 “keep	 the	 people	 quiet.”	 A	 medium	 farmer	emphasized	that	the	Vidarbhan	farmers	“are	not	backward.	They	are	hard	working.	They	
only	want	a	good	price	for	their	yield.	Nothing	else.”	Only	 in	 cases	 of	 an	 accident	 or	 old	age	 should	 the	 government	 provide	 pension	 schemes,	 as	 several	 farmers	 and	 in	particular	AIKS	activists	argued	for.	Supporters	of	 all	 groups	 said	 that	 the	government	 should	provide	 special	 schemes	 for	farmers	with	landholdings	too	small	to	cultivate	profitably.	This	was	also	supported	by	many	 farmers	who	 said	 that	 “those	who	have	money	have	good	yields”.	 Jawandhia	 even	suggested	 redefining	 the	 term	 ‘small	 farmer’.	 According	 to	 his	 idea,	 first,	 one	 should	define	 how	much	money	 a	 family	 needs	 per	month	 to	 live	 a	 decent	 life	 and	 then	 one	should	calculate	how	much	irrigated	or	rain-fed	land	is	needed	to	earn	this	money.	The	ones	 that	 have	 enough	 land	 should	 be	 considered	 cultivators	 and	 get	 agricultural	subsidies.	 The	 others	 should	 be	 considered	 labourers	 and	 get	 other	 forms	 of	 support	like	minimum	wages	or	guaranteed	employment.	This	leads	to	the	demands	concerning	labour.	In	contrast	 to	 the	numerous	demands	made	of	 the	government	regarding	the	needs	of	cultivators	 or	 landowners,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 agricultural	 labour,	 most	 interviewed	farmers	 and	 activists	 did	 not	 see	 a	 need	 for	 either	 a	minimum	wage	 or	 food	 support.	Several	 farmers	 said	 that	 “nowadays	 the	 labourers	 are	 more	 happy	 than	 the	 kisans”,	because	they	get	their	money	more	regularly	than	farmers,	who	get	it	all	at	once	when	they	sell	their	crops.	Even	a	labourer	said	that	“the	situation	is	very	bad	for	the	kisans,	so	
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therefore	 labour	 are	 getting	 bhakari	 [bread]	 and	 chilli	 only”.	 While	 the	 labourers	empathised	with	the	plight	of	Kisans,	activists	of	all	groups	as	well	as	medium	and	big	landholders	 criticised	 the	 already	 existing	 support	 for	 labourers	 through	PDS	 and	 the	rural	employment	scheme	MGNREGA	(see	section	2.4,	chapter	II).	Some	medium	and	big	landholders	 as	 well	 as	 activists	 argued	 that	 the	 food	 prices	 were	 depressed	 and	 the	labourers	got	“lazy”	and	stopped	working	hard.		Unsurprisingly,	 the	 labourers,	 and	 those	marginal	 and	 small	 farmers	 who	 depend	 on	labour	 work,	 do	 not	 share	 this	 opinion	 and	 mentioned	 that	 food	 had	 become	 very	expensive.	 Still,	 many	 farmers	 argued	 that	 the	 prices	 should	 increase	 and	 not	 be	subsidized.	They	were	convinced	that	once	the	prices	for	agricultural	outputs	increased,	the	 labourers	 would	 “automatically”	 get	 higher	 wages	 from	 the	 landowners.	 In	contradiction,	the	labourers	said	that	the	landowners	fixed	their	wages	independent	of	the	 prices	 of	 the	 crops.	 One	 labourer	made	 it	 clear	 that	 “they	[employers]	are	the	ones	
owning	the	land,	they	decide.”	The	only	time	when	their	wages	increased	was	under	the	condition	of	 scarcity	of	 labour,	 either	due	 to	out-migration	or	high	demand	 for	 labour	during	 specific	 operations	 such	 as	 sowing	 or	 harvesting.	Or,	 as	 another	 labourer	 said,	
“even	when	 the	prices	 for	 cotton	 increase,	 our	wages	will	 stay	 the	 same.	 So	how	 come?”	Only	 Jawandhia	 and	 one	 activist	 of	 AIKS	 argue	 that	 affordable	 food	 for	 the	 poor	 is	 as	important	as	remunerative	prices	for	farmers	and	therefore	that	the	government	needs	to	 fill	 in	 the	 gap.	 Jawandhia	 suggested	 that	 minimum	 wages	 for	 labour	 should	 be	included	in	the	calculation	of	the	MSP.	In	 this	 frame,	 all	 demands	 were	 directed	 towards	 the	 government	 because	 the	government,	as	one	marginal	farmer	explained,	were	“those	that	look	after	the	budget	of	
the	state	(…),	those	who	fix	our	prices.”	When	trying	to	negotiate	with	the	government,	it	was	 very	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 “on	what	level	what	issues	can	be	solved,	on	what	level	
we	 should	do	agitations”,	 as	 Kakade,	 leader	 of	 KAA,	 emphasized.	 To	 fix	 the	 MSPs,	 for	example,	was	a	responsibility	of	the	Federal	Government	and	the	District	Collector	could	not	do	anything	about	it.	But	a	small	farmer	complained	that	“for	a	normal	kisan,	it	is	not	
possible	to	reach	the	high	level	of	government.	He	can	only	fight	at	the	district	 level.	And	
there	the	government	is	only	giving	promises	to	the	kisans.”	Lastly,	in	everybody’s	opinion	without	exceptions,	the	main	problem	with	the	government	was	that	most	officials	and	high	politicians	were	assumed	to	be	corrupt.	Many	activists	and	farmers	were	convinced	that	 the	traders	together	with	the	processing	 industry	have	successfully	pressured	the	government	to	keep	the	prices	low.	The	strategies	for	addressing	the	government	on	these	issues	vary	considerably	among	the	 groups.	 Kakade	 of	 KAA	 argued	 that	 before	making	 a	 demand,	 the	 activists	 should	think	about	whether	 the	government	would	be	 able	 to	 fulfil	 the	demand	or	not.	Their	demands,	 another	 KAA	 activist	 said,	 should	 be	 “realistic	 and	 sustainable”.	 Kakade	emphasized	that	“it	is	the	duty	of	a	movement	to	preserve	the	governments’	assets	and	not	
create	 any	 trouble	 for	 the	 public.”	 On	 the	 contrary,	 some	 activists	 and	 farmers,	particularly	 of	 SSS,	were	more	decided	 in	 their	 fight	 against	 the	 government,	 and	one	
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supporter	 argued	 that	 if	 “the	 government	 only	 gives	 promises,	 we	 have	 to	 change	 the	
government.	The	government	should	take	care	of	the	kisans.”	
2.3 ‘Self-Help’	Frame:	“We	Need	to	Help	Ourselves”	This	 frame	 is	 based	 on	 the	 previous	 one	 but	 it	 adds	 the	 assumption	 that	 it	 is	 nearly	impossible	to	control	the	government	and	the	market	in	the	short	term.	A	farmer	stated	that	 “the	prices	are	not	 in	our	hands	and	the	government	exploits	us.	So	the	kisan	has	to	
take	 initiative.”	Also	 Kakade	 reasoned	 that	 “whether	we	win	or	 lose	 the	battle	with	 the	
government,	we	should	be	our	own	alternative.”	KAA	 in	particular	 that	 sees	working	on	local	alternatives	as	an	important	part	of	their	work	(see	section	3.1,	chapter	IV).	Pawar	of	 KAA	 said	 that	 the	movement	 group	“has	two	legs.	One	‘constructive	leg’	(…)	and	one	
‘political	 leg’	 with	 agitations.	 So	 they	 both	 can	 walk	 together.	 But	 because	 of	 the	
constructive	 leg,	 kisans	 will	 have	 faith	 in	 KAA	 (…)	 and	 we	 change	 the	 thinking	 of	 the	
people.	Only	through	this,	change	will	come,	slowly,	slowly.”	To	 start	 with,	 two	 small	 and	 semi-medium	 farmers	 from	 KAA	 and	 SSS	 suggested	introducing	group	farming.	One	of	them	explained	that	“if	the	trader	will	come	to	ask	for	
crops,	he	must	ask	the	group.	The	kisans	can	fix	the	price	then.”	 Supporters	 of	 KAA	have	already	started	group	farming	in	the	village.	Interestingly,	an	agricultural	officer	of	the	government	motivated	them	to	take	this	initiative.	All	of	them	cultivate	their	own	land,	but	 they	 cooperate	 when	 buying	 seeds	 or	 other	 inputs	 and	 when	 selling	 their	 crops.	Furthermore,	activists	and	supporters	of	SSS	and	KAA	have	spoken	about	building	co-operatives	 for	 production,	 trade	 and	 processing	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 prices	 for	agricultural	outputs	as	well	as	to	create	employment	opportunities.	In	this	context,	they	expressed	the	hope	that	if	processing	and	trading	were	in	the	hand	of	farmers,	farming	would	be	profitable	again.	In	general,	however,	interviewees	remained	critical	towards	co-operatives	due	to	the	experiences	in	Western	Maharashtra.	The	sugar	co-operatives	in	 Western	 Maharashtra	 established	 after	 independence	 belong	 to	 the	 co-operatives	made	up	of	agricultural	producers.	They	have	become	an	important	source	of	power	in	Western	 Maharashtra	 and	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 being	 corrupt	 (Lalvani	 2008;	 see	section	1.3,	chapter	III).	KAA	 has	 already	 set	 two	 other	 constructive	 projects	 into	 practice	 (see	 section	 3.1,	chapter	IV).	Recently,	they	started	the	“Root	Milk	Project”,	which	paid	a	higher	milk	price	to	 the	 farmers	 and	 guaranteed	 a	 high	 quality	 of	milk	 for	 consumers	 in	 nearby	 towns	willing	 to	 pay	 a	 premium.	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 foster	 animal	 husbandry	 and	 eventually	increase	 and	 stabilize	 farmers’	 income.	 KAA	 also	 runs	 an	 organic	 shop	 through	 a	 co-operative,	selling	local,	organic	products	in	a	nearby	town.	Interestingly,	 low	input	 farming	 ideas	were	mainly	 framed	 in	terms	of	 ‘self-help’.	Most	activists	 rejected	 the	 word	 ‘organic’	 because	 it	 would	 imply	 a	 “westernized”	 and	
“religion-like”	 component.	 So	 they	 preferred	 “low	 input”	 to	 refer	 to	 agriculture	 with	minimum	 external	 inputs.	 An	 activist	 of	 KAA	who	 founded	 the	 organic	 shop	 called	 it	
svalambi	agriculture	(English:	self-dependent	agriculture).	Activists,	particularly	of	KAA,	argued	 that	 the	 farmers	 could	 regain	 their	 independence	 when	 cultivating	 with	 low	
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inputs.	If	it	is	not	possible	to	control	the	output	prices	and	if	the	yields	are	still	subject	to	high	 risks,	 then	 the	 only	 option	 is	 to	 control	 the	 input.	 This	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	most	interviewees’	–	particularly	farmers’	–	opinions	about	the	genetically	modified	Bt	cotton.	One	farmer	explained	that	he	would	not	oppose	Bt	cotton	because	it	would	in	fact	result	in	high	yields	(see	section	1.2,	chapter	III),	but	these	high	yields	can	only	be	realized	if	a	farmer	has	enough	capital	 to	 invest	heavily	 in	 irrigation	and	 inputs.	So	he	opined	 that	because	of	the	high	costs	and	the	high	risk	that	would	come	with	that,	eventually	local	seeds	would	be	better.		
Picture	8:	Organic	shop	associated	with	KAA	in	Wardha	
	Organic	or	not,	 farming	needs	a	 lot	of	knowledge	and	so,	another	 important	 ‘self-help’	activity	is	training	and	awareness	building.	Kakade,	leader	of	KAA,	said	that	“we	need	to	
cultivate	the	brains	of	kisans.”	The	 first	kind	of	 training	 is	 for	agricultural	practices,	 the	second	 is	awareness	building	about	how	policies	work	and	affect	 farmers.	The	second	point	in	particular	was	mentioned	often	by	activists	of	AIKS	and	KAA.	An	activist	of	KAA	said	 that	 “kisans	need	to	be	aware	how	they	are	exploited	by	the	government	policies.	(…)	
If	a	man	is	aware,	and	then	he	is	not	fighting,	then	he	is	a	foolish	man.”	But	 there	was	also	opposition	against	 this	 ‘self-help’	 frame.	For	example,	Tupkar	 from	SSS	was	very	 clear	 that	 “we	do	not	do	any	constructive	work.	This	is	only	another	way	to	
cheat	 the	 kisans.	 If	we	make	a	 co-operative,	 then	 the	people	 in	 charge	will	 be	again	 the	
leaders	and	will	again	exploit	the	kisans	for	their	personal	benefit.	(…)	We	want	to	change	
the	policies.”	This	directly	leads	to	the	fourth	frame.	
2.4 ‘Alternatives’	Frame:	“Revolution,	not	Evolution”80	Many	activists	and	some	farmers	as	well	argued	that	 it	was	not	enough	to	demand	for	slightly	 different	 policies,	 but	 that	 there	 was	 a	 need	 to	 change	 agriculture	 more	fundamentally.	There	are	three	major	areas	where	change	is	demanded.	
Free	Market	and	Price	Determination	Tiwari	 of	 VJAS	 clearly	 argued	 against	 “free	 trade,	 privatization,	 globalization	 and	
liberalization.	We	want	a	close-door	economy.”	For	 Tiwari	 and	 AIKS	 activists,	 the	 New																																									 																					80	Often	repeated	quotation	from	Tiwari,	VJAS.	
	 164	
Economic	Policies	(see	section	1.3,	chapter	II)	were	a	form	of	neo-colonialism	steered	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	the	World	Bank	and	the	World	Trade	Organization	to	exploit	poor	countries	and	“keep	them	as	slaves”.	It	was	very	unfair	and	hypocritical,	they	never	 tired	 of	 emphasizing,	 that	 rich	 countries	 subsidize	 their	 agriculture	 but	 impose	subsidy	 cuts	 on	 poor	 countries.	 To	 illustrate	 this,	 Jawandhia	 cited	 a	woman	who	 had	once	 told	him	 that	 “it	would	be	better	to	be	a	cow	in	America,	than	a	kisan	in	India.”	But	several	other	activists	of	all	groups	pointed	out	that	not	only	the	rich	countries	benefited	from	 these	 policies,	 but	 also	 the	 rich	 within	 India.	 Jawandhia	 opined	 that	 “the	 new	
policies	 benefit	 only	 the	 already	 rich.	 But	 for	 the	 big	 majority	 of	 Indians,	 this	 did	 not	
change	anything.	 These	 are	 only	 fast	 dreams.	 Please	 stop	 these	 fast	 dreams.	Don’t	make	
misleading	promises	to	the	kisans”.		Tiwari	 criticized	 that	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 cooperated	 with	 and	 protected	 the	transnational	 companies,	which	he	saw	as	detrimental	 to	 farmers.	The	companies	had	managed	 to	 remove	all	 local	 seeds.	After	 selling	 their	own	seeds,	 the	 same	companies	would	then	sell	pesticides	and	fertilizers	and	therefore	strengthen	their	market	position.	Tiwari	 lamented	 that	 “the	farming	community,	which	is	living	in	India	has	become	slaves	
of	companies.	The	companies	decide	what	products	to	be	sold,	what	to	be	cultivated	(…).	So	
wrong	 agrarian	 practices	 in	 India	 are	 promoted	 by	 the	 United	 States,	 with	 the	 help	 of	
corrupt	law	makers	in	my	country.”	He	even	concluded	that	“the	cotton	kisans	are	nothing	
but	bonded	labour	on	their	own	fields.	They	have	been	working	in	order	to	give	the	profit	
to	manufacturer	of	the	seed,	fertilizer	and	pesticides.”	On	 a	more	 immediate	 level,	many	farmers	suspected	the	traders	of	creating	artificial	shortages	to	increase	the	prices	and	activists	 of	KAA	 complained	 about	 the	 unfair	 conditions	 and	monopolies	 on	 the	 input	market,	particularly	for	seeds.	In	 addition	 to	 the	 difficult	 situation	 on	 the	 input	 markets,	 activists	 of	 KAA	 and	 SSS	argued	that	the	price	for	agricultural	produce	is	fixed	by	forces	out	of	the	farmers’	reach.	These	 activists	 emphasized	 that	 with	 the	 New	 Economic	 Policies,	 the	 price	 was	 now	decided	at	the	global	level.	An	activist	of	AIKS	emphasized	that	in	a	free	market,	farmers	are	 typical	 price	 takers	 and	 therefore	 have	 no	 influence	 over	 the	markets.	 He	 further	argued	that	farmers	were	totally	dependent	on	price	as	producers	and	as	consumers	of	inputs	as	well	as	of	consumer	goods	and	food.	The	journalist	Hardikar	even	argued	that	
“it	is	very	obvious	that	liberal	markets	do	not	work	in	agriculture”	and	that	neoliberalism	brings	a	power	structure	of	a	kind	for	which	suicide	seems	the	only	option	(see	chapter	VII)	because	it	is	so	difficult	to	fight	against	those	structures.	Consequently,	farmers	saw	themselves	in	a	position	to	neither	predict	nor	control	the	price	and	felt	a	deep	unease	about	 the	 latter.	 So,	most	 of	 the	 farmers	 argued	 like	 the	 small	 farmer	who	demanded	that	“the	prices	should	be	in	the	hands	of	the	kisans”.		On	 the	more	 immediate	 level	 of	 the	 local	 economy,	many	 farmers	 felt	 threatened	 and	exploited	 by	 traders	 and	 moneylenders.	 They	 perceived	 traders	 to	 have	 much	 more	power	than	them.	The	farmers	had	to	sell	their	crops	directly	after	harvest	due	to	a	lack	of	storage	facilities.	Additionally,	the	traders	were	often	also	the	moneylenders,	forcing	the	 farmers	 to	 sell	 immediately.	 Consequently,	 several	 farmers	 thought	 about	 new	
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systems	 for	 determining	 prices.	 One	 farmer	 suggested	 that	 there	 should	 be	 a	market	committee	consisting	of	 traders	and	 farmers.	This	 committee	could	 then	negotiate	 the	price	on	behalf	of	all	farmers.	Other	farmers	were	even	yearning	for	the	old	times,	when	the	government	bought	all	the	cotton	from	the	farmers	at	fixed	prices	(see	section	2.1,	chapter	 III).	An	activist	of	AIKS	even	suggested	a	radical	change	 in	 the	system	of	price	determination	 and	 wanted	 to	 give	 the	 government	 control	 over	 prices.	 He	 suggested	that	the	government	should	purchase	all	the	agricultural	output	and	then	give	prices	to	farmers	according	to	their	needs	–	namely	according	to	their	landholdings.	This	implies	prices	 that	 ensure	 a	 living	 also	 for	 small	 and	marginal	 farmers.	 Along	 similar	 lines,	 a	medium	 farmer	 demanded	 that	 “if	 the	 government	 does	 not	 have	 any	 solution	 for	 the	
kisans,	they	should	take	our	land	and	give	us	food	and	clothes	and	shelter.”	
Cropping	Systems	in	Rain-fed	Agriculture	Besides	 changing	 market	 mechanisms	 and	 structures,	 many	 activists	 claim	 that	 it	 is	necessary	to	change	the	cropping	system	in	two	major	ways.	First,	 they	argue	that	the	focus	on	the	production	of	cash	crops	like	cotton	in	monoculture	increases	the	farmers’	dependency	on	the	market	and	particularly	on	its	price	fluctuations.	Cotton	is	nowadays	one	of	 the	 least-regulated	crops	 in	 India	with	hardly	any	government	restrictions.	The	shift	towards	cotton	together	with	the	decrease	of	government	support	and	the	lack	of	irrigation	 in	 a	 dry	 land	 area	 had	 put	 farmers	 at	 an	 increasing	 risk.	 Consequently,	Hardikar	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 real	 question	 is	 “how	can	rain-fed	agriculture	go	on?”.	 If	the	 farmers	 change	 their	 cropping	 pattern	 and	 diversify,	 they	 could	 revive	 local	processing	 and	 improve	 their	 economic	 situation.	 This	 would	 require	 a	 fundamental	change	in	government	policies.	An	activist	of	KAA	explained	that	the	policies	incentivize	cash	 crops	 like	 cotton	 and	 increasingly	 sugarcane	 and	 soybean.	 Instead,	 he	 argued,	government	 should	 create	 policies	 to	 incentivise	 more	 sustainable	 crops	 such	 as	sorghum	or	oilseeds.	This	is	the	second	change	in	cropping	patterns	that	was	suggested.	Jawandhia,	KAA	and	VJAS	 activists	 and	 Hardikar	 shared	 this	 conviction	 about	 sorghum	 being	 a	 huge	opportunity	 for	 Vidarbha	 for	 three	 major	 reasons.	 First,	 local	 crops	 –	 sorghum	 in	particular	 –	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 improve	 food	 security.	 Tiwari	 asked	 “why	should	our	
kisans	die	to	keep	you	decorated?	(…)	The	kisans	should	not	worry	about	the	world.	They	
are	hungry	 (…).	They	 should	go	 for	 sustainable	 crops,	 food	 crops,	 fodder	 crops.”	 Second,	crops	 like	 sorghum	 or	 oilseeds	 can	 serve	 as	 fodder	 for	 livestock.	 The	 demand	 to	prioritize	livestock	production	was	very	prevalent	among	supporters	and	activists	of	all	groups.	Livestock	could	make	agricultural	production	more	sustainable,	be	an	important	additional	 income	 for	 farmers	 and	 boost	 local	 processing	 industries.	 Third,	 crops	 like	sorghum	were	 adapted	 to	 rain-fed	 agriculture	 and	 comparably	 drought-resistant	 and	less	dependent	on	irrigation.		Introducing	 the	 third	major	change	demanded,	 the	 line	here	comes	again	 to	 low	 input	farming.	 But	 here,	 it	 is	 framed	 differently	 than	 in	 the	 ‘self-help’	 frame,	 namely	 as	 a	fundamental	alternative	to	the	current	farming	practices.	The	goal	is	to	establish	a	more	sustainable	 farming	 system	 adapted	 to	 local	 conditions.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 ‘traditional’	
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practices	should	be	mixed	with	new	knowledge.	One	AIKS	activist	emphasized	that	“we	
have	 to	 see	 scientifically,	 whether	 organic	 farming	 alone	 can	 increase	 production	 in	 a	
necessary	way.	Maybe	chemicals	are	also	needed.”	Furthermore,	several	activists	deemed	it	 important	to	find	locally	adapted	farming	practices	because	dry	land	agriculture	and	modern	 technologies	 in	 agriculture	 do	 not	 go	well	 together.	Most	 of	 the	 farmers	who	commit	 suicide,	 so	 Tiwari	 claimed,	 were	 “dry	 land	 kisans	 who	 have	 adopted	 modern	
genetically	engineered	agriculture”.	On	the	other	hand,	low	input	farming	could	also	help	breaking	 the	 power	 of	 the	 corporations;	 some	 activists	 labelled	 it	 as	 “non-corporate”	agriculture.	Activists	 from	KAA	and	VJAS	concluded	 that	 low	 input	 farming	could	only	play	 a	 role	 if	 there	 was	 a	 consistent	 policy	 framework	 supporting	 it.	 However,	 the	government	subsidizes	chemical	agriculture	and	it	is	instead	the	NGOs	that	are	active	in	promoting	low	input	agriculture.	Most	of	the	farmers	were	generally	positive	about	low	input	agriculture.	However,	many	argued	that	that	low	input	farming	was	more	feasible	for	the	richer	farmers.	One	farmer	pointed	 out	 that	 those	 who	 got	 involved	 were	 those	 “whose	 economic	 status	 is	 quite	
good,	 those	 that	 are	 well	 educated,	 who	 have	 a	 good	 knowledge	 of	 the	 market,	 the	
business,	 the	 policies,	 and	 those	 who	 have	 irrigation	 facilities.”	 Along	 the	 same	 lines,	Jawandhia	 analysed	 that	 “these	 organic	 people	 they	 only	 talk	 about	 the	 environment,	
nobody	 talks	 about	 social	 justice.”	 He	 was	 also	 highly	 sceptical	 of	 the	 ideas	 of	organizations	like	La	Vía	Campesina.	He	accused	them	of	talking	only	about	communities	and	natural	farming.	He	argues	that	“if	we	are	supposed	to	become	a	high	cost,	developed	
economy,	kisans	incomes	have	to	be	increased	in	the	same	speed.	This	is	only	possible	with	
the	help	of	government.”	
‘Traditional’	Community?	Tiwari	 of	 VJAS	 argued	 strongly	 against	 this	 “developed	economy”	 and	 in	 favour	 of	 the	‘traditional’	 community.	 He	 explained	 that	 “for	 thousands	of	 years,	 rural	 economy	was	
flourishing	 in	 Vidarbha”.	 Then	 during	 the	 first	 Green	 Revolution,	 farmers	 started	
“aggressive	agriculture”	 promoted	by	private	 companies.	But	 the	major	problem	 in	his	view	was	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 living	 had	 increased	 in	 the	 village	with	motorcycles,	mobile	phones,	 and	 ready-made	products.	 In	Tiwari’s	 eyes,	 “materialism	is	killing	the	agrarian	
community	 of	 Vidarbha.”	 He	 was	 convinced	 that	 “this	 old	 type	 of	 economy	 never	 gave	
higher	incomes.	But	it	used	to	give	a	sustainable	life	to	the	villagers.”	Consequently,	Tiwari	demanded	 that	 all	 these	 new	 products,	 alcohol	 as	 well	 as	 these	 “wrong	 agricultural	
practices	should	be	banned.”		Other	 activists,	 particularly	 of	 SSS	 and	 KAA,	 expressed	 strong	 doubts	 about	 the	desirability	 of	 this	 ‘traditional	 community’.	 While	 most	 shared	 the	 concern	 that	 the	farmers	 have	 too	 eagerly	 left	 their	 ‘traditional’	 farming	 practices,	 they	 also	acknowledged	 that	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 had	 boosted	 agricultural	 productivity.	Furthermore,	not	everyone	was	so	enthusiastic	about	the	‘local	community’.	An	activist	of	 VJAS	 saw	 the	 problem	 that	 “the	 people	 love	 the	money,	 and	 not	 each	 other.	 If	 one	
person	 is	 rich,	 he	 will	 not	 even	 give	 Rs	 100	 to	 his	 neighbour	 who	 is	 starving.	 Such	 a	
mentality	 is	 prominently	 observed	 here	 in	 the	 village.”	 Many,	 particularly	 small	 and	
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medium	farmers,	objected	that	the	moneylenders	and	the	big	landholders	were	the	main	problems	for	the	labourers,	the	marginal,	small	and	medium	farmers,	particularly	their	wives	and	daughters.		The	 solution	 for	 Vidarbha	 farmers,	 as	 Hardikar	 argued,	 is	 neither	 to	 go	 back	 to	traditional	 practices	 entirely	 nor	 to	 industrialise	 agriculture	 in	 Vidarbha.	 Rather,	 it	involves	 bringing	 processing	 industries	 back	 to	 a	 local	 level	 with	 private	 and	 public	investment.	Most	farmers	and	activists	talked	about	industries	connected	to	agriculture,	processing	cotton	for	instance.	Only	activists	of	SSS	also	wished	for	other	industries	and	Special	Economic	Zones	 in	 their	 region	–	 “so	change	can	take	place	here”,	 as	an	activist	said.		
3 Concluding	Thoughts:	Fighting	for	Just	Prices?	To	 conclude,	 I	 first	discuss	how	 the	 frames	 correspond	 to	 the	 ideas	of	 earlier	peasant	and	 farmers’	 movements	 in	 the	 region	 and	 how	 they	 have	 changed	 over	 time	 (see	section	 2.3,	 chapter	 IV).	 Second,	 I	 analyse	 the	 frames	 and	 demands	 relating	 them	 to	current	 academic	 and	 movement	 debates	 about	 the	 future	 of	 agriculture	 (see	 also	section	 1.1,	 chapter	 I).	 Third,	 I	 discuss	 how	 these	 frames	 influence	 the	 movement’s	strategies	of	struggle	(see	also	section	1.2,	chapter	I).	
3.1 From	the	‘Free	Market’	to	the	‘Protection’	Frame	The	 frames	 that	 activists	 and	 supporters	 in	 the	 movement	 use	 most	 often	 revolve	around	the	new	farmers’	movements’	demand	for	a	remunerative	price	(see	section	2.3,	chapter	IV).	This	demand	unites	the	different	groups,	activists	and	particularly	farmers,	despite	 all	 the	 differences	 between	 them.	 It	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 the	 1970s,	when	 farmers	were	obliged	to	sell	their	crops	to	procurement	monopolies	of	the	government	at	a	fixed	price.	 At	 that	 time,	 the	 demand	 for	 a	 remunerative	 price	 was	 directed	 against	government	 control	 and	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 free	 market,	 clearly	 part	 of	 the	 ‘free-market’	frame.	While	 it	might	seem	that	 this	demand	has	stayed	 the	same	over	 the	decades,	 it	has	 in	 fact	 changed	 into	 its	 opposite.	 It	 is	 only	 the	 old	 Shetkari	Sanghatana	 that	 still	argues	 within	 a	 ‘free-market’	 frame.	 While	 AIKS	 has	 opposed	 neoliberal	 policies	throughout	its	existence;	SSS,	VJAS	and	KAA	have	realized	that	an	open	market	did	not	seem	to	bring	the	prosperity	that	they	had	hoped	for.	Consequently,	 in	their	view,	 it	 is	now	the	government	that	 is	supposed	to	protect	the	farmers	from	the	market	and	this	falls	clearly	within	the	‘protection’	frame.	This	indicates	not	a	change	in	demands,	but	a	shift	in	frames	between	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	of	the	1980s	and	today.	The	‘free	market’	frame	clearly	corresponds	to	a	vision	for	the	future	of	agriculture	that	is	 based	 on	 neoliberalism.	 Farmers	 are	 conceptualized	 as	 independent	 rural	entrepreneurs	 competing	 in	 a	 market	 environment.	 If	 rural	 producers	 get	 access	 to	markets	and	these	markets	become	deregulated,	 the	agricultural	sector	 is	supposed	to	become	 more	 efficient	 and	 the	 situation	 of	 farmers	 is	 supposed	 to	 improve.	Consequently,	 the	 recommended	 policies	 aim	 at	 letting	 the	 prices	 float	 freely,	liberalizing	trade	and	financial	markets	and	fostering	the	corporatization	of	agriculture	(Braun	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Rao	 2003).	 The	 competitive	 farmers	 can	 prosper	 while	 the	
	 168	
uncompetitive	 ones	 need	 to	 find	 another	 livelihood	 basis,	 be	 it	 as	 labour	 on	 the	 big	farms	or	 in	 the	non-agricultural	sector.	While	 this	vision	 is	dominant	 in	policy-making	bodies	 (see	 Oakland	 Institute	 2014),	 it	 hardly	 finds	 any	 resonance	 among	movement	activists	or	supporters.		The	 frame	 that	 is	most	prominent	 among	all	 groups	 today	 is	 the	 ‘protection’	 frame.	 It	corresponds	 to	 a	 vision	 that	 is	 still	 based	 on	 the	 same	 principles	 as	 the	 ‘free	market’frame,	but	which	is	decidedly	different.	Sanyal	(2007)	argued	that	while	there	is	a	 dominant	 discourse	 about	 –	 almost	 exclusively	 capitalist	 –	 growth,	 “there	 is	 [at	 the	
same	time]	a	growing	sense	now	that	certain	basic	conditions	of	 life	must	be	provided	to	
people	everywhere”	(cited	in	Chatterjee	2008a,	55).	In	the	‘protection’	frame,	these	basic	conditions	 are	demanded	 from	 the	 state	without	questioning	 the	market-led	model	 of	agriculture,	and	only	to	cushion	its	effects.	Alternatively,	the	state	or	NGOs	can	step	into	the	 breach	 to	 ensure	 food	 and	 social	 security	 or	 agricultural	 improvements.	While	 it	makes	a	huge	difference	whether	it	is	the	state	or	NGOs,	both	these	options	are	based	on	the	 idea	 that	 an	 institution	 has	 to	 step	 in	 the	 breach	 to	 protect	 the	 farmers.	 Possible	means	include	different	micro-institutions	based	on	market	principles	such	as	extension	services	enabling	farmers	to	diversify	or	micro	forms	of	collective	action	(Harriss-White	2008).	The	frame	puts	the	protection	of	the	livelihoods	of	marginal	to	medium	farmers	as	 well	 as	 agricultural	 labourers	 at	 centre-stage,	 but	 it	 co-exists	 with	 a	 vision	 of	 a	neoliberal	capitalism.	The	main	reactions	from	the	state	then	can	be	understood	within	this	frame.	The	state’s	response	has	mostly	been	to	grant	some	temporary	relief,	 if	at	all.	The	powerful	elites	have	an	interest	 in	reacting	to	the	claims	of	each	group	separately,	rather	than	to	 let	a	more	 radical	 resistance	 grow,	 as	 Sahoo	 (2010,	 504	 f.)	 has	 argued.	 Chatterjee	 (2008a)	even	 claimed	 that	 the	 capitalist	 project	 in	 an	 electoral	 democracy	 could	 not	 afford	 to	marginalize	farmers	further	because	they	would	otherwise	turn	into	“dangerous	classes”	(ibid,	62).	This	also	implies	that,	as	an	outcome	of	their	mobilization,	the	farmers	might	get	more	concessions	from	the	state	but	that	the	root	causes	will	hardly	change.		
3.2 Tension	within	Demands	for	Remunerative	Prices	Going	one	step	further,	I	argue	that	the	focus	on	a	higher	price	raises	more	fundamental	questions.	Making	this	their	main	demand,	movement	actors	invoke	four	major	tensions,	which	 I	 will	 discuss	 here	 following.	 The	 first	 contradiction	 concerns	 the	MSPs.	While	MSPs	 typically	 aim	 at	 protecting	 producers	 from	 short-term	 price	 drops,	 what	 the	movement	actors	ask	 for	 is	 a	 guaranteed	price	 that	 covers	 their	 expenses	 in	 the	 long-term.	 The	 demand	 for	 a	 price	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 state	 and	 considering	 the	 farmers’	different	expenses,	yields	or	even	 landholdings	questions	 the	concept	of	a	 free	market	price	more	fundamentally	than	most	movement	actors	realize.	Determining	the	price	in	that	manner	would	 imply	 changing	 the	market	 system	and	would	 therefore	belong	 to	the	‘alternative’	frame.	However,	with	few	exceptions,	movement	actors	keep	using	the	‘protection’	 frame,	 asking	 the	 government	 to	 cushion	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 neoliberal	policies.	 Nevertheless,	 I	 argue	 that	 they	 implicitly	 question	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 price	determination	by	markets	in	a	radical	manner.	
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The	second	tension	concerns	the	effect	of	price	increases.	Whatever	the	mechanism	for	the	 determination	 of	 the	 MSPs	 might	 be,	 a	 higher	 price	 for	 agricultural	 output	 is	 a	double-edged	sword	for	farmers,	particularly	in	a	context	where	many	farmers	cultivate	cash	 crops.	 The	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 marginal	 to	 medium	 farmers,	 the	 groups’	constituency,	 are	net-buyers	 of	 food	 (Persaud	 and	Rosen	2003).	 Therefore,	 increasing	prices	 for	 food	 would	 have	 negative	 impacts	 on	 the	 majority	 of	 small	 and	 medium	farmers,	not	to	mention	the	labourers.	Only	for	the	big	landholders,	higher	prices	would	lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 net	 income.	 Sharad	 Joshi	 of	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 partly	acknowledged	this	factor	and	therefore	explicitly	only	demanded	higher	prices	for	cash	crops,	 and	 not	 for	 food	 crops	 (Arora	 2001).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 cotton,	 activists	 and	supporters	sometimes	made	the	example	that	the	price	of	a	T-shirt	would	be	very	high	and	the	portion	that	the	cotton-growing	farmer	receives	of	that	would	still	be	very	small.	This	 indicates	 that	 the	 conflict	 was	 not	 between	 farmers	 and	 consumers,	 and	 that	instead	it	was	the	traders	who	caused	a	high	price	for	the	consumers	and	a	low	price	for	the	 farmers.	 This	 argument	 addresses	 the	 second	 tension	 to	 some	 extent.	 In	 the	interviews,	however,	 activists	 strongly	emphasized	 their	 consequent	 stand	on	price	 to	distinguish	 themselves	 from	 political	 parties,	 which	 sometimes	 favour	 higher	 prices,	sometimes	lower	food	prices.	This	is	even	more	unsettling	considering	the	very	limited	impact	of	prices	on	agricultural	growth	(Ramakumar	2010;	Vaidyanathan	2010).	The	third	tension	concerns	the	fact	that	guaranteed	prices	are	generally	demanded	only	for	agricultural	products,	but	not	for	agricultural	labour	in	the	form	of	minimum	wages.	The	 argument	 of	 movement	 actors	 goes	 that	 the	 trickle-down	 from	 higher	 prices	 of	agricultural	produces	to	higher	salaries	for	workers	would	happen	automatically.	While	farmers	have	a	fine	sense	of	power	inequalities	in	input	and	output	markets,	most	of	the	interviewees	ignore	those	questions	and	suddenly	seem	to	trust	the	market	mechanisms	–	in	this	case	the	landowners	–	when	it	comes	to	wages.		A	 fourth	 contradiction	 connected	 to	 the	 last	 one	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 land	 question.	Most	 interviewees	mentioned	that	 the	plots	of	 farmers	are	becoming	smaller	(see	also	section	 3.4,	 chapter	 II).	 They	 agreed	 that	 farming	 could	 not	 be	 profitable	 for	 farmers	with	small	plots	even	with	a	higher	MSP,	but	that	 it	can	be	profitable	 for	 farmers	with	larger	 landholdings.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 is	 striking	 that	 land	 reforms	 are	 a	 non-issue	for	the	small	and	marginal	farmers.	Only	activists	of	AIKS	complained	that	the	land	reforms	 had	 not	 been	 implemented.	 Even	 when	 I	 explicitly	 asked	 interviewees	 what	they	 would	 think	 about	 land	 redistribution,	 most	 simply	 shrugged	 their	 shoulders.	However,	from	another	angle,	farmers	who	own	little	land	which	is	only	for	agricultural	cultivation	(rather	than	for	selling	on),	whose	land	is	non-irrigated	and	who	do	not	have	capital	 to	 invest	 in	 agricultural	 operations,	 find	 themselves	with	negative	profits	 from	their	 plots.	 Seen	 from	 this	 perspective,	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 demand	 for	 land	 reforms	might	not	be	that	surprising.	Rich	farmers,	on	the	contrary,	talked	a	lot	about	land	and	demanded	to	abolish	the	land	ceiling	laws	(fixing	a	ceiling	to	the	amount	of	land	one	person	can	own,	see	section	1.4,	chapter	 II).	Agricultural	 land	still	has	a	significant	value.	With	 the	appreciation	of	 land	
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values	due	to	an	increased	demand	for	non-agricultural	purposes,	rich	farmers	still	earn	very	high	amounts	in	the	land	market	by	acquiring	land,	at	times	forcibly,	from	poorer	farmers	(Parthasarathy	2015,	822-823).	In	this	line,	some	activists	saw	trends	towards	corporate	farming.	 Jawandhia	as	well	as	activists	of	KAA	and	SSS	reported	that	foreign	companies	had	come	to	the	region	wanting	land	for	agricultural	plantations	or	contract	farming.	 An	 activist	 stated	 that	 “they	have	very	good	technology.	So	compared	to	them,	
our	farming	will	be	poor.	Many	kisans	are	in	stress	and	sell	their	land	to	them”.		In	2015,	land	suddenly	became	the	primary	issue	for	all	activists.	In	March	2015,	the	Lok	
Sabha	 adopted	 the	Land	Bill	 (i.e.	 the	Right	 to	Fair	Compensation	and	Transparency	 in	Land	 Acquisition,	 Rehabilitation	 and	 Resettlement	 (Amendment)	 Bill	 2015).	 This	 bill	severely	cuts	the	rights	of	landowners	when	the	government	or	private	entities	want	to	acquire	land	for	industrial	corridors	or	infrastructure	projects,	including	public-private	partnerships.	Most	strikingly,	it	exempts	such	projects	from	the	necessary	consent	of	80	or	70%	of	landowners	(Hindu	2015;	Nielsen	and	Nilsen	2015).	Even	if,	as	the	journalist	Hardikar	said,	 it	was	often	not	even	necessary	 to	use	direct	 coercion	 to	make	 farmers	sell	 their	 land	because	the	economic	coercion	was	enough,	 it	 is	not	surprising	that	 the	activists	went	up	on	the	barricades	to	fight	this	bill.	This	shows	the	importance	of	land	for	rural	wealth,	or	at	least	what	stands	between	farmers	and	even	more	severe	poverty	(see	Li	Murray	2010).		These	tensions	bring	us	again	to	the	issue	of	who	is	affected,	or	perceived	to	be	affected,	by	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	They	indeed	challenge	the	idea	of	a	united	peasantry	that	would	profit	from	a	measure	like	a	higher	price.	Ramachandran	(2011)	showed	that	within	the	‘agrarian	 crisis’,	 the	 rural	 groups,	 regions	 and	 crops	 are	 very	 differently	 affected	 by	recent	changes	in	the	agricultural	policies.	In	fact,	the	rural	elite,	the	big	landholders	and	capitalist	 farmers,	 can	 still	 have	 very	 high	 returns	 on	 investment	 in	 agricultural	production	 and	 therefore	 a	 high	 income	 from	 agriculture.	 It	 is	 mostly	 the	 small	 and	marginal	 farmers	 who	 suffer	 from	 the	 old	 agrarian	 inequalities	 as	 well	 as	 the	 New	Economic	 Policies.	 He	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 wrong	 to	 conclude	 that	 a	 differentiation	 of	peasantry	 is	 decreasing	 just	 because	 immiserisation	 can	 be	 observed	 (see	 section	 3,	chapter	II).	In	fact,	 inequality	in	villages	is	increasing	“and	classical	processes	of	peasant	
differentiation	may	well	still	be	on-going” (Lerche	2013,	400;	also	Le	Mons	Walker	2008).	The	most	 crucial	 issues	 are	 therefore,	 so	 these	 authors	 argue,	 to	 abolish	 old	 and	new	landlordism,	redistribute	land	and	“free	the	working	peasantry	and	manual	workers	from	
their	 present	 fetters	 of	 unfreedom	 and	 drudgery”	 (Ramachandran	 2011,	 79).	 The	movement	 actors,	 however,	 struggle	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 tensions	 that	 arise	 from	 the	demand	for	a	higher	price.		The	 case	 for	 economic	 liberalisation	 contained	 in	 the	 country	 memorandum	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 for	 India	 released	 in	 the	 year	 1991	 rested	 heavily	 on	 freeing	 up	 the	agriculture	 sector.	 The	 basic	 arguments	 for	 liberalisation	 in	 agriculture	 can	 be	summarised	in	following	points.	Firstly,	the	pre-1991	economic	policy	was	deemed	to	be	anti-farmer	 insofar	as	 it	kept	the	terms	of	 trade	prevalent	 in	the	economy	in	 favour	of	the	 industrial	 sector	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 agriculture.	 This	 occurred	 due	 to	 the	 various	
	 171	
protective	measures	within	the	economy	like	input	subsidies	and	output	price	support,	which	 depressed	 agriculture	 prices	 and	 consequently	 created	 an	 economic	 structure	based	 on	distorted	prices	 not	 in	 line	with	 the	 cost	 of	 production	 and	 relative	 scarcity	(see	sections	1.3	and	3.1,	chapter	II).	This	price	argument	(‘getting	the	prices	right’)	can	be	 said	 to	 be	 the	 foundational	 basis	 of	 the	 neoclassical	 reorganisation	 of	 the	underdeveloped	 economies	 the	 world	 over.	 Secondly,	 various	 policy	 signals	 were	devised	 to	 de-emphasise	 the	 role	 of	 public	 investments	 in	 agriculture,	 which	 again	rested	on	the	assumption	that	 the	public	 investments	 ‘crowded	out’	private	enterprise	in	agriculture.	Thirdly,	 the	possibility	of	an	export-led	agriculture	growth	was	mooted	during	this	time	as	a	single	panacea	for	the	low-income,	backward	agriculture	sector	in	India.	An	emphasis	on	exports	would	lead	to	diversification	in	cropping	patterns,	and	a	movement	 towards	 ‘high	 value	 agriculture’	would	 ensure	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	 terms	 of	trade	 in	 favour	 of	 agriculture.	 Keeping	 these	 three	 main	 points	 in	 mind,	 it	 is	 quite	surprising	to	note	that	a	number	of	movement	actors	had	internalised	the	neoliberal	re-imagination	of	agriculture	even	if	they	have	explicitly	demanded	state	intervention.		Arguably,	 these	 tensions	 immanent	 in	 the	 price	 demand	 are	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 near	absence	of	 systemic	alternatives	 that	would	allow	 for	 a	 fundamental	 rethinking	of	 the	relations	of	production	and	consumption.	While	the	groups	are	successful	in	elaborating	alternatives	 for	 their	 specific	 issues,	 namely	 the	 low	 profitability	 of	 agriculture,	 there	seems	to	be	no	group	that	can	provide	a	platform	to	combine	a	wide	range	of	interests.	The	political	parties	mostly	fail	to	do	so	as	well.	These	characteristics	of	such	movement	groups	 seem	 to	 go	 far	 beyond	 India,	 as	 Bebbington	 (2010)	 has	 found	 very	 similar	tendencies	in	social	movement	case	studies	in	Peru	and	South	Africa.		
3.3 Towards	Food	Sovereignty	Aiming	 at	 a	 more	 holistic	 vision	 for	 the	 future	 of	 agriculture,	 the	 concept	 of	 food	sovereignty	became	well	known	not	so	long	ago	(see	section	1.1,	chapter	I).	Proponents	of	food	sovereignty	claim	to	“hold	a	mirror	to	the	dominant	narrative,	both	left	and	right,	
that	 views	 the	 future	 of	 the	 peasantry	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 capital	 accumulation”	(McMichael	2007,	36)	 to	 instead	 focus	on	 the	 ‘peasant	way’	of	agriculture.	They	argue	that	with	 the	 industrialization	of	 agriculture,	 the	world	market	 sets	 the	 conditions	 for	agricultural	production	and	markets	 favour	 transnational	agribusiness.	This	 is	abetted	by	 neoliberal	 policy	 and	 trade	 agreements.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 ‘the	 peasantry’	 is	threatened	 and	 dispossessed	 and	 needs	 to	 unite	 to	 fight	 against	 the	 corporate	 food	regime.	 Food	 sovereignty	 seeks	 to	 “offer	 alternatives	 to	 the	 social	 and	 ecological	
catastrophes	 of	 neoliberal	 capitalism”	 (McMichael	 2007,	 36)	 by	 focussing	 on	 the	development	of	locally	adapted	forms	of	agriculture.	The	vision	is	to	develop	a	socially	just,	environmentally	friendly	food	regime	with	the	peasant	community	placed	at	centre	stage	(Fairbairn	2008;	Lerche	2013;	McMichael	2006,	2007,	2012;	Patel	2006).	In	 the	 movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	Western	 Vidarbha,	 there	 are	 several	local	 initiatives	 and	 ideas	 for	 resolving	 the	 immediate	 problems	 that	 farmers	 face.	Groups	 that	 rely	 on	 the	 ‘self-help’	 frame	 have	 tried	 to	 improve	 the	 situation	 with	‘constructive	work’,	 including	 low-input	 agriculture,	 group	 farming	 and	 training.	 They	
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all	closely	relate	to	ideas	of	the	concept	of	food	sovereignty.	However,	the	ideas	within	the	‘self-help’	frame	are	hardly	seen	as	long-term	visions	by	the	interviewees,	merely	as	an	emergency	solution	 in	the	absence	of	support	 from	the	state.	This	goes	 in	 line	with	Bernstein’s	(2013)	argument	that	food	sovereignty	focuses	on	local	solutions	and	fails	to	present	solutions	that	include	the	whole	economy	and	not	just	its	agricultural	sector.	He	objected	 that	 the	 narrow	 focus	 on	 traditional,	 agro-ecological	 farming	 practices	 no	longer	accepts	productivity	as	a	goal	and	therefore	does	not	have	a	convincing	position	towards	 technology	 (see	 Kloppenburg	 2008).	 Furthermore,	 these	 approaches	 fail	 to	present	solutions	on	how	a	surplus	should	be	achieved	and	distributed	among	the	non-agricultural	 population	 and	 they	 compromise	 the	 goal	 of	 an	 industrialized	 economy	(Bernstein	2014).		These	 criticisms,	 together	 with	 the	 interviewees’	 perception	 of	 those	 localized	approaches	 rather	 as	 an	 interim	 solutions	 point	 to	 another	 critical	 element	 in	 food	sovereignty:	who	 is	 the	sovereign	(Edelman	2014)?	 I	agree	with	Bernstein	(2013,	21),	who	says	that	with	all	these	new	visions	of	agriculture,	the	state	is	still	“the	elephant	in	
the	room”,	 i.e.	an	obvious	problem	no	one	wants	 to	discuss.	Louis	 (2015)	analysed	 the	role	 of	 food	 sovereignty	 in	 mitigating	 the	 impacts	 of	 neoliberal	 economic	 policies	 on	poor	farmers	in	Telengana,	Andhra	Pradesh.	She	argued	that	small	and	marginal	farmers	face	 socio-economic	 constraints,	 i.e.	 debt	 and	 risk,	 to	 adopting	 food	 sovereignty	practices.	 In	 a	 harsh	 and	 monetized	 economy,	 these	 practices	 based	 on	 localized,	sustainable,	 subsistence	 agriculture	 would	 constrain	 farmers’	 chances	 of	 maintaining	their	livelihoods	viably.	She	concluded	that	“contrary	to	assertions	by	advocates	that	food	
sovereignty	 is	 a	 precondition	 to	 genuine	 food	 security,	 farmers	must	 first	 have	 food	 and	
livelihood	 security	 to	 exercise	 true	 food	 sovereignty	 that	 allows	 them	more	 control	 over	
their	livelihoods”	 (ibid,	 1).	 This	 seems	 to	 fit	 very	well	 the	perception	of	 the	 farmers	 in	this	study.		In	the	‘alternative’	frame	as	well,	ideas	directly	relate	to	the	food	sovereignty	concept.	A	heavy	critique	of	the	neoliberal	policies	and	(transnational)	companies	go	together	with	localised	solutions	such	as	organic	farming	or	locally	adapted	crops	and	a	vision	of	more	fundamental	changes.	Here,	however,	the	groups	have	a	different	stand	on	the	notion	of	a	 peasant	 community.	 Food	 sovereignty	 has	 been	 criticised	 most	 prominently	 by	Bernstein	(2013,	2014)	or	Agarwal	(2014),	while	recently	also	 the	proponents	of	 food	sovereignty	have	accepted	these	contradictions	as	further	research	needs	(;	Edelman	et	al.	 2014;	 Shattuck,	 Schiavoni,	 and	 VanGelder	 2015).	 From	 a	 Marxist	 perspective,	Bernstein	 argued	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 peasant	 community	 is	 a	 trope	 of	 agrarian	populism	that	prominently	figures	within	food	sovereignty.	First,	the	category	‘peasant’	or	equally	‘farmer’	embraces	very	different	groups	and	classes	of	farmers	on	the	globe.	Second,	 the	 focus	on	 ‘community’	 runs	 the	 risk	of	 obscuring	 the	 tensions	within	 rural	society,	 be	 it	 between	 different	 classes,	 generations	 or	 gender.	 In	 India,	 though,	renowned	 economist	 Utsa	 Patnaik	 has	 recently	 turned	 towards	 an	 analysis	 closely	related	to	the	one	of	the	food	sovereignty	proponents.	She	argued	that	the	steeply	falling	agricultural	profitability	has	hit	all	agrarian	classes	 in	 India	and	has	put	a	halt	even	to	
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the	rise	of	capitalist	farming.	While	the	big	landholders	can	resort	to	rent	extraction	and	money	 lending,	 the	 peasantry	 is	 left	 with	 pauperization.	 The	 corporatization	 of	agriculture	 lets	 the	 transnational	capital	 take	control	over	peasant	production,	 leading	to	 an	 “imperialist	 domination	 of	 our	 peasantry”	 (Patnaik	 2010,	 cited	 in	 Lerche	 2013,	390).	 She,	 too,	 argued	 that	 all	 peasant	 classes	 need	 to	 take	 up	 the	 fight	 together.	 She	concluded	that	 the	solution	 is	 that	developing	countries	have	to	 find	their	own	way	of	industrialization,	 and	 preserve	 and	 encourage	 labour-intensive,	 petty	 production	(Patnaik	 2006;	 2010,	 the	 latter	 as	 cited	 in	 Lerche	 2013).	 As	 I	 will	 show	 in	 the	 next	section,	 the	 contradictions	 between	 a	 homogenous	 versus	 a	 heterogeneous	 peasantry	(and	related	contradictions	on	suggestions	for	change)	go	even	further.	
3.4 Bridge	Between	Right	and	Left	In	 the	 Indian	context	Nanda	 (2004,	250)	argued	 that	 the	notion	of	 a	united	peasantry	and	 the	 ideas	 of	 agrarian	 populism	 that	 come	 with	 it	 –	 and	 that	 are	 arguably	 also	present	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 McMichael	 and	 U.	 Patnaik	 –	 can	 have	 very	 real,	 dangerous	consequences.	Nanda	argued	that	as	a	consequence	of	the	indiscriminate	use	of	the	anti-imperialist	card	in	the	analysis	of	the	agrarian	situation,	any	critique	of	the	indigenous	became	 difficult,	 “authenticity	and	indigenousness	and	not	dispassionate	efforts	to	reach	
the	truth	became	the	criteria	of	acceptance”	(ibid,	259).	This	anti-imperialist	card	closely	relates	to	the	urban	bias	argument	(see	section	3.1,	chapter	II)	where	the	colonized	and	westernized	 state	 “looks	 down	 upon	 the	 noble	 traditions	 and	 wisdom	 of	 Bharat’s	
hardworking	 farmers	 becomes	 the	 common	 enemy	 of	 the	 entire	 village	 community”	(Nanda	 2004,	 250).	 However,	 this	 position	 glosses	 over	 differences	 of	 class,	 caste	 or	gender.	 Such	 (neo)-populist	 arguments	 regard	 farmers	 as	 undifferentiated	 and	oppressed	 by	 the	 state,	 big	 business	 and	 foreign	 capital	 (Brass	 1997,	 204ff).	 The	formation	of	 this	peasant	unity	 is	sought	 to	 fight	against	 the	 “imperialist	domination	of	
our	peasantry”	(see	e.g.	Patnaik	2006,	cited	in	Lerche	2013,	390).	This	line	of	argument	also	draws	from	the	so-called	agrarian	myth	that	conceptualises	a	homogenous,	 wholesome	 peasantry	 consisting	 of	 small-scale,	 de-centralised	 owner-cultivators	 embedded	 in	 nature	 and	 the	 institution	 of	 family.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 the	agrarian	myth	is	based	upon	the	farmers’	economic	identity,	which	is	 in	turn	based	on	small-scale	farming	in	the	village	 ‘community’,	visions	to	which	new	social	movements	with	Gandhian	or	postmodernist	 ideas	have	brought	a	progressive	gloss.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 agrarian	 myth	 also	 embraces	 the	 farmer’s	 non-economic	 identity,	 which	 is	mainly	cultural	or	nationalist	(Brass	2000,	15).	Therefore,	the	agrarian	myth	is	defended	by	 mutually	 reinforcing	 aspects	 of	 “peasant-ness”,	 national	 identity	 and	 culture	 that	downgrades	class	and	essentialises	the	peasantry	(Brass	1997,	206).	Nanda	argued	that	Hindu	nationalists	could	capture	these	non-economic	identities	and	“combine	an	appeal	
to	the	primordial	identities	of	farmers	as	Hindus	with	a	promise	of	greater	emphasis	on	the	
economic	 interest	 of	 the	 rural	 sector	 in	 the	 name	 of	 promoting	 cultural	 authenticity”	(Nanda	2004,	250).	 In	 this	 sense,	 such	arguments	have	acted	as	a	bridge	between	 the	right	and	left.	
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Nanda	 (2004,	 253)	 stressed	 the	 strategic	 importance	 of	 this	 mobilizing	 ideology	 of	 a	“contemporized	agrarian	myth”	which	glosses	over	deep	class	and	caste	divisions.	Rich	farmers	 with	 surplus	 to	 sell	 need	 such	 an	 ideology	 of	 presenting	 an	 entire	 village	‘community’	 as	 a	 victim	 of	 the	 state.	 Only	 in	 this	way,	 they	 can	 obtain	 support	 of	 the	majority	 of	 poorer	 farmers	 and	 landless	workers	 to	 pressurize	 the	 state	 for	 subsidies	and	higher	procurement	prices.	Nanda	(2004,	260)	argued	that	the	notion	of	an	urban,	modern,	mentally	colonized	‘India’	as	a	whole	that	exploits	rural,	non-modern,	authentic	‘Bharat’	 would	 help	 the	 message	 of	 the	 religious	 right	 resonate	 with	 a	 rural	constituency.	It	is	also	argued	that	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	in	India	helped	the	rise	of	the	Hindu	right	(see	e.g.	Brass	1997;	Lindberg	1995;	Hasan	1998,	107).		
3.5 Strategies	of	Struggles	against	Mysterious	Forces	Another	interesting	point	is	how	the	frames	influence	the	movement	groups’	strategies	and	 struggles.	 The	 actors	 of	 the	 movements	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha	were	 very	 engaged	 in	 further	 developing	 frames	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 situation	 of	farmers	 and	 struggled	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 change	 they	 sought.	 It	 was	 only	 Shetkari	
Sanghatana	 that	 saw	 their	main	demand	 fulfilled	and	 therefore	had	no	 reasons	 left	 to	fight.	 The	 other	 movement	 actors	 argued	 that	 farming	 could	 be	 profitable	 if	 the	conditions	 would	 be	 righted,	 first	 and	 foremost	 through	 a	 remunerative	 price	 for	agricultural	outputs.	It	was	a	fundamental	fear	of	the	farmers	in	particular,	but	also	the	activists,	that	farmers	are	not	in	a	position	to	determine	or	predict	the	price	themselves.	I	agree	with	Chatterjee	(2008a)	who	argued	that	“peasants	feel	that	the	markets	for	these	
commercial	 crops	 are	 manipulated	 by	 large	 mysterious	 forces	 that	 are	 entirely	 beyond	
their	control”	(ibid,	61).		One	consequence	of	this	perceived	powerlessness	is	that	it	seems	difficult	for	activists	to	challenge	 these	 forces.	 In	consequence,	based	on	 the	 interviews,	 I	understood	 that	 the	groups	have	adopted	two	different	strategies.	One	strategy,	applied	by	those	movement	actors	 who	 rely	 more	 on	 the	 ‘self-help’	 frame,	 was	 to	 try	 establishing	 ‘constructive’	activities	 first	 to	 get	 the	 peoples’	 trust.	 However,	 these	 movement	 actors	 also	acknowledged	that	in	the	long	term,	policies	needed	to	change.	Therefore	and	at	a	later	stage,	 they	sought	 to	build	on	 their	 successes	achieved	with	 ‘constructive’	 activities	 in	order	 to	 change	 prices	 and	 other	 agricultural	 policies	 at	 a	 higher	 level.	 The	 second	strategy	 worked	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Those	 movement	 actors	 saw	 the	 focus	 on	constructive	work	as	an	attempt	to	bedazzle	the	farmers.	They	argued	that	the	only	way	is	 to	 change	 the	policies	 at	 a	high	 level	 first.	Despite	 this	 criticism,	 they	did	 recognize	that	they	were	unable	to	reach	the	appropriate	levels	of	the	government	and	often	went	unheard,	as	they	are	put	off	at	lower	levels	with	empty	promises.		Another	 consequence	 of	 the	 perceived	 mysterious	 market	 forces	 was	 that	 both	presented	 strategies	 eventually	 aimed	 at	 the	 state.	 Sahoo	 (2014)	 observed	 this	 and	argues	that	even	though	the	state	is	the	major	actor	of	engagement	for	the	groups,	they	are	not	 anti-state.	Rather	 –	 and	particularly	 so	 in	 their	 self-perception	 –	 these	 groups	were	in	favour	of	the	government,	as	they	asked	it	to	improve	its	performance	(ibid,	70).	All	 groups	 demanded	 that	 the	 farmers	 should	 influence	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 change	
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agricultural	policies	and,	consequently,	the	market.	Considering	this,	it	is	surprising	how	little	 the	 interviewees,	 particularly	 the	 activists,	 discussed	 decision-making	 and	 the	distribution	of	benefits	once	a	certain	 influence	 in	the	state	would	be	achieved.	This	 is	particularly	 striking	 because	many	 farmers,	 particularly	 those	with	marginal	 to	 semi-medium	 landholdings,	 did	 not	 agree	 with	 a	 notion	 of	 a	 united	 peasantry	 implied	 by	agrarian	populism.	Many	farmers	argued	that	agricultural	profitability	heavily	depends	on	the	access	to	land	and	capital,	and	that	besides	the	mysterious	market	forces,	traders	and	moneylenders	still	threaten	the	farmers.	Lutringer	 (2010),	 in	 analysing	 a	 farmer	movement	 in	 Uttar	 Pradesh,	 argued	 that	 this	movement	 primarily	 aims	 at	 preserving	 the	 subsidized	 agrarian	 capitalism	 in	 which	most	movement	actors	are	involved.	I	argue	that	the	situation	is	different	in	the	case	of	the	movement	in	Vidarbha.	Activists	and	farmers	struggle	to	make	sense	of	the	current	situation	 in	 agriculture	 and	are	 at	 the	 same	 time	very	 creative	 in	 finding	 strategies	 to	challenge	the	seemingly	unreachable	forces	of	the	market	and	the	state.		One	of	these	strategies,	I	argue	in	the	next	chapter,	is	to	engage	in	several	ways	with	the	farmer	suicides	to	give	additional	importance	to	their	struggles.		 	
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VII. Talking	About	Farmer	Suicides	as	Movement	Activism	The	South	Korean	farmer	Lee	Kyung	Hae	stabbed	himself	2003	during	protests	against	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	Ministerial	Conference	in	Cancùn,	Mexico.	He	was	holding	a	board	 that	 said	 “WTO	kills	farmers”.	When	he	died	several	hours	 later	 in	 the	hospital,	 his	 fellow	 protesters	 celebrated	 him	 as	 a	 martyr.	 At	 the	 WTO	 Ministerial	Conference	 in	 Indonesia,	 ten	 years	 later	 in	 2013,	 different	Asian	 farmer	organizations	and	La	Vía	Campesina	remembered	Lee	Kyung	Hae’s	death.	An	Indian	farmer	said:	
“We	want	to	remind	the	world	that	the	WTO	kills	farmers,	just	as	comrade	Lee	had	done	
by	taking	his	own	life.	In	India,	one	farmer	commits	suicide	every	half	an	hour	because	of	
the	cycle	of	indebtedness	caused	by	free	trade.	We	demand	our	governments	to	stand	firm	
against	 any	 attempt	 to	 deny	 small	 farmers	 their	 right	 to	 food	 and	 livelihoods.”	 (Via	Campesina	2013)	This	 shows	 both	 that	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 farmers	 committing	 suicides	 has	 a	 global	dimension	reaching	far	beyond	India,	and	how	social	movements	engage	in	the	debate	and	 use	 these	 suicides	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 desperate	 situation	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	reality	of	today’s	global	economic	regime.	Even	if	Lee	Kyung	Hae	was	South	Korean,	it	is	very	often	India	that	is	cited	as	an	example	for	the	sad	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides.	Indian	farmer	suicides	have	made	their	way	into	many	international	media81	where	the	issue	is	discussed	and	the	root	causes	are	investigated.		In	 Indian	 media	 as	 well,	 the	 topic	 is	 very	 present,	 as	 it	 is	 in	 academic	 debate.	 The	discourse	 about	 farmer	 suicides	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	one	 about	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	(see	 chapter	 II).	 Hardly	 any	 article	 about	 the	 crisis	 of	 agriculture	 goes	 without	mentioning	the	suicides	as	one	extreme	and	very	sad	expression	of	rural	poverty.	Many	authors	 and	 journalists	 see	 it	 as	 an	 “accurate	 indicator	of	problems	afflicting	the	rural	
economy	and	society”	(Mohanty	2005,	243).	It	is	very	common	to	directly	link	it	with	the	government	 policies	 and	 therefore	 to	 blame	 the	 government	 for	 these	 suicides.	When	framing	farmer	suicides	that	way,	they	become	a	powerful	argument	against	the	current	agricultural	policies	of	the	government.	Consequently,	movement	actors	engage	in	many	ways	with	the	topic	of	suicides.		In	the	first	section,	I	introduce	the	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides,	on	a	general	global	level	and	then	on	a	specifically	Indian	one.	I	use	the	expression	‘phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides’	to	refer	to	the	particular	idea	that	the	incidence	of	suicides	is	higher	among	the	farming	 compared	 to	 the	non-farming	population,	 and	 that	 this	difference	hints	at	 the	farmers’	difficult	situation.	 I	 focus	on	how	the	discourse	around	an	epidemic	of	farmer	suicides	 in	 India	 has	 come	 into	 being	 and	 how	 suicides	 have	 become	 ‘eligible’.	 In	 the	second	 section	 I	 analyse	 the	 three	different	 lines	 of	 argument	 to	 explain	 these	 farmer	suicides	 and	 that	 the	 two	main	 lines	 are	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 neoliberal	policies	–	the	New	Economic	Policies	(see	section	1.3,	chapter	II)	–	are	the	root	cause.	I																																									 																					81	There	 are	 countless	 articles	 in	major	media	 from	BBC,	 Al	 Jazeera,	 The	 Guardian	 (2016a)	 or	New	York	Times.	Further,	other	authors	also	noted	that	(see	e.g.	Münster	2015,	1581).	
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particularly	 focus	on	how	these	suicides	have	become	 ‘public	deaths’	(Münster	2015a)	through	 these	 arguments.	 In	 the	 third	 section,	 I	 discuss	 whether	 the	 suicides	 have	become	 political	 and	 could	 even	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 political	 activism	 or	 social	movement	activity.	The	fourth	section	focuses	on	the	empirical	data	from	the	movement	in	 Vidarbha	 and	 shows	 that	 the	 movement	 actors	 engage	 with	 the	 suicides	 in	 many	different	ways.	In	the	fifth	section,	I	contextualize	this	movements’	engagement	with	the	farmer	 suicides	 and	 conclude	 that	 the	 engagement	with	 such	 suicides	 has	 become	 an	important	 part	 of	 activists’	 repertoire	 for	 highlighting	 the	 dark	 sides	 of	 neoliberal	economic	policies.	
1 Introducing	Farmer	Suicides	The	 phenomenon	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 is	 discussed	 not	 only	 in	 India,	 but	 also	 in	 other	parts	of	 the	world,	mainly	 in	Australia,	China82	and	France83.	Behere	and	Bhise	 (2009)	argued	 that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 global	 phenomenon	 related	 to	 the	 changing	 conditions	 of	agricultural	 production	 (see	 section	 1.1,	 chapter	 I;	 section	 1	 and	 3,	 chapter	 VI).	 In	 a	review	about	mental	health	problems	of	farmers	in	Europe,	USA,	Canada	and	Australia,	Fraser	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 however	 concluded	 that	 there	 is	 no	 convincing	 evidence	 that	 the	farming	population	is	disproportionally	affected	by	psychiatric	morbidity.	Only	for	some	particular	groups,	i.e.	male	Australian	farmers,	is	the	risk	of	suicide	elevated	(Judd	et	al.	2006).		Whether	 or	 not	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 has	 any	 statistical	 validity,	 the	discourse	around	this	phenomenon	is	very	present	in	media,	academia	and	among	social	movement	 actors.	 Bryant	 and	 Garnham	 (2014),	 in	 their	 essay	 about	 farmer	 distress	within	today’s	corporate	agriculture,	start	their	introduction	with	the	observation	that	
“in	 the	 international	 literature	 farmer	 stress,	 mental	 illness	 and	 suicides	 are	 socially	
constructed	 by	 dominant	 discourses	 as	 a	 crisis	 besetting	 agricultural	 communities,	
largely	as	a	result	of	economic	consequences	following	drought	and	climate	change	(…),	
agricultural	 disasters	 (…)	 and	 transition	 to	 global,	 neoliberalised	 economies.	 This	
discursive	 framework	 connects	 structural	 conditions	 with	 farm	 men	 by	 establishing	
linear	connections	between	economy,	financial	stress,	mental	illness	and	suicide.”	(Bryant	and	Garnham	2014,	304)	This	 socially	 constructed	 discourse	 about	 farmer	 suicides	 has	 become	 a	 powerful	argument,	 and	 it	 has	opened	up	 a	 space	 to	 talk	 about	 the	difficult	 conditions	of	many	farmers	 globally	 under	 a	 neoliberal	 trade	 regime.	 Some	 authors,	 as	 I	 will	 discuss	 in	section	3.2,	even	conceptualize	these	suicides	as	part	of	a	farmer	movement.																																										 																					82	In	China	the	explanations	differ.	It	is	that	women	have	little	support	in	the	village	because	they	moved	out	of	their	home	village	to	marry	and	then	the	husbands	become	migrant	labourers.	The	women	 then	 have	 little	 support	 in	 dealing	 with	 pressures	 of	 motherhood	 and	 farming.	 Many	become	depressed	and	commit	suicide	(Jacka	and	Sargeson	2011;	Watts	2004)	83	For	France,	see	particularly	Bossard	et	al.	(2013)	and	many	newspaper	articles	(e.g.	Le	Monde	2013,	Lallouët-Geffroy	2016).	
	 179	
Before	I	come	to	these	aspects,	I	will	describe	the	statistics	for	farmer	suicides	in	India	and	 explain	 why	 some	 authors	 talk	 about	 an	 epidemic.	 I	 then	 shed	 light	 on	 how	 the	statistical	category	of	 the	farmer	suicide	has	been	created	and	why	these	numbers	are	so	politically	charged.	
1.1 An	‘Epidemic’	of	Farmer	Suicides	in	India?	Mishra	 (2014)	 evaluated	 the	 official	 statistics	 on	 farmer	 suicides.	 In	 India,	 suicide	 is	categorized	as	a	criminal	offense	and	therefore	the	data	on	suicides	is	recorded	by	the	National	 Crime	 Record	 Bureau	 (NCRB)84.	 The	 data	 on	 farmer	 suicides	 have	 been	recorded	 since	 1995,	 when	 the	 NCRB	 started	 to	 analyse	 the	 suicides	 by	 professional	group	 (farmers	 are	 placed	 under	 the	 category	 ‘self-employed	 (farming/agriculture)’).	Mishra	compared	the	rates	of	suicide	among	different	professions	and	clearly	identifies	a	 higher	 risk	 for	 suicides	 among	 the	 farming	 versus	 the	 non-farming	 population	 –	particularly	 in	Maharashtra	 (see	also	Nagaraj	2008).	 In	 their	nationally	 representative	survey	about	suicide	mortality	in	India,	which	compared	the	proportion	of	suicides	and	other	 causes	 of	 death,	 Patel	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 instead	 did	 not	 find	 any	 higher	 incidence	 of	suicide	among	farmers.	In	 the	 period	 from	 1995	 to	 2014,	 302,116	 people	 in	 the	 category	 ‘self-employed	(farming/agriculture)’	 committed	 suicide	 in	 India	 (Sainath	 2015).	 In	 1995-1997,	 the	suicide	 rate	 was	 lower	 for	 the	 farming	 than	 for	 the	 non-farming	 population.	 In	 the	period	from	1998	to	2009,	this	reversed	and	the	rate	of	farmers	committing	suicide	was	higher,	highest	 in	2004	and	2009.	 In	2010-2012,	the	rate	was	again	higher	 in	the	non-farming	population.	Because	the	suicide	rates	 in	the	non-farming	population	remained	constant	over	these	periods,	these	comparisons	also	reflect	the	development	of	 farmer	suicide	rates	(Mishra	2014).		Mishra	argued	that	the	dip	in	numbers	of	farmer	suicides	in	the	period	from	2010-2012	does	not	reflect	the	real	situation	but	occurred	due	to	data	quality	and	availability	from	two	states	that	traditionally	had	high	incidences	of	suicides.	First,	many	states,	in	trying	to	bring	down	the	numbers	of	 farmer	suicides	 in	earlier	years,	started	to	“massage	the	
data”	(Prof	K.	Nagaraj,	an	economist	at	the	Chennai-based	Asian	College	of	 Journalism,	cited	in	Sainath	2014).	As	an	example,	Rajasthan,	West	Bengal	and	Bihar	claimed	‘zero’	farmer	 suicides	 in	 2014,	 i.e.	 that	 not	 a	 single	 farmer	 had	 committed	 suicide	 (Sainath	2015).	There	are	two	major	strategies	for	lowering	the	number	of	farmer	suicides.	First,	tnumbers	of	suicides	in	the	category	‘self-employed	(others)’	increased	just	as	the	ones	in	 the	 category	 ‘self-employed	 (farming/agriculture)’	 decreased.	 This	 indicates	 that	farmer	 suicides	 are	 registered	 as	 suicides	 of	 persons	 belonging	 to	 other	 professions.	Second,	the	categories	for	the	reasons	for	suicides	have	also	been	shuffled:	The	category	‘other’	 increasingly	 included	 ‘sickness’	 as	 the	 cause	 for	 suicides.	This	 ‘sickness’	was	 in	many	 cases	 reported	 to	 be	 ‘unbearable	 stomach	 ache’,	 which	 then	 turned	 out	 to	 be	farmers	who	drank	pesticides	(Sainath	2015).	Consequently,	Mishra	argued	that	NCRB																																									 																					84	Only	in	2001,	statistical	data	started	to	be	included	in	the	decennial	Census	of	India	(Münster	2012).	
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underreported	 the	 number	 of	 farmer	 suicides,	 particularly	 in	 the	 last	 period	 between	2010	and	2012.	Sainath	(2015)	also	claimed	that	it	was	not	even	possible	to	work	with	those	numbers,	because	the	NCRB	had	misclassified	the	entire	category	of	‘farmers’.		The	 rates	 differ	 greatly	 among	 the	 different	 states.	 The	 ‘Big	 5’	 states,	 Maharashtra,	Andhra	 Pradesh	 (with	 Telengana),	 Karnataka,	 Chhattisgarh	 and	Madhya	 Pradesh,	 are	the	worst	affected,	and	account	 for	over	90%	of	all	 farmer	suicides	 (Sainath	2015).	 In	these	 states,	 the	 suicide	 rates	 are	 higher	 for	 the	 farming	 than	 for	 the	 non-farming	population	 in	 all	 three-year	 periods	 since	 1995.	 In	Maharashtra,	 there	was	 a	 peak	 in	2006	 just	 before	 the	 numbers	 declined.	 After	 2009	 they	 started	 climbing	 again	 (see	figure	3).	This	is	particularly	interesting	since	in	Maharashtra	–	contrary	to	many	other	states	 –	 the	 number	 of	 cultivators	 increased	 in	 the	 period	 2001-2011.	 Furthermore,	Maharashtra	has	 the	highest	area	under	cotton,	and	cotton	 farming	was	often	brought	into	a	direct	correlation	with	suicides	(Mishra	2014).		Maharashtra	alone	accounted	for	over	45%	of	the	total	number	of	farmer	suicides	in	the	country	in	2014	(Sainath	2015).	The	state	has	witnessed	the	largest	number	of	 farmer	suicides	of	all	Indian	states	for	twelve	years	in	a	row,	with	over	3,000	farmer	suicides	in	2013	(Sainath	2014).	Vidarbha	within	Maharashtra	is	known	as	one	of	the	‘hotspots’	for	farmer	 suicides	 (Dahat	 2014,	 Behere	 and	 Behere	 2008;	 often	 relying	 on	 numbers	 of	VJAS).	Frontline	reported	–	based	on	NCRB	numbers	–	that	from	1997	to	2006,	Vidarbha	had	 36,428	 cases	 of	 farmer	 suicides.	 The	 year	 2015	 showed	 the	 highest	 numbers	 of	farmer	suicides	since	2006,	namely	1,328	suicides	(Katakam	2016).	
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Figure	 3:	 Suicide	 rates	 (suicides	 per	 100,000	 people)	 for	 male	 farmers	 and	 non-farmers,	 in	Maharashtra,	1995-2012,	based	on	Mishra	(2014).	
	In	 terms	 of	 gender,	 the	 farmer	 suicides	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 predominantly	 male	phenomenon.	 According	 to	 official	 data,	 more	 than	 80%	 of	 the	 farmers	 committing	suicide	 are	 men.	 The	 rate	 of	 suicide	 is	 also	 higher	 for	 the	 non-farming	 women	population	 than	 for	women	 farming-population	 (Mishra	 2014).	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 papers,	articles	 and	 discussions	 about	 the	 issue,	women	 generally	 appear	 as	widows,	 if	 at	 all	(Janakiramanan	 2014;	 Kumari	 2009).	 The	 statistics	 with	 regards	 to	 women	might	 be	highly	 skewed,	 though,	 because	women	often	do	not	 have	 ownership	 records	 and	 are	often	 not	 accepted	 as	 cultivators	 or	 farmers.	 Therefore,	 women	 farmers	 do	 not	necessarily	 come	 into	 the	 category	 of	 ‘self-employed	 (farming/agriculture)’	 and	 their	suicides	do	not	count	as	‘farmer	suicides’.	As	a	consequence,	as	Sainath	(2015)	observed,	the	category	 ‘housewives’	of	 the	NCRB	statistics	exploded,	particularly	 in	states	with	a	claimed	 ‘zero’	 farmer	 suicides.	 In	 some	 states	 and	 years,	 ‘housewives’,	 who	 are	 often	farmers	but	not	recognized	as	such,	make	up	70%	of	the	total	suicides	of	women.	There	might	be	more	 to	 this	 than	statistical	 issues,	however.	Some	authors	have	additionally	argued	that	notions	of	masculinity	and	honour	engrave	 the	risk	 for	suicides	and	make	men	more	susceptible	(see	Nilotpal	2011;	section	2,	this	chapter).		When	 it	 comes	 to	 caste,	 Mohanty	 (2005),	 Menon	 (2006)	 and	 Vasavi	 (2012,	 108)	 all	argued	that	low	caste	farmers	commit	suicides	more	often	(see	section	2.2,	this	chapter).	A	study	about	Amravati	and	Yavatmal	districts	 in	Vidarbha	 indicates	that	most	suicide	victims	come	 from	middle	or	non-cultivating	castes	 like	Telis	 or	Banjara	(NT)	and	SCs	(Mohanty	2005).	Other	studies	showed	different	results.	Dandekar	et	al.	(2005)	analyses	that	 all	 over	 Vidarbha	 and	Marathwada	 suicide	 numbers	 spread	 across	 all	 castes	 but	
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were	highest	among	OBC	and	non-Scheduled	Castes.	Mishra	(2006)	found	OBC,	mostly	
Kunbis,	and	Banjara	most	affected.	Here,	it	is	important	to	note	that	tenant	farmers,	very	often	 from	the	 ‘traditionally’	non-cultivating	castes,	have	often	only	 informal	and	non-recorded	tenancy	contracts	and	are	therefore	not	counted	as	farmer	suicides,	although	they	come	under	the	category	of	agricultural	labour	(Sainath	2015).		How	 all	 these	 attempts	 to	 numerically	 and	 statistically	 describe,	 validate	 or	 falsify	farmer	suicides	(and	therefore	the	farmers’	suffering)	by	comparing	macro	level	suicide	rates	 of	 different	 groups	 of	 people	 exemplifies	 how	 politically	 charged	 these	 farmer	suicides	have	become.	
1.2 ‘Eligible’	Farmer	Suicides	Münster	 (2012,	 181)	 shows	 how	 farmer	 suicides	 have	 “become	 reified	 and	 visible	
through	 the	 state’s	 enumerative	 practices.	 This	 state-defined	 category,	 conveyed	 and	
scandalised	by	the	media,	rests	on	a	connection	between	suicide	and	–	an	equally	reified	–	
‘agrarian	 crisis’”.	 These	 state	 practices	 include	 the	 production	 of	 statistics	 and	 the	peculiar	 way	 in	 which	 the	 state	 makes	 a	 difference	 between	 ‘real’	 and	 ‘fake’	 farmer	suicides,	where	‘real’	ones	are	then	eligible	for	a	posthumous	compensation	payment.		In	2006,	 the	Government	of	 India	officially	declared	certain	districts	as	 ‘suicide-prone’	and	 issued	 a	 bundle	 of	 relief	 packages	 and	 inquiry	 or	 debt	 relief	 commissions	 (see	Münster	2012).	In	the	same	year,	the	Government	of	Maharashtra	and	some	other	states	started	to	guarantee	a	suicide	compensation	of	Rs	100,000	for	the	bereaved	of	a	farmer	suicide.	 Therefore,	 it	 became	 important	 to	 define	what	 counts	 as	 ‘farmer	 suicide’	 and	what	does	not.	The	state	defined	these	criteria,	and	the	families	of	suicides	try	to	prove	the	‘farmer	suicide’-nature	of	a	death	case.	To	discuss	these	criteria,	I	rely	on	newspaper	articles	(Diggikar	2014;	Sainath	2010,	2015)	and	my	own	interview	data	(backed	up	by	Münster	2012).		Three	 characteristics	 are	 relevant	 for	 an	 death	 case	 to	 count	 officially	 as	 a	 farmer	suicide.	 First,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 proven	 that	 it	was	 indeed	 a	 suicide	 and	 not	 an	 accident.	Interviewees	 reported	 that	 suicides	 by	 drinking	 poison	 would	 be	 officially	 counted	under	 ‘death	 by	 stomach	 unbearable	 stomach	 ache’	 to	 keep	 the	 numbers	 low.	 The	bereaved	 of	 a	 farmer	 who	 had	 committed	 suicide	 told	 that	 the	 deceased	 had	 drunk	poison	and	 then	 jumped	down	a	water	well	 to	 resolve	 all	 doubts	 that	his	death	 could	have	been	an	accident.	Second,	the	person	needs	to	be	a	farmer.	That	means	he	needs	to	own	 land	 as	well	 as	 cultivate	 it.	 Nagaraj	 (2008,	 3-4)	 argued	 that	 tenant	 farmers	who	lease	 land	 and	 therefore	 do	 not	 have	 land	 titles	 and	 often	 only	 informal	 and	 non-recorded	land	contracts	do	not	count	as	farmers;	nor	do	farmers	cultivating	land	owned	by	their	fathers.	Apart	from	the	problem	of	land	records	that	I	already	discussed	above,	another	 barrier	 to	 classification	 as	 ‘farmer	 suicide’	 is	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 suicide	needs	 to	 be	 “problems	 in	 agricultural	 operation	 and	 consequential	 indebtedness”.	 To	prove	that,	farmers	reported	that	the	family	has	to	provide	all	documents	pertaining	to	agricultural	production	and	any	outstanding	loans.	Loans	from	unofficial	moneylenders	do	not	count.	However,	 this	 is	often	not	enough	to	prove	that	there	had	been	no	other	
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major	 factors	 that	 triggered	 the	 suicide.	 Therefore,	 some	 farmers	 left	 a	 suicide	 note	declaring	 that	 they	 committed	 suicide	 because	 of	 the	 desperate	 agricultural	 situation,	crop	 failures	 or	 outstanding	 loans.	 Sainath	 (2010)	 cites	 a	 farmer	 who	 laughed	 with	graveyard	 humour	 that	 “now	 we	 can't	 even	 commit	 suicide	 in	 peace,	 (…)	 not	 without	
reading	those	forms	the	officials	have	created	to	see	we	get	it	right.”	This	 distinction	 between	 the	 ‘real’	 and	 the	 ‘fake’	 farmer	 suicides	 echoes	 in	 many	discussions	 among	 movement	 actors.	 Some	 interviewees	 believed	 the	 compensation	would	give	an	 incentive	 for	 the	bereaved	to	try	and	prove	that	 it	was	a	 farmer	suicide	even	 if	 it	 was	 not,	 i.e.	 if	 the	 reasons	 were	 personal	 in	 nature,	 such	 as	 problems	 in	marriage,	 family	or	alcoholism,	or	 if	 the	death	was	an	accident.	 In	contrast,	 it	was	also	said	that	other	families	would	rather	try	to	hide	the	suicide-nature	of	a	death	because	of	the	shame	that	might	come	upon	the	family.	These	questions	are	discussed	regularly	in	the	local	newspapers,	many	of	which	have	established	farmer	suicide	toll	counts	on	the	front	 page.	 The	 –	 mostly	 empathic	 –	 involvement	 and	 reporting	 of	 the	 media	 is	 a	particularly	 delicate	 issue.	 The	 regular	 reporting	 of	 suicide	 statistics	 and	 the	scandalisation	 of	 suicide	 cases	 can	 cause	 feedback	 loops	 among	 the	 concerned	population,	inspire	imitators	and	again	increase	the	suicide	rates	(the	so-called	Werther	effect,	see	Münster	2015a,	1585).	This	 reporting	 in	 the	 media,	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 state	 as	 well	 as	 the	 practices	 and	discourses	of	the	farmers	strongly	politicized	the	farmer	suicides,	as	exemplified	by	the	folowing	 recent	 incident.	 Prime	 Minister	 of	 India,	 Narendra	 Modi	 (BJP),	 attacked	Maharashtra’s	Chief	Minister	Sharad	Pawar,	President	of	the	Nationalist	Congress	Party,	by	directly	blaming	Pawar	for	the	high	number	of	farmer	suicides	in	Maharashtra.	Modi	said	 that	 "3,700	 farmers	 commit	 suicide	 per	 year	 because	 they	 do	 not	 have	 water	 or	
electricity	 for	 the	crops"	 –	 referring	 to	 Pawar’s	 time	 as	 Chief	 Minister	 of	 Maharashtra	(Bhagwat,	Patil,	and	Phadnis	2014).	Modi	was	silent	about	the	period	between	1997	and	1999,	 when	 a	 Shiv	 Sena-BJP	 coalition	 was	 in	 power	 in	 Maharashtra	 and	 when	 the	number	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 had	 begun	 to	 increase	 drastically	 in	 Maharashtra	 (Mishra	2014).		Arguably,	 this	 politicization	 has	 its	 roots	 mainly	 in	 the	 perceived	 causes	 of	 farmer	suicides	in	academic	as	well	as	public	debate.	I	do	not	wish	judge	which	of	these	causes	or	explanations	is	more	accurate.	I	want	to	analyse	theses	different	arguments	to	show	how	 the	 farmer	 suicides	 have	 become	 ‘public	 deaths’	 (term	 borrowed	 from	 Münster	2015a)	through	such	arguments.		
2 Looking	for	Reasons	for	Farmer	Suicides	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	importance	of	the	arguments	to	explain	the	motivations	of	suicides	differs	depending	on	the	geographical	contexts.	In	the	case	of	farmer	suicides	in	India,	most	studies	focus	on	structural,	economic	and	sociological	reasons.	Only	a	few	publications	focus	on	psycho-social	factors.	In	contrast,	most	studies	on	farmer	suicides	in	Northern	countries,	particularly	Australia	and	USA,	 focus	on	non-structural,	psycho-
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social	 factors.	A	whole	body	of	 literature	examines	 the	relation	of	distress	and	suicide	with	gendered	identities,	patriarchal	family	farming,	or	cultures	of	farming	masculinity,	pride	 and	 shame	 (see	 e.g.	 Bryant	 and	 Garnham	 2014).	 To	 my	 knowledge,	 there	 are	hardly	 studies	 that	 focus	 directly	 on	 the	 state’s	 policies	 and	 their	 influence	 on	 the	suicide	rates	of	farmers.	The	papers	 that	 I	have	 found	on	 the	reasons	of	 farmer	suicides	 in	 India	all	agree	on	a	lowest	common	denominator,	which	Mishra	sharply	describes:		
“The	relatively	higher	incidence	of	suicides	among	a	particular	sub-group	of	population,	
(…),	are	to	be	identified	with	socio-economic	risk	factors	that	are	precipitating	in	nature.	
This,	however,	does	not	imply	the	absence	of	socio-economic	ills	when	suicide	incidences	
are	lower	or	absent.”	(Mishra	2014,	7)	Therefore,	studies	about	 farmer	suicides	mostly	 investigate	these	precipitating	factors.	The	changes	of	the	agricultural	economy	as	well	as	the	agrarian	society	since	the	1990s	are	seen	as	the	major	reasons,	mostly	the	liberalization	of	the	markets,	the	withdrawal	of	 the	state,	and	sometimes	also	the	 impacts	of	Green	Revolution	(see	section	1	and	2,	chapter	II).	Within	those	studies	that	mostly	blame	the	neoliberal	policies,	there	are	two	major	 lines	of	argument.	The	 first	 is	highly	economistic	and	sees	economic	disaster	as	the	 very	 direct	 cause	 of	 the	 farmer	 suicides;	 it	 therefore	 analyses	 the	 economic	implication	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 policies.	 The	 second	 line	 of	 argument	 analyses	 these	implications	of	neoliberalism	on	a	sociological	level.	It	tries	to	understand	what	the	new	realities	mean	for	the	 farmers’	 lifeworlds	and	what	brings	so	many	of	 them	to	commit	suicide.	The	sociological	line	could	be	seen	as	a	bridge	to	the	third	line,	which	focuses	on	psycho-social	factors.	As	argued	above,	this	is	not	very	prominent.	But	still	I	would	like	to	mention	Gyanmudra	(2010)	who	examines	the	predisposing,	“social	and	behavioural”	factors	(such	as	age,	family	history	or	alcoholism)	of	farmer	suicides	and	Nilotpal	(2011)	who	 focuses	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 dignity	 and	 honour	 and	 a	 notion	 of	 masculinity	structuring	the	processes	of	macro	change85.	
2.1 First	Line:	Economic	Reasons	Arguably,	 the	New	Economic	Policies	 affected	 those	 farmers	most	who	produced	 cash	crops,	 positively	 and	 negatively.	 To	 my	 knowledge,	 the	 different	 analyses	 of	 the	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides	show	that	the	majority	of	the	deceased	are	commercial	cash	crop	cultivators.	For	the	same	reason,	the	suicides	are	very	unequally	distributed:	mostly	 in	 India’s	 Green	Revolution	 states	Maharashtra,	 Karnataka,	 Punjab,	 Kerala	 and	Andhra	Pradesh	and	much	less	in	both	highly	industrialized	states	such	as	Tamil	Nadu	or	 Gujarat	 and	 the	 poorest	 states	 like	 Bihar	 or	 Madhya	 Pradesh	 (Kennedy	 and	 King	2014;	Mishra	2014,	10,	5;	Shah	2012,	5-6).		
																																								 																					85	I	 am	 aware	 that	 there	 are	 many	 extensive	 debates	 about	 the	 reasons	 and	 motivations	 for	suicides,	from	a	psychological,	sociological	or	historical	perspective.	I	surpass	them	because	my	argument	is	not	to	make	a	point	about	the	reasons	for	farmer	suicides	in	India,	but	to	show	what	the	implications	of	different	discussions	of	them	are	for	social	movements.		
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The	 regions	 that	 are	most	 affected	 are	 characterized	 as	 ecologically	 fragile,	 semi-arid	and	groundwater	dependent	and	as	having	a	 capital-intensive,	 commercial	 agriculture	(Nilotpal	2011;	Vasavi	2012,	103).	In	these	states,	there	was	a	shift	from	low-value	food	crops	to	high-value	cash	crops,	mostly	grown	in	monocultures.	It	is	cotton	production	in	particular	 that	 is	 said	 to	 ‘cause’	 most	 of	 these	 suicides	 (Mishra	 2006).	 As	 I	 have	elaborated	 in	 section	 2	 of	 chapter	 II,	 this	 commercialized	 farming	 has	 brought	 an	increasing	 dependence	 of	 farmers	 on	 external	 inputs	 and.	 Together	with	 the	 low	 and	fluctuating	 prices	 for	 those	 crops,	 this	 has	 driven	 many	 farmers	 into	 indebtedness.	These	 tropes	 of	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 are	 widely	 brought	 forward	 as	 being	 the	 main	reasons	 for	 farmers	 to	 commit	 suicide	 (see	 e.g.	 Dandekar	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Dongre	 and	Deshmukh	2010;	Mishra	et	al.	2006).	While	 there	 is	 abundant	 evidence	 that	 the	 commercial	 farmers	 constitute	 the	 largest	segment	of	suicide	victims,	there	is	less	consensus	about	which	groups	of	farmers	have	the	 highest	 suicide	 rates	 among	 the	 cash	 crop	 producers.	 Shah	 (2012,	 17-18)	 argued	that	 most	 of	 the	 suicides	 are	 small	 and	 medium	 farmers	 who	 are	 dominant	 in	 the	agrarian	structure,	have	already	profited	from	the	benefits	of	the	Green	Revolution	and	do	have	a	political	voice.	The	reason	for	the	suicides	is	then,	so	she	claimed,	not	a	real	scarcity	of	 food,	 but	 the	 fear	of	pauperisation,	 impoverishment	 and	humiliation.	Many	other	authors	instead	emphasized	that	small	and	marginal	cash	crop	producers	are	most	likely	 to	 become	 indebted	 and	 to	 commit	 suicide	 (Kennedy	 and	King	 2014,	 2;	Mishra	2014,	 10;	 Mohanakumar	 and	 Sharma	 2006,	 1557;	 for	 Maharashtra	 in	 particular	 see	Mohanty	2005,	267).	Indeed	indebtedness	is	found	to	be	the	most	important	reason	for	suicides,	 particularly	 for	 farmers	 with	 small	 or	 marginal	 landholdings	 (Kennedy	 and	King	2014,	4).		
2.2 Second	Line:	Sociological	Reasons	Because	indebtedness	is	such	an	important	factor,	Vasavi	(2012,	73	ff)	pointed	out	that	for	 commercial	 farmers	 in	 particular,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 risk	 has	 changed	 in	 five	ways.	First,	 the	 neoliberal	 developments	 together	 with	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 changed	 the	nature	 of	 agricultural	 risk.	 The	market	 risk	 increased	 because	 of	 the	 fluctuating,	 less	supported	 price	 of	 agricultural	 in-	 and	 output.	 Second,	 the	 ecological	 risk	 augmented	caused	 by	 the	 increased	 irrigation,	 the	 use	 of	 chemical	 fertilizers	 as	 well	 as	 climate	change,	 i.e.	 the	 tremendous	 effect	 of	 a	 greater	 variability	 in	 quantity	 and	 timing	 of	rainfall	 on	 rain-fed	 agriculture	 (see	 section	 2.5,	 chapter	 II;	 2.2	 in	 chapter	 III).	 Third,	production	 increasingly	 relies	 on	 water-intense	 high	 yield	 variety	 crops,	 which	 have	increased	the	production	risks.	Fourth,	it	has	become	more	and	more	difficult	to	access	capital	 and	 farmers	 have	 to	 rely	 on	moneylenders.	 Fifth,	 the	 knowledge	 required	 for	agriculture	changed.	The	new	agricultural	crops,	so	Vasavi	argued,	need	new	knowledge,	but	 the	 farmers	 still	 rely	 on	 their	 ‘traditional’	 knowledge.	 Gupta	 (2016)	 called	 this	 a	‘speculative	 climate’.	What	makes	 these	 risks	unbearable	 for	 farmers	and	 in	 the	end	a	reason	 for	suicide	 is	 the	 ‘individualization’	of	 those	risks,	which	 I	will	elaborate	 in	 the	following.	
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Many	 authors	 argued	 that	 not	 only	 the	 nature	 of	 risk,	 but	 farming	 as	 a	 whole	 has	changed	as	a	consequence	of	the	Green	Revolution	and	the	New	Economic	Policies	(see	section	1,	chapter	II).	These	studies	mostly	relate	to	work	on	the	root	causes	of	suicides	(Durkheim	1952).	Durkheim	described	suicides	as	related	 to	a	specific	combination	of	social	and	economic	reasons,	assuming	that	suicide	rates	correspond	to	changes	in	the	society.	Mohanty	(2005)	has	completed	a	detailed	study	of	farmer	suicides	in	Vidarbha	in	which	he	directly	relied	on	Durkheim.	In	the	case	of	cotton	producers	in	Maharashtra,	Mohanty	argued,	this	combination	is	that	the	low	and	middle	caste	farmers	are	trapped	between	 the	 aspirations	 evoked	 since	 1947	 (through	 the	 promised	 land	 reforms,	 the	Green	 Revolution	 and	 the	 market	 liberalization)	 and	 the	 reality	 of	 neoliberalism	(Mohanty	 2005,	 267).	 Now	 farmers	 experience	 an	 individualization	 of	 risk,	 decision-making	and	success	that	leaves	them	more	vulnerable	to	suicide	(Mohanty	2005;	Vasavi	2009).	This	process	has	several	dimensions.		Before	 the	 1950s,	 the	 agrarian	 system	 was	 highly	 hierarchical	 with	 caste-based	allocation	 of	 land	 and	 resources.	 But	 “agriculture	was	conducted	on	a	pattern	that	was	
based	on	collectively	shared	knowledge	forms”	 (Vasavi	 2009,	 99).	 Then,	 the	practices	 of	agriculture,	the	“meaning	and	significance	of	agricultural	activities”	(ibid)	changed,	while	the	 caste-based	 structures	 as	 a	 social	 basis	 of	 production	 have	 largely	 remained	(Harriss-White	 2004).	 During	 the	 period	 of	 Green	 Revolution	 and	 later	 the	 New	Economic	 Policies,	 when	 commercial	 agriculture	 became	 more	 widespread,	 “support	
and	 sustenance	 that	 could	 have	 been	 provided	 during	 times	 of	 crisis	 under	 the	 patron-
client	systems	have	disintegrated”	 (Vasavi	 2009,	 100)	 and	 the	 dependence	 on	 external,	often	 state-based	 structures	 increased.	 Vasavi	 emphasized	 that	 this	 has	 liberated	 the	working,	 low-ranked	 castes	 and	 groups	 and	 enabled	 them	 to	 escape	 the	 hierarchical,	oppressive	 structures.	 However,	 the	 state	 mechanism	 of	 provision	 was	 unable	 to	compensate	 the	 older	 provision	 mechanisms	 (Vasavi	 2009,	 2012).	 Related	 to	 that,	extended	families	developed	into	separate	nuclear	families,	which	further	weakened	the	familial	sources	of	sharing,	support	and	decision-making.	It	was	then	the	burden	of	the	head	 of	 the	 household	 to	 make	 a	 living	 for	 the	 family	 increased.	 The	 decisions	 on	agricultural	 operations	 –	 and	 therefore	 the	 risks	 –	 lie	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 one	 single	person	(Vasavi	2012,	118).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 Vasavi	 (2012,	 108)	 as	 well	 as	 Mohanty	 (2005)	 argued	 that	 the	composition	 of	 the	 peasantry	 changed	 in	 the	 1980s,	 when	 the	 traditionally	 landed,	higher-caste	farmers	who	gained	the	most	from	the	first	wave	of	Green	Revolution	left	agriculture	 and	 found	 sources	 of	 economic	wealth	 outside	 agriculture	 .	 Then,	 farmers	from	earlier	non-cultivating	castes	started	(commercial)	farming	and	became	marginal,	small	 or	 even	medium	 farmers	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s.	 Jodhka	 (2005,	 25)	 as	well	 as	Vasavi	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 particularly	 these	 new	 farmers	 became	 autonomous	 from	traditional	 structures	of	 patronage	 and	 loyalty.	These	 structures,	 however,	 apart	 from	the	many	 forms	 of	 oppression	 associated	with	 them,	 also	 entailed	 that	 farmers	 could	rely	 on	 a	 shared	 corpus	 of	 knowledge	 as	well	 as	 a	 net	 of	 social	 relations	 (see	 above).	‘New’	 farmers	 could	 not	 rely	 on	 such	 structures,	 while	 the	 prejudices	 and	 the	
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discrimination	from	the	upper	caste	against	lower	caste	farmers	remained.	This	isolates	low	caste,	‘new’	farmers	even	more.	Both	Vasavi	(2012)	as	well	as	Mohanty	(2005,	243,	in	 particular	 for	Maharashtra)	 argue	 that	 these	 ‘new’,	 small	 and	marginal	 commercial	farmers	are	the	ones	that	commit	suicide	most	often.	This	is	backed	up	by	the	study	of	Menon	 (2006)	 who	 shows	 that	 46%	 of	 suicides	 belong	 to	 OBCs,	 42%	 to	 SC	 (for	Telengana).	 It	 is	 thus	 not	 the	 entire	 class	 of	 ‘peasantry’	 that	 is	 uniformly	 affected	 as	concerns	farmer	suicides;	instead,	these	‘new’,	small,	marginal	or	semi-medium	farmers	are	particularly	at	risk	of	becoming	indebted	and	committing	suicide.		This	shows	that	the	old	structures	of	caste	and	class	are	still	rigid	despite	the	changes	in	the	agrarian	economy.	It	is	not	that	the	‘old’	structures	would	be	replaced	by	the	‘new,’	rather	 that	 the	 new	 developments	 interact	 with	 the	 old	 social,	 political	 and	 caste	structures	(Vasavi	2012).	The	individualization	of	risk	and	the	isolation	on	an	economic	level	does	stand	in	sharp	contradiction	with	the	social	pressure	and	stigmas	in	the	social	and	private	sphere.	Vasavi	argues	that	new	demands	of	consumer-defined	lifestyles	and	commercialisation	 of	 the	 social	 life	 together	 with	 the	 sanskritization	 and	 the	consolidation	of	rituals	as	 lifestyles	show	that	pre-existing	and	new	forms	of	collective	norms	 and	 obligations	merge	 and	mount	 immense	 pressure	 on	 farmers.	 These	 newly	emerging	contradictions	ultimately	lead	to	suicides	(Vasavi	2009,	101-102).		Lastly,	 the	 ideational	 nature	 of	 neoliberalism	 is	 important	 to	 understanding	 the	individualisation	of	farming.	Following	Beck	and	Beck-Gernsheim	(2001),	Vasavi	argues	that	 neoliberal	 policies	 have	 brought	 a	 “do-it-yourself	 biography”	 (Vasavi	 2009,	 101-102).	 This	means	 that	with	 the	withdrawal	 of	 state	 support	 and	 the	 assumption	 that	everything	is	possible	if	farmers	are	only	entrepreneurial	enough,	their	biographies	are	under	a	permanent	threat	–	overt	or	concealed	–	of	breakdown.	Within	the	environment	of	 commercial	 agriculture,	 the	 state’s	 withdrawal	 and	 unreliable	 climatic	 conditions,	farmers	 face	 unpredictable	 output	 prices	 and	 an	 unreliable	 quality	 and	 quantity	 of	inputs.	They	also	have	to	decide	on	new,	untested	agricultural	practices.	Thus,	they	are	unable	 to	 gauge	 the	 risk	 involved.	 They	 have	 to	 seek	 knowledge,	 inputs,	 credit	 and	market	 access	 on	 an	 individual	 basis	 and	 rely	 on	 the	 small	 structures	 of	 their	households	and	families.	Additionally,	many	are	heavily	indebted	with	moneylenders	or	their	extended	family.	A	crop	failure	means	public	humiliation	because	the	debtors	are	not	able	to	repay	their	debts.	Farmers	perceive	that	they	are	to	be	blamed	personally	for	the	 loss	and	 its	 impact	on	 the	 family’s	wellbeing.	As	a	 consequence,	 a	 crop	 failure	can	mean	 a	 drastic	 individual	 failure	 and	 shame	 for	 the	 farmer	 (see	 also	 Mohanty	 2005,	263).	What	applies	here	to	risks	applies	equally	to	aspirations.	Shah	(2012,	18)	states	that	the	Green	Revolution	and	later	the	market	liberalization	has	“coded	the	farmers	choices	and	
aspirations”.	The	 limitless	optimism	 that	 came	with	 these	 two	developments	 stands	 in	sharp	contrast	with	the	reality	of	many	farmers.	The	 farmer	perceives	his	 future	to	be	full	 of	 opportunities	 that	 he	 then	 failed	 to	 seize.	 This	 situation	 helps	 cause	 a	 jump	 in	suicide	numbers	(see	also	Gupta	2016).	
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2.3 Farmer	Suicides	as	Public	Deaths	In	India,	 these	three	different	arguments	often	–	 implicitly	or	explicitly	–	criticize	each	other.	Even	if	the	economic	and	the	sociological	lines	both	see	the	neoliberal	policies	as	the	 root	 causes,	 they	 differ	 in	 where	 they	 locate	 agency.	 The	 arguments	 that	 focus	strongly	 on	 the	material	 effects	 of	 the	New	Economic	 Policies	 leave	 all	 agency	with	 a	state	 that	 lets	 farmers	 live	 or	 die.	 In	 consequence,	 these	 studies	 do	 not	 put	 much	emphasize	 on	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 persons	 committing	 suicide	 or	 on	 their	 individual	motives	 (see	 also	 Münster	 2015a,	 1581	 and	 1587).	 Therefore,	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	sociological	 approaches	 accuse	 the	 others	 of	 being	 economically	 reductionist	 (ibid,	1589).	There	 are	 countless	 examples	 of	 the	 economic	 –	 that	 is,	 more	 structuralist	 –	understanding	of	 the	 farmer	 suicides.	One	 is	Mohanakumar	and	Sharma	 (2006,	1553)	who	strongly	argue	that	“the	on-going	spate	of	farmers’	suicides	is	caused	basically	due	to	
economic	 distress	 rather	 than	 psychological	 and	 social	 reasons”.	 This,	 arguably	economically	 reductionist	approach	 is	also	exemplified	by	 the	debate	over	whether	or	not	 Bt	 cotton	 causes	 farmers	 to	 commit	 suicide	 (see	 e.g.	 Gruère	 and	 Sengupta	 2011;	Gutierrez	 et	 al.	 2015;	Herring	 2005).	 Some	 even	 refer	 to	Bt	 cotton’s	 ‘seeds	 of	 suicide’	(Shiva	 et	 al.	 2002).	 While	 one	 side	 argues	 that	 the	 suicides	 are	 a	 consequence	 of	“corporate	 feudalism”	 and	 see	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 the	 suicides	 and	 these	 corporate	actors	together	with	Genetic	Modification	technology	(GM)	in	particular,	the	other	side	calls	this	whole	argument	a	“hoax”	(Herring	2006,	468).	In	any	case,	this	argument	is	so	powerful	that	one	of	these	transnational	corporations,	Monsanto,	has	created	a	webpage	trying	 to	prove	 that	 they	are	not	 responsible	 for	 the	 suicides	 (Monsanto	2014).	While	these	rather	technocratic	debates	about	GM-crops	or	the	Green	Revolution	as	causes	for	the	suicides	are	important,	the	argument	that	the	major	cause	are	the	state’s	neoliberal	policies	is	omnipresent.		To	give	a	more	nuanced	analysis	of	the	reasons	that	lead	farmers	to	commit	suicide,	the	sociological	 line	 of	 argument	 conceptualizes	 suicides	 as	 a	 relational	 act	 seeking	 to	convey	 meaning	 (Vasavi	 2012).	 It	 acknowledges	 that	 even	 in	 desperate	 economic	situations,	 the	farmers	can	choose	between	different	options,	suicide	being	one	among	them.	This	 implies	 to	 give	 the	 farmers	 a	 higher	 agency	 and	 to	 consider	 other	 reasons	that	would	bring	the	farmers	to	the	decision	to	commit	suicide.	But	those	authors	from	the	 economic	 line	 of	 arguments	who	 see	 a	direct	 line	between	neoliberal	 policies	 and	suicides	 claim	 that	 looking	 for	 other	 reasons	 is	 dangerous,	 because	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	highlight	the	structural	violence	of	globalization	and	neoliberalization	of	the	agricultural	policies.	Mohanakumar	and	Sharma	(2006,	1558)	for	example	strongly	argued	that	
“recently,	 there	 have	 been	 attempts	 to	 situate	 farmers’	 suicides	 in	 broad	 theoretical	
frameworks	such	as	Family	Stress	Models	and	Durkheim	propositions	of	individualisation	
[here	 he	 refers	 directly	 to	 Gyanmudra	 and	 Mohanty]	 with	 a	 purposeful	 objective	 of	
belittling	the	devastating	impact	of	neoliberal	policies	on	farming	community.”	Despite	 these	 differences	 and	 to	 my	 knowledge,	 all	 studies	 that	 act	 on	 the	 basic	assumption	that	farmer	suicides	as	a	phenomenon	exist,	agree	on	the	basic	assumption	
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that	the	neoliberal	policies	of	the	1990s	are	a	major	factor	causing	the	farmer	suicides.	Even	the	reports	and	 fact-finding	commissions	of	 the	government	 itself	do	not	deviate	from	this	assumption.	One	report	for	Maharashtra,	for	example,	argued	that		
“repeated	crop	failures,	 inability	to	meet	the	rising	cost	of	cultivation,	and	indebtedness	
seem	to	create	a	situation	that	forces	farmers	to	commit	suicide.	However,	not	all	farmers	
facing	these	conditions	commit	suicide	—	it	is	only	those	who	seem	to	have	felt	that	they	
have	exhausted	all	avenues	of	securing	support	have	taken	their	 lives”	(Dandekar	 et	 al.	2005,	iii-iv).		So	far,	this	is	the	state’s	analysis	of	the	discussion	of	the	reasons	for	farmer	suicides.	It	turned	out	 that	 it	 is	 a	 common	argument	 in	 academic	 and	political	 debates	 to	draw	a	direct	or	indirect	relation	between	the	package	of	New	Economic	Policies	(and	at	times	agricultural	 practices).	 Because	 it	 is	 the	 government	 that	 has	 issued	 these	 policies	 or	allowed	these	practices,	the	government	is	consequently	responsible	for	the	suicides.		Additionally,	 I	 showed	 in	 the	 last	 section	 how	 the	 suicides	 have	 become	 politicized	through	 blame-games	 and	 statistical	 trickery.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 nature	 of	 farmer	suicides	has	changed.	While	it	used	to	be	an	individual	act	within	the	anonymity	of	the	family,	they	have	now	become	highly	politicized	and	therefore	‘public	deaths’	(see	also	Münster	 2015a;	 Vasavi	 2012,	 192).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 that	 this	 political,	 public	nature	of	 the	suicides	does	not	derive	 from	the	 intentions	of	 the	 individual	 farmer	 for	committing	 suicide,	 but	 from	 all	 the	 reasons	 analysed	 above.	 To	 come	 to	 such	 a	conclusion	means	to	“turn	away	from	the	intentions	of	individual	actors	and	instead	focus	
attention	on	the	aggregate	effects”	 (Münster	 2015a,	 1605)	 of	 these	 suicides.	 This	 turn	away	 from	an	 individual	 farmer’s	 intentions	 could	be	 interpreted	as	 a	denial	of	his	or	her	 political	 agency.	 But	 I	 agree	with	Münster	 (2015a,	 1605),	who	 argues	 that	 on	 the	contrary,	 to	 conceptualize	 farmer	 suicides	 as	 public	 “is	 an	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	
political	potential	of	seemingly	apolitical	acts”.	But	 are	 these	 suicides	 really	 “seemingly	 apolitical	 acts”	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 i.e.	 in	 the	intentions	of	the	farmers	who	commit	suicide?	Several	authors	have	conceptualised	the	suicides	as	a	political	action	in	itself	or	at	least	as	part	of	a	movement.	
3 Framing	Suicides	as	Part	of	Activism	In	 India,	 farmer	 suicides	 can	be	understood	 in	a	 context	of	different,	 rather	desperate	forms	of	protests	among	farmers.	 It	started	with	people	who	placed	their	own	villages	“for	 sale”	 as	 a	 form	 of	 protest.	 The	 farmers	 claimed	 that	 if	 agriculture	 was	 so	unprofitable,	they	would	prefer	selling	their	village	and	moving	to	cities	(own	interview	data,	Vasavi	2009).	Later,	Sharma	(2006)	reported	on	his	blog	 that	 in	Punjab,	a	whole	village	had	put	itself	for	sale	by	calling	the	Prime	Minister	and	the	President	to	conduct	a	human	market	and	to	sell	the	farmers’	kidneys.	Sadly,	such	forms	of	protest	have	found	a	 combination	 with	 increasing	 incidences	 of	 organ	 trafficking.	 The	 Times	 of	 India	featured	a	report	about	a	similar	protest	in	a	Vidarbhan	village.	People	hanged	a	banner	with	 “Farmers’	 kidney	 sale	 centre”	 at	 their	 gate	 –	 and	 claimed	 to	 invite	 high-ranking	
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politicians	 to	 the	 inauguration.	 Bhagwat	 writes	 in	 The	 Times	 of	 India	 that	 because	indebted	 farmers	 are	 “unable	 to	 find	 an	 avenue	 to	 eke	 out	 a	 living,	 (…)	 farmers	 of	 the	
village	have	decided	to	sell	their	kidneys”	 –	 and	 then	 he	 draws	 a	 direct	 line	 to	 the	 high	number	of	farmer	suicides	in	the	district	(Bhagwat	2006).	
3.1 Suicides	as	a	Political	Act	In	this	context,	some	authors	and	journalists	have	reported	on	an	increasing	number	of	cases	where	farmers	directly	address	the	government	in	their	suicide	notes	–	the	Chief	Minister	of	Maharashtra	or	even	the	Prime	Minister	of	India	–	with	demands	for	support	and	remunerative	prices	 (I	have	also	been	 told	about	such	cases).	Sometimes,	 farmers	even	 sought	 the	 politically	 charged	 method	 of	 self-immolation	 in	 or	 in	 front	 of	government	buildings.	While	 this	 seems	 rather	 rare,	 several	 journalists	 have	 reported	about	numerous	farmers	who	had	chosen	public	places	such	as	the	Agricultural	Produce	Marketing	 Committee	 office	 or	 the	 office	 of	 agricultural	 officer	 to	 kill	 themselves	(Abraham	2015,	18;	Münster	2015a;	Sainath	2007,	14).	These	clearly	and	explicitly	political	farmer	suicides	are	rather	exceptional	cases.	More	generally,	 the	 aspect	 of	 political	 protest	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 does	 not	 derive	 from	 an	“element	 of	 resistance	 innate	 to	 individual	 acts”,	 but	 by	 the	 “sheer	 number	 of	 farmers’	
suicides”	(Münster	2015a,	1605)	and	by	the	fact	that	the	farmers	who	commit	or	think	of	committing	suicide	know	that	they	are	part	of	‘the	farmer	suicides’	(Münster	2012,	198;	Münster	 2015b).	 This	 also	 implies	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 farmer	 suicides	 are	 not	protest	 suicides	 in	 a	 narrow	 sense:	 Münster	 (2015a,	 1593)	 distinguished	 farmer	suicides	 clearly	 from	 protest	 suicides	 because	 for	 the	 former,	 the	will	 or	 intention	 to	convey	 a	 political	 message	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 is	 not	 the	 primary	 motivation	 for	committing	suicide.		Nevertheless,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 suicides	 are	 explicitly	 political,	 they	 can	 be	conceptualized	 “as	communicative	acts	 that	 intend	 to	do	more	 than	 just	end	a	 life:	 they	
convey	 a	 message	 of	 despair	 and	 protest	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 political	 message”	 (Münster	2012,	 198).	 Münster	 (2012,	 197)	 observed	 that	 in	 some	 reports	 and	 articles	 about	farmer	suicides,	 they	have	been	“understood	as	subaltern	anti-WTO	protests	and	so	have	
been	 treated	 in	 a	 direct	 sense	 as	 political:	 farmers’	 suicides	 as	 political	 protest.”	 At	 the	very	 least,	 farmer	suicides	can	 “open	up	a	space	to	speak	publicly	about	the	violence	and	
disappointments	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 dispensation”(Münster	 2015a,	 1605)	 and	 thus	 they	have	politicized	farmers.	Vasavi	(2009,	104)	makes	it	more	explicit	when	she	says	that	the	suicides	are	“the	last	act	of	the	desperate	to	speak	in	a	political	voice”.	To	 speak	 in	 a	 political	 voice	 has	 become	 increasingly	 difficult	 in	 times	 when	 the	neoliberal	 paradigm	 of	 development	 has	 become	 very	 dominant.	 McMichael	 (2010)	claimed	 that	 “by	 politicizing	 market	 culture,	 and	 its	 material	 consequences”	 (ibid,	 4,	emphasis	 in	original)	numerous,	diverse	and	local	struggles	all	over	the	world	manage	to	 challenge	 this	 dominant	 development	 vision,	 difficult	 as	 thus	 may	 be.	 He	 further	argued	that	the	challenge	of	social	movements	today	is	to	make	the	diverse	sufferings	of	people	visible,	which	would	otherwise	 “be	made	invisible	by	the	disempowerment	of	the	
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people	 concerned”	 (ibid,	 4).	 Consequently,	 social	 movements	 need	 to	 find	 strong	arguments	 to	overcome	this	challenge	and	make	 their	struggles	visible.	The	use	of	 the	discourse	about	 farmer	suicide	can	then	be	seen	as	one	tactic	 to	draw	attention	to	the	difficult	 situation	 of	 smallholders	 in	 commercial	 agriculture	 and	 make	 their	 grief	tangible,	 even	 if	 alternative	 visions	 are	 difficult	 to	 find.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 context,	 where	Münster	 (2012)	 framed	 farmer	 suicides	 as	 “part	of	the	activists’	repertoire	of	depicting	
India’s	bestiary	of	 the	underside	of	globalization”	 (ibid,	 198).	 As	 I	 will	 show	 later,	 this	discussion	 helps	 to	 understand	 the	 role	 that	 farmer	 suicides	 play	 in	 mobilisation	 in	Vidarbha.	
3.2 Suicides	as	a	“Silent	Movement”	I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 conceptualize	 these	 suicides	 at	 least	 as	 part	 of	 a	 social	protest,	because	it	breaks	with	the	main	argument	of	most	papers	that	take	agency	away	from	the	farmers.	It	opens	the	stage	for	the	question	whether	the	suicide	should	be	seen	as	a	breakdown	and	absence	of	farmer	protest	or	rather,	as	a	new,	though	tragic,	form	of	farmer	 movement,	 or	 as	 one	 important	 part	 of	 contemporary	 farmer	 movements’	repertoire.	 So,	 what	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 previous	 farmer	movements	 and	these	farmer	suicides?	Shah	(2012,	5)	argued	that	 the	 farmers	who	commit	suicide	are	 the	very	 farmers	who	formed	 the	 constituency	 of	 the	 New	 Farmers’	 Movements,	 namely	 the	 commercial	farmers.	Their	anger,	she	argues,	has	shifted	from	corrupt	bureaucrats,	merchants	and	the	local	level	administration	to	the	state	per	se.	By	emphasizing	rural	vulnerability	and	mixing	it	with	the	landed	farmers’	issues	and	their	argumentation	of	the	urban	bias,	the	persisting,	contemporary	factions	of	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	have	now	found	an	“emotionally	 authentic	 voice”	 (Shah	 2012,	 6).	 Other	 authors	 might	 disagree.	 Münster	(2012,	199)	argued	that	suicides	often	did	not	take	an	active	part	in	farmer	movements.	I	 have	 argued	 in	 section	 2.3	 of	 chapter	 IV	 that	 the	 constituency	 of	 the	 New	 Farmers’	Movements	were	rather	landed,	medium	or	large	commercial	farmers	(for	Maharashtra	see	 e.g.	 Arora	 2001).	 Further	 above	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 I	 showed	 that	 a	 majority	 of	studies	 and	 reports	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 now	 rather	 the	 marginal,	 small	 and	 medium	commercial	 farmers	 who	 commit	 suicide	 (see	 e.g.	 Kennedy	 and	 King	 2014;	 Mishra	2014).	Therefore,	 the	argument	that	the	constituency	of	the	New	Farmers’	Movements	of	 the	1970s	and	1980s	are	 those	 farmers	who	are	now	committing	suicide	stands	on	shaky	 ground.	 Certainly,	 though,	 both	 these	 groups	were	 farmers	who	 owned	 at	 least	some	land	for	commercial	production	and	were	not	in	the	economically	lowest	strata	of	the	rural	society.		However,	 the	 suicides	 themselves	 are	 increasingly	 conceptualized	 as	 a	 successor	 of	earlier	 forms	of	movements	and	as	a	more	or	 less	political	public	action	by	 farmers	to	call	attention	to	the	situation	of	agriculture.	Shah	(2012,	18)	argued	that	the	suicides	are	caused	 by	 a	 crisis	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 alternative	 forms	 of	 political	 and	 cultural	 imaginations,	which	 links	 back	 to	 McMichael	 (2010).	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 suicides	 might	 not	 be	 a	movement	 themselves,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 still	 conceptualized	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 or	 a	discourse	that	can	be	seen	in	one	line	with	earlier	struggles	of	farmers;	now	that	farmer	
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movements	 have	 become	weak,	 farmers	 commit	 suicide.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	Vidarbha	based	 journalist	 Chandrakanth	 Wankhade	 called	 the	 farmer	 suicides	 a	 new	 “silent	
movement”	of	farmers	(Wankhade	2010,	interview	data).	The	intense	debates	in	academic	as	well	as	activist	circles	show	that	farmer	suicides	are	now	a	highly	politicized	public	issue	and	that	they	have	become	part	of	the	repertoire	of	the	contemporary	farmer	movements.	As	I	mentioned	in	the	beginning	of	 this	chapter,	journalists	and	activists	all	over	the	world	use	this	issue	in	India	to	emphasize	the	grief	that	 the	 neoliberal	 economic	 policies	 and	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 practices	 of	industrialized	agriculture	have	caused	for	farmers	in	the	global	South.	By	doing	so,	they	draw	 on	many	 local	 farmer	movements	 in	 India	 who	 engage	 with	 farmer	 suicides	 in	many	ways.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 show	how	 the	movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha	 engages	 with	 those	 farmer	 suicides	 in	 various	 ways;	 they	 provide	support,	 encouragement	 and	 last	 but	 not	 least,	 they	 use	 of	 the	 discourse	 of	 farmer	suicides	to	prove	the	farmers’	suffering	and	the	government’s	guilt.	
4 Voices	of	Movement	Actors:	“Don’t	Kill	Yourself,	but	Fight”	In	the	following	section,	I	analyse	first	how	the	interviewees	themselves	interpreted	the	farmer	suicides.	The	concurrence	among	the	interviewees	was	very	high	with	regards	to	these	 reasons,	 and	 this	 also	 corresponds	 well	 with	 the	 literature	 discussed	 above.	Stemming	 from	 the	 perceived	 reasons,	 the	 responsible	 persons	 and	 institutions	were	very	bluntly	named	in	many	interviews.	I	then	explore	how	the	groups	engaged	with	the	issue	of	farmer	suicides.		
4.1 Perceived	Reasons	for	Suicides	The	most	important	reason	and	often	the	immediate	trigger	for	the	decision	to	commit	suicide,	many	interviewees	agreed,	was	indebtedness.	Many	farmers	–	and	in	particular	many	 activists	 –	 regretted	 the	 time	when	 the	 government	 had	 provided	 loans	 for	 the	farmers.	 The	 journalist	Wankhade	particularly	 emphasized	 that	 “in	older	times,	he	[the	
farmer]	was	indebted,	but	he	had	other	assets.	Over	the	last	decades,	slowly,	he	lost	all	this,	
a	slow	degradation.	Now,	he	has	 lost	everything	and	has	nothing	to	sell.	 (…)	That	 is	why	
they	[farmers]	commit	suicide.”	An	activist	of	AIKS	explained	that	often	land	was	the	only	collateral	 the	 farmers	 could	 offer,	which	 drew	 them	 deeper	 and	 deeper	 into	 the	 debt	trap.	 But	 most	 importantly,	 if	 the	 farmers	 were	 unable	 to	 repay	 their	 loans,	 the	moneylenders	would	come	to	the	 farmers’	homes	to	threaten	and	humiliate	them.	The	moneylenders’	 perceived	 thuggery	 was,	 many	 interviewees	 believed,	 often	 the	 straw	that	broke	the	camel’s	back.	A	supporter	of	SSS	underscored	that	“for	the	kisans,	the	visit	
of	the	moneylender	feels	like	an	insult.	That	is	why	they	commit	suicide.”	While	everybody	agreed	 that	 indebtedness	was	always	a	reason	and	often	a	 trigger	 to	commit	suicide,	there	were	two	main	lines	of	arguments	to	explain	why	farmers	became	indebted	and	why	they	then	chose	to	commit	suicide.	A	minority	of	interviewees	argued	that	 the	 farmers	 were	 weak	 and	 isolated.	 The	 majority	 of	 people	 argued	 that,	 to	 the	contrary,	 agricultural	 operations	 were	 the	 reason	 for	 those	 suicides	 and	 they	 clearly	
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identified	 the	 culprits.	 These	 two	 arguments	 broadly	 correspond	 to	 those	 lines	 in	 the	academic	debate,	i.e.	economic	and	sociological,	that	I	have	outlined	in	the	last	chapters.		
Weak	and	Isolated	A	minority	of	interviewees	blamed	the	farmers’	personal	weaknesses.	Interestingly,	this	opinion	came	up	often	as	well	in	informal	discussions	with	people	in	cities,	far	removed	from	 agriculture.	 The	 interviewees	 argued	 that	 the	 farmers	 who	 decided	 to	 commit	suicide	were	“weak”	individuals.	Either	they	were	lazy	and	would	not	farm	properly,	or	they	were	 drunkards.	 Activists	 in	 particular,	 though,	 considered	 this	 accusation	 as	 an	insult.	 If	 it	was	 true	 that	 alcohol	was	 the	 reason,	 an	SSS	activist	 exemplified,	 “then	the	
people	in	Bollywood,	the	people	in	the	expensive	hotels,	they	all	would	also	have	to	commit	
suicide.”	 Others	 further	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 indeed	 true	 that	 many	 farmers	 who	committed	 suicide	 were	 addicted	 to	 alcohol,	 but	 as	 an	 AIKS	 activist	 objected,	 it	 was	important	to	talk	about	“why	the	kisan	is	in	such	problem”.		Similar	but	crucially	different	is	the	argument	that	the	farmers	were	only	weak	but	also	received	very	little	support	from	their	families.	The	farmers	felt	responsible	but	unable	to	provide	for	the	family’s	needs,	most	often	the	dowries	for	the	family’s	daughters	or	a	disease	of	 the	 farmer	himself	or	a	 close	 family	member.	A	 supporter	of	KAA	reasoned	that	 “the	kisan	is	responsible	for	the	whole	family.	He	cannot	provide	for	them,	cannot	do	
anything,	not	repay	the	loans.	So	he	decides	to	commit	suicide.”	 In	 this	 situation,	 farmers	feel	 lonely	 and	 isolated	 by	 their	 problems	 and	 see	 no	 other	 way	 out	 than	 to	 commit	suicide.	 A	 supporter	 of	 AIKS	 criticised	 that	 there	was	 a	 “lack	of	interaction	among	the	
kisans”.	They	go	to	their	fields	and	don’t	discuss	their	problems	with	anyone.	Only	those	farmers	without	 family	 or	 friends	 to	 encourage	 them	 commit	 suicide.	 Additionally,	 an	activist	 of	 SSS	 argued	 that	 the	 “kisans	are	devalued	in	the	village	and	therefore	commit	
suicide”.		As	mentioned,	only	a	minority	of	interviewees	brought	forward	personal	weakness	and	also	isolation	to	explain	farmer	suicides.	The	majority	in	surprising	accordance	blamed	the	government	for	the	deaths	of	the	farmers.		
The	Government’s	Fault	I	showed	in	chapter	II	and	VI	that	most	farmers	blame	the	government	for	the	low	prices	for	their	output.	Consequently,	most	interviewees	claimed	outright,	that	farmers	decide	to	 commit	 suicide	 because	 agriculture	 is	 no	 longer	 profitable	 anymore,	 given	 the	 low	prices.	 One	 mother,	 whose	 son	 had	 committed	 suicide	 recently,	 said	 that	 “he	 had	
committed	 suicide	 due	 to	 low	 income	 of	 agriculture.	 He	 jumped	 into	 a	 water	 well	 and	
drank	poison.	The	reason	was	agriculture	only.”		Most	often	 the	 interviewees	directly	blamed	 the	government.	Sometimes,	 they	blamed	the	 government	 in	 general,	 sometimes	 the	 Congress	 (see	 section	 2.1,	 chapter	 IV)	 in	particular.	Several	supporters	of	SSS	emphasized	that	“the	Congress	is	responsible	for	this	
whole	situation.”	Countless	times,	interviewees	made	similar	statements	as	the	one	of	an	AIKS	 activist:	 “Because	 of	 the	 bad	 government	 policies,	 there	 is	 no	 price,	 kisans	 cannot	
repay	the	 loans.	They	 face	 the	moneylenders	and	agricultural	problems.	The	kisans	 loose	
	 194	
their	wish	to	 live.	This	means	 that	 the	state	government	 is	 fully	responsible	 for	 the	kisan	
suicides.”	Also	 the	 leader	of	SSS	clearly	said	 that	 “the	policies	are	anti-kisan.	That	is	why	
they	commit	suicide.”	And	a	supporter	of	KAA	added	that	“the	government	says	that	‘we’ll	
give	you	good	rates’.	But	they	tell	this	since	more	than	sixty	years.	They	tell	this	once	and	
then	they	hide	away	for	five	years.	Because	of	that,	kisans	commit	suicide.”	The	 government	 responded	 to	 these	 accusations,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 by	 granting	compensation	 payments	 for	 the	 bereaved	 of	 those	 farmers	 who	 committed	 ‘farmer	suicides’.	The	family	members	often	said	that	they	did	get	the	compensation	–	often	with	the	help	of	activists	–	and	they	could	use	the	money	to	build	a	well	or	then	to	pay	their	debts.	A	farmer	whose	father	had	committed	suicide,	reported	that	after	the	suicide,	the	Revenue	Officer	came	to	the	village	to	enquire	whether	or	not	the	suicide	was	an	eligible	farmer	 suicide.	 For	 that	 case,	 the	 father	 had	 written	 a	 suicide	 note	 stating	 that	 he	committed	 suicide	 only	 because	 of	 agricultural	 problems.	 After	 the	 Revenue	 Officer	checked	 the	 respective	 documents	 about	 debts	 and	 agricultural	 records,	 the	 family	received	the	compensation,	and	the	family	was	able	to	build	a	water	well.	However,	the	son	 complained	 that	 “if	the	government	had	given	a	water	well	to	my	family	before,	then	
there	was	no	need	for	my	father	to	commit	suicide.”	Some	 supporters	 and	 particularly	 activists	 were	 enraged	 that	 some	 journalists	 or	politicians	would	 accuse	 the	 farmers	 of	 committing	 suicide	 only	 to	 get	 compensation.	This	 idea	was	 strongly	 rejected	by	 all	 the	 interviewees.	Often,	 interviewees	 suggested	offering	Rs	100,000	to	rich	people	to	see	if	they	would	kill	themselves.	Kakade,	leader	of	KAA,	 stated	 that	 “everybody	wants	to	live.	Nobody	is	ready	to	die	for	one	lakh	[100,000]	
rupees.”	Further,	several	supporters	argued	that	Rs	100’000	might	be	a	support	for	the	bereaved,	but	 it	would	never	solve	the	family’s	problems.	The	family	would	instead	be	worse	off	after	the	suicide	of	one	of	its	members.	A	supporter	of	SSS,	however,	accepted	all	 those	reasons	but	blamed	the	 farmers	because	“they	are	not	thinking	about	who	will	
take	care	of	the	family	after	him.”	Some	activists	argued	directly	that	the	suicides	had	started	as	a	consequence	of	the	New	Economic	 Policies	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	 Jawandhia	 for	 example	 claimed	 that	 the	 farmer	suicides	 started	 in	 the	 1990s,	 because	 the	 gap	 between	 urban	 and	 rural	 India	 had	widened	 after	 the	 New	 Economic	 Policies	 in	 1991.	 Free	 trade	 had	 failed	 Indian	agriculture,	 Jawandhia	 argued:	 “this	 could	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years	 with	 these	
kisan	 suicides.”	 The	 argument	 went	 that	 the	 farmers	 were	 crushed	 by	 the	 markets	without	 the	 help	 of	 the	 government.	 “The	market	uses	the	kisans	forcefully,	that	is	why	
the	kisans	commit	suicide”,	a	supporter	of	AIKS	said.	Consequently,	activists	of	SSS	and	VJAS	–	particularly	Tiwari	–	blamed	the	international	institutions	 like	 the	 WTO	 or	 then	 the	 U.S.A.	 He	 accused	 “the	 government	 and	 the	
international	 community”,	 “America	 and	 their	 friends”	 to	 “let	 these	 people	 die”	 and	therefore	“commit	mass	genocide”.	The	U.S.A.,	so	he	said,	knowingly	let	the	farmers	of	the	poor	 countries	 die	 “for	 the	sake	of	 their	own	kisans”.	 Rathod,	 activist	 of	 VJAS,	 claimed	that	 the	 seed	 companies,	 together	 with	 the	 government,	 would	 promote	 wrong	agricultural	 practices,	 including	 genetically	 modified	 crops,	 and	 therefore	 cause	 the	
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farmer	suicides.	Also	organic	 cotton,	 so	Tiwari	 claimed,	was	only	a	 “European	fantasy”	and	“Indian	kisans	die	just	for	healthy	clothes	for	the	Europeans.”		It	is	very	clear	for	most	of	the	supporters	and	particularly	most	of	the	activists	that	there	are	people	directly	responsible	for	driving	farmers	to	suicide.	Consequently,	the	suicides	constituted	an	 integral	part	of	 the	groups’	activities.	To	name	an	example,	Tupkar,	 the	leader	of	SSS,	said	that	 the	high	number	of	 farmer	suicides	had	been	the	direct	reason	for	SSS	to	expand	its	activities	to	Vidarbha.	Tupkar	said,	SSS	would	now	fight	for	those	farmers.	 A	 supporter	 of	 SSS	 also	 said	 that	 he	would	 fight	 “for	that	the	kisans	don’t	kill	
themselves,	for	that	they	are	working.”		There	 is,	 however,	 another	 factor	 that	 –	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 many	 interviewees	 –	constitutes	a	cause	for	farmers	to	commit	suicide:	the	unreliability	of	rains	(see	section	3.2,	 chapter	 III).	The	 farmers	 in	dry	 land	areas	 like	Vidarbha	depend	on	 the	 rains	and	any	variability	in	the	timing	and	amount	of	precipitation	causes	crop	failures	and	makes	it	 impossible	 to	 repay	 their	 loans.	 So,	 farmers	often	said	 that	 “nature	and	government”	are	not	in	favour	of	farmers	and	would	bring	them	to	commit	suicide.		In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 will	 analyse	 the	 different	 levels	 the	 groups	 engage	 with	 the	omnipresent	topic	of	farmer	suicides.		
4.2 Suicides	and	Movement	Groups	At	the	most	concrete	level,	the	activists	supported	the	bereaved	in	getting	compensation	payments	 from	the	government.	This	 is	a	 form	of	 ‘fixing	qualities’	 (see	section	1.2	and	2.1,	 chapter	 V).	 As	mentioned	 earlier,	 a	 young	 farmer	whose	 parents	 both	 committed	suicide	the	same	day	told	that	Tiwari	came	to	his	house,	gave	him	his	condolences	and	helped	 him	 get	 the	 compensation	 by	 arranging	 the	 required	 documents.	 Furthermore	and	more	importantly,	activists	of	all	groups	try	to	support	the	farmers	in	the	event	of	family	problems,	crop	failure	or	debts	to	prevent	them	from	committing	suicide.	Apart	 from	 direct	 material	 help,	 activists	 and	 fellow	 supporters	 provide	 “mental	
support”	 for	 the	 farmers	who	 are	 isolated,	 lonely	 and	 desperate.	 Both	 supporters	 and	activists	 described	 this	 as	 one	 of	 the	 groups’	 main	 tasks.	 One	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 this	mental	support	was	to	assure	the	farmers	that	all	their	problems,	the	lack	of	resources	and	the	indebtedness,	were	not	their	fault	or	failure,	but	instead	the	government’s.	This	takes	away	the	responsibility	for	their	situation	and	relates	the	difficulties	to	structural	aspects;	in	other	words,	it	shifts	the	responsibility	from	the	individuals	to	the	structures,	and	especially	to	a	state	that	acts	against	the	farmers’	interests.		This	implies	that	the	farmers’	failures	should	no	longer	be	perceived	as	humiliation	and	therefore	a	reason	to	commit	suicide,	but	rather	as	a	reason	to	fight	and	join	the	group.	Additionally,	 the	 activists	 try	 to	 convince	 farmers	 that	 committing	 suicide	 does	 not	change	anything,	either	in	the	short	or	the	long	run.	Farmers	instead	need	to	organize	to	change	government	policies.	A	supporter	of	AIKS	reasoned	that	“kisans	should	stay	alive	
and	protest.	Because	just	by	dying,	the	family	problems	are	not	going	to	be	solved.	We	do	
this	kind	of	discussions	with	them.”	A	supporter	of	KAA	said	that	“we	tell	the	kisans	‘don’t	
commit	suicide,	but	enter	the	battlefield’.	(…)	The	politics	of	these	rich	parties	is	that	they	
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don’t	allow	the	kisans	to	enter	the	battlefield.	But	if	the	kisans	comes	on	the	street,	then	the	
rich	parties	will	be	in	trouble.”	Kakade	 of	KAA	 claimed	 that	 the	 farmers	 often	 feel	 they	have	no	other	choice	than	to	commit	suicide,	but	 that	 this	 is	not	be	true,	because	they	can	 always	 “go	 to	 the	 street	 and	 fight	 there	 and	 die.	 Then	 at	 least	 something	 would	
change”.	Or,	as	the	local	activist	of	SSS	said,	“don’t	drink	poison,	come	for	agitation.”	In	this	sense,	the	movement	actors	sometimes	conceptualize	the	suicides	themselves	as	a	form	of	agitation.	Jawandhia	told	that	once	the	Prime	Minister	of	Congress	had	visited	his	 village.	 Jawandhia	 told	 him	 that	 the	 suicides	 were	 caused	 by	 the	 government’s	policies,	and	that	those	farmers	who	did	not	commit	suicide	were	not	living	a	good	life,	that	they	simply	“live	because	they	are	just	not	dying.	Because	to	live	doesn’t	require	more	
than	a	hand	full	of	rice	and	a	pinch	of	salt.”	He	 further	 argued	 that	 “kisans	suicides	is	an	
agitation,	 it	 is	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 iceberg”.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 journalist	 Chandrakanth	Wankhade	saw	the	suicides	as	a	“silent	movement”.	In	 certain	 cases,	 the	 suicides	–	or	 their	 threat	–	already	are	 far	 from	silent,	but	 rather	loud	demands.	The	threat	to	commit	suicide	has	become	a	very	direct	way	to	pressure	government	officials	or	politicians.	As	an	example,	one	old	farmer	told	how	he	came	to	the	group.	He	was	very	badly	affected	by	moneylenders.	In	his	despair,	he	had	gone	to	Mumbai	 and	 asked	 the	Ministers	 for	 help.	 He	 said	 that	 he	 had	 been	 –	 and	 still	was	 –	ready	to	commit	suicide	if	nothing	would	change.	The	Minister	told	him	to	address	SSS	in	 order	 to	 get	 support.	 Another	 example	 is	 a	 farmer,	 supporter	 of	 AIKS,	 who	 grew	sugarcane.	He	said	that	he	had	planned	to	sell	his	crop	to	a	big	sugarcane	factory	owned	by	a	big	BJP	leader.	But	after	one	year,	the	factory	had	still	not	bought	his	sugarcane	so	that	all	the	sugarcane	got	wasted.	The	farmer	went	to	the	manager	of	the	sugar	factory,	told	 him	 that	 he	was	 desperate	 and	 threatened	 him	 “if	you	don’t	give	me	the	money,	 I	
don’t	 have	 any	 other	 option	 than	 to	 commit	 suicide”.	 He	 reported	 that	 he	 was	 still	unsuccessful.	 So,	 he	 went	 to	 a	 local	 activist	 of	 AIKS	 and	 told	 him	 his	 problems.	 The	activist	 helped	 him	 and	 “he	sent	one	letter	to	the	BJP	leader.	He	said	that	he	should	pay	
that	money	or	otherwise	this	person	will	commit	suicide.	Then	you	have	to	pay	also	for	his	
crops,	his	 sugarcane	and	his	 suicide	as	well.	 So	you	should	rather	give	 that	money	now.”	After	this,	the	farmer	got	his	money	and	decided	to	join	AIKS.		Last	but	not	least,	the	most	important	level	on	which	the	movement	actors	engage	with	the	 farmer	 suicides	 is	 discursive.	 Very	 often,	 the	 interviewees	 mentioned	 the	 farmer	suicides	early	 in	an	 interview	to	underline	the	despair	and	suffering	of	 the	 farmers.	 In	the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 an	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	interviewees	directly	blame	the	government	 for	 the	suicides.	This	argument	 is	used	to	mobilize	 supporters	or	potential	 supporters,	but	 it	 is	 also	used	extensively	 in	political	demands	and	speeches.	By	blaming	 the	government	 for	killing	 farmers,	 their	demands	gain	urgency	and	seriousness.	 Interviewees	sometimes	argued	 in	 the	same	 line	as	one	supporter,	 saying	 that	 “terrorists	[Maoists]	are	at	least	not	giving	troubles	to	the	kisans,	
but	to	the	politicians,	government	people.	Because	they	[government]	let	the	kisans	die.”		
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5 Concluding	Thoughts:	Protesting	against	Neoliberalism?	
5.1 Suicides	as	Part	of	Movement	Activism	in	Vidarbha	In	 India	 in	 particular	 but	 also	 far	 beyond,	 farmer	 suicides	 have	 become	 an	 important	part	of	the	discourse	in	farmer	movements,	in	the	media	and	in	academic	debates.	These	discourses	 together	with	 the	state’s	own	practices	and	statistical	categories	constantly	reify	the	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides	(leaving	aside	the	question	of	whether	it	can	be	statistically	proven	or	not).	The	phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides	serves	as	a	prominent	and	emotional	issue	to	underline	the	devastating	effects	of	world	market	prices,	fading	state	support	or	GM	crops	on	farmers.	It	opens	up	a	space	to	talk	about	the	implications	of	industrialized	agriculture	and	particularly	neoliberal	policies	on	farmers.	In	the	case	of	 Vidarbha,	 most	 interviewees	 agree	 with	 the	 academic	 and	 public	 discourses	 that	blame	 the	 neoliberal	 policies	 of	 the	 early	 1990s	 –	 and	 therefore	 the	 government	 that	issued	them	–	as	the	cause	of	these	deaths.	Because	 of	 the	 explosiveness	 of	 this	 accusation,	 farmer	 suicides	 figure	prominently	 in	the	political	rhetoric	particularly	of	movement	activists,	but	also	other	politicians,	even	the	 Prime	 Minister.	 The	 actors	 of	 the	 movement	 in	 Vidarbha	 have	 actively	 used	 the	rhetoric	 of	 the	 suicides	 to	 emphasize	 their	 suffering	 and	 to	 prove	 how	 badly	 the	government	 treats	 them.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 suicides	 have	 become	 ‘public	 deaths’	(Münster	2015a).	Despite	many	farmers	referring	to	political	demands	 in	 their	suicide	notes,	 I	 argue	 that	 only	 exceptional	 cases	 of	 suicides	 are	 explicitly	 political	 acts.	 Still,	even	 if	 most	 of	 them	 are	 seemingly	 apolitical	 individual	 acts,	 they	 become	 political	because	they	relate	to	the	far-reaching	discourse	of	farmer	suicides.	Consequently	 the	 actors	 of	 the	 movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha	engage	with	 the	 farmer	 suicides	on	many	 levels,	 be	 it	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	politicians,	 to	mobilize	 new	 supporters,	 or	 to	 underline	 the	 urgency	 of	 their	 demands	 towards	 the	governments.	 If	not	 the	suicides	themselves,	 then	the	rhetoric	about	them	and	various	levels	of	engagement	with	them	have	made	them	a	part	of	the	activism	in	Vidarbha.		The	question	remains	whether	the	movements	emerged	and	developed	in	parallel	with	the	 suicides	 and	 then	 took	 them	 up	 in	 their	 framings	 and	 actions	 or	 whether	 the	movements	emerged	as	a	consequence	of	the	suicides.	This	is	difficult	to	answer	without	data	that	would	allow	a	comparison	of	movement	groups	in	Vidarbha	and	in	other	parts	of	 India.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 section	 3.2	 in	 this	 chapter,	 Shah	 (2012)	 argued	 that	 the	suicides	 are	 caused	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 other	 forms	 of	 political	 imagination,	 e.g.	 farmer	movements.	Also	Vasavi	(2012,	154)	saw	an	absence	of	agrarian	movements	and	stated	an	“inability	and	failure	of	agriculturalists	to	mobilise	around	issues	pertinent	to	agrarian	
issues	and	to	demand	and	gain	policies”.	When	 I	 talked	 to	 the	 journalist	 P.	 Sainath,	 he	claimed	 that	 the	burning	question	was:	 “what	did	fundamentally	change	in	the	farmers’	
universe	 that	 they	went	 from	mass	movement	 to	mass	 suicide?”	All	 these	 readings	 and	comments	imply	that	suicides	are	a	consequence	of	a	lack	of	movements	rather	than	the	movements	emerging	as	a	consequence	of	the	suicides.	This	was	my	impression	as	well.		
	 198	
The	suicides	were	important	to	emphasize	the	severity	of	the	situation,	to	engage	with	people	as	I	have	described	in	section	4.	When	telling	me	or	others	about	suicides,	a	hope	resonated	 in	 these	 arguments.	 A	 hope	 that	 external	 agents	 such	 as	 myself	 would	understand	how	difficult	 the	 situation	was	 for	 the	 farmers	 and	 that	 the	 suicides	were	even	a	reason	to	take	action.	For	the	farmers	themselves,	though,	the	suicides	were	not	a	trigger	 for	becoming	engaged	 in	a	movement,	and	 if	so	only	as	a	symptom,	as	proof	of	the	desperate	situation	they	faced.	In	sum,	it	is	a	reasonable	assertion	that	suicides	are	an	outcome	of	a	 long	process	of	weakening	of	 farmer	movements	 that	occurred	 in	 the	context	 of	 neoliberal	 reorganisation	 of	 rural	 society.	 Interestingly,	 the	 same	 farmers	who	 were	 able	 to	 organise	 themselves	 into	 strong	 farmer	 movements	 as	 late	 as	 the	1980s	 are	 now	 resorting	 to	 suicides,	 understood	 either	 as	 silent	 protest	 or	 desperate	escape.	Another	aspect	that	demands	special	attention	is	the	role	of	movements	in	the	building	of	 farmer	 consciousness.	 This	 is	 not	 directly	 a	 subject	 of	 the	 present	 study,	 but	 the	increased	pressure	on	middle	peasantry	within	the	existing	agrarian-social	structure	is	a	matter	 of	 concern.	 The	 older	 structures	 have	 yet	 to	 give	 way	 to	 a	 newer	 social	 and	economic	 formation	 but	 the	 persistence	 of	 suicides	 has	 reinvigorated	 the	 debate	 on	rural	transformation.	The	new	farmer	movements	do	not	manage	to	form	a	new	farmer	consciousness	that	would	do	justice	to	these	new	realities	(see	chapter	VI).		In	the	following	section,	I	aim	to	place	the	farmer	suicides	in	India	in	the	context	of	other	incidents	of	suicides	that	have	been	recently	used	rhetorically	to	point	to	the	injustice	of	the	current	system.	I	am	going	to	talk	about	three	cases	of	suicides	that	hardly	count	as	classical	 protest	 suicides.	 They	 are	 seemingly	 apolitical	 individual	 acts	 of	 despair,	 but	they	have	become	political	 through	 the	way	media,	 academia	or	activists	have	 framed	these	deaths.	
5.2 Beyond	India:	Framing	Suicides	
China:	Global	Labour	Regime	The	 suicides	 of	 young	 workers	 at	 Foxconn	 have	 shocked	 the	 global	 public.	 Thirteen	young	workers	attempted	or	committed	suicide	at	two	Foxconn	production	sites	in	the	first	months	of	2010	(Foxconn	is	a	Chinese	supplier	for	Apple,	HP,	Dell,	 IBM,	Samsung,	Nokia,	 Hitachi	 and	 other	 electronic	 giants).	 Chan	 and	 Pun	 (2010)	 stated	 that	 Chinese	migrant	workers	are	exploited	by	 the	 transnational	electronic	companies	 in	 the	global	electronics	supply	chain	as	well	as	by	 the	 local	management	through	their	methods	 to	increase	 worker	 efficiency	 and	 silence	 protest.	 Equally	 importantly,	 Chinese	 officials	cooperate	with	the	two	former	actors,	neglect	basic	labour	rights	and	are	therefore	also	responsible	 for	 these	 exploitative	 conditions.	 The	 authors	 claim	 that	 “their	 defiant	
deaths	demand	that	society	reflect	upon	the	costs	of	a	state-promoted	development	model	
that	sacrifices	dignity	for	corporate	profit	in	the	name	of	economic	growth”	 and	 that	 the	suicides	 can	 be	 interpreted	 “as	 protest	 against	 a	 global	 labour	 regime	 that	 is	 widely	
practiced	in	China”	 (ibid,	 2)	 –	 even	 if	 the	 individuals	 committed	 suicide	out	 of	 despair	rather	than	direct	protest.		
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Guo	et	al.	(2012)	have	analysed	the	media	coverage	of	the	Foxconn	suicides	and	argue	that	 while	 in	 China	 the	 suicides	 where	 framed	 as	 being	 caused	 by	 psychological	problems,	 in	 Western	 newspapers	 they	 were	 framed	 with	 regards	 to	 “global	 social	
justice	and	world	economy”	(ibid,	484).	These	two	articles	show	how	these	suicides	are	framed	 very	 similarly	 to	 the	 farmer	 suicides:	 as	 the	 last	 desperate	 protest	 of	 people	adversely	included	in	the	global	economy.	
Europe:	Austerity	Measures	The	 second	 example	 comes	 from	 Europe	 where	 there	 have	 been	 increased	 rates	 of	suicides	 over	 the	 period	 of	 2007-2009.	 Several	 studies	 and	 newspaper	 articles	 have	directly	associated	them	to	governments’	economic	policies.	This	period	coincided	with	the	 economic	 downturn	 of	 certain	 countries	 and	 the	 European	 Union’s	 austerity	measures	 (Stuckler	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Karanikos	 et	 al.	 (2013,	 1323)	 argued	 that	 it	 is	particularly	Greece,	Spain	and	Portugal,	the	countries	that	adopted	strict	fiscal	austerity,	that	had	an	increased	rate	of	suicides.	Iceland,	which	rejected	austerity	policies	through	a	popular	vote,	did	not	see	such	an	 increase.	This	study	as	well	as	McKee	et	al.	 (2012,	346)	directly	blamed	the	austerity	measures	not	only	for	being	an	economic	failure	but	also	for	being	a	health	failure	and	responsible	for	the	increasing	number	of	suicides.		Povoledo	and	Carvajal	(2012)	in	an	article	in	the	New	York	Times	argued	that	in	these	fragile	 countries,	 it	 is	 mostly	 small-business	 owners,	 entrepreneurs	 and	 retirees	 who	increasingly	decide	 to	 take	 their	own	 life.	Stuckler,	 the	author	of	 the	above	mentioned	study,	 argued	 that	 the	 “financial	 crisis	 puts	 the	 lives	 of	 ordinary	 people	 at	 risk.	 (…)	
Austerity	can	turn	a	crisis	into	an	epidemic”	(cited	in	Povoledo	and	Carvajal	2012).	While	most	 of	 these	 suicides	 happen	 in	 private,	 some	 suicides	 decide	 to	 turn	 “their	personal	
despair	 into	dramatic	public	expression	of	anger	at	the	 leaders”	 whom	 they	 perceive	 to	have	 failed	 them	in	 the	 face	of	 the	crisis.	Povoledo	and	Carvajal	 (2012)	 find	that	some	European	 newspapers	 have	 started	 calling	 these	 suicides	 “suicide	by	 economic	 crisis”.	These	 discourses	 again	 construct	 a	 connection	 between	 an	 adverse	 inclusion	 into	 an	economic	system	and	the	act	of	suicide.	They	use	the	suicides	to	underline	the	adverse	effects	 that	 these	 austerity	measures	 –	 also	 rooted	 in	 a	 neoliberal	 ideology	 –	 have	 on	people.		I	want	to	state	clearly	that	I	am	not	discussing	protest	suicides	as	such,	only	people	who	decide	 to	 take	 their	 own	 life,	 often	 with	 quite	 apolitical	 personal	 intentions.	 It	 is	 the	media,	the	academic	discourses	or	the	political	rhetoric	that	use	these	suicides	to	show	the	downsides	of	neoliberal	development	paradigms.	Therefore,	the	next	example	might	sound	a	little	far	fetched.	It	is	in	fact	different	from	the	ones	above,	but	I	believe	that	it	still	fits	this	debate	to	a	certain	extent.	
Tunisia:	The	Spark	of	the	Arab	Revolutions	When	Mohammed	Bouazizi	 immolated	himself	 in	December	2010,	 his	 attempted	 (and	eventually	successful)	suicide	was	the	spark	for	the	Arab	Revolutions.	Bouazizi	earned	a	living	for	his	family	as	a	street	vendor.	He	illegally	ran	a	vegetable	stall	for	many	years.	Suddenly,	the	police	confiscated	his	cart	and	his	goods	worth	225	USD	and	denied	him	
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his	 regular	 location	 on	 the	 street	market.	 Bouazizi	 tried	 to	 bribe	 the	 officer,	 but	 was	insulted.	 He	 therefore	 went	 to	 complain	 to	 the	 local	 municipality	 office,	 without	 any	success.	He	 left	 the	office,	 returning	 an	hour	 later	 to	 immolate	himself	 in	 front	 of	 this	very	government	building	(Zevnik	2014).		Most	 people	 agree	 that	 Bouazizi	was	 a	 small	merchant	 operating	 outside	 the	 law	 and	facing	 insurmountable	 obstacles	 from	 the	 government.	His	 despair	was	 caused	by	 the	economic	 harassment	 of	 state	 officials	 (Abulof	 2012;	 Zevnik	 2014).	 His	 suicide	 “thus	
publicly	tore	off	the	last	shreds	of	the	mask”	that	the	autocratic	regime	had	been	wearing	(Abulof	2012).	Bouazizi’s	despair	was	neither	mainly	nor	directly	caused	by	neoliberal	policies.	It	is	important,	however,	to	acknowledge	that	Tunisia	under	president	Ben	Ali	was	 a	 one	 of	 the	 “celebrated	success	stories	of	the	‘Washington	Consensus’,	or	neoliberal	
reform”	 (Pfeifer	 2016,	 21).	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 neoliberal	 policies,	 public	 investment	and	services	shrank	while	the	benefits	of	 these	policies	concentrated	 in	the	hands	of	a	few	 ruling	 families.	 Inequality	 and	 poverty	 therefore	 increased	 (Pfeifer	 2016,	 42).	 In	some	sense,	Bouazizi’s	 suicide	 is	different	 from	 the	above	cases.	But	 in	another	 sense,	“the	 Tunisian	 uprising	 is	 also	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 hideous	 neo-liberal	 model	 of	 economic	
development”	 (Nazemroaya	 2011)	 and	 so	 therefore,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 discourses,	 is	 also	Bouazizi’s	death. While	there	is	no	doubt	that	Bouazizi’s	death	became	a	public	death,	only	a	few	media	and	protest	 groups	 framed	 the	 suicide	 itself	 as	 a	political	protest	 (see	 e.g.	BBC	2011).	Many	others	rather	argued	that	is	was	an	individual	act	of	despair	(Abulof	2012;	Zevnik	2014).	De	 Soto	 (2011)	 in	 his	 article	 in	 Foreign	Policy	 tried	 figuring	 out	who	 the	 “real	
Bouazizi”	was.	He	sees	him	as	an	apolitical	man	and	his	suicide	not	as	a	protest	suicide.	When	De	 Soto	 asked	Bouazizi’s	 brother	what	would	 have	 been	 his	 brother’s	wish,	 he	said:	 "That	 the	 poor	 also	 have	 the	 right	 to	 buy	 and	 sell”	 (all	 cited	 in	 De	 Soto	 2011).	Despite	 these	 ‘apolitical’,	 economic	 reasons	and	 intentions,	Bouazizi	did	not	 choose	 to	commit	suicide	where	nobody	could	see	him,	though.	He	instead	chose	a	place	where	a	wide	audience	would	witness	this	act	of	desperation	(Abulof	2012).	Spehr	and	Dixon	(2013)	described	Bouazizi’s	suicide	as	caused	by	“blocked	aspirations	
of	 a	 personal	 sort”.	 But	 they	 would	 be	 “associated	 with	 practices	 that	 violated	 the	
aspirations	of	most	people	in	his	society	who	wished	to	achieve	their	individual,	as	well	as	
collective,	 goals”	 (ibid,	 381).	 Zevnik	 (2014)	 argued	 that	 “what	made	 Bouazizi’s	 act	 so	
powerful	was	not	 the	radical	act	 itself	–	 the	 sacrifice	of	 life	–	but	rather	 the	desperation	
that	led	him	to	it”.	 He	 argues	 that	 this	 desperation	was	 shared	 by	many	Tunisians.	 De	Soto	(2011)	argued	that	the	“desire	to	prosper”	and	the	despair	in	face	of	these	obstacles	is	 what	 resonated	 so	 strongly	 across	 the	 differentiated	 Arab	 world.	 Rua	Wall	 (2012)	concludes	 that	 the	 suicide	was	 ”a	gesture	that	marked	and	traced	the	everyday	injustice	
shared	by	all	 in	the	situation,	but	about	which	all	had	to	remain	silent”	 (cited	 in	 Zevnik	2014).	As	a	consequence	and	despite	the	 impression	that	Bouazizi’s	suicide	was	not	a	protest	suicide,	 he	 has	 become	 “to	 some	 (…)	 a	 generic	 symbol	 of	 the	 resistance	 to	 injustice;	 to	
others	an	archetype	of	 the	 fight	against	 autocracy”	 (De	 Soto	 2011).	 Again,	 it	 was	 also	
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against	an	autocratic	state	that	 implemented	neoliberal	policies.	As	a	consequence,	the	‘Occupy	 Wall	 Street’-activists	 used	 his	 suicide	 in	 their	 “struggle	 against	 the	 unholy	
alliance	 between	 Washington	 and	 corporate	 America”	 (ibid).	 To	 conclude,	 how	 these	authors	frame	Bouazizi’s	death	is	 in	a	similar	 line	with	the	suicides	described	above:	a	man	who	was	deprived	of	his	livelihood	and	who	committed	suicide	out	of	despair.	Even	if	he	did	not	intend	the	act	of	suicide	as	a	protest	suicide,	activists	later	used	his	suicide	to	point	to	the	harm	caused	by	economic	policies	or	economic	practices	of	the	state.	 
5.3 Making	Grief	Tangible	These	three	examples	–	very	similar	to	the	farmer	suicides	–	are	framed	as	a	desperate	protest	 not	 by	 those	who	 do	 not	 have	 anything,	 but	 by	 those	who	 fear	 they	will	 lose	everything	they	have.	Neoliberal	development	was	a	promise	to	have	a	stake	in	growth	and	 wealth,	 but	 these	 hopes	 have	 been	 bitterly	 disappointed.	 An	 Irish	 man	 who	 had	attempted	 to	 commit	 suicide	 earlier	 asked	 “how	many	other	people	 lie	awake	at	night	
with	 the	 same	 fears?	How	many	people	are	on	 the	verge	of	 losing	everything?”	 (cited	 in	Povoledo	and	Carvajal	2012).	In	the	same	line,	De	Soto	(2011)	said	that	for	most	people	in	Europe	or	the	USA,	 it	might	seem	inconceivable	to	commit	suicide	because	of	a	 loss	worth	225	USD	and	a	 location	on	a	 street	market	as	Bouazizi	had	done.	But	 for	many	people	across	 the	Arab	world	–	and	 I	would	argue	across	most	parts	of	 the	world	–	 it	was	 immediately	 understood.	 It	 was	 not	 corruption	 or	 even	 public	 humiliation	 that	killed	him,	but	it	was	that	“he	had	been	deprived	of	the	only	thing	that	stood	between	him	
and	starvation”	(De	Soto	2011).	These	 suicides	 are	 examples	 of	 a	 desperate	 protest	 against	 unbearable	 economic	conditions.	Chan	and	Pun	(2010)	cited	from	a	worker	blog	(after	the	twelfth	suicide)	to	make	this	despair	and	this	sense	of	marginalization	tangible:		
“To	die	 is	 the	only	way	to	testify	that	we	ever	 lived.	Perhaps	 for	the	Foxconn	employees	
and	employees	like	us	(…)	the	use	of	death	is	simply	to	testify	that	we	were	ever	alive	at	
all,	and	that	while	we	lived,	we	had	only	despair.”	Chan	and	Pun	(2010)	further	argued	that	suicide	is	“the	most	desperate	form	of	protest.	It	
should	not	be	used	as	a	means	to	resist	social	injustice”	 (ibid,	32).	Even	 if	 the	 individuals	committing	 suicides	 themselves	 did	 not	 mean	 to	 commit	 a	 political	 suicide,	 their	suicides	 –	mostly	because	 they	occurred	 in	 large	numbers	 –	have	been	used	by	 social	activists	 to	 underline	 the	 grief	 that	 economic	 policies	 can	 cause	 across	 national	boundaries.	 Sometimes,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 farmer	 suicides,	 people	 that	 attempted	 to	commit	suicide	raise	their	voice	and	call	for	action.	The	Irish	man	cited	above,	continued	that	 “everyone	 in	 Ireland	 must	 become	 active	 in	 our	 rescue”	 (cited	 in	 Povoledo	 and	Carvajal	2012).		In	conclusion,	I	argue	that	farmer	suicides	can	be	seen	in	this	context	of	suicides	that	are	not	protest	 suicides	 as	 such	but	 rather	 apolitical,	 individual	 acts	 that	become	political	because	of	the	way	media,	researchers	and	movement	activists	engage	with	them.	These	discourses	construct	a	direct	causal	 relationship	between	neoliberal	economic	policies	and	 the	 suicides.	 Here	 the	 South	 Korean	 farmer	 Lee	 Kyung	 Hae,	 who	 killed	 himself	
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during	 protests	 against	 the	 WTO	 in	 Cancùn,	 is	 another	 example.	 The	 American	Punkband	Anti-Flag	dedicated	him	the	song	“W.T.O.	kills	farmers	“	and	hoped	to	see	“the	
spark	of	revolution	in	a	farmer’s	suicide”	 (Anti-Flag	2006).	The	 farmer	suicides	 serve	as	impressive,	 visible	 examples	 of	 the	 injustice	 caused	 by	 certain	 economic	 –	 mostly	neoliberal	–	policies.	The	argument	 that	suicides	are	caused	by	 these	policies,	 that	 the	policies	would	literally	kill	these	people,	becomes	important.	Why?	Neoliberalism	has	become	so	dominant	that	alternatives	are	difficult	to	imagine.	People	suffering	 from	 the	 current	 economic	 system	are	 rather	 seen	as	 a	 residual	 category,	 as	short-term	collateral	damage,	if	they	are	seen	at	all.	First,	this	means	that	the	radical	act	of	ending	one’s	life	can	be	used	to	prove	the	desperate	suffering	of	these	people	and	to	attract	attention	to	their	issues.	Second,	the	neoliberal	argument	claims	that	in	the	long	term,	 all	 the	 people	 now	 suffering	 would	 profit	 from	 the	 trickle-down	 effect	 of	 the	neoliberal	 development	 path	 eventually.	 Furthermore,	 if	 these	 people	 would	 develop	enough	 entrepreneurial	 capabilities	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	markets,	 their	 situation	would	improve.	 It	 seems	 that	 for	 all	 questions	 or	 accusations	 of	 people	 opposing	 these	economic	 policies,	 neoliberalism	 has	 an	 answer	 –	 that	 most	 often	 lies	 in	 the	 future.	However,	if	a	person	decides	to	take	his	or	her	own	life	and	therefore	dispossesses	him-	or	herself	of	this	future,	this	stands	in	crass	contrast	to	those	neoliberal	promises.		Therefore,	 these	suicides	can	be	understood	as	pointing	 towards	 the	dark	sides	of	 the	dominant	 development	 narrative,	 especially	 when	 they	 bear	 the	 potential	 to	 make	voices	 louder	 –	 or	 even	 heard	 –	 especially	 those	 voices	 that	 have	 been	 silenced	 or	deliberately	overheard.	When	movement	activists	engage	with	these	suicides,	 they	can	draw	attention	to	problems	and	sufferings	of	people	who	are	adversely	affected	by	the	process	 of	 globalization	 and	 liberalization	 of	 markets	 and	 who	 therefore	 experience	their	structural	violence.	Consequently,	these	suicides	have	become	important	for	social	movement	struggles	and	discourses	not	only	 in	India,	but	 in	other	countries	as	well.	 It	has	 become	 a	 strategy	 of	 social	 movements,	 locally	 and	 globally,	 to	 point	 to	 people	committing	 suicide	 to	 make	 their	 grief	 tangible	 and	 their	 demands	 visible.	 It	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 re-politicize	 these	 seemingly	 apolitical	 neoliberal	 policies	 of	 liberalization,	increased	efficiency	or	austerity.	
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VIII. Conclusions	The	 objective	 of	 this	 research	 was	 to	 show	 how	 people	 in	 Vidarbha	 affected	 by	 the	
'agrarian	crisis'	mobilise	to	struggle	 for	their	concerns/interests	and	what	the	 latter	are.	In	 sum,	 the	 study	 found	what	 can	 be	 called	 a	 heterogeneous	movement,	 consisting	 of	several	micro-movements	 or	movement	 groups	 that	 claim	 to	 speak	 for	 the	 farmers	of	Vidarbha.	They	mobilise	mostly	 landed,	 rather	 small	 farmers	 that	 are	 engaged	 in	dry-land	cotton	production.	While	these	are	not	the	most	downtrodden	of	the	rural	society,	they	do	suffer	from	the	neoliberal	policies	introduced	in	the	1990s.		This	heterogeneous	movement	is	rather	weak,	but	it	is	very	diverse	and	the	movement	actors	 develop	 creative	 strategies	 to	 confront	 the	 perceived	 'mysterious	 forces	 of	 the	market'	 and	 the	 'unreachable	 government'.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 gives	 the	 movement	 a	potential	 to	 make	 visible	 and	 politicise	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 policies.	 An	important	strategy	to	do	so	is	to	make	farmers	aware	of	the	structural	reasons	for	their	desperate	 situation	 and	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 farmer	 suicides.	 This	 helps	 to	underline	the	hardship	of	the	farmers	towards	decision	makers	and	the	public.		I	 showed	 that	 leaders	 and	 particularly	 activists	 take	 an	 important	 role	 in	 mobilising	farmers.	In	order	to	be	successful,	they	need	to	prove	their	trustworthiness	on	different	levels.	 This	 means	 a	 balancing	 act	 between	 being	 a	 ‘political	 leader’,	 perceived	 as	corrupt	but	able	to	do	things,	and	being	a	‘movement	leader’,	honest	but	powerless.	This	contradiction	is	symptomatic	and	is	also	mirrored	in	the	groups’	failure	to	form	alliances	representing	different	interests	of	those	suffering	from	the	neoliberal	policies.		The	groups,	based	on	a	particular	understanding	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’,	raise	one	main	demand:	 a	 remunerative	 price	 from	 the	 government	 for	 the	 farmers'	 agricultural	produce.	 Innate	 in	 this	 price	 demand	 though,	 are	 several	 tensions	 that	 relate	 back	 to	how	 they	 frame	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’,	 for	 whose	 interests	 they	 speak	 and	 what	 their	visions	about	the	future	of	agriculture	are.	Indeed,	the	price	demand	first	tends	to	hide	the	structural	inequalities	among	farmers	and	hinders	the	groups	from	fully	politicising	neoliberalism.	 The	 rhetorical	 importance	 of	 this	 price	 demand	 also	 risks	 to	 hide	 the	many	different,	creative	ideas	and	ways	of	resisting	that	these	movement	groups	exhibit.	In	the	following,	I	will	elaborate	on	these	findings	based	on	my	fieldwork	and	academic	engagement.	 I	 will	 end	 this	 conclusion	 with	 reflections	 on	 very	 recent	 political	developments	in	Vidarbha	and	their	consequences	for	the	farmers’	mobilisations.	
1 The	‘Agrarian	Crisis’:	A	Web	of	Inequalities	and	Risks	To	understand	 the	mobilisations,	 it	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 important	 to	 understand	 the	very	 difficult	 situation	 that	 large	 sections	 of	 the	 peasantry	 in	 Vidarbha	 are	 facing,	 a	situation	 generally	 labelled	 as	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’.	 Therefore,	 one	 research	 sub-question	was:	 How	 do	 the	 movement	 actors	 understand	 the	 present	 situation	 of	 agriculture	 in	
Vidarbha,	 and	 how	 do	 these	 perceptions	 correlate	 with	 available	 statistical	 data	 (see	chapter	III)?		
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I	found	that	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	and	its	immediate	reasons	are	depicted	very	similarly	in	testimonies	of	interviewees,	academic	studies	and	data	from	the	government.	Because	of	–	among	other	reasons	–	low	prices	and	insufficient	irrigation,	the	material	conditions	of	many	cotton	farmers	in	Vidarbha	are	harsh	and	they	live	below	the	poverty	line.	This	is	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 of	 them	 have	 relatively	 big	 land	 holdings.	 But	 beyond	 this	description,	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 also	 offers	 an	 arena,	 where	 politicians,	 movement	leaders	and	activists	as	well	as	farmers	voice	different	understandings	of	the	situation	in	the	countryside.	This,	in	turn,	affects	the	demands	they	raise.		Based	on	 these	different	perceptions	 and	understandings,	 the	 academic	 literature	 and	statistical	data	that	I	analysed	in	this	thesis,	I	conceptualize	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	as	a	web	of	various	layers	of	inequalities	and	increasingly	dreadful	risks.	Such	a	conceptualisation	helps	 basing	 a	 structural	 analysis	 on	 grassroots	 testimonies,	 while	 still	 triangulating	them	with	statistical	data	and	academic	analysis.	As	 I	will	detail	below,	understanding	the	 crisis	 in	 this	way	 implies	 to	 scrutinize	 the	 different	 layers	 of	 inequality	 that	 lay	 –	open	 or	 hidden	 –	 in	 the	 different	 data.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 popular	 conception	 of	 the	‘agrarian	crisis’	tends	to	see	the	very	differentiated	‘peasantry’	as	one	class,	avoiding	the	multitude	of	social	and	economic	factors	that	mediate	the	effects	of	the	crisis	(section	3,	chapter	 II).	 An	 understanding	 of	 the	 agrarian	 crisis	 as	 a	 web	 of	 risks	 and	 layers	 of	inequality	then,	makes	the	unequal	consequences	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	visible.		
Layers	of	Inequality	The	first	significant	inequality	relevant	for	farmers	and	activists	was	regional	inequality.	Within	 the	state	of	Maharashtra,	 the	eastern	regions	of	Vidarbha	and	Marathwada	are	worse	 off	 in	 terms	 of	 developmental	 and	 agricultural	 indicators	 than	 Western	Maharashtra.	 This	 inequality	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 people	 as	 well	 as	 in	statistical	 data	 and	 studies	 (see	 section	 1,	 chapter	 III).	 One	 of	 its	 most	 important	manifestations	 is	 that	 Vidarbha	 has	 a	 very	 small	 area	 under	 irrigation,	most	 of	which	relies	 strongly	 on	 private	 investments	 in	 groundwater	 pumps	 belonging	 to	 relatively	better	 off	 farmers.	 This	 regional	 inequality	 is	 caused	 by	 a	 particular	 constellation	 of	caste-based	 politics	 that	 has	 allowed	 the	 dominant	 Maratha-Kunbi	 caste	 complex	 to	channel	 resources	 to	 Western	 Maharashtra,	 away	 from	 Vidarbha’s	 cotton	 fields.	Additionally,	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 technology	 largely	 neglected	 dry	 land	 regions	 and	the	crops	that	can	suitably	be	grown	there.	Even	in	terms	of	price	support,	cotton,	being	the	major	 crop	 in	 the	 area,	 is	 less	 supported	 than	 sugar	 cane,	 being	 the	main	 crop	 of	Western	Maharashtra	(section	2,	chapter	II).		The	second	 inequality	refers	to	an	allegedly	general	neglect	of	agriculture	compared	to	urban	 areas,	 conceptualised	 as	 the	 ‘urban	bias’	 (see	 section	3,	 chapter	 II).	 Indeed,	 the	idea	of	the	urban	bias	still	reverberates	in	many	papers	and	articles	about	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	 in	 India,	 even	 if	 it	 remains	 highly	 questionable	whether	 there	 is	 any	 statistical	proof	 for	 this.	 The	 New	 Farmers	 Movements	 (see	 section	 IV,	 chapter	 IV)	 were	 clear	proponents	of	the	urban	bias	 ideas.	Although	they	 lost	their	strength	in	the	1990s,	 the	idea	 has	 survived,	 not	 only	 among	 the	 remaining	 factions	 of	 these	 New	 Farmers’	
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Movements	 (some	 of	 them	 now	 being	 part	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 movement	 in	Vidarbha),	but	in	all	groups.		The	 third	 layer	of	 inequality	 lies	 in	 the	 inequalities	within	the	rural	society	of	Vidharba,	i.e.	 those	 between	 labourers	 and	 landed	 farmers,	 between	 genders	 and	 castes.	 I	collected	the	testimonies	of	farmers	(see	section	3.1,	part	I),	focusing	on	the	inequalities	among	themselves,	that	is	between	landed	farmers	owning	different	landholdings.	This	layer	 of	 inequality	 resonated	 in	 the	 farmers’	 testimonies,	 but	 more	 so	 in	 an	 implicit	manner:	When	talking	directly	about	the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’,	many	farmers	supported	the	view	 of	 the	 whole	 of	 Vidarbha’s	 peasantry	 in	 crisis.	 But	 when	 talking	 about	 their	problems	 in	more	 detail,	 farmers	 for	 example	 explained	 that	 agricultural	 profitability	would	highly	depend	on	the	size	of	 their	 landholding,	 irrigation	 facilities	and	available	capital.	 Additionally,	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 many	 farmers,	 the	 inequality	 and	 conflict	between	 farmers	and	moneylenders	and	 traders	 (often	 the	same	person)	 is	 important	(see	section	3.2,	chapter	III).	I	 found	 that	 these	 immediate	 exploitations	 of	 farmers	 and	 the	 inequality	 between	 the	different	classes	of	 farmers	are	much	more	reflected	 in	 the	 testimonies	of	 the	 farmers	than	in	those	of	movement	leaders.	Also	in	most	of	the	studies	I	found	on	the	‘agrarian	crisis’,	the	immediate	exploitations	of	farmers	within	villages	remain	a	neglected	subject	(see	chapter	II	and	III).	However,	when	scrutinizing	the	available	statistical	data,	some	authors	 found	 that	 Indian	rural	 society	 is	 increasingly	differentiated.	Old	structures	of	inequality	 and	 oppression	 meet	 neoliberal	 New	 Economic	 Policies	 to	 enable	 the	 rich	farmers	 to	 accumulate	 wealth,	 while	 the	 marginal	 and	 small	 farmers	 face	 the	 risk	 of	complete	pauperization	(see	section	3,	chapter	II).	
Increasingly	Dreadful	Risks	The	first	risk	that	farmers	face	is	price,	that	is,	the	price	farmers	get	for	their	agricultural	output.	The	Green	Revolution	was	accompanied	by	heavy	state	support	for	agriculture.	This	 included	 the	 provision	 of	 rural	 credit	 or	 inputs	 as	well	 as	 the	Minimum	Support	Price	 (see	 section	 2.1,	 chapter	 III).	 In	 the	 1990s,	 this	 kind	 of	 state	 support	 decreased	tremendously	as	a	result	of	the	New	Economic	Policies	(section	1.3,	chapter	II).	The	still	existing	price	support,	 i.e.	 the	Minimum	Support	Price,	 is	 too	 low	 for	many	 farmers	 to	earn	 a	 profit,	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 farmers	 as	 well	 as	 according	 to	 statistical	 data.	Additionally,	many	–	particularly	 the	poor	 –	 sections	of	 the	peasantry	 are	 indebted	 at	moneylenders	cum	traders.	This	makes	 it	difficult	 to	 realize	even	market	or	minimum	support	prices.	 	Apart	 from	that,	many	 farmers	expressed	a	deep	unease	because	 they	do	 not	 know	 how	 and	 by	whom	market	 prices	 are	 determined	 and	 because	 the	 next	season’s	prices	would	then	be	pure	speculation.		The	second	risk	is	that	the	input	prices	have	increased	and	become	increasingly	volatile.	The	farmers	often	said	that	the	costs	of	production	increased	faster	than	the	prices	for	outputs	 –	 a	 fact	 that	 is	 backed-up	 by	 academic	 studies.	 In	 a	 more	 and	 more	 cash-intensive	 Green	 Revolution	 agriculture,	 the	 prices	 of	 inputs	 have	 a	 huge	 impact	 on	farmers.	During	the	Green	Revolution,	high	state	support	allowed	farmers	to	gauge	the	
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risk	of	high	input	costs,	volatile	prices	and	possible	crop	failure	to	a	certain	extent.	But	with	the	New	Economic	Policies,	the	state	has	withdrawn	from	all	these	areas	of	support	such	 as	 credit,	 extension	 service	 or	 regulation	 of	 the	 input	market.	 Also	during	Green	Revolution,	the	policies	have	concentrated	on	certain	states,	certain	crops	and	classes	of	farmers.	 But	 the	 neoliberal	 policies	 worsened	 the	 situation	 by	 leaving	 extension,	research	 and	 investment	 to	 be	 dependent	 on	 private	 capital.	 The	 small	 and	 medium	farmers	in	less	endowed	regions	like	Vidarbha	could	then	only	hope	for	the	support	of	a	withdrawing	state.	The	third	risk	is	the	ecological	scope	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	Many	farmers	reported	that	the	timings	and	amount	of	rains	have	changed.	This	is	a	tremendous	risk	particularly	for	those	without	irrigation.	Those	farmers	who	irrigate,	said	that	they	would	need	to	drill	the	 wells	 deeper	 and	 deeper.	 This	 depletion	 of	 groundwater	 levels	 is	 also	 caused	 by	agricultural	 policies:	 In	 dry	 land	 areas	 like	 Vidarbha,	 the	 lack	 of	 state	 regulation	 and	support	 for	 irrigation	 leads	 to	a	heavy	dependence	on	privately	 financed	groundwater	irrigation,	leading	to	an	overuse	of	the	groundwater	(see	section	2,	chapter	II;	section	2,	chapter	III).	Additionally,	there	is	an	increasing	pressure	on	land	that	manifests	itself	in	soil	 salinization	 and	 erosion,	 as	 well	 as	 surface	 water	 pollution.	 The	 general	environmental	and	health	risks	of	Green	Revolution	agriculture	are	severely	worsened	when	the	state	fails	to	regulate	certain	areas	of	agriculture,	i.e.	if	the	prices	of	different	fertilizers	are	allowed	to	float	freely,	if	the	sale	and	use	of	pesticides	are	not	regulated,	or	if	extension	services	are	not	provided.		Taking	 into	consideration	these	risks,	 this	research	provides	an	empirical	contribution	to	 Gupta’s	 (2016)	 argument	 that	 agriculture	 is	 increasingly	 a	 ‘speculative	 activity’.	Agriculture	 relies	 on	 an	 increasingly	 unpredictable	 climate	 and	 equally	 unpredictable	markets.	 Farmers	 have	 to	 take	 up	 loans	 to	 start	 agriculture,	 invest	 in	 extension	 and	more	inputs	and	then	hope	for	the	rains	and	prices	to	make	a	profit.	Otherwise	they	fail	completely.	 The	 ability	 of	 farmers	 to	 cope	with	 these	 risks,	 whether	 they	 are	 able	 to	make	profits	or	whether	they	fail,	strongly	depends	on	the	different	layers	of	inequality.	
2 Nature	of	Mobilisations	in	Vidarbha	The	mobilizations	around	this	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	are	very	energetic.	The	 involved	groups	and	 activists	 engage	 in	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 current	 situation	 in	 agriculture	 and	 in	analysing	 this	web	of	 inequalities	and	 risks.	They	all	 claimed	 to	 speak	 for	 the	 farmers	and	 raised	 very	 similar	 demands,	 such	 as	 remunerative	 prices	 and	 a	 better	infrastructure	 to	 enable	 profitable	 farming.	 This	 leads	 to	 the	 research	 sub-question	about	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 mobilisations	 that	 form	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	 the	
phenomenon	of	farmer	suicides	in	Western	Vidarbha.		
A	Heterogeneous	Movement	around	Crisis	I	observed	 five	very	heterogeneous	groups,	 four	of	which	–	despite	 their	differences	–	perceived	 themselves	 and	 each	 other	 as	 parts	 of	 a	 broader	 movement	 in	 Vidarbha	around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 (see	 chapter	 III).	 One	 such	 group	 is	 Svabhimani	 Shetkari	
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Sanghatana	 (SSS),	within	Vidarbha	mostly	active	 in	Buldhana	district.	They	developed	as	a	faction	of	the	earlier	New	Farmers’	Movement	Shetkari	Sanghatana.	Now,	they	work	all	over	Maharashtra	with	a	strong	presence	in	Western	Maharashtra.	The	group	focuses	heavily	on	the	issues	of	the	price	of	agricultural	produce	and	it	organizes	large	political	agitations.	 A	 second	 group	 is	 Kisan	 Adikar	 Abiyan	 (KAA),	 founded	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	active	 in	 the	 Wardha	 district.	 Its	 activists	 believe	 in	 targeted	 political	 actions	 and	organize	 ‘constructive’	 activities	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 support	 to	 the	 farmers.	 A	 third	group	 is	 Vidarbha	Jan	Andolan	Samiti	 (VJAS),	 in	 which	 the	 leader	 plays	 a	 particularly	important	 role.	 It	 is	 active	 in	 the	Yavatmal	district.	Along	 its	direct	 support	 to	people,	farmer	 suicides	 are	 an	 important	 issue	 that	 they	 try	 to	publicise.	Then,	All	India	Kisan	
Sabha	 (AIKS)	 is	 the	 farmer	 wing	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 India	 (Marxist),	 within	Vidarbha	mostly	active	 in	 the	Wardha	district.	They	believe	 in	direct	action	and,	more	than	other	groups,	they	criticise	the	New	Economic	Policies	and	problematize	inequality	within	villages.	Finally,	Bharatiya	Kisan	Sangha	(BKS)	is	also	one	of	those	groups,	within	Vidarbha	mostly	active	in	the	Nagpur	district.	They	are	an	India-wide	organization	and	belong	to	the	sangh	parivar,	the	organisations	that	promote	the	Hindutva.	They	are	not	very	 active	 or	well	 networked	within	 this	 heterogeneous	movement	 in	 Vidarbha.	 The	other	movement	activists	often	considered	the	activists	of	BKS	too	communalist	to	work	with.		All	these	groups	conduct	a	range	of	activities.	This	includes	political	agitations	as	well	as	backing	 their	 supporters	 in	 their	 interactions	 with	 the	 state	 or	 market	 actors	 (see	section	3,	chapter	IV;	and	section	2,	chapter	V).	With	the	exception	of	AIKS,	the	groups	do	 not	 have	 clear	memberships,	 organizational	 structures	 or	 defined	 roles	within	 the	groups.	Rather,	most	of	these	groups	have	a	leader,	some	activists	and	many	supporters	who	are	more	or	less	closely	attached	and	involved.	All	the	groups	are	small	in	Vidarbha,	even	if	SSS	and	AIKS	have	a	considerable	presence	elsewhere.	Their	 local	geographical	reach	is	very	limited	as	they	are	active	and	known	primarily	in	those	villages	where	an	activist	 is	 doing	 the	 mobilization	 work,	 whereas	 they	 might	 be	 unknown	 in	 a	neighbouring	 village.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 groups	 hardly	 stand	 in	 direct	 competition	 with	each	 other.	 Rather,	 the	 different	 groups	 try	 to	 network	 and	 cooperate	 horizontally	 to	increase	 their	 strength.	 But	 this	 cooperation	 is	 irregular,	 limited	 to	 individual	discussions	 or	 agitations.	 The	 leaders	 often	 deemed	 closer	 cooperation	 as	 impossible.	They	emphasized	the	differences	in	their	political	ideologies	and	mistrusted	the	others’	honest	intentions.	The	reason	that	cooperation	still	happens	despite	these	differences	is	often	only	because	they	believe	that	there	are	no	other	cooperation	partners	–	“no	other	
sane	people	around”,	in	an	activist’s	own	words.	There	are	several	other	actors	that	I	consider	part	of	the	broader	movement,	based	on	the	people’s	perceptions:	 the	 farmer	wings	of	 the	main	party	 coalitions	 in	 the	 state	of	Maharashtra,	i.e.	the	Congress-NCP	and	the	BJP-Sena.	While	the	former	was	not	so	active	at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 study,	 some	 BJP	 leaders	 were	 perceived	 as	 being	 part	 of	 the	movement.	 But	much	more	 important	were	 old	 activists	 from	Shetkari	Sanghatana	 as	well	as	certain	journalists	who	worked	in	solidarity	with	the	groups.	
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In	 defining	 what	 I	 call	 the	 heterogeneous	 movement,	 I	 strongly	 refer	 to	 the	 emic	understandings	 of	 the	 actors	 involved.	Within	 this	 emic	 understanding,	 however,	 the	movements’	perceived	borders	are	far	from	clearly	defined.	First,	 it	is	important	to	the	actors	 in	 the	different	groups	 that	NGOs	do	not	belong	 to	 the	movement.	They	argued	that	the	NGOs	active	in	the	area	–	in	contrary	to	the	movement	groups	–	would	not	have	explicitly	 political,	 rights-based	 demands.	 Rather,	 their	 activities	 were	 confined	 to	charitable	 support	 for	 the	 people.	 Second,	 it	was	 crucial	 for	 the	 groups	 to	 distinguish	themselves	 from	 political	 parties	 that	 take	 part	 in	 electoral	 politics.	 This	 boundary,	though,	 is	 even	more	difficult	 to	maintain	 than	 the	distinction	 from	NGOs.	The	groups	VJAS	and	KAA	did	have	connections	 to	political	parties,	but	were	not	directly	active	 in	electoral	politics.	SSS	and	AIKS,	on	contrary,	did	directly	take	part	in	electoral	politics.	I	discuss	 below	 how	 activists	were	well	 aware	 of	 these	 ambivalent	 relationships	when	trying	to	distinguish	between	the	spheres	of	‘movements’	and	‘politics’.		
Movement	Surviving	The	 structures	 I	 found	 in	 Vidarbha	 of	 many	 small	 groups	 building	 a	 heterogeneous	‘movement'	 closely	 relates	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘micro-movements’	 (Sheth	 2004).	 The	groups	are	neither	NGOs	nor	political	parties	and	 this	 concept	helps	 in	understanding	them	with	respect	to	their	role	in	Vidarbha.	The	groups	do	profess	a	politics	and	vision	of	their	own	by	associating	and	dissociating	themselves	from	certain	ideological	strands.	In	their	everyday	activities	they	might	speak	of	immediate	demands	and	cooperate	with	other	actors	with	similar	demands.	But	 the	groups’	demands	and	 ideas	are	not	merely	local.	By	 talking	about	 the	 ‘agrarian	crisis’	 and	 the	 situation	of	 farmers	 in	a	neoliberal	environment,	 they	also	relate	 to	 the	broad	debates	among	global	 (farmer)	movements	(see	chapter	I	and	VI).	I	 conceptualize	 these	 mobilizations	 or	 these	 different	 micro-movements	 as	heterogeneous	movement,	though	still	as	one	‘social	movement’	(following	Bebbington	2009,	 see	chapter	 IV).	This	 conceptualization	helps	understanding	 these	groups	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’,	 of	 the	 global	 rural	 neoliberal	 restructuring	 as	 well	 as	reflects	the	emic	understanding	of	activists	and	farmers	involved.	Combining	this	with	a	qualitative	 methodology	 reveals	 the	 strategies	 of	 and	 cooperation	 that	 the	 activists	apply.	Particularly,	it	revealed	the	activists’	attempts	to	increase	the	political	awareness	of	farmers	in	a	phase	of	low	levels	of	movement	activities.	Certainly,	the	earlier	peasant	movements	of	the	1960s	and	1980s	were	more	powerful	in	 voicing	 their	 issues	 on	 a	 political	 level.	 This	 said,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 retrospectively	compare	 the	 present	 structure	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 movement	 to	 the	 moments	 of	purportedly	 high	 level	 of	 movement	 activities	 in	 the	 1960s	 or	 1980s.	 One	 could	 also	argue	 that	 on	 a	 very	 local	 level,	 the	 earlier	movements	were	 (only)	 effective	 in	 those	villages	where	 they	 had	 strong	 activists	 –	which	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 today’s	movement	reality.	But	today	and	at	the	state	and	national	level,	the	old	peasant	movements	and	the	New	 Farmers’	 Movements	 have	 surely	 lost	 their	 strength	 (see	 section	 2,	 chapter	 IV).	Interestingly,	Shetkari	Sanghatana	is	still	much	better	known	among	farmers	than	any	of	the	other,	recent	groups.		
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A	 second	 point	 around	 which	 the	 earlier	 peasant	 movements	 might	 be	 compared	 to	today's	 movements	 is	 the	 question	 of	 representation.	 Having	 one	 large	 movement	(earlier)	 can	 mean	 to	 create	 one	 (strong)	 voice	 of	 ‘the	 farmers’.	 Considering	 the	ambivalence	 of	 this	 discourse	 and	 of	 the	 price	 demand	 (see	 section	 3.2,	 part	 VI),	 this	bears,	however,	a	risk:	It	can	result	in	giving	priority	to	the	issues	of	those	farmers	with	larger	landholdings	and	of	dominant	castes	while	neglecting	those	of	small	and	marginal	farmers	and	lower	castes.	In	contrast,	today’s	multitude	of	groups	(i.e.	the	structure	of	a	heterogeneous	movement)	can	possibly	open	up	an	opportunity	to	give	voice	to	a	larger	range	 of	 issues	 that	 different	 types	 of	 farmers	 face	 and	 to	 give	 opportunities	 to	more	marginalized	groups’	demands.	This,	 though,	 is	a	 theoretical	option,	and	it	 is	crucial	 to	look	 closely	 at	 the	 actual	 reality,	 i.e.	 	 to	 see	 whose	 voices	 the	 contemporary	 micro-movements	really	represent.	This	is	addressed	in	the	next	section.	
A	Movement	for	Whom	The	groups	and	movement	actors	I	met	claimed	to	speak	for	the	kisans,	 the	farmers	of	Vidarbha.	 Indeed,	 the	 main	 constituency	 of	 each	 of	 the	 active	 groups	 is	 small	 and	medium	 farmers	 (see	 chapter	 III;	 section	 3,	 chapter	 I).	 When	 looking	 closer	 at	 the	groups’	constituencies	though,	it	becomes	evident	that	it	is	mostly	male,	landed	farmers	often	of	dominant	castes.	But	even	if	they	are	surely	not	the	most	oppressed	of	the	rural	society,	 they	 are	 still	 those	 affected	 by	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’,	 those	 whose	 hopes	 and	aspirations	 have	 been	 raised	 by	 the	 neoliberal	New	Economic	 Policies,	 those	who	 are	now	bitterly	disappointed	by	these	policies.	This	makes	it	no	less	important	to	look	at	the	sections	of	rural	people	and	the	injustices	that	the	movement	groups	do	not	include.	First,	the	people	who	own	no	land	at	all	and	work	as	agricultural	labourers	face	extreme	oppression	and	poverty.	It	is	clear	that	the	contemporary	 heterogeneous	movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 has	 little	 to	 offer	the	 agricultural	 labourers.	 Most	 movement	 actors	 (with	 notable	 exceptions)	 believed	that	 the	 struggle	 for	 higher	 prices	 would	 automatically	 increase	 the	 wages	 of	 the	labourers.	Some	even	saw	the	labourers	as	part	of	the	farmers’	problem.	However,	many	of	 the	 supporters	were	working	 not	 only	 on	 their	 own	 land,	 but	 also	 as	 labourers	 on	other	people’s	land.	This	indicates	that	the	distinction	between	farmers	and	agricultural	labourers	is	highly	complex	and	overlapping.	Interestingly,	thus,	when	they	understood	themselves	as	actors	of	a	movement	groups,	they	refered	only	to	their	identity	as	landed	farmers.		Second,	caste	oppression	was	hardly	ever	a	topic	among	the	groups	and	inequality	was	never	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 caste.	 The	 castes	 represented	 in	 the	 groups	 are	mostly	 the	ones	that	dominate	the	rural	landscape	in	Vidarbha.	But	there	are	also	many	ST	and	SC	among	the	constituency	of	some	groups.	Nevertheless,	I	did	not	find	a	reflection	of	their	caste	 basis	 or	 other	 related	 caste	 issues	 in	 any	 of	 the	 groups.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising.	Historically,	farmer	discourse	and	politics	have	rarely	been	about	caste	oppression	but	rather	tried	to	envision	a	homogenous	class	of	peasantry.		
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Last	but	not	least,	this	heterogeneous	movement	around	agrarian	crisis	and	suicides	is	dominated	 by	 men.	 There	 are	 no	 female	 leaders	 or	 activists	 and	 very	 few	 female	supporters	were	interested	in	talking	to	me	about	 ‘politics’.	The	existing	women’s	self-help	groups	do	not	see	 themselves	as	part	of	any	kind	of	movement	and	are	distinctly	different	 in	 their	 activities.	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 surprising	 that	 women’s	 issues	 are	remarkably	absent	in	the	discourses	of	the	groups.	The	only	exception	is	the	demand	for	an	abolition	of	the	exorbitantly	high	dowry	that	concerns	not	only	the	women,	but	also	affects	the	whole	families.	
Grievances	Fuelling	Protest?	To	conclude	then,	there	exists	a	movement,	but	considering	the	scope	and	severity	of	the	agrarian	crisis,	it	is	smaller	than	it	could	expected	to	be.	To	understand	this	issue,	I	rely	on	 approaches	 that	 are	 brought	 forward	 by	 Buechler	 (2011,	 2016)	 and	 Bebbington	(2009).	They	understand	certain	kinds	of	grievances	and	senses	of	injustice	to	be	likely	to	spark	mobilisations	and	unrest	(see	section	1.2,	chapter	I).	I	argue	that	the	situation	of	an	‘agrarian	crisis’	in	Vidarbha	is	such,	that	one	would	expect	larger	mobilisations,	a	big	emerging	social	movement.	There	are	essentially	five	points	to	consider.	To	 start	 with,	 many	 farmers	 do	 experience	 daily	 disruptions	 in	 their	 lives.	 These	disruptions	arrive	 in	the	form	of	 liberalisation	of	markets,	 the	consequent	upsetting	of	prices	or	the	state’s	withdrawal	from	the	banking	sector	that	leaves	farmers	vulnerable	to	moneylender	humiliations	and	pressures.	Last	but	not	least	the	climatic	changes	and	unreliable	rains	pose	a	disruption	that	is	only	likely	to	grow.	Second,	there	is	a	feeling	of	relative	deprivation	among	farmers.	They	compare	their	situation	to	other	parts	of	the	state,	to	urban	areas	in	general	or	to	big	landholders.	Third,	but	less	pronounced,	is	the	perception	that	the	grievances	increase	in	time.	The	perception	that	things	were	better	earlier	 referred	 to	 times	when	 cotton	was	 ‘white	 gold’	 and	 the	 state	provided	 credits.	Fourth,	 the	processes	 for	distributing	wealth	are	perceived	as	being	extremely	unjust.	The	processes	mentioned	are	the	state	of	Maharashtra’s	policies	as	well	as	the	prices.	As	a	fifth	point,	I	found	that	many	activists	in	Vidarbha	attempted	to	heighten	a	perception	of	 injustice	 by	 framing	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 a	 certain	way.	 They	 aimed	 to	make	 the	farmers	 aware	 that	 they	 are	not	 responsible	 for	 their	difficult	 situation	but	 that	 there	are	structural	reasons	for	their	personal	failures.		Taking	these	specific	(perception	of)	grievances	and	disruptions	into	consideration,	one	could	 expect	 a	 large	movement	 to	 emerge.	 Yet,	 the	movement	 in	Vidarbha	 is	 far	 from	being	 big.	 This	 shows	 that	 there	 are	 other	 factors	 that	 determine	 the	 emergence	 of	mobilisations.	For	the	case	of	Vidarbha	I	argue	that	one	of	 these	factors	 is	 the	focus	of	movement	actors	on	only	one	issue,	i.e.	price.	With	this,	many	layers	of	inequalities	and	injustices	 relevant	 to	 diverse	 sections	 of	 the	 rural	 population	 are	 not	 addressed.	Therefore,	the	movement	groups	fail	to	provide	a	platform	to	jointly	fight	these	diverse	exploitations.	
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3 Strategies	of	Mobilisation:	Trustworthiness	A	 crucial	 factor	 for	 the	 potential	 success	 of	 the	 groups’	mobilisations	 is	 the	perceived	trustworthiness	 of	 leaders	 and	 activists.	 This	 factor	 became	 empirically	 very	 evident	when	 studying	 one	 research	 sub-question:	 the	 different	 motivations	 for	 people’s	
participation	 and	 the	 mobilization	 strategies	 the	 different	 movement	 actors	 use,	
specifically	if	and	why	participation	in	electoral	politics	is	a	part	of	these	strategies.		Lack	 of	 resources,	 particularly	 time,	 was	 often	 given	 as	 the	 main	 reasons	 for	 not	participating.	 But	 I	 found	 that	 the	most	 important	 reason	 for	 people	 to	 dedicate	 their	scarce	 resources	 to	 a	 group	 was	 the	 perceived	 trustworthiness	 of	 the	 leaders	 and	activists.	A	perception	of	doubt	in	their	trustworthiness	was	the	most	important	reason	for	not	participating.	As	a	result,	proving	trustworthiness	became	the	crucial	mobilizing	strategy.	First	and	foremost,	it	was	the	leaders	and	the	activists	working	in	the	villages,	who	 built	 this	 trustworthiness	 day-to-day.	 Their	 activities	 and	 strategies	 provide	 an	empirical	 example	 of	what	Gorringe	 (2010)	 called	 the	 painstaking	work	 of	mobilizing	people.	
Able	Fixers	with	Honest	Intentions	–	Between	Politics	and	Movements	I	argue	that	the	endeavour	to	establish	and	maintain	this	trustworthiness	is	marked	by	a	contradiction.	 This	 contradiction	 can	 also	 be	 found	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Alm	 (2010)	 and	Nielsen	 (2012),	 to	which	 this	 study	provides	more	 empirical	 evidence	 and	detail.	 The	contradiction	emerges	on	 two	 levels	 that	 I	 detail	 below.	Activists	 and	 leaders,	 though,	are	 aware	 of	 these	 contradictions.	 They	 have	 different	 discursive	 and	 practical	strategies	 to	 deal	with	 them	and	 to	 become	 successful	 and	 trustworthy	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	their	(possible)	supporters	(see	chapter	V).	The	first	level	on	which	this	contradiction	appears	is	the	level	of	the	individual	leaders	and	particularly	activists	in	the	villages.	On	the	one	hand,	activists	and	leaders	need	to	be	 good	 ‘fixers’	 (Jeffrey	 2009).	 The	 fixing	 qualities	 on	 this	 level	 refer	 to	 the	 ability	 of	activists	 and	 leaders	 to	 achieve	 things	 and	 support	 farmers	 in	 their	 every-day	 life.	Empirically,	this	meant	to	support	farmers	in	their	interactions	with	the	government	in	order	to	get	benefits	from	or	protection	against	the	state.	It	also	meant	to	strengthen	the	position	of	farmers	in	interactions	in	the	marketplace,	especially	with	traders.	Last	but	not	least,	it	was	about	immediate	–	often	financial	–	help.	To	be	able	to	perform	all	these	activities,	 it	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 activists	 to	 have	 good	 relations	 with	 powerful	 and	influential	 people.	 And	 these	 people	 were	 often	 politicians.	 Now,	 these	 powerful	politicians	 are	 perceived	 highly	 corrupt.	 This	 can	 create	 problems.	 Maintaining	 the	image	 of	 honesty	 and	 morally	 flawless	 intentions	 is	 equally	 important	 to	 proving	trustworthiness.	This	means	that	when	the	cooperation	and	ties	of	movement	activists	with	those	(corrupt)	politicians	become	too	close,	this	puts	their	reputation	of	honesty	at	stake.	The	same	happened	when	an	activist	or	a	leader	became	too	powerful	himself.	To	 counter	 this	 reputational	 damage,	 the	 leaders	 and	 activists	 keep	 emphasizing	 that	they	are	involved	in	the	movement	for	selfless,	honest	reasons.		
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The	 second	 level	 refers	 to	 people’s	 relation	 to	 electoral	 politics	 and	 therefore	 the	groups’	 and	 leaders’	 participation	 in	 the	 latter.	 Many	 people	 –	 leaders,	 activists	 and	supporters	 –	 were	 disillusioned	 about	 electoral	 politics.	 Often,	 electoral	 politics	 is	perceived	 as	 the	 dirty	 playground	 of	 the	 powerful.	 Therefore,	 the	 image	 of	 honesty	corresponds	closely	with	whether	the	farmers	saw	the	leaders	as	a	‘movement	leader’	or	as	 a	 ‘political	 leader’.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 though,	 people	 hold	 on	 to	 their	 belief	 in	democracy	 as	 the	 place	 to	 change	 things.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 ‘political	 leaders’	 are	those	 perceived	 to	 be	 able	 to	 bring	 change	 –	 and	 not	 the	 (presumably)	 honest	‘movement	leaders’.		This	 balancing	 act	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 very	 different	 relations	 (but	 surprisingly	 similar	justifications)	 of	 the	 groups	 towards	 participation	 or	 non-participation	 in	 electoral	politics.	 It	 is	 SSS	 where	 this	 contradiction	 becomes	 most	 clear:	 the	 group	 has	 a	movement	 part	 (sangathana)	 and	 a	 party	 part	 (paksha).	 Even	 though	 the	 involved	people	and	the	demands	are	the	same,	activists	and	leaders	understood	this	distinction	as	 crucial,	 presenting	 the	sanghatana	as	 responsible	 for	 the	 agitations	 and	 the	paksha	for	the	elections.		In	general,	the	activists	and	leaders	of	all	groups	put	a	considerable	rhetorical	effort	in	distancing	 themselves	 from	 ‘politics’.	 This	 despite	 of	 the	 political	 nature	 of	 their	demands	 and	 regardless	 of	 their	 actual	 involvement	 in	 electoral	 politics.	 I	 argue	 that	upholding	 this	 distinction	 is	 a	 strategy	 to	 achieve	 or	maintain	 an	 image	 of	 an	 honest	‘movement	 (leader)’.	 The	 leaders,	 activists	 and	 supporters	 were	 aware	 of	 the	contradictions	 that	 these	 dual	 expectations	 invoke.	 I	 could	 show	 that	 in	 constant	interaction	with	supporters,	 leaders	and	activists	tried	to	redefine	their	place	between	being	 a	 ‘political	 leader’	 and	 being	 a	 ‘movement	 leader’.	 When	 reflecting	 on	 what	‘politics’	 actually	means	 in	 a	 democracy,	 they	 even	 try	 to	 challenge	 the	 power	 of	 this	distinction	and	the	pejorative	notion	of	‘being	political’.	Instead,	the	distinction	between	established	 parties	 in	 power	 and	 the	many	 groups	 and	 parties	 that	 are	 not	 becomes	much	 more	 important.	 In	 Vidarbha,	 the	 movement	 groups	 in	 this	 thesis	 very	 clearly	belong	to	the	latter.	Therefore,	they	could	not	outrival	the	fixing	qualities	of	established	parties.	Consequently,	 the	groups’	reputation	of	honesty	became	their	main	mobilizing	argument.		This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 fixing	 qualities	would	 be	 less	 important	 to	 understand	 the	movement.	I	would	even	argue	that	they	bring	the	groups’	most	important	impact	on	the	farmers’	 lives.	These	small	supports	and	achieved	successes	in	everyday	situations	can	mean	a	lot	to	marginal,	small,	medium	farmers	suffering	from	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	They	remain	important,	also	when	there	was	no	one	leader	capable	of	gathering	the	different	groups	and	farmers	behind	him	and	achieve	bigger	successes.		
Powerless	but	Honest	–	Opening	up	Spaces	I	argue	that	 these	groups	can	open	a	space	 for	 farmers	to	discuss	and	agitate	 for	 their	demands.	 They	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 engage	 people	 who	 are	 disillusioned	 by	representational,	electoral	politics.	They	can	reach	those	farmers,	who	elect	a	party	for	
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various	 reasons	 such	 as	 patronage,	 but	 who	 do	 not	 see	 their	 demands	 represented	there.	This	study	then	provides	an	empirical	case	for	an	argument	brought	forward	by	Sahoo	 (2010).	He	 argued	 that	micro-movement	 groups	 have	 the	 potential	 to	mobilize	people	outside	the	arena	of	electoral	politics.	With	this,	they	create	other	opportunities	to	people	to	fight	for	their	demands.		However,	 the	 above	 contradictions	 clearly	 show	 the	 limitations	 of	 this	 increased	involvement.	 The	 dual,	 contradicting	 expectations	 of	 supporters	 of	 these	 movement	groups	tells	us	several	things	about	the	consciousness	of	these	movement	groups.	In	the	distinction	often	made	between	civil	society	and	political	society	(referring	to	Chatterjee	2004),	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 ordinary	 supporters	 act	 as	 members	 of	 political	 society	locally	 but	 affirm	 their	 faith	 in	 the	 process	 of	 bourgeois	 civil	 society	 for	 tackling	mysterious	market	forces.	This	can	be	interpreted	as	posing	a	limit	to	these	movement	groups’	capacity	to	form	mass	alliances	as	a	counter	hegemonic	force	against	the	politics	of	neoliberalism.		
4 Farmer	Suicides	as	Part	of	the	Movement	Movement	 actors	 engage	with	 ‘farmer	 suicides’	 in	many	ways.	 These	ways	 show	how	important	 it	 is	 for	 the	movement	 actors	 to	make	 farmers	 aware	 about	 the	 structural	reasons	 for	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’.	 Vidarbha	 is	 infamous	 for	 being	 a	 farmer	 suicide	‘hotspot’.	The	suicides	are	as	omnipresent	 in	 the	movement	actors’	discourses	as	 they	are	important	in	the	public	discourse	of	farmer	movements	beyond	Vidarbha	and	even	India,	the	media,	and	academic	debates.	This	refers	to	the	research	sub-question	about	
how	movement	actors	frame	these	‘farmer	suicides’	and	how	they	engage	with	them	 (see	chapter	VII).		Farmer	 suicides	means	 a	 statistically	 higher	 likelihood	 for	 farmers	 to	 commit	 suicide	than	for	other	professional	groups.	 It	 is	contested	 if	 this	higher	 likelihood	does	 indeed	exist.	The	farmers	who	do	commit	suicide	are	not	those	who	suffer	most	from	the	layers	of	inequality	in	the	‘agrarian	crisis’,	not	the	poorest	or	most	socially	oppressed.	Rather,	it	is	those	who	face	high	and	unpredictable	risks.	It	is	those	that	are	confronted	with	the	promises	that	come	with	the	neoliberal	policies,	the	promise	that	anyone	can	make	it	if	they	just	try.	 ‘Hotspots’	 for	 ‘farmer	suicides’	are	therefore	mostly	semi-arid	zones	with	capital-intensive,	 groundwater-based	 commercial	 agriculture.	 Vidarbha	 is	 a	 case	 in	point.	Here	too,	though,	 ‘old’	structural	factors	that	predate	the	New	Economic	Policies	come	into	play	and	combine	with	the	effects	of	these	policies.	
Public	deaths	I	show	in	this	 thesis	(see	section	2,	chapter	VII)	 that	 there	 is	one	major	reason	for	the	farmer	suicides	having	become	part	of	political	farmer	protest:	the	specific	way	political	activists	and	 journalists,	 as	well	 as	 in	academics	explain	 these	suicides.	 I	 refer	here	 to	those	 activists	 and	 authors	 who	 work	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 phenomenon	 of	‘farmer	 suicides’	 statistically	 exists.	 They	 overwhelmingly	 blame	 the	 New	 Economic	Policies	of	the	1990s.	Looking	closely,	there	are	two	major	lines	of	argument	to	explain	
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how	 these	 policies	 have	 caused	 farmers	 to	 commit	 suicide.	 One	 line	 emphasizes	 the	directly	 economic	 consequences,	 while	 the	 other	 line	 analyses	 more	 the	 sociological	consequences	 of	 the	neoliberal	 policies.	 Even	 if	 these	 two	 lines	 at	 times	 criticize	 each	other,	they	still	both	accuse	neoliberalism	as	the	major	cause.		Blaming	 the	neoliberal	policies	of	 the	early	1990s	means	–	 implicitly	or	explicitly	–	 to	blame	the	government	 that	 issued	 them.	 It	means	 to	put	a	direct	 responsibility	on	 the	government	 for	 indebtedness,	 desperation	 and	 finally	 the	 deaths	 of	 these	 farmers.	Because	of	the	explosiveness	of	the	accusation,	the	‘farmer	suicides’	figure	prominently	in	political	rhetoric.	This	 is	particularly	 true	 for	movement	activists,	but	also	 for	other	politicians.	Based	 on	 this	 analysis,	 this	 research	 strongly	 argues	 that	 the	 farmer	 suicides	 have	become	 ‘public	 deaths’,	 using	 a	 term	 coined	 by	 Münster	 (2015a).	 The	 suicides	themselves	are	not	protest	suicides	because	those	who	commit	suicide	act	mostly	out	of	personal	despair.	But	the	discourses	of	media	and	academia,	of	local	and	global	farmer	movements	 make	 them	 ‘public’	 and	 inherently	 political.	 Additionally,	 it	 is	 the	 state’s	own	 categories	 and	 practices	 that	 constantly	 reify	 and	 politicise	 the	 phenomenon	 of	‘farmer	suicides’.	It	can	be	criticized	that	making	such	arguments	neglect	the	agency	of	farmers.	But	by	 looking	 at	how	 the	 farmer	movement	 actors	 reclaim	 this	discourse	 in	their	activism,	their	agency	becomes	clear	again.		
Suicides	in	Movements	against	Neoliberalism	The	 actors	 of	 the	 movement	 in	 Vidarbha	 engage	 with	 the	 farmer	 suicides	 on	 many	levels.	By	doing	this	they	make	the	suicides	part	of	the	movement	around	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	 The	 heterogeneous	 movement's	 practices	 to	 engage	 with	 suicides	 are	 both	 a	reason	for	and	a	consequence	of	the	suicides	having	become	‘public	deaths’.	On	one	level	movement	 activists	 support	 the	 bereaved.	 For	 example,	 they	 help	 them	 to	 obtain	compensation	 payments	 from	 the	 government.	 Another	 level	 is	 ‘moral	 support’,	 as	movement	actors	call	it.	It	is	when	activists	assure	farmers	that	the	government	is	in	fact	responsible	for	their	miserable	conditions,	and	not	they	themselves.	With	this,	activists	aim	to	counter	the	neoliberal	discourse.	This	discourse	says	that	farmers	only	have	to	be	sufficiently	 entrepreneurial	 in	 order	 to	 be	 successful,	 and	 that	 any	 lack	 of	 success	 is	therefore	 a	 personal	 failure	 (see	 section	 2,	 chapter	 VII).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 activists	encourage	 farmers	 to	 take	 their	 despair	 to	 the	 streets	 rather	 than	 kill	 themselves.	 A	third	 level	of	movement	engagement	 is	 that	 the	movement	actors	 in	Vidarbha	actively	use	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 suicides	 to	 emphasize	 the	 suffering	 of	 farmers.	 They	 nearly	unanimously	 agree	 with	 the	 academic	 and	 public	 discourses	 around	 the	 ‘farmer	suicides’	and	talk	about	them	to	prove	how	the	government	neglects	them.		Movement	 actors	 increasingly	understand	 the	widespread	 suicides	 as	 a	direct,	 though	very	 different,	 successor	 of	 earlier	 forms	 of	movements.	 Some	 even	 see	 it	 as	 a	 ‘silent’	movement	 in	 itself.	 I	 argue	 that	 if	 not	 the	 suicides	 themselves,	 then	 the	 rhetoric	surrounding	 them	 and	 the	 various	 levels	 of	 engagement	 with	 them	 have	 become	 an	important	 part	 of	 the	 activism	 in	 Vidarbha.	 For	 farmers,	 activists	 and	 leaders	 on	 the	
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ground,	as	well	as	 for	 journalists	and	researchers,	 the	phenomenon	of	 farmer	suicides	serves	as	a	prominent	and	emotional	issue	that	can	help	movement	actors	to	politicise	neoliberal	economic	policies,	the	mysterious	forces	of	the	market.	It	opens	up	a	space	to	talk	about	the	implications	of	capitalist	agriculture	and	especially	neoliberal	policies	for	farmers,	to	discuss	the	darker	sides	of	the	dominant	development	narrative.	The	radical	act	of	farmers	taking	their	own	lives	makes	their	suffering	tangible.	The	suicides	or	the	rhetoric	around	them	can	therefore	be	understood	as	part	of	the	movement	in	Vidarbha.	It	is	a	movement	though,	which	is	–	as	I	argued	repeatedly	–	characterized	by	a	certain	powerlessness	 and	 inability	 to	 capture	 the	 new	 realities	 of	 farmers	 who	 are	 caught	between	neoliberal	policies	and	old	structures.		
5 Ideas	about	the	Future	of	Agriculture	The	‘agrarian	crisis’	is	an	Indian	phenomenon,	but	neoliberal	policies	affect	rural	areas	and	 agricultural	 production	 in	 large	 regions	 of	 the	 globe.	 In	 this	 context,	 local	 and	transnational	 movements	 have	 emerged	 to	 add	 new	 ideas	 about	 the	 future	 of	agriculture.	This	brings	me	to	the	last	research	sub-question,	namely	to	understand	what	
frames	 the	 involved	actors	 use	 to	 construct	 long–term	visions	 for	 agriculture,	 how	 these	
ideas	differ	between	actors	and	how	they	relate	to	other	ideas	(see	chapter	VI).		When	analysing	the	ideas	and	demands	of	farmers	and	movement	leaders	in	Vidarbha,	I	found	that	they	can	be	grouped,	to	some	extent,	into	four	different	frames.	These	frames	group	the	actors’	ideas	and	demands	about	understanding	the	present	situation	as	well	as	 about	 envisioning	 alternatives.	 The	 distinction	 of	 these	 four	 frames	 allowed	 to	analyse	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	 groups	 as	well	 as	 the	 tensions	 immanent	 in	 all	 the	groups’	main	demand	for	a	better	price	for	agricultural	produce.	The	 ‘protection’	frame	represents	the	 idea	that	the	farmers	should	receive	support	and	care	from	the	government.	It	is	the	most	prevalent	and	most	important	frame	for	actors	from	all	groups,	for	activists,	leaders	as	well	as	supporters.	These	ideas	are	most	central	for	AIKS,	whose	supporters	demand	a	 strong	state.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 ‘free	market’	frame	sees	 the	 free	 market	 as	 the	 solution.	 It	 corresponds	 to	 a	 vision	 for	 the	 future	 of	agriculture	based	on	neoliberal	capitalism.	While	this	vision	is	dominant	among	policy-making	bodies,	 it	 finds	hardly	any	resonance	among	movement	supporters.	Only	a	few	activists	and	leaders	of	SSS	occasionally	argue	within	this	frame,	though	inconsistently.		The	‘self-help’	frame	instead	concentrates	on	solutions	for	farmers	to	become	more	self-reliable.	 Self-help	 becomes	 important	 because	 neither	 the	 market	 nor	 the	 state	 is	perceived	 to	 be	 able	 or	 willing	 to	 provide	 support	 in	 the	 short-term.	 This	 frame	 is	especially	important	for	KAA	and	their	focus	on	low	input	agriculture.	Interestingly,	they	frame	this	kind	of	low	input	–	or	organic	–	agriculture	not	as	an	ecological	alternative	in	the	 first	 place,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 solution	 for	 farmers	 not	 to	 depend	 on	 input	 markets.	Finally,	 the	 ‘alternatives’	 frame	 contains	 new	 ideas	 and	 solutions	 that	 question	 the	contemporary	 capitalist	 system	 of	 agriculture.	 This	 frame	 is	 important	 mostly	 for	
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activists	and	leaders	from	VJAS,	KAA,	the	journalists	and	single	activists,	who	all	propose	alternatives	that	can	be	very	different	from	each	other.		
Tensions	in	the	Price	Demand		The	groups’	main	demand	is	for	a	remunerative	price	for	agricultural	produce.	For	the	movement	actors	–	particularly	the	supporters	–	this	is	the	main	demand	that	unites	all	the	 different	 groups.	 They	 often	 argue	 that	 the	 demand	 for	 a	 remunerative	 price	remained	the	same	since	the	1970s.	But	in	fact	while	the	demand	has	stayed	the	same,	the	 frame	 in	 which	 this	 demand	 is	 raised	 changed.	 The	 earlier	 New	 Farmers’	Movements,	 namely	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana,	 argued	 within	 the	 ‘free-market’	 frame.	 But	most	 of	 the	 contemporary	 groups	 that	 have	 the	 same	 demand,	 argue	 within	 the	‘protection’	 frame.	 They	 claim	 that	 the	 government	 is	 supposed	 to	 guarantee	 a	remunerative	price	and	protect	farmers	from	the	market.		The	movement	 actors	 put	 the	 demand	 towards	 the	 state	 for	 a	 remunerative	 price	 at	centre	stage.	With	this,	they	invoke	four	major	tensions,	which	mirror	the	contradictions	immanent	 in	 the	 ‘protection’	 frame.	 The	 first	 contradiction	 concerns	 the	 Minimum	Support	Prices	(MSPs).	The	MSP	is	supposed	to	guarantee	that	the	government	will	step	into	 the	breach,	 if	 the	market	price	 falls	below	a	 certain	 limit.	Many	movement	actors	imagine	that	this	price	must	make	agriculture	a	viable	activity	for	all	farmers.	This	then	means	 for	 them	that	 it	must	compensate	 farmers	differently	according	 to	 their	 region,	irrigation	facilities	or	land	holdings.	Movement	actors	thereby	question	the	mechanisms	of	price	determination	by	markets	radically,	arguably	more	radically	 than	they	realize.	The	second	tension	concerns	the	 fact	 that	higher	prices	 for	agricultural	products	are	a	double-edged	 sword	 for	 farmers.	 Because	 most	 of	 them	 –	 particularly	 the	 small	 and	marginal	 farmers	 –	 are	 net-food	 consumers,	 increasing	 food	 prices	 affect	 them	adversely.	The	third	tension	is	that	guaranteed	prices	are	generally	demanded	only	for	agricultural	products,	but	not	for	agricultural	labour.	The	farmers	I	interviewed	have	a	fine	nose	for	power	inequalities	in	input	and	output	markets.	In	sharp	contrast,	most	of	them	ignore	those	power	inequalities	within	the	agricultural	labour	market,	where	they	suddenly	seem	to	trust	the	market	mechanisms.		A	fourth	contradiction	is	the	absence	of	the	land	question.	For	the	so-called	old	peasant	movements,	 land	reforms	were	 the	main	demand.	Land	reforms	have	been	an	 integral	part	 of	 the	 first	 set	 of	 policies	 after	 independence,	 but	 have	 never	 been	 implemented	(except	 in	 some	 regions).	 Therefore,	 rural	 inequality	 has	 persisted.	 Surprisingly	 then,	the	 possibility	 or	 even	 desirability	 of	 a	 land	 redistribution	 hardly	 reverberate	 in	contemporary	farmer	movement	groups.	Land	reforms	are	not	deemed	important	even	among	supporters	and	activists	of	the	All	India	Kisan	Sabha	 (the	CPI(M)	peasant	wing).	This	point	is	very	important	against	the	backdrop	of	the	rise	in	the	number	of	small	and	marginal	landholdings	and	their	unprofitability.		These	tensions	point	again	to	the	issue	of	who	is,	or	 is	perceived	to	be,	affected	by	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	These	last	three	tensions	show	the	striking	absence	of	the	issues	of	the	most	marginalized	rural	people,	namely	the	landless	or	people	of	low	caste.	But	the	first	
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tension	–	immanent	in	the	movement	actors’	own	definition	of	a	Minimum	Support	Price	–	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 question	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 united	 peasantry.	 Beyond	 that,	 this	definition	can	possibly	challenge	 ideas	of	a	neoliberal,	capitalist	agriculture	 in	general.	Clearly,	demanding	a	higher	MSP	without	fundamentally	changing	its	calculation	would	again	 increase	 inequality.	 A	 higher	 MSP	 would	 probably	 still	 not	 make	 farming	profitable	 for	marginal	 to	medium	 farmers,	while	 the	 large	 landholders	 could	 instead	earn	 large	profits.	Most	of	 the	groups’	constituencies	would	 therefore	be	on	the	 losing	end	 of	 such	 a	 proposition.	 Nevertheless,	movement	 actors	 demanded	 a	 differentiated	price	 that	 needed	 to	 make	 farming	 viable	 for	 all	 farmers.	 I	 showed	 that	 with	 this	demand,	movement	actors	 suggested	 to	 change	how	 the	price	mechanism	works.	This	would	necessitate	a	fundamental	rethinking	relations	of	production	and	consumption.		
Food	Sovereignty	and	the	‘Peasantry’	at	Risk	The	prominence	of	the	price	demand	risks	to	hide	away	the	many	ideas	that	movement	actors	bring	forward.	Many	of	those	ideas	closely	relate	to	concepts	of	food	sovereignty,	particularly	ideas	of	those	groups	that	rely	on	the	‘self-help’	frame.	They	try	to	improve	the	 situation	 through	 ‘constructive	 work’,	 by	 developing	 local	 initiatives	 and	 ideas	 to	improve	 the	 farmers’	 immediate	 problems.	 But	 interestingly,	 the	 interviewees	 hardly	ever	consider	ideas	within	the	‘self-help’	frame	as	long-term	solutions.	Instead	they	see	these	ideas	as	an	stopgap	in	the	absence	of	government	assistance.	In	their	minds,	long-term	 solutions	 only	 become	 thinkable	 once	 the	 state	 provides	 basic	 protection	 and	livelihood	 security.	 This	 points	 to	 one	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 food	 sovereignty	concept:	the	state’s	role	is	highly	unclear,	as	Bernstein	(2014)	argued.	In	the	‘alternative’	frame	as	well,	ideas	directly	relate	to	the	food	sovereignty	concept.	In	this	 frame,	 a	 heavy	 critique	 of	 neoliberal	 policies	 and	 (transnational)	 companies	 goes	together	with	localised	solutions	like	low	input	farming	or	locally	adapted	crops	as	well	as	visions	of	more	 fundamental	changes.	Consequently,	some	of	 the	 ‘alternative’	 frame	ideas	 also	 face	 the	 same	 criticism	 as	 the	 food	 sovereignty	 concept.	 This	 critique	culminates	 in	 the	question	of	how	to	envision	resistance	against	 the	neoliberal	system	without	 reifying	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 united	 ‘peasantry’	 and	 thereby	 neglecting	 structural	inequalities.			I	 could	 show	 that	 such	 multi-class	 struggles,	 which	 include	 large	 sections	 of	 the	‘peasantry’,	can	be	important	for	fighting	the	neoliberal	policies	that	farmers	face.	This	study	 therefore	 serves	 as	 an	 empirical	 example	 from	 India,	 supporting	 the	 argument	Petras	 and	 Veltmeyer	 (2011)	 have	 made	 for	 Latin	 America.	 The	 small	 and	 medium	farmers	of	Vidarbha	–	the	constituency	of	the	groups	–	are	not	at	all	on	the	winning	side	of	these	neoliberal	developments.	Therefore,	their	mobilizations	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a	multitude	of	 localized	struggles	and	micro-movements	across	 India.	They	are	different	in	their	location	and	their	demands,	but	their	constituencies	face	the	same	macro	reality	of	 being	 adversely	 affected	 by	 the	 capitalist	 system.	 Despite	 the	 inequalities	 and	differences	between	and	within	these	groups	and	struggles,	they	are	important	to	make	the	consequences	of	neoliberal	policies	visible	and	 to	 resist	 them.	 In	consequence,	 the	
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idea	 of	 a	 united	 peasantry	 that	 is	 rather	 strong	 in	 all	 movement	 groups,	 can	 be	supportive	for	their	struggle.		At	the	same	time,	I	have	repeatedly	argued	that	the	understanding	of	the	‘agrarian	crisis’	as	threatening	the	entire	peasantry	equally	is	misleading.	Such	a	mobilizing	ideology	of	a	united	peasantry	 risks	glossing	over	deep	class	and	 caste	divisions.	Rich	 farmers	with	surplus	 to	sell	need	such	an	 ideology	of	presenting	 the	entire	village	 ‘community’	as	a	victim	of	the	state.	Only	in	this	way	can	they	obtain	the	support	of	the	majority	of	poorer	farmers	 and	 landless	 workers	 to	 demand	 subsidies	 and	 higher	 prices	 instead	 of	 land	reforms,	for	example.	I	argued	in	this	thesis,	that	such	ideas	may	even	contribute	to	the	rise	 of	 communalist	 forces,	 particularly	 when	 they	 are	 based	 on	 a	 contemporized	agrarian	myth	and	make	references	to	‘traditional’	societies.		The	earlier	New	Farmers’	Movements	in	India	used	this	rhetoric	very	prominently.	It	is	often	 argued	 that	 by	 doing	 so,	 they	 in	 fact	 exacerbated	 the	 rise	 of	 Hindutva	 forces	 in	several	 states.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Maharashtra,	 however,	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 played	 a	different	 role.	 Shetkari	 Sanghatana	 is	 perceived	 as	 having	 taken	 up	 an	 aggressive	reformist	 approach	 and	 having	 been	 an	 active	 counterforce	 to	 reactionary	 Hindu	nationalism.	 In	 the	 contemporary	movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidarbha,	this	 looks	 very	 different	 for	 the	 different	 groups.	 BKS	 is	 very	 openly	 part	 of	 the	communalist	forces.	SSS	has	a	strong	rhetoric	of	the	united	peasantry.	VJAS	makes	many	references	 to	 the	 ‘traditional’	 society.	 I	 argue	 that	 for	 these	 two	groups,	 the	 argument	that	 they	 helped	 the	 rise	 of	 Hindutva	 is	 convincing.	 For	 KAA	 and	 AIKS,	 such	 an	accusation	would	be	highly	inaccurate.	They	understand	it	as	one	of	their	main	tasks	to	be	a	bulwark	against	these	very	forces.		To	 conclude,	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	 different	 rural	 classes	 are	 immanent	 in	 the	groups’	demands	 for	a	higher	price	 for	 the	agricultural	produce.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	higher	 price	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 state	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 major	 vision	 for	 the	 future	 of	farming.	 It	 is	 quite	 surprising	 to	 note	 that	 a	 number	 of	 movement	 actors	 had	internalised	the	neoclassical	view	of	agriculture	even	 if	 they	explicitly	demanded	state	intervention.	 Arguably,	 these	 tensions	 are	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 almost	 total	 absence	 of	systemic	alternatives	(with	notable	exceptions).	 It	underscores	the	need	for	new	ideas	and	 thorough	 analysis	 to	 resist	 neoliberal	 capitalism	 without	 falling	 back	 onto	 the	romanticized	notion	of	a	‘united	peasantry’.		
6 Negotiating	with	the	State	and	Thinking	Alternatives	For	 the	movement	 actors	 and	 farmers,	 the	 forces	 of	 the	market	 seem	mysterious	 yet	determining,	 and	 the	 forces	 of	 the	 state	 seem	 unreachable.	 This	 remains	 a	 major	obstacle	 in	the	struggles	of	the	movement	actors	 in	Vidarbha.	All	 the	more,	 the	groups	are	very	creative	in	finding	strategies	to	challenge	these	seemingly	unreachable	forces.	They	 are	 quite	 successful	 in	 elaborating	 solutions	 for	 their	 specific	 issues,	 i.e.	 the	 low	prices	for	their	products	or	the	high	costs	for	inputs.	Interestingly,	the	groups	chose	two	very	 different	 strategies,	 being	 aware	 of	 the	 innate	 difficulties	 in	 both	 of	 them.	 Some	
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movement	groups	chose	to	start	at	the	local	level	with	‘constructive’	work.	They	want	to	first	 strengthen	 grassroots	 resistance,	 and	 then	 grasp	 power	 to	 realize	 their	 own	alternatives.	 Other	 groups	 believe	 that	 such	 local	 initiatives	 are	merely	 an	 attempt	 to	bedazzle	 farmers.	Rather,	 the	policies	need	to	be	changed	first	 in	order	to	enable	 local	solutions.		This	 leads	to	the	question	of	 the	 impact	of	 those	movement	groups	on	different	 levels.	First	and	arguably	 foremost,	 the	movement	groups	and	activists	support	or	encourage	the	farmers	in	difficult	situations.	The	relief	is	temporary	and	the	successes	that	activists	and	 leaders	 together	with	 their	 supporters	are	able	 to	achieve	are	 small.	But	 they	are	meaningful	 for	 farmers	and	motivate	 them	to	struggle.	However,	 the	responses	by	 the	state	 failed	 to	 tackle	 the	 root	 causes.	 Many	 movement	 actors	 were	 aware	 of	 that.	Arguably,	 the	capitalist	project	 in	an	electoral	democracy	cannot	afford	 to	marginalize	the	 farmers	 completely.	 Therefore,	 the	 government	 tries	 to	 respond	 to	 some	 of	 the	farmers’	 claims.	This	 response	 though	 is	only	very	partial,	 in	order	 to	prevent	 a	more	radical	resistance	from	growing.	How	ridiculous	state	support	can	be,	becomes	evident	in	the	government’s	compensation	for	‘real’	farmer	suicides.	Against	this	backdrop,	it	is	rather	 surprising	 that	 both	 of	 the	 above	 strategies	 eventually	 target	 the	 state.	 Even	more,	it	is	striking	that	there	was	no	discussion	about	the	decision-making	process	and	the	distribution	of	resources	once	a	certain	power	towards	the	state	would	be	achieved	(see	section	3,	chapter	VI).	What	these	movement	groups	could	do,	though,	is	very	important	in	the	context	of	the	new	economic	policies	 in	 India.	These	small	movement	groups	are	unable	 to	avert	 the	implications	of	the	neoliberal	policies	per	se.	But	they	have	helped	to	create	awareness	on	the	ground	about	political	developments	and	to	politicize	the	farmers’	conditions.	By	engaging	 in	 the	 discourses	 around	 farmer	 suicides	 and	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’,	 they	 give	some	farmers	an	opportunity	to	reflect	on	the	structural	reasons	for	the	crisis	they	face,	and	 thus	 to	 question	 the	 dominant	 neoliberal	 paradigm	 of	 development.	 On	 the	 one	hand	 then,	 these	 many	 small	 groups	 all	 over	 India	 or	 even	 the	 world	 can	 be	 an	important	 part	 of	 challenging	 the	 current	 development	 paradigm.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	though,	they	fail	to	tackle	questions	of	state	power	and	to	fully	politicise	the	mysterious	forces	 of	 the	 market.	 This	 prevents	 them	 from	 forming	 alliances	 or	 platforms	 that	combine	a	broader	range	of	interests.	It	makes	it	difficult	to	bring	forward	visions	that	can	truly	challenge	the	core	workings	of	neoliberalism.	The	 transnational	 movements	 of	 farmers	 are	 arguably	 a	 chance	 to	 change	 that.	 But	similar	 to	 the	 heterogeneous	movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 in	 Vidharba,	 they	struggle	 to	 find	 an	 ideology	 that	 can	 lead	 the	 struggle	 of	 the	 ‘peasantry’	 while	 at	 the	same	 time	 acknowledging	 the	 very	different	material	 interests	 of	 the	different	 groups	within	 this	 category.	 This	 thesis	 shows	 that	 listening	 to	 the	 voices	 of	 those	 that	 are	adversely	affected	by	the	capitalist	system	is	indispensable	when	questioning	this	very	system	 and	 its	 development	 paradigm.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 I	 show	 the	 importance	 of	analysing	 the	 fine-grained	 structures	 of	 power	 and	 interests	 within	 the	 movement	
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groups	 that	make	 these	voices	heard,	and	 the	 importance	of	 looking	closely	 for	whom	they	are	speaking.		
7 Digging	Deeper	This	thesis	contributes	to	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	farmers’	agency	within	the	‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	of	 their	 frames	of	 reference	 for	 the	present	 and	 the	 future.	 It	 has	taken	 a	 perspective	 from	 within	 these	 movement	 groups,	 but	 it	 also	 points	 to	 those	inequalities	 within	 the	 villages	 that	 are	 not	 addressed	 by	 the	 movement	 groups.	 To	understand	 what	 such	 movement	 groups	 mean	 for	 the	 excluded	 (namely,	 women,	people	 belonging	 to	 ST	 or	 SC	 communities	 or	 agricultural	 labour)	 would	 provide	interesting	insights	into	their	impact	on	rural	society.		With	 respect	 to	 visions	 for	 a	 future	 of	 agriculture,	 it	 would	 help	 to	 understand	 the	impact	of	neoliberal	policies	on	 those	groups	who	do	not	 express	 themselves	 through	these	movement	groups	and	to	listen	to	their	ideas	for	the	future.	This	would	also	shed	light	 on	 how	 the	 ideas	 of	 these	 disadvantaged	 and	marginalized	 groups	 relate	 to	 the	notions	of	food	sovereignty	that	have	become	so	prominent.		Connected	to	this,	it	would	be	crucial	to	understand	how	concepts	like	food	sovereignty	develop	 and	 become	 widespread,	 and	 what	 the	 influence	 of	 such	 small	 movement	groups	 like	 those	 in	marginal	 areas	 of	 India	 can	have	 on	 this	 process.	 In	 particular,	 it	would	 be	 interesting	 to	 learn	 if	 and	 how	 the	 many	 ambivalences	 that	 emerge	 are	included	in	such	concepts.		I	have	shown	that	many	people	are	disappointed	by	the	state	and	by	politicians	but	still	believe	 in	 the	 state	 and	 in	 democracy.	 They	 struggle	 to	 find	 a	 political	 space	 to	make	their	voices	heard.	It	would	be	interesting	to	analyse	these	discourses	from	a	historical	perspective	in	India	or	other	democratic	states.	Last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 peculiar	 role	 of	 land	 deserves	 further	 attention.	 Why	 is	 the	unequal	distribution	of	land	a	non-issue	for	many	of	the	groups	I	studied?	Why	has	land	become	so	important	for	the	rich	farmers	and	corporations,	while	the	poor	feel	unable	to	 use	 it	 profitably	 for	 agricultural	 cultivation?	 It	 would	 be	 extremely	 interesting	 to	study	 this	 in	 the	 context	 of	 India’s	 role	 in	 the	 global	 rush	 for	 land,	 as	 the	 country	 is	leasing	 land	 in	 other	 countries	 and	 continents,	 purportedly	 to	 cope	with	 coming	 food	shortages.	
8 A	Bleak	Future	Most	of	the	fieldwork	for	the	present	study	was	done	prior	to	2014.	In	2014,	the	Hindu-nationalist,	 right-wing	Bharatiya	 Janata	Party	(BJP)	won	the	national	elections	and	the	state	 elections	 in	Maharashtra.	 The	 rivalling	 Congress	 Party	 had	 ruled	 both	 India	 and	Maharashtra	for	the	last	decade	and	was	perceived	as	utterly	corrupt.	Some	movement	actors	 had	 supported	 the	 BJP	 just	 because	 they	 felt	 that	 it	 might	 do	 better	 than	 the	
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Congress.	 When	 I	 went	 back	 to	 Vidarbha	 in	 early	 2015,	 the	 movement	 actors	 were	divided	in	their	interpretation	of	this	new	government	in	relation	to	the	‘agrarian	crisis’.	In	2017,	 the	 situation	with	 regards	 to	 the	agrarian	 crisis	has	 further	deteriorated	and	protests	have	grown	big86.		
Opposing	or	Being	Co-opted?	Some	movement	actors,	namely	AIKS	and	KAA,	have	strongly	opposed	the	BJP	from	the	start	 and	 see	 their	 work	 as	 a	 bulwark	 against	 communalist	 forces.	 Activist	 Vijay	Jawandhia,	a	strong	critic,	was	quoted	in	an	article	in	the	newspaper	The	Hindu	as	saying	that	“the	BJP	is	now	totally	bypassing	the	issue	of	loan	waiver	or	MSP	 [Minimum	Support	Price]”	87.	There	are,	in	fact,	a	number	of	reasons	why	farmers	can	be	unhappy	with	the	BJP-Sena	 government.	 But	 before	 getting	 to	 that,	 I	 come	 to	 VJAS	 and	 SSS,	which	 both	became	part	of	the	BJP-Sena	government.	Kishor	Tiwari	of	VJAS,	who	had	been	openly	 supportive	of	 the	BJP,	 also	expressed	his	deep	 disappointment	with	 the	 new	 government	 in	 2015.	In	 the	 above	 article,	 he	 said	that	 “the	 BJP	 has	 backtracked	 on	 the	 assurance	 of	 loan	 waiver	 and	 considering	 higher	
MSP.	(…)	The	farmer	is	crying	for	a	bailout	package	but	there	is	no	talk	of	that.“88	A	short	while	later,	though,	he	was	named	as	chairman	of	the	Vasantrao	Naik	Sheti	Swavlamban	
Mission	and	now	also	holds	the	status	of	a	Minister	of	State.	Arguably	he	was	rewarded	for	 his	 activism,	 which	 draws	 a	 lot	 of	 media	 attention,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 his	 loyalty	 to	BJP/RSS	 forces.	 The	 Mission	 was	 set	 up	 by	 the	 government	 to	 find	 solutions	 for	 the	‘agrarian	 crisis’	 and	 suggest	 measures	 against	 the	 staggering	 numbers	 of	 farmer	suicides.	By	its	own	account,	the	mission	proposes	new	crop	loans	to	all	farmers	in	the	14	 districts	 that	 they	 are	 in	 charge	 of	 –	 “in	 a	 bid	 to	 arrest	 suicides”89.	 Even	 after	 his	appointment,	Tiwari	conceded	that	the	government’s	efforts	had	not	yielded	results.	But	according	 to	 an	 article	 in	 The	Indian	Express,	 he	 also	 promised	 that	 “we	[the	mission]	
have	 launched	 a	 number	 of	 schemes	 to	 halt	 the	 suicides	 of	 farmers	 in	Marathwada	 and	
other	parts	of	the	state.”90	In	the	present	research,	Tiwari	had	strongly	argued	using	the	three	frames	of	‘protection’,	‘self-help’	and	‘alternatives’,	while	emphasizing	strongly	the	two	 latter	ones.	Until	now,	his	 rhetoric	has	not	 changed	much	yet.	But	 since	Tiwari	 is	now	part	of	 the	government	and	 fully	stands	behind	Modi,	 it	will	be	 interesting	 to	see	how	this	develops91.		The	activists	and	 leaders	of	SSS	 in	Vidarbha	had	–	and	still	have	–	many	doubts	about	cooperating	with	 the	BJP-Sena	government	even	after	 the	2015	election.	All	 the	 same,	SSS	has	become	an	official	BJP	ally.	In	July	2016,	SSS	leader	Sadabhau	Khot	became	the																																									 																					86	See	the	 issue	“Farmers’	Revolt”	of	Frontline	(July	2017)	or	more	specifically	on	Vidarbha	see	Times	of	India	(2017)	87	Rashid	(2015)	in	the	newspaper	The	Hindu	88	Rashid	(2015)	in	the	newspaper	The	Hindu	89	See	government	homepage	http://vnss-mission.gov.in/	(accessed	2016/09/03)	90	More	(2016)	in	The	Indian	Express	91	More	(2016)	in	The	Indian	Express	
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Minister	of	State	for	agriculture,	horticulture	and	marketing	in	the	BJP-Sena	government	of	Maharashtra.	SSS	leader	Ravikanth	Tupkar	became	Maharashtra	Textile	Corporation	Chairman,	a	Minister	of	State92.	 It	will	be	 interesting	 to	see	 if	and	how	Tupkar’s	 frame	will	 change.	 In	 the	 interviews	 analysed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 Tupkar	 had	 argued	 in	 the	‘protection’	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ‘free	 market’-frame	 and	 strongly	 blamed	 the	 government,	which	 was	 at	 that	 time	 controlled	 by	 the	 Indian	 National	 Congress.	 Additionally,	Tupkar’s	 role	 in	 the	 movement	 around	 the	 ‘agrarian	 crisis’	 as	 well	 as	 the	 farmers’	perceptions	of	him	might	strongly	change	now	that	he	has	become	a	‘political	leader’.	Here,	it	is	worth	citing	from	the	suicide	note	of	a	farmer	in	Washim	who	took	his	life	in	September	2015.	He	expresses	that	“we	[kisans]	are	not	afraid	of	drought,	we	are	tired	of	
the	 rulers’	 apathy”.	 He	 is	 directly	 addressing	 the	 current	 Maharashtra	 Chief	 Minister	Devendra	 Fadnavis,	 member	 of	 BJP	 and	 RSS:	 "You	 are	 a	 highly	 educated	 leader	 from	
Vidarbha	 and	 therefore	 we	 always	 backed	 you.	 (…)	We	 believed	 you	 will	 have	 a	 better	
understanding	of	 farmers’	 issues	 in	Vidarbha.	However,	one	gets	 the	 feeling	 that	you	are	
deliberately	ignoring	their	problems.”93	How	the	new	power	constellation	with	BJP	in	the	government	 will	 change	 both	 VJAS’	 as	 well	 as	 SSS’	 mobilization	 strategies,	 and	particularly	the	farmers’	perceptions	of	them,	remains	to	be	seen.	
Deteriorating	Situation	When	 I	 talked	 to	 movement	 actors	 again	 in	 2015,	 often	 informally,	 most	 were	disappointed	 or	 even	 terrified	 by	 these	 new	 political	 developments.	 On	 a	 discursive	level,	many	movement	 actors’	 demands	 and	 arguments	 rely	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 united	peasantry	 and	 therefore	 indirectly	 risk	 contributing	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 such	 communalist	forces.	 But	 on	 the	 level	 of	 actual	 policies	 there	 are	 many	 reasons	 for	 the	 movement	actors	to	be	disappointed.		First,	 the	 climate	 for	 political	 activism	 outside	 Hindu-nationalist	 organisations	 of	 the	
sangh	parivar	is	becoming	harsher.	Many	activists	–	even	those	who	still	supported	the	BJP	 to	 some	 extent	 –	 reported	 their	 deep	 concern	 over	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 violence	coming	from	communalist	forces.	At	the	time	of	my	last	visit,	Communist	Party	of	India	leader	Govind	Pansare	was	shot	in	the	Maharashtrian	city	of	Kolhapur	and	died	from	his	injuries.	 Activists	 and	 leaders	 all	 expressed	 their	 solidarity	 with	 him	 and	 strongly	opposed	 this	 violence	 by	 organising	 agitations	 and	 strikes.	 In	 their	 eyes,	 the	 violence	was	 directed	 against	 social	 activists	 per	 se	 and	was	 coming	 from	 a	 Hindu-nationalist	direction.	An	activist	 from	 the	 left	 (AIKS)	detailed	 the	 repression	against	 activists	 and	worsening	of	the	farmers’	situation.	Then	he	said	that	the	motivation	of	people	to	fight	and	participate	in	the	movement	would	also	become	stronger	these	days.	And	that	there	was	still	hope.		Second,	farmers’	dreams	of	a	profitable	agriculture	were	dealt	a	further	blow.	Narendra	Modi,	now	the	Prime	Minister	of	India,	construed	himself	as	a	farmer-friendly	politician																																									 																					92	See	government	homepage	http://www.mstc.co.in	(accessed	2016/09/03) 93	Lokhande	(2015)	in	the	newspaper	dna,	news	website	Rediff	(2015)	
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during	the	election	campaign.	Many	activists	said	they	had	supported	Modi	because	he	promised	 during	 rallies	 in	 Maharashtra	 to	 give	 better	 prices	 to	 the	 farmers	 and	guarantee	 them	 50%	 profit.	 Movement	 actors	 said	 that	 Modi	 has	 even	 given	 this	promise	 in	writing	 in	 a	 letter	 to	Maharashtrian	 SSS	 leader	Raju	 Shetti.	 In	 the	 budgets	since	 the	 elections,	 Modi’s	 government	 has	 broken	 these	 promises94.	 Once	 in	 power,	Modi	 dissolved	 the	 National	 Planning	 Commission	 and	 replaced	 it	 by	 the	 National	Institution	 for	Transforming	 India	 (NITI)	Commission.	With	 this,	 he	dissolved	 the	one	institution	that	could	to	some	extent	satisfy	the	demands	of	the	movement	groups	for	a	remunerative	 price.	 That	 move	 made	 it	 clear	 once	 more	 that	 the	 government	 is	supporting	the	advancement	of	the	neoliberalization	of	agriculture	and	the	withdrawal	of	the	state.		The	 newspaper	 The	Hindu	 reported	 that	 in	 the	 2015	 season,	 the	 prices	 the	 farmers	earned	were	 significantly	 lower	 than	 the	 year	 before,	 both	 the	MSPs	 and	 the	market	prices.	 Additionally,	 the	 yields	 were	 short	 of	 expectations.	 In	 2017,	 the	 yields	 were	rather	high	 in	many	areas,	but	demonetisation	policies95	of	 the	Modi	government	have	affected	farmers	disastrously.	They	caused	prices	to	plummet	and	the	rural	economy	to	fall	in	a	state	of	panic96.	In	response	to	these	developments,	the	BJP-led	Maharashtra	and	other	state	governments	announced	several	relief	packages	including	loan	waivers.	But	many	farmers	are	not	even	entitled	to	such	loan	waivers97.		The	third	point	 is	 land.	Before	2014,	many	movement	actors	said	that	 land	was	not	an	issue	for	them.	They	even	said	that	the	profit	from	agriculture	for	small	farmers	would	be	 so	 small	 that	 labourers	would	 be	 even	 better	 off	 than	 landowning	 farmers.	 But	 in	2015,	 land	had	become	the	most	 important	 issue.	The	reason	is	the	new	government’s	Land	 Bill	 (i.e.	 the	 Right	 to	 Fair	 Compensation	 and	 Transparency	 in	 Land	 Acquisition,	Rehabilitation	 and	 Resettlement	 (Amendment)	 Bill	 2015).	 This	 bill	 severely	 cuts	 the	rights	of	landowners	when	the	government	or	private	entities	want	to	acquire	land	for	industrial	projects	or	infrastructure	projects,	including	public-private	partnerships	(see	section	3.2,	chapter	VI).	The	movement	actors	in	Vidarbha	were	enraged	about	this	new	act	 and	 organized	 protests.	 This	 shows	 that	 land	 is	 still	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 rural	wealth,	 or	 at	 least	 that	 it	 stands	 between	 farmers	 and	 even	 more	 severe	 levels	 of	poverty.	Movement	actors	reasoned	that	until	now,	the	government	just	refused	to	pay	remunerative	 prices	 and	 allowed	 dispossession	 by	 debt	 to	 intensify.	 But	 now	 the	government	has	even	got	the	right	to	take	their	land.	Land	that	was	all	they	still	had	to	support	themselves.		
																																								 																					94	See	Panwar	(2015)	in	the	magazine	Frontline,	Rashid	(2015)	in	the	newspaper	The	Hindu	95	On	8th	November	2016,	the	Government	of	India	announced	the	immediate	demonetisation	of	all	Rs	500	 and	Rs	1000	banknotes.	This	meant	 that	 four	hours	 after	 this	 announcement,	 these	banknotes	 became	 invalid.	 In	 the	 days	 following	 the	 demonetisation,	 the	 country	 faced	 severe	cash	shortages	with	severe	detrimental	effects	across	the	economy.		96	See	Ramakrishnan	and	Tripathi	(2017)	in	Frontline	97	See	Katakam	(2015)	in	the	magazine	Frontline	
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In	2017,	 these	developments	have	worsened	again	and	considerably.	The	political	and	social	 climate	 is	 becoming	 even	 harsher.	 An	 important	 case	 in	 point	 is	 the	 increasing	violence	 against	 dalits	 that	 too	 often	 goes	 unpunished.	 Connecting	 to	 the	 last	 point	above,	it	is	crucial	to	note	that	a	high	number	of	these	attacks	on	dalits	happen	because	of	land	conflicts,	i.e.	when	dalits	acquire	land	and	their	ownership	is	disputed	by	upper	caste	villagers.	Land	therefore,	is	a	hot	issue	also	in	these	conflicts98.	Then,	large	regions	of	India	faced	a	severe	drought	in	2016	after	two	consecutive	years	of	weak	monsoons	and	a	drought	in	2012.	Within	Maharashtra	28,000	villages	were	affected;	Marathwada	and	Western	Vidarbha	were	particularly	 troubled99.	When	 the	monsoons	 finally	 came,	they	 came	 late	 and	were	 so	 excessive	 that	 in	 several	 parts	 of	Maharashtra,	 the	 lower	lands	 faced	 flood-like	situations	–	also	 in	Vidarbha100.	The	drought	and	 its	devastating	effects	 on	 many	 farmers	 is	 surely	 a	 combination	 of	 human-made	 and	 natural	disasters101.	 But	 the	 difficult	 situation	 has	 been	 exacerbated	 by	 certain	 measures,	including	demonetisation	and	the	ban	on	the	sale	of	cattle	for	slaughter	in	Maharashtra.	In	 addition	 to	 the	 many	 other	 –	 often	 violent	 –	 impacts,	 this	 ban	 threatens	 to	 push	farmers	into	deepening	distress.	Prices	of	cattle	have	fallen	drastically.	Farmers	who	are	in	trouble	due	to	bad	harvests	often	need	to	sell	their	animals.	They	might	need	to	sell	them	to	get	money	to	survive,	or	because	they	can	no	longer	feed	or	water	the	animals.	Farmers	used	to	sell	their	cattle	in	a	drought	year	to	butchers	and	buy	new	ones	when	their	 earnings	 rose	 after	monsoon.	 If	 that	 cycle	 is	 broken,	 it	 leaves	 farmers	with	 little	money	to	buy	inputs	for	the	next	agricultural	season.102		A	 farmer	 who	 committed	 suicide	 in	 1997	 wrote	 in	 his	 suicide	 note:	 “I	 wish	 the	
government	paid	attention	to	our	woes”103.	Now,	nearly	twenty	years	later,	many	farmers	feel	 that	 the	 government	 is	 still	 not	 listening.	 In	2014,	 the	BJP	very	 successfully	 ran	 a	“high-pitched	 Assembly	 election	 campaign	 against	 the	 Congress-NCP	 regime	 on	 farm	
suicides”104.	As	a	reaction	to	accusations	that	this	government	is	not	easing	the	farmers’	plight	 either,	 the	 Maharashtra	 government	 issued	 more	 relief	 packages	 and	 ordered	another	survey	to	find	the	reasons	for	the	suicides105	–	as	if	those	were	not	sufficiently	known	already.	At	the	same	time,	the	farmer	suicides	and	the	talk	about	them	finds	no	end.	 In	 the	 whole	 of	 2015,	 3228	 farmers	 across	 Maharashtra	 –	 mostly	 Vidarbha	 and	Marathwada	–	committed	suicide.	This	is	the	highest	number	since	2001106.																																										 																					98	According	 to	 different	 newspaper	 articles	 based	 on	 official	 data	 (Mishra	 2016	 in	The	Week,	Namala	2016	in	The	Indian	Express,	Couderé	2016	in	The	Diplomat)	99	Article	in	The	Indian	Express	(2016a),	and	The	Guardian	(2016b)	100	Article	in	The	Indian	Express	(2016b)	101	Sharma	(2016)	in	The	Huffington	Post	or	most	famously	Sainath	(1996)	102	Jadhav	(2016)	in	Reuters,	Biswas	(2016)	in	The	Indian	Express	and	Rashid	(2016)	in	The	Hindu	103	Blog	of	the	journalist	Jaideep	Hardikar	(2015)	104	Rashid	(2015)	in	The	Hindu	105	See	Rashid	(2015)	in	The	Hindu	106	Deshpande	(2016)	in	The	Hindu	
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Farmers’	revolt?	In	 2017,	 the	 situation	 has	 deteriorated	 fast	 and	 the	 farmers'	 frustrations	 about	 the	current	 government	 are	 deep.	 Indeed,	 large-scale	 protests	 started	 in	 June	 in	 different	places	 of	 the	 country,	 including	 Vidarbha.	 The	 protests	 include	 assemblies,	 marches,	blockades	and	strikes,	i.e.	refusal	to	commence	cultivation	or	to	deliver	their	produce	to	the	markets107.	AIKS	 is	strongly	advocating	these	protests	 in	Maharashtra,	cooperating	with	many	other	groups.	Also	SSS	leader	Raju	Shetti	is	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	protest,	now	publicly	repenting	for	having	enlisted	farmers’	support	for	BJP108.		It	 is	 too	 early	 to	 know	what	 further	 emerges	 from	 this	 farmers’	 revolt.	 Based	 on	my	study,	I	do	see	two	reasons	for	hope	for	the	case	of	Vidarbha.	One	reason	is	the	diversity	of	 farmers’	 voices	 that	manifest	 in	 a	 heterogeneous	movement	 and	 the	many	 creative	ways	 of	 resistance.	 They	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 serve	 as	 one	 cornerstone	 of	 a	 larger	movement,	 of	 larger	 associations	 to	 emerge.	 Second,	 the	 policy	 assault	 of	 the	 new	government	 on	 agriculture,	 land	 and	 on	 other	 social	 issues	 is	 so	 big	 that	 it	 triggered	larger	mobilisation	of	rural	people,	 including	farmers,	on	several	occasions.	This	raises	the	hope	that	in	coming	days,	movement	actors	may	see	a	heightened	need	to	cooperate	and	include	different	interests.	May	be	one	or	more	of	the	frames	laid	out	in	this	thesis	may	spread	and	become	more	amenable	to	others,	thereby	hinting	at	bigger	movements.	I	 believe	 that	 activists	 and	 activist-scholars	 in	 India	 and	 elsewhere	 will	 and	 can	contribute	 to	 struggles	 against	 above-mentioned	 developments	 –	 be	 it	 neoliberal	capitalist	policies	or	the	rise	of	communalist	right-wing	forces.	I	am	optimistic	that	the	activists	and	farmers	in	Vidarbha	will	creatively	continue	to	resist	the	forces	that	exploit	them	and	fight	for	what	is	worth	fighting	for.		 	
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X. Annex	
1 Interview	guidelines	supporters	
Topic	 Entry	 Points	to	be	touched	/	underlying	
assumptions	
Profile:		
	
- Name	
- Age	
- Education	
- Family	members	in	this	household	
- Main/alternative	income	sources	
- How	many	animals	
- How	many	acres	à	irrigated	or	rain-fed	
- Religion/caste		
	
Please	tell	me	about	
your	agricultural	
activities.		
- What	crops	do	you	grow?	
o Do	you	have	good	yields?	à	Why?	
o Do	you	get	good	prices	for	your	crops?	à	Why?	
o Do	you	hire	any	labourers?	
- Is	it	the	same	for	your	neighbours	/	other	villagers?	
- Has	it	changed	in	the	recent	years?		
- This	is	a	district	where	many	peasants	commit	suicide.		
o What	do	you	think	about	this?		
o Why	do	they	do	that?	
- Main	problems	(prices,	hunger,	employment,	oppression…)	
- Change	over	time	
- Reasons	(state,	market,	system…)	
Do	you	think	
anything	can	be	
done	about	this?	
Who	could	help	you?		
- According	to	the	answers	above		
- Who	is	responsible	for	this	situation?	Why?	How?	
- Where	do	you	go	if	you	have	problems,	need	support?	
- Do	you	think	that	your	situation	can	change	in	future?		
o Why?	How?	By	whom?	
Solutions	in	short	run	(what,	who)	Parties,	NGOs…	Micro	public	spheres		
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Are	you	part	of	a	
group	or	do	you	join	
any	activities?	Why	
(not)?	
- Do	you	know	about	any	groups	or	leaders	or	parties	that	try	to	help	you?	
o How	did	you	get	to	know	them?		
o What	do	you	think	about	them?		
o What	do	they	do?		
o Do	they	work	together?	Why?	
- Do	you	take	part	in	any	of	these	groups?		
o Why?	Why	this	particular	group?	
o Since	when?	
o What	exactly	do/did	you	do?		
o How	much	time	do	you	spend	in	these	activities?	
o (How)	do	you	try	to	convince	others	to	participate?	
o How	can	you	profit?	Any	successes	of	the	movement?	
- Do	you	know	anybody	(else)	who	is	part?	
o Why	are	they	part?	
o (Why	you	not?)	
o Women?	
o Labour?	
o Small/middle/large	peasants?	
Political	parties,	rallies…	Part	because	of?	
- tradition	
- personal	contacts	
- family	
- conviction		Not	part	because?	
- No	hope,	opportunities	
- Leader	
- Time,	money…	
- Other	groups	(caste	identity)		Strategies	to	convince	them?	
What	is	your	vision	
about	development?	
- If	you	could	choose,	what	would	you	do	for	a	living?	
o If	prices	for	agriculture	would	be	higher,	would	you	like	to	stay	a	peasant	/	in	the	village?	
- If	you	were	CM	of	Maharashtra,	how	would	Buldhana/Yavatmal/Wardha	look	like	in	10	years?	What	would	you	do?	
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2 Interview	guidelines	activists	
Topic	 Entry	 Points	to	be	touched	/	underlying	
assumptions	
Can	you	tell	me	about	your	group,	about	
who	is	in	your	group,	what	your	strategies	
are?	
- What	are	your	current	activities?		
- How	do	you	implement	this?	What	do	you	do	day	after	day?	
- How	do	you	communicate	with	the	peasants?	
- With	whom	are	you	in	contact?	How?	Media?	
- Do	you	coordinate	your	activities	with	other	groups?	Why	(not)?	
- Active,	passive	
- Other	groups	(collaborators,	opponents,	reasons)	
- Rallies,	demonstrations…	
- Negotiations,	litigations…	
- Media	(who,	how)	
- Successes	
Why	is	it	that	some	peasants	are	part	of	
your	group,	others	are	difficult	to	
mobilise?	
- Who	is	coming	to	your	events?	Why?	
- Who	do	you	want	to	come?	
- Do	you	think	other	groups	are	more	successful?	Why?			
- Members,	supporters	(gender,	caste,	class,	region)	
- 	Part	because	of?	
- tradition	
- personal	contacts	
- family	
- conviction	
- 	How	to	reach	them,	keep	in	touch	Not	part	because?	
- No	hope,	opportunities	
- Leader	
- Time,	money…	
- Other	groups	(caste	identity)	
- Strategies	to	convince	them?	
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Is	it	difficult	to	win	other	people	for	your	
cause	(e.g.	government	officials,	journalists	
or	urban	people)?	
- Whom	do	you	tell	about	the	problems	of	the	peasants?	
- How	do	you	make	them	listen?	
- How	do	they	react	to	you?	
- Some	people	say,	that	having	such	a	small	peasant	basis	is	not	enough	to	speak	in	the	name…	
- Why	did	you	personally	decide	to	get	involved	with	the	rural	poor?	
- State	(who,	how)	
- Media	(who,	how)	
- Urban	people	
- International	groups	
Please	 tell	 me	 about	 the	 situation	 of	 the	
rural	people	of	Vidarbha	
- How	would	Vidarbha	look	like	in	10	years	if	you	were	in	power?			End:	ask	about	the	basic	data	of	the	group	and	the	person,	if	not	mentioned	already.	
- Main	problems	(prices,	hunger,	employment,	oppression)	
- Change	over	time	
- Reasons	(state,	market,	system)	
- Solutions	in	short	run	(what,	who)	
